Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/8416226562432/WN_WLYcdRa6T5Cs1MMdmM0Mug

 

About the Event: Is there a place for illegal or nonconsensual evidence in security studies research, such as leaked classified documents? What is at stake, and who bears the responsibility, for determining source legitimacy? Although massive unauthorized disclosures by WikiLeaks and its kindred may excite qualitative scholars with policy revelations, and quantitative researchers with big-data suitability, they are fraught with methodological and ethical dilemmas that the discipline has yet to resolve. I argue that the hazards from this research—from national security harms, to eroding human-subjects protections, to scholarly complicity with rogue actors—generally outweigh the benefits, and that exceptions and justifications need to be articulated much more explicitly and forcefully than is customary in existing work. This paper demonstrates that the use of apparently leaked documents has proliferated over the past decade, and appeared in every leading journal, without being explicitly disclosed and defended in research design and citation practices. The paper critiques incomplete and inconsistent guidance from leading political science and international relations journals and associations; considers how other disciplines from journalism to statistics to paleontology address the origins of their sources; and elaborates a set of normative and evidentiary criteria for researchers and readers to assess documentary source legitimacy and utility. Fundamentally, it contends that the scholarly community (researchers, peer reviewers, editors, thesis advisors, professional associations, and institutions) needs to practice deeper reflection on sources’ provenance, greater humility about whether to access leaked materials and what inferences to draw from them, and more transparency in citation and research strategies.

View Written Draft Paper

 

About the Speaker: Christopher Darnton is a CISAC affiliate and an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He previously taught at Reed College and the Catholic University of America, and holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. He is the author of Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Johns Hopkins, 2014) and of journal articles on US foreign policy, Latin American security, and qualitative research methods. His International Security article, “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II,” won the 2019 APSA International History and Politics Section Outstanding Article Award. He is writing a book on the history of US security cooperation in Latin America, based on declassified military documents.

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Christopher Darnton Associate Professor of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School
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Daphne Keller
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I am a huge fan of transparency about platform content moderation. I’ve considered it a top policy priority for years, and written about it in detail (with Paddy Leerssen, who also wrote this great piece about recommendation algorithms and transparency). I sincerely believe that without it, we are unlikely to correctly diagnose current problems or arrive at wise legal solutions.

So it pains me to admit that I don’t really know what “transparency” I’m asking for. I don’t think many other people do, either. Researchers and public interest advocates around the world can agree that more transparency is better. But, aside from people with very particular areas of interest (like political advertising), almost no one has a clear wish list. What information is really important? What information is merely nice to have? What are the trade-offs involved?

That imprecision is about to become a problem, though it’s a good kind of problem to have. A moment of real political opportunity is at hand. Lawmakers in the USEurope, and elsewhere are ready to make some form of transparency mandatory. Whatever specific legal requirements they create will have huge consequences. The data, content, or explanations they require platforms to produce will shape our future understanding of platform operations, and our ability to respond — as consumers, as advocates, or as democracies. Whatever disclosures the laws don’t require, may never happen.

It’s easy to respond to this by saying “platforms should track all the possible data, we’ll see what’s useful later!” Some version of this approach might be justified for the very biggest “gatekeeper” or “systemically important” platforms. Of course, making Facebook or Google save all that data would be somewhat ironic, given the trouble they’ve landed in by storing similar not-clearly-needed data about their users in the past. (And the more detailed data we store about particular takedowns, the likelier it is to be personally identifiable.)

For any platform, though, we should recognize that the new practices required for transparency reporting comes at a cost. That cost might include driving platforms to adopt simpler, blunter content rules in their Terms of Service. That would reduce their expenses in classifying or explaining decisions, but presumably lead to overly broad or narrow content prohibitions. It might raise the cost of adding “social features” like user comments enough that some online businesses, like retailers or news sites, just give up on them. That would reduce some forms of innovation, and eliminate useful information for Internet users. For small and midsized platforms, transparency obligations (like other expenses related to content moderation) might add yet another reason to give up on competing with today’s giants, and accept an acquisition offer from an incumbent that already has moderation and transparency tools. Highly prescriptive transparency obligations might also drive de facto standardization and homogeneity in platform rules, moderation practices, and features.

None of these costs provides a reason to give up on transparency — or even to greatly reduce our expectations. But all of them are reasons to be thoughtful about what we ask for. It would be helpful if we could better quantify these costs, or get a handle on what transparency reporting is easier and harder to do in practice.

I’ve made a (very in the weeds) list of operational questions about transparency reporting, to illustrate some issues that are likely to arise in practice. I think detailed examples like these are helpful in thinking through both which kinds of data matter most, and how much precision we need within particular categories. For example, I personally want to know with great precision how many government orders a platform received, how it responded, and whether any orders led to later judicial review. But to me it seems OK to allow some margin of error for platforms that don’t have standardized tracking and queuing tools, and that as a result might modestly mis-count TOS takedowns (either by absolute numbers or percent).

I’ll list that and some other recommendations below. But these “recommendations” are very tentative. I don’t know enough to have a really clear set of preferences yet. There are things I wish I could learn from technologists, activists, and researchers first. The venues where those conversations would ordinarily happen — and, importantly, where observers from very different backgrounds and perspectives could have compared the issues they see, and the data they most want — have been sadly reduced for the past year.

So here is my very preliminary list:

  • Transparency mandates should be flexible enough to accommodate widely varying platform practices and policies. Any de facto push toward standardization should be limited to the very most essential data.
  • The most important categories of data are probably the main ones listed in the DSA: number of takedowns, number of appeals, number of successful appeals. But as my list demonstrates, those all can become complicated in practice.
  • It’s worth taking the time to get legal transparency mandates right. That may mean delegating exact transparency rules to regulatory agencies in some countries, or conducting studies prior to lawmaking in others.
  • Once rules are set, lawmakers should be very reluctant to move the goalposts. If a platform (especially a smaller one) invests in rebuilding its content moderation tools to track certain categories of data, it should not have to overhaul those tools soon because of changed legal requirements.
  • We should insist on precise data in some cases, and tolerate more imprecision in others (based on the importance of the issue, platform capacity, etc.). And we should take the time to figure out which is which.
  • Numbers aren’t everything. Aggregate data in transparency reports ultimately just tell us what platforms themselves think is going on. To understand what mistakes they make, or what biases they may exhibit, independent researchers need to see the actual content involved in takedown decisions. (This in turn raises a slough of issues about storing potentially unlawful content, user privacy and data protection, and more.)

It’s time to prioritize. Researchers and civil society should assume we are operating with a limited transparency “budget,” which we must spend wisely — asking for the information we can best put to use, and factoring in the cost. We need better understanding of both research needs and platform capabilities to do this cost-benefit analysis well. I hope that the window of political opportunity does not close before we manage to do that.

Daphne Keller

Daphne Keller

Director of the Program on Platform Regulation
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Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation

Keller explains some of the issues currently surrounding platform regulation
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In a new blog post, Daphne Keller, Director of the Program on Platform Regulation at the Cyber Policy Center, looks at the need for transparency when it comes to content moderation and asks, what kind of transparency do we really want?

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Three CISAC scientists have joined 26 of the nation’s top nuclear experts to send an open letter to President Obama in support of the Iran deal struck in July.

“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future non-proliferation agreements,” the group of renowned scientists, academics and former government officials wrote in the letter dated August 8, 2015.

“This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated non-proliferation framework.”

CISAC senior fellow and former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Sig Hecker is a signatory to the letter, along with CISAC co-founder Sid Drell, and cybersecurity expert and CISAC affiliate Martin Hellman.

Six Nobel laureates also signed, including FSI senior fellow by courtesy and former Stanford Linear Accelerator director Burton Richter.

The letter arrives at a crucial time for the Obama administration as it rallies public opinion and lobbies Congress to support the Iran agreement.

You can read the full letter along with analysis from the New York Times at this link.

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Lyuba's Hope film poster

Lyuba’s Hope follows Lyubov Sobol, a Russian anti-war opposition politician and anti-corruption figure, who has endured repeated arrests, hunger strikes, aborted political campaigns, attempted poisoning, and exile in her pursuit of a democratic post-Putin Russia.

As head of Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, Sobol advanced pathbreaking investigations, including that of “Putin’s cook,” Prigozhin. In 2026, she was among the fifteen Russian opposition figures admitted to the European Parliament PACE program.

Lyuba, who was a 2022 Visiting Scholar at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), will join us in person for the screening of Lyuba’s Hope, along with noted Russian-American director Marianna Yarovskaya and Paul Gregory, Hoover Research Fellow and producer. Discussion will be moderated by Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of CDDRL and Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Gregory and Yarovskaya’s previous film collaboration, Women of the Gulag, was shortlisted for an Academy Award in 2018.

This event is sponsored by the Hoover History Lab, in partnership with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures.
 

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Hauck Auditorium, David and Joan Traitel Building of the Hoover Institution
435 Lasuen Mall, Stanford (map)

Film running time: 80 mins. Discussion to follow.

Questions? Please contact rsvp-weisfeld@stanford.edu

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As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to visit Beijing on May 14-15, 2026, for a highly anticipated summit with President Xi Jinping, the world is watching to see if the two leaders can stabilize a U.S.-China relationship strained by disputes over trade, technological race, the future of Taiwan, and the rippling effects of the conflict with Iran.

Trump’s trip to Beijing – already rescheduled once due to the conflict in the Middle East – has been described as having tremendous symbolic significance. Yet, expectations for a breakthrough on specific deliverables should remain low, according to Susan Thornton, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat. Thornton joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing video series to analyze the potential outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and the high-stakes dynamics shaping U.S.-China relations.
 

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Kiyoteru Tsutsui interviews Susan Thornton.


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Symbols Over Deliverables


Thornton’s nearly three-decade career with the U.S. State Department in Eurasia and East Asia culminated in her role as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the first Trump administration. She offered a pragmatic forecast for the Trump-Xi summit, arguing that its primary value lies in the act of meeting itself.

While both President Trump and President Xi are committed to keeping their dialogue, the expectations for concrete outcomes on pivotal issues in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship should be tempered, argued Thornton, who is currently a senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, the director of the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

Whether on Taiwan or other pressing matters, China has made it clear it is not interested in a “G2 or a grand bargain” and has relatively low expectations for the list of substantive disputes between the two powers.

The Shadow of the Iran War


The ongoing conflict with Iran has added a new layer of complexity to the tense bilateral relationship. President Trump heads to Beijing after unsuccessful efforts to pressure China into helping reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Beijing continues backing Tehran politically and potentially militarily. 

Thornton assessed that China will not allow the conflict to derail its high-level engagement with Washington, even as it officially disapproves of the U.S. intervention in the Middle East. “Keeping the U.S.-China relationship on track is much more important than having some kind of a protest signal like that,” she stated.

She suggested that Beijing may see a strategic advantage in America’s renewed focus on the Middle East. While China has made nominal peace proposals, it has not stepped up as a mediator. “It seems like they are kind of hanging back and waiting to see what will happen,” Thornton observed. She posited that, from Beijing’s perspective, a U.S. entanglement in the Middle East may serve as a useful distraction, diverting Washington’s attention and pressure away from China.

At the same time, China is hedging its bets by securing alternative energy supplies and gaining influence in regions where the conflict in the Middle East has damaged U.S. credibility.

The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is focusing on two or three enduring and major asks of the Chinese in the trade and economic market-opening space. We've really had a hard time deciding what it is that we want from China.
Susan Thornton

Trade and Tech: A Call for a Paradigm Shift


On the economic front, Thornton drew on her deep experience in trade negotiations to critique the lack of focus in U.S. policy.

"The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is deciding what it is that we want from China," she said. "We tend to give them a long list of revolving priorities, which [makes it easy for the] other side of the negotiating table to just fob them off and not actually commit to anything over years of negotiations.”

On the technology rivalry between the two powers, Thornton urged a shift in strategy. Rather than pursuing sweeping export controls that are often unilateral and incomplete, she advocated for a narrower, multilateral approach focused on the most sensitive technologies, combined with a greater emphasis on American innovation. AI governance is one of the areas Thornton believes could be a common ground for Washington and Beijing to align their policies.

“It's going to be very hard for the United States to contain China's technological ambitions and growth,” she said. “I don't think that we're exactly competing on the same metrics. I question how it is that we're going to be able to keep China from getting technologies that are dual-use but might be useful in some military application when these things are basically economy-wide products.”

When it comes to technological competition, "We need to try to run faster than China, not be constantly trying to trip China up and looking in the rearview mirror," Thornton urged. "I don't think that's going to bode well for the long-term development of the U.S. tech sector."

The Taiwan Flashpoint: A Longer-Term Challenge


While Taiwan remains the most dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a kinetic warfare between the United States and China, Thornton believes that the immediate risk of conflict has receded, in accordance with recent U.S. threat assessments that no longer see 2027 as a likely target date for a potential Chinese takeover of the island.

Beijing, she argued, is closely watching the domestic political situation in Taiwan and how the leadership in Taipei views U.S. reliability and support. “I think the Chinese have determined, based on both of those things they've been watching, that they can afford to wait a bit longer, see what happens.”

Thornton cautioned, however, that, even as a conflict over Taiwan may no longer pose an immediate-term threat, “it is a problem that is going to develop over the coming decade.”

Diplomacy in a Multipolar World Order 


When asked about the future of the global order, Thornton described a trend toward fragmentation. If the United States steps back from its global leadership role, it is difficult to see who else would be willing or able to shoulder the cost of providing global public goods, she said. A “thinner world order,” with the United Nations at its center, may eventually find favor with countries that can afford to pay for some of those goods, she reflected.

In a closing advice for aspiring foreign service officers, Thornton argued that the emergence of a multipolar world reinforces the need for skilled diplomacy. “As the global order changes and more countries come into the mix of the councils of politics in the world, the United States will have to lean back toward diplomacy more,” she predicted.

“We're going to need very good diplomats,” she concluded, because it will be significantly harder to be an American diplomat in a fragmented world order in which the United States is no longer the single overwhelmingly dominant power.

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Kimberly Hoang and Kiyoteru Tsutsui seated in an office during a recorded podcast conversation.
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Weaponized Corruption, Extreme Wealth, and Democratic Reordering: Insights from Asia

Speaking on the APARC Briefing video series, University of Chicago sociologist Kimberly Kay Hoang examines the architecture of global capital and how corruption discourse is transforming governance and political order in Asia and the United States.
Weaponized Corruption, Extreme Wealth, and Democratic Reordering: Insights from Asia
Panelists gather for a group photo at the 2026 Oksenberg Conference.
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Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape

At the 2026 Oksenberg Conference, scholars and foreign policy experts assessed how Indo-Pacific powers are coping with a less predictable United States as China pursues selective leadership and Russia exploits Western divisions.
Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape
Portrait photo of Shibani Mahtan, winner of the 2026 Shorenstein Journalism Award.
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Singapore-Based Investigative Journalist Shibani Mahtani Wins 2026 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage

Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the 25th annual Shorenstein Journalism Award honors Mahtani for her exemplary investigations into the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong and China's growing global influence.
Singapore-Based Investigative Journalist Shibani Mahtani Wins 2026 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage
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Speaking on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing series, China expert and veteran diplomat Susan Thornton argues for managing expectations of the summit between the two presidents, rethinking the U.S.-China technology competition, and understanding Beijing’s long game on Taiwan.

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Edward Fishman Event

Drawing on his New York Times–bestselling book, Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, and his cover essay in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, “How to Fight an Economic War,” Edward Fishman will discuss how globalization gave rise to an age of economic warfare. As governments increasingly weaponize finance, technology, energy, and supply chains, the world is in the midst of what Fishman calls an "economic arms race” and a "scramble for economic security." From sanctions on Russia and Iran to the U.S.-China struggle over semiconductors and rare earths to the shock waves caused by the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, the session will examine how economic warfare is reshaping global power and the international order.

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EddieFishman

Edward Fishman

Senior Fellow and Director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics, Council on Foreign Relations
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Edward Fishman is Senior Fellow and Director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics at the Council on Foreign Relations and Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is the New York Times–bestselling author of Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare. Previously, Fishman served at the U.S. State Department as a member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff and as Russia and Europe Sanctions Lead, at the Pentagon as an advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at the U.S. Treasury Department as special assistant to the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.

 


 

Kathryn Stoner

Kathryn Stoner

Mosbacher Director, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
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Kathryn Stoner is the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and the Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). From 2017 to 2021, she served as FSI's Deputy Director. She is Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford and teaches in the Department of Political Science, the Program on International Relations, and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Program. She is also a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) at the Hoover Institution.

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner

William J. Perry Conference Room, 2nd Floor, Encina Hall

Open to Stanford affiliates with an active Stanford ID and access to the William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall. Registration required.

Edward Fishman Senior Fellow and Director Presenter Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
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Introduction and Contribution:


The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has been one of the most devastating conflicts of the 21st century. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine has experienced not only mass casualties but immense cultural destruction, as well as the forcible deportation and adoption of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russian families. Ending the war requires understanding its causes, particularly from the point of view of Vladimir Putin and other key Russian decision-makers. 

Some observers of Russian and global politics — as well as Putin and his allies — have claimed that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO caused the war. The argument here is that as a superpower, Russia could not tolerate the security implications of a country on its border joining a rival alliance. Russia’s war, then, was a preventive one — less a choice than a strategic necessity. Any superpower in such a situation would do the same.

In “NATO Did Not Cause Putin’s Imperial War,” James Goldgeier and Brian D. Taylor convincingly challenge the NATO hypothesis, showing it to be more a piece of Kremlin propaganda than a plausible account of Putin’s decision-making process. Instead, the authors draw our attention to Putin’s most deeply held and longstanding beliefs: that Ukraine is not a legitimate nation state, that Ukrainians would not freely associate with the West and its alliances (unless they were being manipulated), and that dominating Ukraine is essential to Russia reclaiming its status as a global superpower, one that is constantly disrespected by the West. 

As many social scientists focus on improving the causal power of their statistical inferences, Goldgeier and Taylor helpfully focus our attention on the beliefs and reasons of political actors who cause political outcomes such as wars and revolutions. More importantly, the authors provide a starting point for thinking about ending the Russo-Ukrainian war, one focused not on the distraction that is NATO arguments but on Putin’s imperial ambitions.

The authors provide a starting point for thinking about ending the Russo-Ukrainian war, one focused not on the distraction that is NATO arguments but on Putin’s imperial ambitions.

Pitfalls of the NATO Explanation:


The authors begin by noting that NATO enlargement clearly played a role in the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West over the past 25 years. In part, this is because many Russian elites — owing to their imperialistic beliefs, more on this below — never accepted that former Soviet Republics were free to join the alliance. However, NATO enlargement was but one item in a long list of Russian grievances, some based in reality and others fictional. These include the 2003-04 Color Revolutions — mainly reflecting widespread domestic sentiment, not Western machinations — and alleged American support for the 2011-13 Russian protests in the aftermath of Putin’s rigged elections, which were similarly homegrown.

There is good evidence that Putin and his inner circle neither feared NATO aggression nor believed that Ukraine could realistically join the alliance. After George W. Bush’s failed bid for Ukrainian membership in 2008, no American president has seriously entertained or pushed for Ukraine’s admission. NATO took minimal action after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, before which time Ukrainians themselves didn’t support joining the alliance (likely because they anticipated the negative consequences for Russia-Ukraine relations). NATO itself has worked against admitting Ukraine; indeed, much of its security assistance has been designed to make it possible for Ukraine to defend itself without formal admission. What’s more, no country bordering Russia joined NATO after 2004 until Finland did so in 2023.

When Putin decided on war in 2021, his invasion plan was based on the assumption that victory would be quick and easy, evidencing his lack of concern for NATO intervention. Further, he knew that NATO lacked the troops and would be extremely wary of confronting nuclear Russia. 

Putin’s Imperial Beliefs and Goals:


For several decades, Putin has expressed the belief that Ukraine is not a genuine nation-state and that Russia both gave away and was “robbed” of much of its territory. One of Putin’s key goals is arguably to rebuild Russian greatness via imperial conquest. The West is not merely intervening in Eastern European politics but, according to Putin, actively working to downgrade Russia to a second-class country and undermine its sovereignty. Putin views the war as key to reversing Russia’s declining status.

Because Putin and his inner circle view Ukraine to be a natural part of Russia, the possibility that Ukrainians would freely tie their fortunes to the West is inconceivable — Ukrainian elites must have been tricked, co-opted, or bribed. Some Russian propagandists have even described the war as one of “Russians killing Russians.”

Putin’s imperialism is not only confined to privately held beliefs. During COVID-19, he spent a great deal of time reading historical texts to prepare a 5000-word article on the alleged historic inseparability of Russia and Ukraine. What could such an undertaking have to do with NATO expansion?

Russia’s wartime conduct also provides strong evidence for the imperialism explanation. As mentioned above, Russia has gone to great lengths to destroy Ukrainian culture. It has rejected multiple peace deals that would have prevented Ukraine from joining NATO.

Russia’s wartime conduct also provides strong evidence for the imperialism explanation. As mentioned above, Russia has gone to great lengths to destroy Ukrainian culture. It has rejected multiple peace deals that would have prevented Ukraine from joining NATO. Putin saw these as failing to address the conflict’s “root causes,” arguably a euphemism for Ukrainian sovereignty. Instead, Russian conditions for peace include making Russian an official language, disbanding “nationalist” political parties, and ensuring the influence of Moscow’s Orthodox Church. These conditions smack of Russian chauvinism.

Of course, elites’ imperial beliefs do not necessarily lead to war. And indeed, Putin initially sought to control Ukraine through political measures, such as election interference. However, the authors argue that when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seized the assets of a key Putin ally, Putin realized his position was weakening. Russian security officials then assured Putin — likely out of fear — that overthrowing Ukraine’s government would be easy. This flawed decision-making process led to war. Readers will come away struck by how many lives have been lost while policy and scholarly debates remained focused on the NATO hypothesis.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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Aleeza Schoenberg Gelernt
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On March 11, 2026, the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program (JKISP) at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law hosted constitutional scholar Masua Sagiv for a discussion, part of its Israel Insights Webinar series, titled “Who Stands for Democracy? Understanding Israel’s Constitutional Crisis.” Moderated by Amichai Magen, Director of JKISP, the conversation explored how Israel’s ongoing war, political realignment, and institutional tensions are reshaping debates over the country’s democratic future. The discussion also unfolded in real time under wartime conditions: Sagiv briefly left the session to take shelter during a missile alert before returning to continue the conversation, a moment Magen noted reflected the realities of daily life in Israel.

Sagiv argued that the key political question in Israel’s next elections may be less about individual leaders than about the coalitions that emerge afterward. While Israeli politics has shifted rightward — especially on security issues since the Second Intifada and the October 7 attacks — she emphasized that future governments could vary widely depending on whether parties align with far-right and ultra-Orthodox partners or form broader centrist coalitions. Turning to Israel’s constitutional crisis, Sagiv said that broad agreement exists across political camps that reforms are needed to clarify the balance of power among the judiciary, executive, and legislature. Yet political mistrust has repeatedly derailed compromise proposals. Ultimately, she argued, resolving the crisis will require rebuilding trust across Israel’s ideological divides and establishing clearer constitutional “rules of the game” to stabilize the country’s democratic system.

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Israel Insights Webinar with Tomer Persico — Liberalism in Israel: Foundations, Development, and Crises

Thursday, April 16. Click for details and registration.
Israel Insights Webinar with Tomer Persico — Liberalism in Israel: Foundations, Development, and Crises
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Israel Insights Webinar with Ambassador Daniel Shapiro — US-Israel Security Relations: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?

Thursday, May 21. Click for details and registration.
Israel Insights Webinar with Ambassador Daniel Shapiro — US-Israel Security Relations: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?
Judea Pearl (R) in conversation with Amichai Magen (L) at the 2026 Daniel Pearl Memorial Lecture.
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Judea Pearl Examines Coexistence, Sovereignty Among Israelis, Palestinians

UCLA scholar reflects on history, legitimacy, and the prospects for two states at the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program’s annual Daniel Pearl Memorial Lecture.
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Constitutional scholar Masua Sagiv examines Israeli democracy, coalition politics, and institutional reform amid wartime pressures.

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On February 25, 2026, as part of the Israel Insights webinar series hosted by the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, former Mossad counterterrorism chief Oded Ailam — now a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs — discussed the evolving dynamics of the Israel–Hamas conflict and its broader regional and global implications.

Ailam argued that Hezbollah is currently weakened financially and constrained domestically in Lebanon but may increasingly rely on overseas attacks against Israeli, American, and Jewish targets to demonstrate loyalty to Iran. He also contended that Hamas is becoming less dependent on Iran as support from Turkey and Qatar grows, forming what he described as a new axis of political, financial, and military backing. According to Ailam, Hamas is unlikely to relinquish its weapons or influence in Gaza and will instead attempt to retain control behind the scenes even under a potential technocratic governing structure, casting doubt on the viability of proposed diplomatic frameworks.

The discussion also addressed concerns about global radicalization and dormant terrorist networks in Western countries, with Ailam emphasizing the role of state-backed ideological and financial influence in spreading extremism and calling for stronger Western responses and long-term deradicalization efforts.

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Israel Insights Webinar with Tomer Persico — Liberalism in Israel: Foundations, Development, and Crises

Thursday, April 16. Click for details and registration.
Israel Insights Webinar with Tomer Persico — Liberalism in Israel: Foundations, Development, and Crises
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Oded Ailam examines Hamas, Iran, and shifting Middle East alliances in an Israel Insights webinar hosted by the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program.

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SteveStedmanSeminar

Democracy and security coexist uneasily. Security asserts priority over democracy during emergencies, when democratic processes seem luxuries. Yet deference paid to security can sow the seeds of democracy’s destruction. This prospect is magnified now, as both popular and elite usages of security in the United States have reached their highest levels in history. A short list of recent threats to national security alleged by our leaders includes unions of government workers, wind turbines, Chinese automobiles, Chinese garlic, America’s lack of sovereignty over Greenland, and America’s declining birth rate.

Why is security discourse so pervasive now, and what does this mean for democracy? This talk addresses these questions through examining security's history, focusing on three problematic features — ambiguity, immeasurability, and amorality — and their implications for contemporary democracy.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Professor by Courtesy of Political Science, and Director of Stanford's Program in International Relations. He joined Stanford in 1997, initially at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, before moving to the Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law (CDDRL) in 2010. Previously, he taught at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Washington University in St. Louis.

Professor Stedman has led three major global commissions examining critical aspects of international security and democracy. From 2003-2004, he served as Research Director for the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and in 2005 as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. This work produced the landmark report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) and led to significant institutional innovations, including the UN peacebuilding architecture (commission, support office, and fund), the mediation support office, a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and streamlined decision-making processes for the Secretary General. From 2010 to 2012, he directed the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, which published Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide (2012). From 2018 to 2020, he served as Secretary General of the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age, which examined how social media and the internet affect democratic processes, resulting in Protecting Electoral Integrity in the Digital Age (2020).

Professor Stedman's research spans mediation, civil war termination, international institutions, American foreign policy, and democracy. His work has appeared in leading journals, including The Lancet, International Security, Foreign Affairs, Journal of Democracy, International Affairs, International Studies Review, and Boston Review. His co-authored book Power and Responsibility (Brookings, 2009) drew praise from Brent Scowcroft, who wrote that "the vision, ideas, and solutions the authors put forward…have the potential to redeem American foreign policy."

A dedicated teacher, Professor Stedman has directed the Fisher Family Honors Program at CDDRL since 2015 and received Stanford's Dinkelspiel Award in 2018 for outstanding contributions to undergraduate education. 

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. If prompted for a password, use: 123456

Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Conference Room E-008 in Encina Hall, East, may attend in person.

CDDRL
Encina Hall, C152
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2705 (650) 724-2996
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
Stedman_Steve.jpg PhD

Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, and will be faculty director of the Program on International Relations in the School of Humanities and Sciences effective Fall 2025.

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance.

In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.

His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Director, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law
Director, Program in International Relations
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Stephen J. Stedman Senior Fellow Presenter Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
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