A panel of Carnegie Russia experts presented analysis of the current state of Russia's political and economic development and the likelihood of continuity or change in Dmitry Medvedev's first term as president of Russia. The panel included scholars-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center Nikolay Petrov and Maria Lipman and Carnegie senior associate Michael A. McFaul. Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies, served as moderator.

Petrov emphasized structural conditions delimiting the options available to the Russian leadership over the ability of any particular personality to radically change course. He noted that Medvedev, as Vladimir Putin's protégé, was unlikely to introduce major modifications to Putin's established trajectory and that he could not do so even if such was his desire.

He described his conception of the Kremlin-designed political system in Russia today, making reference to what he called the "mechanical configuration of power": the creation of elements that cannot operate indepedently and a highly hierarchical administration that is inherently inefficient and divorced from the realities of society.

Although poorly governed autocracies can last for a long time, if there is a crisis and Russia still lacks the democratic instruments to deal with it there could be a serious authoritarian retrenchment.
-Michael McFaul

At the same time, he argued that change is inevitable -- not because of Medvedev's intentions, but because of evolving facts on the ground, such as the demographic situation and the need to transition from recovery-based economic growth to modernization and expansion. Petrov said that one of the major features of the Russian regime -- controlled elections -- is becoming a source of major weakness as Russia faces a number of serious political, social, and economic challenges. Although these elections nominally legitimize the authorities, they do not provide any feedback from the population nor do they offer any opportunity for genuine political competition of the kind that could introduce diversity and accountability. He compared the Russian leadership to a dinosaur, with a small head far removed from the body politic.

Lipman focused on the evolution of the media from the relative pluralism of Boris Yeltsin's presidency to the tight control of Putin's system. She contrasted the interview Putin had as he was coming into the presidency in 2000 with the interview that his successor has recently had. While the journalists interviewing Putin were inquisitive and at times confrontational, Medvedev enjoyed a far more passive and respectful tone from the journalists who interviewed him. This, she said, was a sign of the success of Putin's project for the media.

She noted that the state and Gazprom were the two largest players in the national media market and that loyalty to the state is a requirement for sucess in any business sector, including media. The state's control of broadcast media is particularly important, as television is the overwhelmingly primary source of information for the Russian public. Meanwhile, on a regional level, journalists are routinely punished for attempting to uncover local malfeasance or corruption.

Although the Russian leadership has consolidated a majority of the media under its control, Lipman said, media with independent editorial content still exists. She speculated that there were a number of functions that having a tiny minority of independent media could serve: existing for the sake of external consumption, a valve to let off some steam, and potentially an in-house bulletin board for the use of elites to signal dissatisfaction or to inform the leadership of conflicts.

McFaul began his remarks by noting he would not use the term "democracy" to refer to the political system in place in Russia today. He said that political science as a discipline is struggling to properly code and understand systems such as Russia's and other countries whose regimes are "between" dictatorship and democracy. He illustrated this lack of clarity by referring to the lack of correspondence between various freedom coding scores when it comes to regimes that do not fall into either extreme of the political freedom spectrum.

With regard to Russia, McFaul noted the crucial significance of the fact that there was an election and that a new leader was appointed. In that way, he said, Russia is not like Uzbekistan. He elaborated on what he sees as three possible reasons that the Russian leadership decided to construct the system that exists today: (1) Putin has decided that this system is necessary for the modernization project he wishes to undertake; (2) in order to allow for theft by the elites, for which McFaul noted a controlled national media was crucial; and (3) to manage the transition. Now that Putin's plan for the transition has been fulfilled, it is an open question whether the regime can become a system for governance.

Having delineated the "why," McFaul put forward what he sees as the chief characteristics of the Russian regime: a lack of any defining ideology; little connection to citizenry -- the fact that this is not an autocracy of mobilization; no charismatic leader; the fact that the regime is not a military junta, and that a strategy of massive repression is not a viable alternative; the existence of foreign enemies, which is important for autocracies to survive; and the dependence of the regime's legitimacy upon performance, particularly in the economic sphere. McFaul believes Putin knows that this system is not sustainable over the long term, but that paradoxically he nonetheless emphasizes continuity. He expressed cautious hope that Medvedev's liberal-sounding speech in Krasnoyarsk -- which contained criticism of the current state of affairs in Russia and lacked a real precedent in recent Russian political history -- could signal a change in policy in the Kremlin.

He noted that he would not predict the future course of Russia's political development and reiterated his point about the failings of political science: although scholars can understand the structural conditions that make potential social and political crises in such regimes possible, the political science community does not do well at predicting when they will occur. McFaul sounded a note of warning on this point, saying that although poorly governed autocracies can last for a long time, if there is a crisis and Russia still lacks the democratic instruments to deal with it there could be a serious authoritarian retrenchment.

In response to questions, Petrov and Lipman made clear that they did not believe Medvedev's liberal rhetoric should be treated seriously. McFaul noted that such changes, if they were to take place, would likely occur at the margins and said that the situation is more optimistic than if hawk Sergei Ivanov had been chosen as president.

The Bush administration's North Korea strategy is being criticized from the right and the left for letting Pyongyang off the hook. Some advocate scuttling the six-party talks. Others suggest slowing our own compliance with the agreement to get North Korea to make a full declaration of its nuclear program first. We disagree with both positions. Our mantra should be: It's the plutonium, stupid.

North Korea does have the bomb -- but a limited nuclear arsenal and supply of plutonium to fuel its weapons. The Yongbyon plutonium production facilities are closed and partially disabled.

In separate visits to North Korea in February, we concluded that the disablement was extensive and thorough. We also learned that Pyongyang is prepared to move to the next crucial step of dismantling Yongbyon, eliminating plutonium production. This would mean no more bombs, no better bombs and less likelihood of export. After this success, we can concentrate on getting full declarations and on rolling back Pyongyang's supply of weapons and plutonium.

We must not miss this opportunity, because we have the chance to contain the risk posed by North Korea's arsenal while we work to eliminate it. As dismantlement proceeds, negotiations should focus concurrently on the plutonium declaration, the extent of the uranium enrichment effort and Pyongyang's nuclear exports.

Pyongyang's declaration of 30 kilograms of plutonium (sufficient for roughly four to five bombs) falls short of the estimate of 40 to 50 kilograms, based on our past visits. We believe that North Korea is prepared to produce operating records and permit access to facilities, equipment and waste sites for verification. Obtaining and verifying its declaration of plutonium production and inventories is imperative. Let's proceed.

Pyongyang continues to claim that it has made no efforts to enrich uranium, despite strong evidence to the contrary. Although it appears unlikely that these efforts reached a scale that constitutes a weapons threat, a complete accounting is required. Dismantlement of the Yongbyon facilities should not, however, be postponed to resolve this issue. In October 2002, the Bush administration accused North Korea of covert uranium enrichment, only to have Pyongyang withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and produce plutonium to fuel the arsenal that we are now attempting to eliminate.

Nuclear exports are of greater concern. As recently revealed evidence demonstrates, North Korea sold nuclear technology to Syria, much as it sold missile technology. North Korea must cooperate if we are to get to the bottom of the Syrian incident and ensure that it is not repeated elsewhere. Israel eliminated the Syrian threat, for now, by bombing the reactor at Al Kibar. But it is imperative that Pyongyang reveal the nature and extent of its export operations and, most important, whether it has similar deals underway with Iran.

We do not advocate letting Pyongyang off the hook, but a "confession" regarding Syria is not the critical issue. We have good knowledge of what the North Koreans supplied to Syria. What we really need is information from North Korea that will help us deal with potential threats. For example, was North Korea acting alone, or was it part of a more sophisticated proliferation ring involving Pyongyang's trading partners and suppliers? North Korea's leadership must resolve all three declaration issues fully, and these will take time to verify.

To ultimately succeed in the peaceful elimination of nuclear weapons, we must understand why North Korea devoted its limited resources to going nuclear. The September 2005 six-party joint statement addresses many of these concerns, promising mutual respect for national sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and a commitment to stability and lasting peace in Northeast Asia, as well as normalization of relations. Given the acrimonious history of our relations, such steps require a transformation in the relationship between North Korea and the United States, a change that will first require building trust -- step by step.

The six-party negotiations have put us on that path, and there is much evidence of winds of change blowing in North Korea that will make navigating that path easier (the recent New York Philharmonic concert in Pyongyang is one such symbol of change; the joint industrial facility at Kaesong is another). But North Korea's reluctance to provide full declarations and the Syria revelations have moved us in the wrong direction.

Nevertheless, walking away from the talks or slowing them at this point would be counterproductive. Instead, in its remaining months, the Bush administration should focus on limiting North Korea's nuclear capabilities by concluding the elimination of plutonium production. If it can also get answers on the Syrian operation and resolve the question of uranium enrichment, it will put the next administration in a stronger position to finally end the nuclear threat from North Korea.

Siegfried S. Hecker and William J. Perry are with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Hecker was director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 through 1997. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 through 1997.

Ohio Wesleyan University presented CISAC Co-Director Scott D. Sagan with an honorary Doctor of Laws degree during its 164th commencement ceremony on May 11. The citation accompanying the honor states: "Scott D. Sagan's grandfather, J. Waskom Pickett, a bishop in the United Methodist Church, served as a missionary in India and advised his grandson on the importance of helping to make the world a better place. Sagan's father, the late Dr. John Sagan-a beloved 1948 Ohio Wesleyan graduate, OWU trustee, and vice president/treasurer of Ford Motor Company-often mentioned the student's Golden Rule: 'Find out what you enjoy doing most, and then figure out a way to get paid for that activity.' Dr. Scott Sagan has found great enjoyment-and success-in following both his father's and grandfather's advice: his career has combined his love of research and teaching about international relations with influential policy work that has reduced the danger that nuclear weapons pose to the United States and to the rest of the world."

Sagan, a professor of political science, "is one of the most widely cited scholars of international relations in the United States," the citation states. "His seminal publications have shaped the way scholars and policy makers have thought about the risks of nuclear terrorism." In addition, CISAC, which Sagan has helped lead for the past decade, "is widely recognized as one of the world's preeminent university-based think tanks conducting policy research on global security matters."

Ohio Wesleyan is a private, undergraduate liberal arts college in Delaware, Ohio.