Suicide bomb ers are not all alike . Palestinians prepare elaborate martyr videos before their killings and become celebrities afterward, while Iraqi Sunnis kill their fellow citizens in obscurity. In Afghanistan, the suicide bombers have their own distinction: They are known for their ineptness, often blowing themselves up without killing anyone else.

“They’re not efficient,” said Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. She arrived at Stanford this summer, after several decades of studying terrorism as a professor of government at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Conn.

Afghan suicide bombers tend to be poorer, younger and less educated than suicide bombers elsewhere, Crenshaw said during a recent CISAC seminar. She cited a United Nations report that accused the Taliban of strapping explosives to boys, despite a commitment not to recruit those too young to have facial hair. Promises of motorcycles and cell phones have been used as inducements.

One boy whose mission failed was interviewed by U.N. workers. “He somehow thought he would survive the attack and get to spend the money they had promised him, not quite understanding that he would not be there,” Crenshaw said in an interview following her talk.

In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, the person wearing the explosives belt or driving the car bomb is the least valuable person in the terror group, Crenshaw said. The key people are the bomb maker and the organizer: “They never send the bomb maker with the bomb.” In Israel, security officials target the bomb makers for assassination.

“It’s the organization that decides who’s going to be attacked and when and where and why,” Crenshaw said. “Then they recruit somebody to carry it out. So the person carrying the bomb really is just a foot soldier.”

Afghanistan’s most famous suicide attack happened in 2001, just two days before the 9/11 assault on the United States. Al-Qaida operatives masquerading as journalists preemptively blew up tribal warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud in anticipation that he might aid U.S. troops if they eventually invaded Afghanistan in search of Osama bin Laden.

Today, al-Qaida, the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami (the group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) aim their suicide attacks at U.S. and Afghan government forces, but the victims are overwhelmingly civilian bystanders, often large numbers of children. Many of the bombers, Crenshaw said, are recruited from religious schools across the border in Pakistan.

The predominant motivation for terrorists to employ suicide attacks is strategic, not religious, according to Crenshaw. One suicide bomber kills many people, a perfect example of what the U.S. military calls asymmetric warfare. According to the United Nations, since the 1980s suicide bombers have been involved in only 4 percent of the world’s terror attacks, but have caused 29 percent of the deaths.

Crenshaw gave her CISAC talk the day of the bloody suicide-bomber attack on Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto. With some 140 deaths and 500 injuries, it was the deadliest of more than 50 suicide attacks in Pakistan in recent years. Bhutto survived without injury, but if she had died, the volatile country could have come unglued, according to Crenshaw. “It shows you how one major suicide bombing could make a big difference,” she said.

Her interest in terrorism began in graduate school in the late 1960s. Her first book, Revolutionary Terrorism (Hoover Institution Press, 1978), was on guerilla warfare against the French during the Algerian war for independence from 1954 to 1962. It still sells on Amazon, for $100.

How does one research suicide bombers, since most of them, by definition, are dead? “We don’t have very many studies that are based on extensive interviews,” Crenshaw said. The one well-known body of work based on interviews involves failed Palestinian suicide bombers held in Israeli prisons. But the prisoners have told their stories so often that it is difficult to separate truth from imagination, according to Crenshaw.

Scholars of terrorism in general can turn to trial transcripts, databases of newspaper stories or the “Harmony Project” documents captured from al-Qaida and posted online by the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

But less has been written specifically about suicide bombers. “In Iraq, it’s very difficult to know who they were, even. They’re dead and they’re blown to bits, too,” Crenshaw said. “You might not have a hand with fingerprints, for example. Surprisingly enough, often they do seem to find heads. But still, how do you identify someone in Iraq, where you don’t have a record of who the population is to begin with? There are no identity cards, no nothing. Really, we’re just guessing.”

The predominant motivation for terrorists to employ suicide attacks is strategic, not religious, according to Martha Crenshaw.

Crenshaw’s most recent paper, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay” (Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2007), relied on the bookstore: She bought and read 13 books about suicide bombers, then produced a review of them all as a guide to other researchers.

CRENSHAW'S RESEARCH AGENDA
Why is the United States the target of terrorism? Crenshaw is answering this question, as a lead investigator with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence. Her research focuses on groups that have targeted the United States or its interests since the mid-1960s, placing incidents in context by comparing them with instances in which groups displayed similar anti-American ideas but did not resort to terrorism.
"Contrary to popular belief, only about 10 percent of active terrorist groups have targeted the United States," she says. "You have to get into the local politics to see what's going on" with anti-U.S. terrorism abroad. Such attacks can be aimed at the local regime, she explained.
Crenshaw is also editing a book tentatively titled The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Democracies, to be published by the Russell Sage Foundation which supported the research.
And "The Debate over ‘New' versus ‘Old' Terrorism," a paper Crenshaw presented at the 2007 American Political Science Association meeting, is set to appear in an edited volume. Crenshaw questions common claims that terrorism in recent years has taken on a completely new character, more religious and lethal.
"Terrorism has changed over time, but there is no fundamental difference between ‘old' and ‘new' terrorism," she said. Researchers and policymakers should "ask why some groups cause large numbers of civilian casualties and others do not," she said, "rather than assuming that religious beliefs are the explanation for lethality."

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Agricultural Development Program has awarded Stanford University’s Program on Food Security and the Environment (FSE) and a team of collaborators $3.8 million over three years to conduct a quantitative assessment of the effect of biofuels expansion on food security in the developing world. This work will determine how different scenarios of expanded biofuels production in rich and poor countries will affect global and regional food prices, farmer incomes, and food consumption of the poor. In three case-study countries (India, Mozambique, Senegal), it will make a more detailed assessment of the opportunities and pitfalls associated with an array of possible biofuels development scenarios (e.g., using different crops for biofuels production, using marginal land versus highly productive land, etc.). We expect the work will represent the first systematic, detailed effort to address the effects of biofuels expansion on welfare in poor countries and the first available analytic tool for assessing possible biofuels investments in individual developing countries. Project collaborators include FSE, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Center on Chinese Agricultural Policy, and the University of Nebraska.

Through this grant, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation aims to assess how biofuels may affect smallholder farmers in the developing world. This includes assessing both the risks, such as increasing food prices, and the potential opportunities for smallholder farmers to leverage biofuels to boost their productivity, increase their incomes, and build better lives for themselves and their families. The foundation and Stanford University will disseminate the findings widely to inform a broad audience, including policymakers.

FSE is also very pleased to announce a private gift from Lawrence Kemp for further work in the biofuels area. The Kemp gift will be devoted to building a team of faculty and students on campus who will analyze the transmission of global price effects to local markets, provide policy advice and communication on biofuels, and expand the field-level coverage of Stanford’s biofuels work.

In the November 2007 issue of Environment, project collaborators Rosamond L. Naylor (FSE), Adam Liska, Marshall Burke (FSE), Walter P. Falcon (FSE), Joanne Gaskell, Scott Rozelle (FSE), and Kenneth Cassman demonstrate how high energy prices and biofuelspromoting agricultural policy result in higher food prices generally and then examine in detail the potential global effects of biofuels expansion in four countries for four crops—corn in the United States, cassava in China, sugarcane and soy in Brazil, and palm oil in Indonesia. They argue that in each case, the threats to global food security from biofuels expansion likely outweigh the benefits, especially in the short run. This is because in many poor countries these crops play an important role in the diets of the poor and because the poorest in the world typically spend more money on food than they earn in income through farming. They also note that “second generation” technologies such as cellulosic biofuels will likely not play a significant role in biofuels production over the next decade or longer—and thus in the near-term are very unlikely to be the win-win that their proponents suggest. “The ripple effect: biofuels, food security, and the environment” excerpted from Environment, November 2007

The integration of the agricultural and energy sectors caused by rapid growth in the biofuels market signals a new era in food policy and sustainable development. For the first time in decades, agricultural commodity markets could experience a sustained increase in prices, breaking the long-term price decline that has benefited food consumers worldwide. Whether this transition occurs—and how it will affect global hunger and poverty—remain to be seen. Will food markets begin to track the volatile energy market in terms of price and availability? Will changes in agricultural commodity markets benefit net food producers and raise farm income in poor countries? How will biofuels-induced changes in agricultural commodity markets affect net consumers of food? At risk are more than 800 million food-insecure people—mostly in rural areas and dependent to some extent on agriculture for incomes— who live on less than $1 per day and spend the majority of their incomes on food. An additional 2–2.5 billion people living on $1 to $2 per day are also at risk, as rising commodity prices could pull them swiftly into a food-insecure state.

The potential impact of a large global expansion of biofuels production capacity on net food producers and consumers in low-income countries presents challenges for food policy planners and raises the question of whether sustainable development targets at a more general level can be reached. Achieving the 2015 Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, which include halving the world’s undernourished and impoverished, lies at the core of global initiatives to improve human well-being and equity, yet today virtually no progress has been made toward achieving the dual goals of alleviating global hunger and poverty. The record varies on a regional basis: Gains have been made in many Asia-Pacific and Latin American-Caribbean countries, but progress has been mixed in South Asia and setbacks have occurred in numerous sub-Saharan African countries. Whether the biofuels boom will move extremely poor countries closer to or further from the Millennium Development Goals remains uncertain.

Biofuels growth also will influence efforts to meet two sets of longer-run development targets. The first encompasses the goals of a “sustainability transition,” articulated by the Board on Sustainable Development of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which seeks to provide energy, materials, and information to meet the needs of a global population of 8–10 billion by 2050, while reducing hunger and poverty and preserving the planet’s environmental life-support systems. The second is the Great Transition of the Global Scenario Group, convened by the Stockholm Environment Institute, which focuses specifically on reductions in hunger and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions beyond 2050. As additional demands are placed on the agricultural resource base for fuel production, will ecosystem services (such as hydrologic balances, biodiversity, and soil quality) that support agricultural activities be eroded? Will biofuels development require a large expansion of crop area, which would involve conversion of marginal land, rainforest, and wetlands to arable land? And what will be the net effect of biofuels expansion on global climate change?

Although the questions outnumber the answers at this stage, two trends seem clear: Total energy use will continue to escalate as incomes rise in both industrial and developing countries, and biofuels will remain a critical energy development target in many parts of the world if petroleum prices exceed $55–$60 per barrel. Even if petroleum prices dip, policy support for biofuels as a means of boosting rural incomes in several key countries will likely generate continued expansion of biofuels production capacity. These trends will have widespread ripple effects on food security—defined here as the ability of all people at all times to have access to affordable food and nutrition for a healthy lifestyle—and on the environment at local, regional, and global scales. The ripple effects will be either positive or negative depending on the country in question and the policies in play.

Zvisinei Sandi is a Scholar Rescue Fellow at CDDRL. She lectures on the human rights situation in Southern Africa, especially in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and also collaborates with Stanford Law School's Human Rights Clinic on its ongoing project in Southern Africa. She has worked as a journalist and political activist in Zimbabwe, but her writing and activism have brought her hostile attention from the Zimbabwean government, resulting in threats and physical attacks. Here she shares some of her observations about Zimbabwe's March 19 elections and how the "seemingly impossible happened. Mugabe and his party lost control of the parliament and lost the presidential elections to Morgan Tsvangirai."

Zimbabwe's March 29 elections were held in an atmosphere that everybody saw as impossible for the opposition. There was virtually no media freedom, no campaign time for the opposition, and so much violence that being merely associated with the opposition MDC could very well mean death, and the Zimbabwe electoral commission, run by the fanatical Mugabe loyalist, Tobaiwa Mudede, was handpicked by the ZANU PF administration and is heavily in favor of ZANU and Mugabe. In addition, it can easily be argued that much of the election was rigged long before the election itself took place. Election observers found that the numbers on the voter's roll were far greater than the numbers of the voters on the ground. Many of the names were simply created to inflate the numbers in the constituencies that supported Mugabe, while another big number was comprised of the deceased. Plucky Zimbabwean humor suggested in the run up to the election that Mugabe had recruited the dead since the living had no more time for him.

To make matters even worse, in the period before the election, the military generals got together and announced that they would never serve under, or submit to being led by, a person without anti-colonial war credentials. In other words, they were saying that if Mugabe did lose to Tsvangirai they would just hold on to power through the use of force and ensure that Mugabe, the man they have served unquestioningly through several decades, stayed on. In real terms, this was a threatened coup: if Tsvangirai won, there would be a coup, Mugabe would stay on, and life would go on as usual.

In spite of all of these factors, the seemingly impossible happened. Mugabe and his party lost control of the parliament and lost the presidential elections to Morgan Tsvangirai. At this point, the question became whether the generals would carry out their threatened coup. Events, and reports from the inside, suggest that they have done it, and in such a smooth fashion that, of all the screams that have been heard from Zimbabwe recently, none of them has been "Coup!"

Reports in the independent newspapers suggested that Robert Mugabe had directed the ZEC to delay the announcement of the presidential election results in order to manage a political crisis triggered by his defeat and that of his ZANU PF party. It was reported that the service chiefs had approached Mugabe with results that showed his defeat and they advised him to buy time. The Zimbabwe Independent (April 4–10) reported that ZEC's delay was part of the government's crisis management plan following clear indications that Mugabe had lost the presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Mugabe is reported to have ordered the withholding of results by ZEC to buy time to manage his defeat and allow the three weeks for the run-off to elapse, thereby creating circumstances for him to try to survive politically. It was reported in the same issue of the Zimbabwe Independent that part of the government's strategy was to force ZEC to delay announcing the result until Mugabe had found a way to deal with the problem.

Zimbabwe's electoral law provides for a run-off in the event that none of the presidential candidates wins 50% plus one vote in the election. The run-off was therefore supposed to be held on or before April 19. The Zimbabwe Independent revealed that Mugabe and his close advisors from the country's state security agencies wanted Mugabe to use his temporary presidential powers to amend the Electoral Act to have the run-off after ninety days, ruling by decree in the meantime. They advised Mugabe that this would give them time to regroup and strategize.

Soon after the election, it was reported that Mugabe had offered a transitional government that would run the country for six months. Mugabe proposed to head the transitional government. According to the proposal, tabled to the MDC, was one of the many options that Mugabe was considering to manage his departure from office. Weeks later, Tsvangirai confirmed that his party had held secret talks with Mugabe's ZANU PF about forming a government of national unity. Tsvangirai revealed in a BBC interview that ZANU PF had approached the MDC to talk of a transition. The situation reportedly changed after ZANU PF hardliners asserted themselves. Word in the streets was that the service chiefs, Constantine Chiwenga of the Zimbabwe National Army, Perence Shiri of the Air Force, Augustine Chihuri of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Happyton Bonyongwe of the Central Intelligence Organization, and Paul Zimondi of Zimbabwe Prison Service were demanding assurances that they would not face prosecution for crimes they had committed during their service. It was then that reports suggested that the military had taken over.

The South African Sunday Independent of April 20 reported that the military was waging a systematic war of terror on rural people while the vote was being "faultlessly" rigged, ahead a contrived presidential run-off. The paper reported that central to the plot were hundreds of "command centers" led by war veterans and youths in police uniform, which were established across Zimbabwe to wage a national terror campaign. According to the paper, Zimbabwe's top military authority, the Joint Command, made up of service chiefs, has established a chain of command to ensure that Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF remain in office even though they both lost in elections on March 29. The network will be concentrated in the rural areas where 70 percent of the Zimbabwean population lives.

A senior army officer and a police chief described the president's re-election plan to the Sunday Independent. They said each command center would consist of three policemen, a soldier, and a war veteran who would be in charge. They would dispatch militias, comprised of war veterans and members of the ZANU PF Youth militia, to assault and torture known opposition supporters. They would also control the local police to ensure that the militia was immune from arrest. The generals have called on the four security services—army, police, intelligence, and prisons—to ensure that people are terrorized into voting for Mugabe in the expected presidential run-off. Generals who report directly to the Joint Command have explained in a series of closed meetings how people will be terrorized and beaten into voting for Mugabe in the run-off. Human rights groups verified reports of the terror campaign, saying that ZANU PF was using a network of informal detention centers to beat, torture, and intimidate opposition activists and ordinary Zimbabweans. A statement by Human Rights Watch provided a chilling account of systematic intimidation and violence, including the abduction and savage beating of opposition supporters in several areas. Detention centers are said to have been set up in Mutoko North, Mutoko South, Mudzi in Mashonaland East province, and in Bikita West in Masvingo province. Opposition supporters are being tortured at these camps in what ZANU PF terms "Operation Makavhoterapapi?" ("Where did you put your vote?") The aim in all this is threefold: to assert his power over the cowed population, to punish the people for having voted for the MDC, and to intimidate them to vote for ZANU PF in the event of a presidential run-off.

Playing a pivotal role in the current drama is the country's intelligence unit, the CIO (Central Intelligence Organization). Headed by one the most brutal figures in Zimbabwe's recent history, Happyton Bonyongwe, the CIO is responsible for collecting data and information about opposition party activists and leading the attacks on the targeted activists. Hundreds of villagers have reportedly fled their homes in the countryside after ZANU PF militia, war veterans, the notorious "Green Bombers" and the army attacked them.

War veterans went on fresh farm invasions similar to the ones in February of 2000, threatening the few remaining white commercial farmers and their farm workers. In Masvingo, they invaded Crest Farm owned by Graham Goddard and they gave him a 10-hour notice to pack his belongings and vacate. The Masvingo Mirror, a provincial weekly, reported that soldiers were wreaking havoc in rural areas in the province. The Mirror said that members of the Zimbabwe National Army and ZANU PF militia were deployed in some rural areas in the province, where they were beating up civilians suspected to be members of the MDC. The Zimbabwean on Sunday (April 20, 2008) reported that the CIO has a file on "each MDC activist detailed to the level of the football club he or she supports together with family members' details etc." The paper reported of a complex web of deception, coercion, and violent intimidation to ensure that another electoral defeat for Robert Mugabe in the presidential run-off is not remotely possible. The same issue of the Zimbabwean on Sunday carried a photograph of a battered and stoned body of MDC Hurungwe East Organizing Secretary, Tapiwa Mbawanda. The Standard of April 13, 2008, told stories of war veterans and ZANU PF militia on the rampage in Mashonaland Central. War veterans and ZANU PF militia reportedly burnt down more than 30 farm workers' huts, accusing them of voting against Robert Mugabe. The defenseless farm workers fled and watched from a distance as the war veterans and militia helped themselves to property before setting the huts on fire. The workers lost all of their belongings. Eighteen families now shelter temporarily in tobacco barns, exposed to the cold and diseases.

In Bulawayo, some businesspeople reported that from April 16, 2008, their environment was growing more and more scary by the day as they had began receiving threats from some war veterans and supporters of ZANU PF in the city. The war veterans were said to be visiting business premises regularly, threatening to close them down as Mugabe's retribution campaign against opposition activists and supporters spreads to all sectors of society. One business owner complained that they had visited him three times the same day accusing him of sponsoring the MDC. They threatened to loot everything in his shop and close it down after Mugabe wins the run-off.

The Zimbabwe Independent (April 11–17, 2008) carried a story that said ZANU PF members were moving around Mutoko East constituency waving guns of different sizes and types, and telling people that the run-off was the last chance for them to vote for ZANU PF.

At the moment, no one knows what will happen. The opposition and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai, live in fear for their lives. Ordinary voters have been brutalized for simply having voted their choice. Simple election officers have been arrested, tortured, and imprisoned just because the constituents voted for the opposition. Hundreds of them are still in jail. And the world has watched. Independent observers and journalists have been arrested, beaten, and tortured, and no one has acted. The electoral commission, run by the fanatical and totally unscrupulous Tobaiwa Mudede, steadfastly refused to release the results of the presidential elections for five whole weeks, and when they were finally released, they differed from those of the independent and opposition observers, whose offices had, incidentally, been raided to remove all the materials pertaining to the presidential election.

The Mugabe government then announced the need for a run-off election, which under Zimbabwe law is necessary in the event that none of the winners got fifty percent of the vote. In the meantime the violence is escalating, and there are all indications that, in the event of the run-off taking place, more violence is going to occur. There is no chance of a free and fair run-off election taking place in the present circumstances, and to attempt it without first of all tackling Mugabe would be a sheer waste of time and of Zimbabwe lives. Mugabe would win, out of the sheer terror he has managed to instill in the minds and lives of the Zimbabwean people while the whole world watched.

Now it does seem that while everybody watched, Mugabe's generals have gone ahead and staged a very bloody coup. All the time that everybody has been begging, negotiating, and lobbying for the release of the March 29 election, Mugabe has moved a step ahead—he has gone ahead and asserted his power. The violence being witnessed is simply his way of telling the Zimbabwean people that nothing has changed and that he is the one in charge, no matter what everybody else wants. His coup is complete, and he is staying on because his supporters, the commanders of the Armed Forces, the ones with the guns, have said so. The coup is complete, and almost perfect, unless somebody from the outside decides to do something about it.

The Program on Food Security and the Environment was featured in a short profile in the Stanford Report.

CISAC faculty member John W. Lewis argues in the Boston Globe that the North korea diplomatic initiative launched by President Bush in October 2006 will come to naught if the administration fails to follow through on promises it made to encourage Pyongyang to destroy its nuclear weapons programs.

The diplomatic initiative launched by President Bush in the wake of North Korea's nuclear weapon test in October 2006 has made substantial progress in rolling back the nation's drive to become a nuclear power.

That success, however, will be for naught if the administration fails to follow through on promises it made to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to destroy its nuclear weapons programs. The United States must honor its commitments in order to begin normalizing relations with North Korea.

Unfortunately, a recent barrage of criticism against the administration's policy aims to derail this process. Even as Pyongyang has taken more than 80 percent of the required steps to disable its Yongbyon nuclear weapons facilities, the fulfillment of US obligations has stalled.

The critics who want to stymie all forward movement, are, for the most part, the same specialists who can take credit for jettisoning in 2003 the agreement with North Korea, known as the 1994 Agreed Framework, which had stopped its plutonium production for almost a decade. Only after the collapse of the Agreed Framework did the North Koreans process the fissile material needed to build and test nuclear weapons. Three years later, in 2006, the president adopted a more realistic policy that is now under attack.

Many of the policy's critics denounce a declaration of the North's nuclear programs that has not yet been finished and argue that we must have clarity about North Korea's role in the construction of a Syrian nuclear facility and its uranium enrichment path to nuclear weapons.

Whatever the role of Korea in the Syrian reactor project, that facility no longer exists. Israel destroyed it last September.

Last year, the United States downgraded from medium to low its confidence level that North Korea continues to pursue a uranium enrichment program. In October, Pyongyang allowed US inspectors into a missile factory, where it said that aluminum tubes suspected of being used in that program were being remade into missile parts. North Korea handed over aluminum samples that later showed traces of enriched uranium, but analysis was inconclusive.

The United States apparently has secured Pyongyang's agreement to pursue these types of "clarifying" activities. Moreover, China has agreed on the importance of a verification regime aimed at assuring a "complete and correct" declaration, and a key goal of the next round of talks would be to fashion that regime.

Recent developments are even more impressive. On May 8, the North Koreans passed to a US State Department official a trove of 18,822 pages of operating records for the Yongbyon 5MWe reactor and reprocessing plant, which date back to 1986. That is 18,822 pages more than we ever had before, and begins a verification process previously impossible.

Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency and US nuclear experts have overseen the shutdown and continuing disablement of all key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon. Discussions have been held to ship out the monitored unused reactor fuel rods.

If diplomacy is to succeed, Washington needs to begin delivering on some of the promises it has made as part of the Six-Party agreements. It must move toward normalizing relations with Pyongyang: That means beginning "the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism" and starting to "advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK."

We know that North Korea seeks better relations with the United States to create the environment essential to facilitate economic recovery, give it more diplomatic space, and smooth the way for an upcoming political succession. Since the New York Philharmonic concert in Pyongyang last February, it has begun portraying the United States in a more positive light to its own people, laying the groundwork for a major breakthrough in relations with the United States.

This breakthrough is needed if the United States is to achieve its ultimate objective: to cap, roll back, and completely eliminate the North's nuclear weapons program.

Critics in Washington, like those in Pyongyang, are afraid of exploring the future and only want to cling to the past. That isn't the way out.

John W. Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University, is coauthor of "Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007."