STANFORD, Calif., February 14, 2008—Stanford Law School today announced that O’Melveny & Myers law firm and a number of its current and retired partners have committed $1.5 million over five years to permanently endow the Warren Christopher Professorship of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy. The gift is one of the largest from a law firm to fund a faculty position at the law school.

The joint appointment between Stanford Law School and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) was first established as a visiting position in fall 2003 to pay tribute to Warren Christopher, a former Secretary of State of the United States and an alumnus of Stanford Law School. Christopher is considered by many to be the consummate lawyer-statesman—multifaceted and unsurpassed in his ability to bridge the gap between national interests and global affairs, and public service and private enterprise. Among his many accomplishments, his negotiations played a key role in the release of American hostages in Iran; he chaired the commission that investigated the Rodney King assault and subsequent riots in Los Angeles; and he served on the California Hate Crimes Task Force. Today he continues as a senior partner at O’Melveny & Myers, and is co-chair—along with former Secretary James A. Baker III—of the National War Powers Commission.

“This gift, in honor of one of the nation’s greatest statesmen, provides a lasting endowment to support the study and teaching of international issues that impact the world and its future,” said Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer. “What we teach our students about practicing law in a global context—whether it’s about easing relationships between governments, or conducting cross-border transactional work for private parties—has been profoundly shaped by all that Warren Christopher has accomplished over his lifetime.”

Because most lawyers have a multinational dimension to their practice today, the law school is expanding its international law program and shaping its entire curriculum to better prepare its graduates to practice across national borders. The Warren Christopher chair is a key part of that transformation.

“We are delighted to support the Christopher chair and thereby to recognize Warren Christopher’s many accomplishments, and his continuing example and service,” said A.B. Culvahouse, chairman of O’Melveny & Myers. “The values that Chris represents are those of our firm, and we are pleased that the Christopher chair will continue to honor Warren Christopher’s excellence, leadership and citizenship.”

Stanford Law School’s innovative curriculum immerses students in the theory and practice of international law through combined legal, business organization, and policy studies. The faculty approaches international law not just as a subject for academic inquiry but also as a force for change in the world. They fundamentally understand how law operates in relation to governments, international organizations, and the global economy because they have practiced international law in these contexts. For example, faculty who teach public international law and international human rights have served as lawyers in the U.S. Department of State and litigated terrorism cases before the Supreme Court of the United States. Faculty who teach international deal making and arbitration have completed complex international transactions and litigated disputes over international agreements. Along with teaching international human rights law, international criminal law, and international administrative law, the law school also teaches international trade, international business, comparative law, international tax, international administrative law—and the interplay between public and private law in the global arena.

The idea for the Christopher chair was driven by Stanford Law School alumnus Richard L. Morningstar, former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, and his wife Faith Morningstar. Many other supporters joined the Morningstars in initially underwriting the professorship, including Edison International and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, of which Christopher is a former chairman. O’Melveny & Myers partner Steve Warren spearheaded the firm’s gift effort.

"We are so pleased that O’Melveny & Myers has chosen to give this magnificent gift in honor of one of the most inspirational statesmen of the 20th century," said Coit D. Blacker, director of FSI. "This gift will ensure that Warren Christopher's legacy, his commitment to public policy, and his exemplary service to our nation will live on for generations of Stanford students."

In 2003, Allen S. Weiner was appointed as the inaugural Warren Christopher Professor of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy as a visiting chair, both to Stanford Law School and the Stanford Institute for International Studies (the precursor to FSI). Weiner is a former State Department attaché and legal counselor for the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, and is involved in the effort to stop global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During his tenure as Warren Christopher Professor of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy, Weiner taught and conducted research in the fields of public international law and foreign relations law of the United States. Weiner remains at Stanford Law School as a senior lecturer in international law, co-director of the Stanford Program in International Law, and co-director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN).

Following Allen Weiner, William H. Taft IV was appointed to the Warren Christopher Professorship of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy through the 2007-2008 school year, teaching Contemporary Issues in International Law and Diplomacy and Foreign Relations Law. Like Weiner, he also joined FSI at Stanford as a visiting scholar. Taft is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and U.S. Ambassador to NATO. He served at the Federal Trade Commission, in the Office of Management and Budget, was general counsel at the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and was the U.S. Department of State's Legal Advisor, the highest legal position in the department. Taft also worked for several years in private practice, and is currently of counsel in the Washington D.C. office of Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson.

About Stanford Law School

Stanford Law School is one of the nation’s leading institutions for legal scholarship and education. Its alumni are among the most influential decision makers in law, politics, business, and high technology. Faculty members argue before the Supreme Court, testify before Congress, and write books and articles for academic audiences, as well as the popular press. Along with offering traditional law school classes, the school has embraced new subjects and new ways of teaching.

About the Freeman Spogli Institute

The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) is Stanford University's primary center for rigorous and innovative research on the major international issues and challenges of our time. FSI builds on Stanford's impressive intellectual strengths and exacting academic standards through interdisciplinary research conducted by its university-wide faculty, researchers, and visiting scholars.

New York and Stanford, CA., Jan. 10, 2008 -- With South Koreans having elected a new president last month and Americans going to the polls in November to choose a new leader, Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the New York-based Korea Society today announced the formation of a non-partisan group of distinguished American former senior officials and experts to study ways to strengthen the alliance between the two countries.

The New Beginnings' study group will gather at the end of the month at Stanford University to discuss and analyze the implications of the Korean election for alliance relations. The group will then proceed to Seoul in early February for meetings with South Korean President-elect Lee Myung-bak and his top aides, as well as other leading figures in Korean business, academic, media and policy circles. Based on these meetings, the group will prepare a report in March on their findings and recommendations to present to American policymakers, including those from the leading U.S. presidential campaigns.

Korea Society President Evans J.R. Revere and Stanford University Professor Gi-Wook Shin said group members believe that U.S.-South Korean relations are critically important to the United States' role in East Asia and that the inauguration of new administrations in both the U.S. and South Korea offers a unique opportunity to create "new beginnings" in the alliance relationship.

They also noted that the two presidential elections coincide with a critical phase in multinational talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and that close U.S.-South Korean cooperation is essential to successful diplomacy in dealing with North Korea.

Shin and Revere said that the Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, after initial policy differences over North Korea especially, had recently significantly improved their cooperation, but that the two countries could do much more to strengthen bilateral relations.

Shin and Revere said they regarded the study project as a continuing collaborative effort by their two institutions. After issuing the report in March, they intend to continue to meet with U.S. and South Korean policymakers and other leaders. They plan to update the report and recommendations after the U.S. presidential election.

Study group members are:

• Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University
• Stephen W. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a former State Department Northeast Asia intelligence chief
• Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies and D.S. Song Professor at Georgetown University, and former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council and U.S. deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks in the George W. Bush administration
• Thomas C. Hubbard, Kissinger McLarty Associates, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Don Oberdorfer, chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and former longtime Washington Post foreign correspondent
• Charles L. Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., and former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea
• Evans J.R. Revere, president of the Korea Society, and former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; and professor of sociology at Stanford University
• Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist
• David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director

Reprinted with permission from Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company and The Washington Post

As the year draws to a close, it's important to note that the U.S. debate on Iran is stalled, trapped between "regime changers" vs. "arms controllers," "hawks" vs. "doves," and "idealists" vs. "realists." The National Intelligence Estimate released this month offers an opportunity to escape this straitjacketed debate by embracing a new strategy that would pursue both the short-term goal of arms control and the long-term goal of democracy in Iran.

The NIE's "key judgment" that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program has thrust the arms controllers onto center stage. Because the nuclear threat is no longer immediate, the arms controllers insist that the time is ripe for the United States to engage in direct diplomacy with Tehran as a way to change the regime's behavior, but not the regime itself -- specifically, to persuade the mullahs to suspend their nuclear enrichment program.

Those who profess to back regime change claim that the NIE changes nothing and that the United States should continue to use coercive power, potentially including military strikes, to counter Tehran.

Both sides have part of the strategy right, but on its own neither offers a long-term vision for dealing with Iran.

It is folly to assume that advocates of military strikes are in the same camp as those who advocate regime change. There is no better way to prolong the life of the autocratic regime in Tehran, to strengthen increasingly weakened radicals such as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, than bombing Iran. Thankfully, the NIE has made military strikes less likely.

But the estimate provides no evidence to suggest that Iran's regime has changed its ways to be more compatible with American national interests or the interests of the Iranian people. The regime continues to repress its own people; supports terrorist organizations that threaten Israel and destabilize the governments in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories; and still has not suspended its enrichment program, the key aspect of developing a nuclear weapon. Iran's suspension of its military nuclear program in 2003 was a tactical response to revelations about the clandestine operation, not a fundamental shift in strategic thinking.

To presume, therefore, that the NIE gives the United States license to bargain with Iran over its enrichment program and forgo any pressure on the regime is also folly. Focusing solely on enrichment would play into the hands of the mullahs, who see how the NIE has weakened the coalition in support of serious sanctions. They have every incentive to stretch out any negotiations -- while continuing to develop their enrichment program. Days after the NIE was made public, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran plans to have a cascade of 50,000 centrifuges, surely enough to make highly enriched uranium. American diplomatic tools to alter this behavior are extremely weak. Moreover, this strategy gives Iran a free pass on its support for terrorism and human rights abuses.

The United States and its allies must develop an Iran strategy that establishes both short- and long-term goals. Specifically, the United States must recommit to a policy of encouraging democratization inside Iran, because only a democratic regime will stop supporting terrorist groups abroad and repression at home. A democratic Iran is also less likely to restart a nuclear weapons program, especially if the United States and a new Iranian regime establish close military ties, a likely outcome.

Although counterintuitive to some, diplomatic engagement is required to pursue the long-term goal of democratization and, in parallel, the short-term goal of arms control. The first American offer of direct talks should include everything: the prospect of formal diplomatic relations and the lifting of sanctions; the potential supply and disposal of nuclear fuel (from a third-party organization or state); suspension of nuclear enrichment; an end to aid to Hezbollah and Hamas; and a serious discussion about stopping the arrests of students and human rights advocates and the persecution of union leaders and religious minorities. Discussion of new security institutions in the region should also be on the table. America's experience dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War demonstrates that we can engage a despotic regime without compromising our commitment to democracy and human rights.

Greater contact between Iranian and American societies will further undermine the regime's legitimacy, strengthen the independence of Iranian economic and political groups, and perhaps even compel some regime leaders to cash out and exchange their diminishing political power for enduring property rights. Over the past four decades, autocratic regimes have rarely crumbled as a result of isolation but more often have collapsed when seeking to engage with the West. Even the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred not when tensions between Moscow and Washington were high but during a period of engagement.

Will Iran follow a similar path? We will never know if we do not try. Of course, the mullahs might reject our overtures, but their refusal would embolden the opposition inside Iran. And a serious attempt to engage the Islamic republic now would strengthen the American case for more coercive diplomatic and economic pressure, should they be necessary in the future.

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