TRANSCRIPT

McFaul: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of FSI.

Today I'm sharing a conversation I had with Gabrielius Landsbergis. He is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and he is currently here at the Freeman Spogli Institute as our Bernard and Susan Liataud Visiting Fellow.

Gabrielius has an extremely impressive resume, and we can't go through it all right now, but he's been instrumental in pursuing a values-based foreign policy in Lithuania and the European Union. He is also one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine, Taiwan, and freedom fighters worldwide.

We had the opportunity to discuss not just the diplomatic and political ramifications for Europe of Russia's war against Ukraine, but also the emotional journey this war has had for many people in Lithuania, including Gabrielius.

This was a very unique, often poignant conversation, and I hope you'll take away as much from it as I did.

[BEGIN EVENT RECORDING]

Before we get into the questions that I have that we agreed to talk about, I first just want to get your explanation of the title of this talk. It's an interesting title. Why did you choose it?

Landsbergis: Well, first of all, it's a great honor to be here, to speak to the people who are interested in the topic of Ukraine, that's mainly at the core of it, and the war that's ongoing.

I'm really honored to be at Stanford for the year. Thank you so much for kind words. It makes me blush every time.

When I was thinking about the topic, I was thinking for the first time as a bit of an observer.

McFaul: Because you used to be a participant.

Landsbergis: Yeah, it felt like one. So, the war started in 2022 when I was a minister. I was fully in my office when I got the news. I was supposed to travel to Kyiv the same day, February 24th; I had a ticket to go to Kyiv.

McFaul: Really?

Landsbergis: Yeah. I went to the airport and the flight was canceled at 5 a.m. And I called the chief of staff of the Lithuanian Army and they said, this is it. This has started.

So the opportunity to travel to California to stay at Stanford allowed me a step back. Even though my mind is fully with the people who are fighting for their country—basically that takes all my thinking time throughout the day—but still one has an ability to reflect.

And what I reflected is that there is an amplitude of emotion when we observe the war. It started with a shock, with the first sights of burning buildings in Kyiv, Russians crossing the borders and just flowing in, like really existential threats.

Then it was changed with some sort of a relief or even a joy that Ukrainians were able to push back. Then it picked up when the counter-offensive started and when Ukrainians started pushing Russians out. I've seen people who are like watching this as if they were winning. We were winning. This was part of our victory. It felt as if any one of us could go to the front and help Ukrainians just to finish this off and restore the normality, restore something that we were afraid that we were losing.

And then it was changed again. The first signals that the West is unable to support to the extent that is needed. Russia threatening with a nuclear (possible) nuclear strike. The West taking it very seriously [and] stopping Ukrainians moving forward. And then the question, okay, so what's next?

And then when I came back here, the information that reached us was that the one that Ukrainians developed new weapons. They've developed long range missiles. They developed the ability to strike deep within Russian territory. Apparently the allies have removed the restrictions on the strikes and Ukrainians have been very successful with that.

So the first thing that I would do: I open whatever social media I'm using that day and one of the first messages there is, “New factory is burning.” It's like, oof, okay, so we still have cards. We're in this and it's not over. Even though it was said in the Oval Office that that's it, Ukraine has no cards. We do have cards. And “we” as those people who are deeply supportive of Ukraine.

And then came Alaska, now the peace plan. And again, we're over the hill and down to valley, so to say, of emotions.

So I was thinking about this trajectory because there is a lot of emotion into this. So how do we deal with that? How do we stay on the line? How do we explain to ourselves where Ukraine actually is, what actually needs to be done, and how we can continue supporting despite what the headlines are telling us today? So we don't give in to overjoy that, Okay, this is won, this is fine, like we did in late 2022.

Or we don't give in to despair like it happened a number of times when the front is breaking or one important point on the front line is being lost.

McFaul: Step back for a minute and talk about not emotions, but objectives. To the best of your knowledge and guessing—these are difficult things to establish—what are today, Russia's interests and objectives in the war? What about Europe? What is your assessment of American interests? I'm kind of curious what you think about that because I'm not quite sure what they are. And maybe they're self-evident, but I don't think they are: maybe say a little bit about what you think Ukrainian objectives are today.

And as you go through that list—and maybe add China too if you want; I think that could be interesting to hear your view on China—and as you do so, also do you think they've changed over time? Most certainly the American objectives seem to have changed with our election, but maybe not. I don't want to presume that I know that. Or have they been consistent over time since the full-scale invasion began?

Landsbergis: So first of all, think that one country that has not in no way changed their objectives is Russia. Their objective is subjugation of Ukraine or Ukrainian country. Full control, either physical or political control, any way they can exert it. That might require them conquering the whole country. That might require just creating enough instability so that the country is ungovernable and would be basically then controlled in a similar way like, for example, Georgia now is. Russians did not need tanks to take Tbilisi; they managed to do that in a different form. Even though people are still protesting there, the country is ruled basically by a Russian proxy. 

So, this is still their goal. It could be political. It could be that Putin's mandate, the way that he structured his mandate, why people do support him, why his circle of oligarchs continues to support him is because he can bring victories. And this is still required and he still has this goal. 

But there is also a practical element in this. I try to imagine if there would be a ceasefire signed between Ukrainians and Russians. Just imagine: 2,000 kilometers of frontline. 2,000 kilometers is like half of Europe from Vilnius, from Lithuania's capital, all the way to Amsterdam. That's how much frontline there is.

So to maintain a ceasefire on that extensive frontline, you basically have to have an enormous amount of trust that the other side will not counter attack. I very much doubt that Putin has that trust on Ukrainians and vice versa, right? So both sides will be forced to keep and maintain the force presence on a frontline just in order to make sure that the frontline is not moving. And Ukrainians have showed that they're capable with Belgorod.

It's almost couple of years ago when they crossed the Russian border and attacked a Russian territory, taking a bit of Russian Federation as a leverage for the possible upcoming negotiations. So, Ukrainians show that they have the capacity.

Thinking about that, Putin will have to maintain about a million peoples army, as much as he has now, on the front line to make sure that the front does not progress. Or he needs Kyiv. So, that's why I believe that in his mind, a ceasefire will not work.

And that's why he was pushing back on American efforts to offer a ceasefire. When President Trump suggested that, he said, well, I need a comprehensive peace agreement with everything that I set out to achieve. This is what I need. And the reason is it could be very practical because the ceasefire will just not work. He will never trust Ukrainians. And he doesn't want to maintain troops. If he wants to let troops do something else, attack another country, turn back home, whatever that he has on his mind, he needs Kyiv where he wants that.

So whatever comes out of any talks now, I'm pretty convinced that Russians have not moved with their goals. And they believe that they're successful with that. That's number one.

So I will jump over to Europe. Europe is developing its goals. My biggest criticism of Europe that we've set out to support Ukraine without a clear plan as to what we want to achieve. Like, what is our goal?

Do we want to stop Russians? Do we want to push them back? Do we want Ukraine to win? Do we want to restore the deterrence of the European continent with European Union on one side, but allies kind of also in this hold? What is our plan? So we paid up without knowing what we are buying.

So we bought some time. With a lot of money, we bought some time. We bought four years. But we have not developed a strategy. The reason could have been is that we've outsourced the strategic thinking over to the other side of the Atlantic.

We said, “Okay, fine, we'll pay the bill. There are people in Washington who will know how this should end. We might not like it, but we still trust that it's probably the best outcome.” And that has been happening through with the previous administration, where Jake Sullivan was the one saying the strategic defeat of Russia is in the transatlantic goal. Again, that was the only time that I heard somebody suggesting a strategy.

With the change of administration, there is no longer a strategy. And Europe is now figuring out that we have to have something. That's why you see Europeans scrambling for money. Because we don't have a plan for next year. And the only way to have a plan for next year is to have something we could finance it with.

And that's why we need frozen Russian assets. That would help us finance for next year and maybe a couple of years in the future. That is the first shape of the European strategy to Europe. I hope that it will have other steps. I'm still hoping that we have enough time.

For Ukraine, the strategy, you might say, that it has not changed fundamentally: it's to defend the sovereignty of its country. Certain elements have moved. First of all, was claiming back all the territory, 2022 autumn. Ukrainians have declared that our goal is to go all the way back to Crimea. Now this is no longer a goal. And honestly, I do understand them. They have a strategy, right? They had a strategy, but it very much depends on [if] our strategies are aligned, if we see the same way, and if we're going to help them to achieve their strategy.

Unfortunately, they were not aligned. And that means that they are unable to achieve certain goals. And Zelensky was brutally clear yesterday in his interview, suggesting that, unfortunately, the plans changed. We cannot get to NATO because there is no path for us going there. We cannot reclaim Crimea and so many other things.

I mean, it breaks my heart to listen to that. For me, it's very, very much 1938, a speech by Czechoslovakia's president saying, certain things were forced on us and we're just unable to withstand pressures from two sides. And this is where Ukraine currently is.

I could talk about China, but I mean, it will take another 20 minutes.

McFaul: Well, let’s come back to China, because they're peripheral. But you haven't seen any change in their behavior, have you?

Landsbergis: I think I do see. Many people do argue, and I participate in number of conversations where people would argue that saying, “Well, for China, they need a stable world. And they need Europe stable because it's a good client for whatever they're selling and they require stability.”

And I'm not so sure whether that's true any longer. They built up an enormous, extraordinary leverage on Russia as it is now.

When experts say that 90% of Russian military output is produced with Chinese help, either equipment or material or just produced in China, that tells me that if you remove that, Russia would be unable to fight against Ukraine, not at the extent that they are doing it currently.

So that means that China actually is invested in the war. That actually they want the war. So that raises a lot of interesting questions. So that means that instability in Europe works in their benefit.

And I mean, even in stable Europe, just the recent quarter numbers, German imports of Chinese goods has risen by 14% in just the last three months. That's biggest in the world. So even unstable Europe is a rather good client.

McFaul: So they have their cake and eat it, too.

Landsbergis: Yeah. And they are probably getting other cakes that we can only kind of try to imagine or I mean, try to understand what those are. One of them [is] building up a leverage on Russia where you can call the credit back either in Indo-Pacific or actually keeping Europe occupied. I mean “busy.”

McFaul: Talk a little bit about the U.S. and the piece that you wrote in the New York Times and what is your analysis—I'm asking not for your opinion about what should be the U.S.—we'll get to that later. Analytically, what do you think the Trump administration is trying to achieve right now?

Landsbergis: Well, that's probably one of the most difficult questions that there is. Honestly, when the administration took over, I tried to understand, tried to read the administration's mind as a European. And there are certain elements that I do understand.

It's very difficult to explain to an American why Europe is unable, like completely unable to deter Russian attack. A continent of 450 million people, if you add United Kingdom, more than half a billion people. Probably one of the richest places in the world.

And we are seeing Ukraine, a country of 40 million people, that was able to stop Russian attacks. Or at least to slow it down significantly in order to retain its sovereignty for a number of years. And then the continent of 450 million says, “Well, unfortunately, there is nothing that we can do.”

You're unable to square this. So when we hear criticism, or at least a question like, guys, are you sure that there is nothing that you can do? I cannot answer that. I only can say, yes, there are things that we can do. We should be doing them. We should have been doing them long, long ago, probably when President Obama suggested that United States will be pivoting over to Indo-Pacific.

That was the beginning of it. This is where we should have started our rethinking of a European strategy. We did not do it. It's on us. We'll fast forward it now and we'll figure things out.

I understand that Europe has to become stronger. I understand that Europe has to find ability to deter Russian attack to help its allies and make a proposal to United States why a strong partner is a better partner.

This is the part of the strategy, the part of thinking that I understood as a strategy. Now the recent documents that have been announced, they talk about very different point of view. They talk basically about weak Europe, about divided Europe, about a Europe of Hungarys that would all look just for their own interest. No united Europe, no Europe that could be able to figure out its united budget of defense.

If this is the vision of Europe, this Europe will be purchasing Russian oil and gas the same way that Hungarians are doing. This is the Europe that will not be able to help Ukraine as much as Hungary has blocked almost all the attempts of Europe to do that. This is the Europe that will not be a good partner for United States, either deterring China or stopping Russia or basically doing anything. This is the Europe that would be susceptible to Russian attacks, that will be susceptible to Chinese interventions, economic or otherwise. The weak Europe that is suggested in the latest strategy document is a very scary perspective for Europe.

It's very difficult to understand why that would be in the interest of the United States. That's probably the most difficult question to answer. Maybe it will be explained in some way. People are trying to square the circle, and I've seen Sir Elbridge Colby trying to explain that it's still the same strategy. We still want a strong Europe.

McFaul: It wasn't in the document, though.

Landsbergis: Yeah, wasn't in the document. So, for a European, it's very difficult to understand that. It doesn't change the fact that Europe has to get its act together.

And my piece in New York Times argued that basically the way that I see is that there are things that we just cannot change in the United States, and we shouldn't be attempting that. In many ways, President Trump, for us, is a force of nature. We are not participating in the election. We won't be. We don't have a vote. So we just have to accept whatever he considers is in the interest of Americans.

But that doesn't mean that there are nothing that we can do. We can make a very good proposal to American people [to] have a strong partner in Europe. Be successful. I argue that nothing brings success as much as success. And we can do that in Ukraine. We can do that with our own defense. And kind of I have a sense that if there's something that could convince [the] U.S. administration to turn around and look differently at the European Union, that would be us becoming stronger.

McFaul: Well, I agree with you, by the way. And I am an American; I do get to vote, unlike you. 

And I do think this is a debate we need to now have now that this national security strategy has put it out so baldly. I've been traveling around the country talking about my book. And in the conversations later, I sense that people like me most certainly, but maybe also Europe needs to make the case— I'm just restating what you said, but in a more America-centric way—about why Europe is so good for us. I think we've taken advantage of that and we've forgotten what the arguments were, kind of original purposes.

But come back just for a moment on the Ukraine part. What do you think this latest rounds of negotiations are they trying to achieve? What's the outcome they desire? Is it just simply they just want to end the war and let the president say he ended the war? Or is there something bigger at stake?

Landsbergis: You mean U.S. effort?

McFaul: U.S.effort, yes.

Landsbergis: I'm thinking that probably for some in the current administration, the war in Europe is a distraction. It’s a distraction for what's really happening in the Indo-Pacific and the worries that are growing there.

So it's a kind of a cut loss situation. And there's no better strategy, right? This is what President Trump has always been saying. And even in yesterday's interview in Politico, he said, “Well, if Europeans do have a strategy, they should come forward with it.” And to our embarrassment is like, yeah, we have not figured that one out. So what do you expect, right?

So it's the best strategy in town. It's a horrible strategy for Ukraine. It's a horrible strategy for Europe. It basically increases the chance of Russian attack on Europe tremendously, at least from my perspective. If he's given, if he's rewarded for his attack of 2022 and 2014, that will only increase his thinking that he can continue with that. But it's on Europe

Now we need to figure out what we're going to do with it. And then in this, well, President Trump is doing what he does, right? So if you don't have a better plan, that's my plan is the only one that I have.

So Russia’s not in good place with this. U.S. basically is just . . . I usually call that a shift, shifting from Europe, from European security area, wider security area, meaning that it's larger than just NATO. And Ukrainians are basically cornered with very little things that they can do. 

I've heard, again, it was written out that Zelenskyy spoke with the European leaders, and he said that he's extremely worried that if Europeans will not figure out the frozen assets. That's basically the last thread for Ukrainians. If that gets figured out, then Ukrainians get in a stronger position. Then they have a lifeline, know, some more runway for two, three years to figure things out. If they don't have that, then this is it.

McFaul: That debate, in my view, is so tragic. I run an international working group on Russian sanctions, and we’ve published 23 papers on how to increase sanctions over the last three and half years.

In October of 2022 was when we published a paper about these assets. We're still debating these things. That just doesn't seem strategic to me.

And this thing that you've talked about before, that we're constantly worried about escalation from Putin And you noted that the biggest moment was in the fall of 2022 when allegedly he threatened to use nuclear weapons. But then we do so many things that I just don't think are in our own national interest.

So you've hinted at this, but I want to hear you one more time on your sense of, even more emotionally, to use the title of the talk, of the sense inside Ukraine. Your colleagues there, what you're reading, does this feel like the valley? Obviously it is. We get that. But is it this last valley, and that they're just going to have to capitulate? Or is there other things that, I mean, the assets is one of them, maybe weapon systems that are coming on board, that you hear gives Ukrainians hope right now?

Landsbergis: Well, I've never heard Ukrainians complaining. I can tell a short story which defines the spirit of Ukraine. So that was in 2023, Vilnius was supposed to host [the] NATO summit and President Zelenskyy did a tour in the Baltic states to talk with the countries about what to expect from [the] NATO summit.

And prime minister of my country, my good friend, she invited me to participate in the meeting which she had with the president. During the meeting, she gave me the floor and I said, “Well, unfortunately, Mr. President, I'm doing the diplomatic rounds in Europe and NATO. And as an upcoming host of events in Vilnius, there are not too many things that I can promise. And if there is a saying about the glass being half full or half empty, my glass is almost empty, preparing for NATO summit.”

And I meant that most of the promises or belief that they had, the invitation coming over or, something substantial being announced . . . it's just not happening. There's just too many divisions within the alliance.

And Zelenskyy reacted in a very Zelenskyy way. He took his bottle of water and said, “Do you want me to pour you some?” And this is what Ukraine has always been.

I've been fourteen times in Kyiv after the war started.

McFaul: Fourteen times?

Landsbergis: Yeah.

McFaul: Wow.

Landsbergis: And every time I go over there, I said, I'm really depressed. I mean, this is looking so bad. And they're like, no, it's not that bad. We're fighting. Donbas has not fallen. Kyiv is standing. And now they're saying we're fighting corruption. Bad guys lose. We still have a hold of it.

I mean, it's incredible. It's incredible. If you want to lift your spirits, just talk to a Ukrainian. They will tell you the most horrible stories that they're undergoing, and they will still be upbeat. That kept me up and lifted me up and never allowed me to get into despair.

And today is exactly the same story. Yeah, the allies betray. Some of them walk away. Some of them change their attitudes. But nothing has been lost yet. That is their attitude. I'm pretty sure that they are. And it actually there is a political element to this.

So when people are saying, well, Zelensky can just give Donbas and let it go. Ukraine is a democracy. And that means that the president is mandated, very strongly, democratically mandated by its people. And people do not believe that they should be letting the territories that are not under Russian occupation go.

And these are the civil society, the so-called Maidan people who are still very much there, who walked over to the streets last summer during the war protesting against the reform of the anti-corruption agencies and told the government, you cannot do that. We're against this. And [the] president retracted.

These are the frontline warriors who spent decades in the front line digging in, fortifying the cities in Donbas. And I don't imagine them letting that go. And they mandate, democratically, the president. So, and when Zelenskyy says, “People will not allow me to do that,” this is not a way to politically get away from a pressure. That's a reality. His political mandate does not allow him to do that.

And this is what upsets me when the Coalition of the Willing meets, takes a picture and suggests, well, we're talking about security guarantees. Ukraine can mostly depend on Ukrainians. This is their thinking. This is not a way to do it. Ukraine needs true commitment. Ukraine needs Western commitment, no longer just words.

If we want to make sure that this peace holds, that the Russians don't attack, that we have to tell Putin that the next time you attack, you are going to meet, like President Macron suggested, French troops in Odessa, Polish troops in Kyiv, Lithuanian troops together with Poles and German air force, whoever is willing to give their equipment or people for the cause.

That is the statement that Ukrainians want and I'm pretty sure that this is the thing that is required. Are Europeans ready to do that? Well, I have not yet seen the signals that would encourage me.

McFaul: Well, that's a downer note in the valley of emotions, just like you said. But I want to end on an optimistic note.

As an American who believes that my country is stronger and more secure and prosperous and free with strong European allies, it's one thing to like debate these things abstractly when you've never been to Europe. But when you meet leaders like Gabrielius, how can you not be inspired about a future with guys like him in power in Europe? That's a world I want to be a part of. And that's why I'm so grateful that you're here with us at Stanford today.

Landsbergis: Thank you.

McFaul: Thank you!

[END EVENT RECORDING]

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts, to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

This commentary first appeared in The Diplomat magazine.

In March 2025, one of the authors vividly observed hundreds of thousands of people filling downtown Seoul over President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment. Reminiscent of the “candlelight protests” of 2017 but with greater intensity, these rallies began after the short-lived martial law declaration of last December, with some demanding Yoon’s immediate removal from office and others denouncing it as illegitimate. Even after the Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision to impeach him on April 4, rival protests continued through the June 3 snap elections.

Such rallies were hardly unprecedented in South Korea, given its rich history of civic engagement in politics. However, in the context of Yoon’s martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment, the protests illustrated a fragile democracy divided against itself. In fact, Yoon had justified his action as a necessary measure to remove “anti-state forces” in the face of the intensifying political fight with opposition forces, which controlled South Korea’s legislature throughout Yoon’s presidency.

Public opinion polls and election outcomes show how deeply divided the nation has been. A 2022 Pew survey found that 83 percent of South Koreans believed there were strong partisan conflicts, the highest among all 19 countries surveyed. Recent election results reflected such societal and political division. Yoon’s razor-thin 2022 victory over Lee Jae-myung and Lee’s narrow win in the 2025 snap election revealed a nation split down the middle.

In addition, mass protests, largely associated with progressives, have become common for conservatives too and spilled from plazas to online platforms. Politics has turned into “culture wars” and competing claims to be representative of “the people,” provoking moral charges and emotional responses. Polarization now cuts across gender and generational lines beyond political and ideological divisions of the past, standing alongside illiberalism and populism as a core threat to Korean democracy.

Continue reading via The Diplomat >

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Overview & Contribution:

Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele calls himself the “world’s coolest dictator,” which may be an apt title given his social media savviness, backwards baseball caps, and concerted efforts to undermine democracy. While Bukele has enjoyed widespread popularity for his success in crushing El Salvador’s gangs, this has come at a high cost. Thousands of innocent Salvadorans have been imprisoned without due process as Salvadoran streets become ever more militarized. The “Bukele model” has been emulated by a number of Latin American leaders with authoritarian ambitions, which will likely complicate international efforts to isolate the Salvadoran government. Can Bukele continue to consolidate his personal power and popular support? 

In “Does the Bukele Model Have a Future?” Beatriz Magaloni and Alberto Díaz-Cayeros argue that the Salvadoran state’s apparent strength sits atop an extremely fragile foundation: Bukele’s crime policy has successfully improved physical security for some while failing to deliver social and economic gains for El Salvador’s increasingly vulnerable citizenry. As the country’s economic situation worsens, Bukele’s support will decline, likely increasing his reliance on repression. The article is informed by original interview data, which illustrates how dire the situation for ordinary Salvadorans has become both inside and outside of the country’s notorious prisons. 

The reader comes away somewhat optimistic that Bukele’s authoritarianism cannot remain popular indefinitely. And although El Salvador has largely evaded international pressure, this could change, for example, after the United States’ 2028 elections. At the same time, domestic efforts to push back against Bukele and his anti-democratic legacy will surely be difficult. The authors predict that Bukele will alternate between moments of popularity, episodes of repression, and external challenges.

The Bukele Model and Its Pitfalls:

Bukele is perhaps best known for his war on crime, which followed his unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with and make concessions to gang leaders. Although Bukele took office at a time when homicide rates had declined considerably, crime has sharply declined during his tenure. Yet El Salvador now enjoys the world’s highest incarceration rate by more than double the next highest country. Bukele has consolidated significant executive power, firing Supreme Court justices and pressuring his opponents via armed military and police incursions into the legislature.

The authors conducted interviews with formerly incarcerated Salvadoreans to better understand how the Bukele model has been experienced both inside and outside of prison. Interviewees report that ordinary people are incentivized to provide information (whether true or false) that leads to arrests because of the cash rewards offered. As the country’s economy worsens, these practices have led to a mushrooming of innocent arrests. Although international observers have tended to focus on human rights abuses in El Salvador’s CECOT prison, the conditions in more peripheral prisons are even more harrowing. As the authors report,

Upon entry, detainees are frequently subjected to a violent initiation ritual involving beatings by multiple prison guards…leav[ing] many prisoners with severe physical injuries…once confined…basic human needs such as rest, sanitation, breathable air, food, and water were denied. Some people…reported guards throwing tear gas into their cells and banging repeatedly on cell bars throughout the night…[they] described cells as so overcrowded that they were often forced to sleep in rotations: one half lying on the floors, with their neighbors’ feet pressed against their faces, while the remainder stood waiting for their turn.

A worrying consequence of Bukele’s rise is the diffusion and emulation of his “model” across the hemisphere. For example, Honduras and Ecuador have implemented states of emergency and deployed the military against domestic gangs, citing Bukele as inspiration. Javier Milei’s cabinet has used Bukele’s alleged success as a justification for undermining judicial autonomy in Argentina. Even Costa Rica — one of Latin America’s most stable democracies — built a CECOT-inspired prison and has witnessed growing support for strongman rule as it faces its highest homicide rates on record.

Possible Scenarios:

The authors identify three routes that might characterize El Salvador’s politics in the coming years, none of which are mutually exclusive. A first scenario would involve support for Bukele continuing or increasing. However, given El Salvador’s economic situation, this situation is very unlikely. In places like Singapore and Kuwait, autocrats have enjoyed steady popularity because they have been able to deliver economic prosperity. Yet Bukele lacks foreign investment and world-class infrastructure, as in Singapore, and it lacks the Gulf oil monies that have been showered on Kuwaiti citizens to buy their acquiescence.

A second scenario, which the authors see as more likely, is that Bukele’s popularity declines, leading him to default to more repression and authoritarianism. This parallels Venezuela under Nicholas Maduro, where the collapse of oil prices — which had previously boosted Hugo Chávez’s popularity — coincided with growing corruption and economic precarity. As the country experienced hyperinflation, Maduro clamped down on his opponents and the media while rigging elections.

A third scenario would involve international pressure from democratic countries, such as the US and Brazil. This could at least strengthen Salvadoran opposition forces, but would not likely restore the country’s democracy to pre-Bukele levels. For the time being, much of the international community has minimized or ignored Bukele’s transgressions. For example, Bukele maintains a strong relationship with Donald Trump, and a recent U.S. State Department report downplayed Bukele’s human rights violations. Magaloni and Díaz-Cayeros show how El Salvador exemplifies the tension between genuine public approval — driven by unprecedented reductions in gang violence — and mounting authoritarianism that inspires other Latin American leaders.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Introduction and Contribution:

Authoritarian regimes are often reluctant to let their citizens leave: 79% of autocracies restrict emigration compared to only 4% of democracies. This reluctance is understandable, as migration deprives rulers of talent, resources, and implied consent to the system. Yet autocracies do change their emigration laws. What are the consequences of these changes? 

In “A Little Lift in the Iron Curtain,” Hans Lueders examines how a 1983 emigration reform in socialist East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR) affected crime rates in the country. The reform permitted about 62,500 citizens to exit the GDR over a short period of time — mostly to reunite with their families in West Germany. Lueders asks how this emigration affected crime. This is a natural outcome to consider because the former GDR, like many autocracies, used the emigration system to filter out individuals seen as criminals or  “undesirables.” Unauthorized exit was criminalized, and some citizens committed crimes precisely to signal that they should be allowed to leave.
 

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Figure 1: Consequences of the 1983 Emigration Reform
Note. This figure reports the number of first-time exit visa applications per year (gray line [Eisenfeld 1995, 202]) and annual emigration from the former GDR (black line; data collected by the author). The period after the emigration reform is emphasized.
 

Lueders shows that the effects of emigration following the 1983 reform on criminal activity depended on the type of crime. Ordinary kinds of crime — those not committed for political motifs — declined after the reform. However, border-related crimes increased sharply. This is ostensibly because those “left behind” (i.e., unable to take advantage of the 1983 reforms) resumed lawbreaking in order to pressure the regime to let them out as well. An analysis of petitions submitted to the state supports the idea that emigration raised demand for emigration.

The paper makes important contributions to our knowledge of authoritarianism and migration. For one, it shows how policies enacted to temporarily satisfy domestic or international audiences can backfire, later increasing the state’s burden. Autocrats may behave strategically in the short run, yet their choices can have powerful, unanticipated consequences in the years ahead. Otherwise, “strong” and repressive autocracies like the former GDR may struggle to address migratory pressures and be too inflexible to switch course after negative consequences become apparent. 

Safety Valves and Reform in East Germany:

Social scientists have argued that emigration policy under authoritarianism can serve as a “safety valve,” allowing or forcing the exit of those who threaten the stability of the regime. In addition, requiring citizens to apply for exit visas acts as a “screening mechanism” because applying is politically costly; those who keep applying reveal themselves to be potential troublemakers whose exit ought to be permitted. Lueders provides evidence that the costs of applying for exit visas were indeed high in the former GDR: applicants (and sometimes their families) were intimidated and harassed by secret police, expelled from universities, and demoted or fired. The state also tried to “win over” prospective emigrants, showing them reports about the allegedly dismal living conditions in West Germany or letters from East German refugees begging authorities to return to the GDR.

Importantly, officials considered how emigration would influence the GDR’s stability, looking for those who opposed the country and its socialist vision. Many applicants realized this and thus sought to publicly challenge the regime, for example, by leaving socialist mass organizations or abstaining from voting. Committing crimes thus raised one’s chances of successfully emigrating. East Germans watched peers and family members break the law to force their exit, learning that the system encouraged and rewarded criminality. 

After Germany’s division into two, many East Germans preferred the economic and political freedoms found in democratic West Germany. The government thus grew concerned: most émigrés were young and educated, and their exit undermined the GDR’s claims that it was popular and that socialism was the superior politico-economic system. Accordingly, emigration was criminalized in 1952, and the GDR began erecting physical barriers, culminating in the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Emigration plummeted to between 25,000 and 40,000 per year thereafter.

Emigration remained severely limited until the early 1980s, when international pressure — from both West Germany and the Soviet Union — to reform its emigration system began to build. Ultimately, in September 1983, the GDR conceded and recognized the right of all citizens with family abroad to apply for an exit visa. 

After the reform, exit visa applications and departures surged, the largest wave since the Berlin Wall’s construction. Emigration patterns evidenced a clear demographic shift: émigrés were less likely to be retired or to have formerly served in prison, while working-age East Germans made up 75% of emigrants, up from 49%. The state viewed this emigration wave as a welcome opportunity to get rid of criminals and political enemies. However, it underestimated the long-term consequences of offering some citizens a way out.
 

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Table 1: Comparison of Emigrants in 1983 and 1984 (January to June of each year)
 

Data and Findings:

To measure the effects of the 1983 policy on crime, Lueders presents crime data from 1976 to 89. He divides crime into “ordinary,” e.g., against state property or persons, and “political” crimes, e.g., the use of force against state officials, treason, and, importantly, illegal border crossings. Two of Lueders’ key hypotheses for our purposes are that emigration reform led to (1) a decline in ordinary crime, because the GDR effectively removed so-called troublemakers (the safety valve mechanism), and (2) a rise in border crimes, because those left behind were willing to break the law in order to exit (the demand mechanism).

The statistical analysis — consisting of comparing places with varying emigration rates — is consistent with both hypotheses. For the most part, ordinary crime declined after 1983. By contrast, border crime also initially declined, but this pattern dramatically reversed within two years. By 1987, border crimes began to rise significantly in places that had experienced a lot of emigration in the initial wave. Lueders thus provides evidence that in the short run, emigration indeed functioned as a safety valve (i.e., criminals were successfully identified). But thereafter, emigration had severe repercussions: rather than alleviating pressure on the regime, it created even greater demand for emigration — and thus more criminal activity.

A final piece of evidence comes from detailed data on petitions. The GDR encouraged citizens to communicate a range of demands and grievances to state officials, including the desire to emigrate. Lueders shows that in 1984, over 16,000 petitions were written specifically about emigration, which constituted nearly 28% of the total number of exit visa applications. And these petitions for exit visas increased substantially more in areas with above-average emigration during the initial emigration wave, suggesting that greater emigration in one period was associated with greater demand for it in subsequent periods. An understanding of East Germany illustrates how autocrats face a delicate balance between permitting migration and managing its consequences.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.