On Wednesday, January 14, the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law welcomed Ambassador Dennis Ross — a veteran U.S. negotiator in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and advisor on Middle East policy — to discuss his latest book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World. Ambassador Ross joined former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, FSI, and the Woods Institute for the Environment, in a conversation moderated by Amichai Magen, director of the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program.

Magen explained that Ambassador Ross’s book focuses on Russia and China, and McFaul’s latest book, Autocrats Vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, focuses on several locations, with an emphasis on the Middle East. Both former ambassadors, Magen explained, sought to make sense of an era of geopolitical fluidity, approaching from a liberal internationalist perspective. The former ambassadors discussed the place of America in the world order, the decline of a rule-based international order and the development of a disorderly world, and the meaning of liberalism. The seminar concluded with a focus on Iran’s role in the Middle East and the roles of force and diplomacy in the geopolitical landscape.

Sunday morning, we awoke to the good news that Jesús Armas, a Venezuelan civic leader and 2022 alumnus of the Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), had been released from prison after more than a year in detention. He was forcibly disappeared and detained in Venezuela by security forces in December 2024 following the country’s stolen presidential election earlier that year. We are deeply relieved that he is now free from imprisonment in El Helicoide — a place, Jesús wrote upon his release, “that has been a symbol of torture, evil, and authoritarianism.”

Jesús is a dedicated public servant, engineer, and activist who has worked bravely with the opposition to promote peaceful democratic participation, free and fair elections, and civic unity in Venezuela. His detention occurred amid a broader wave of arrests targeting opposition organizers, journalists, and civil society actors in the country, and his case drew sustained international concern.

Reflecting on his experience, Jesús wrote that “nobody should be behind bars for thinking differently,” underscoring the principle that peaceful dissent must not be met with imprisonment.

We hope this development contributes to continued progress toward the release of all individuals unjustly detained for peaceful civic and political engagement, in Venezuela and beyond, and toward renewed respect for human dignity, fundamental rights, and the rule of law.

On February 5, 2026, Natalie Letsa, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina and previously a 2018-19 CDDRL postdoctoral fellow, presented the argument and contributions made in her book, The Autocratic Voter: Partisanship and Political Socialization under Dictatorship. The book addresses the question: Why do some citizens choose to get involved in politics, while others do not? And, for those who get involved, why do some support the opposition, while others support the ruling party?  

In the context of electoral autocracies, the book argues, social identity theory provides a model of partisanship, rather than rationalist or materialist theories. This argument rests on three key parts:

• Part 1: “Ruling Party Partisan" and “Opposition Partisan” are unique social identities that have common meaning across electoral autocracies.
• Part 2: Processes of partisan socialization occur within social networks.
• Part 3: The political orientations of social networks are constrained by the structural homophily created by the political geography of electoral autocracies.
   

Within the idea that “ruling party partisan” and “opposition partisan” are social identities, ruling party partisans trust the regime and believe it is democratic, whereas opposition partisans do not. Amongst these identities, out-group animus occurs, but opposition partisans experience stronger animus. Letsa looked at two questions from the World Values Survey: "How democratic is your country today?" and “How satisfied are you with the political system?” Results found that partisans in electoral autocracies are divided on these questions, whereas partisans in democracies are not.

On social networks, Letsa argues that people raised by partisans are more likely to adopt partisan identities, and that people with party activists in their networks are more likely to do so. Lastly, Letsa asserts that people with more politically homogenous social networks are more likely to adopt partisan identities. When conducting an original survey in Cameroon, Letsa found that citizens with social networks that fully support the opposition are five times more likely to be opposition partisans themselves than citizens with no opposition partisans in their social networks.

On geography, Letsa argued that opposition strongholds are severely constrained in electoral autocracies, producing extreme structural homophily. Because of this structural homophily, the political orientation of a social network is largely determined by its physical location. However, political geography does not only affect the identities of partisans in party strongholds; it also predicts the political beliefs of nonpartisans and out-party partisans in these places. To test this, Letsa examined survey data from Cameroon and found that the average respondent living in an extreme ruling-party stronghold has a network composed of 29% opposition supporters. The average respondent living in an extreme opposition party stronghold has a network made up of 59% opposition supporters.

The Autocratic Voter offers a unified theory of partisanship that explains both support for the ruling party and for the opposition. It presents a new framework for understanding public opinion and political behavior in electoral autocracies. Finally, it bridges research on democracy and autocracy.

The January 28, 2026, Israel Insights Webinar hosted by the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program and moderated by Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies Or Rabinowitz featured security experts Sima Shine and Raz Zimmt. Analyzing the growing likelihood of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, they said that despite Iran’s proxy strategy's failure to prevent escalation and rising domestic pressure, Tehran remains committed to rebuilding Hezbollah and other allied groups. Shine and Zimmt said that a future war—likely more expansive than previous exchanges—could involve strikes on leadership, economic, and symbolic targets. They discussed Israel’s desire for U.S. leadership in any major military action against Iran and Gulf states’ strong opposition to war and instability and preference for a negotiated U.S.–Iran agreement. Skeptical that external military action will yield rapid democratic change in Iran, they argued a more viable transformation likely requires gradual emergence within the regime.

A full recording of the webinar can be viewed above.

In January and February of 2026, Alon Tal, Former Member of Knesset and Professor in the Department of Public Policy at Tel Aviv University, spoke in the Stanford course, "Sustainable Societies Lab: Exploring Israel’s Innovation Ecosystem in Human & Planetary Health – Pathways to Peace.” During his visit, he caught up with Amichai Magen, Director of the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program at CDDRL. They discussed the atmosphere and sentiment on the ground in Israel as Israelis begin preparing for the first national elections since the launch of the Netanyahu coalition government's controversial "judicial overhaul" campaign in January 2023 and the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack. 

They set out seven principles for understanding Israeli elections, democracy, and electoral politics, and seven key questions about the upcoming elections.

A full recording of the webinar can be viewed above.

In a CDDRL research seminar held on January 29, 2026, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, presented her human rights theory of democracy to explain democratic backsliding. Arat’s research shows how economic and social policies have contributed to the decline of democracies worldwide since the mid-twentieth century. While democratic decline was once primarily associated with developing countries, it has now become a global concern, visible as the rise of electoral authoritarianism, hybrid regimes, illiberal democracies, and right-wing populism.

Arat’s theory upholds that democracy’s stability depends on maintaining a balance between two sets of human rights: civil and political rights and social and economic rights. Civil and political rights such as freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rights to political participation, are critical components of democracy. Social and economic rights include the right to work, labor rights, education, healthcare, housing, food, an adequate standard of living, and social security. Arat argued that while democracies maintain relatively high levels of civil and political rights, successive governments may neglect social and economic rights, leading to the emergence of a growing gap between the two sets of rights. This imbalance leads to a legitimacy crisis. As citizens begin to question the government’s ability to respond to everyday struggles and provide basic welfare, the government or an alternative elite triggers a process that ultimately undermines democratic stability.

Arat outlined a three-phase process through which democratic decline unfolds. In the first phase, democratization begins, and civil and political rights expand rapidly, while social and economic rights remain stagnant. Although a gap exists between the two sets of rights, the expansion of political freedoms provides legitimacy to the new democratic system. In the second phase, civil and political rights stabilize while social and economic rights stagnate or decline, creating an imbalance that fuels social and political unrest. In the third phase, governments that are unwilling or unable to improve social and economic conditions respond by limiting civil and political rights, ultimately marking the decline of democracy.

Arat examined democratic decline for two major eras. During the Cold War, politics focused on class-based movements such as labor and student activism, while governments responded with authoritarian measures justified by anti-communism. Many developing countries followed uneven development models and trickle-down economics that promised rapid economic growth. However, in the post-Cold War era, the neoliberal economic paradigm, which seeks privatization, deregulation, labor flexibility, and reduced government services, spread across both developing and developed countries. Although promoted as efficient, these reforms weakened social and economic rights and increased public dissatisfaction. At the same time, political struggles and claims shifted toward identity politics.

Arat described this as a “convergence of fundamentalisms.” She referred to neoliberalism as “market fundamentalism,” which prioritizes the private sector and markets, reducing the public sector's role and resulting in declining employment, reduced social services, and growing inequality. Along with the rise of neoliberalism, religious and nationalist fundamentalisms gained strength, increasing cultural tensions around gender identity and roles, minority rights, immigration, and national identity. Furthermore, instead of addressing the social and economic rights violations caused by neoliberal policies, governments reverted to cultural politics to manage public frustration.

These cultural strategies served as a divide-and-rule approach. Political leaders frame social problems around internal and external enemies, such as minorities, immigrants, feminists, global/cosmopolitan elites, and intergovernmental organizations, redirecting anger away from economic policy failures. This populist rhetoric divides society into “victims” and “others,” while promoting strong leadership as the solution to the grievances of “authentic and legitimate” citizens. Through this process, governments are able to maintain neoliberal economic structures while simultaneously weakening civil and political rights and shrinking the democratic space.

Arat concluded that democratic decline cannot be understood without recognizing the central role of social and economic rights. While inequality is important, it would not be destabilizing by itself; the erosion of welfare systems and the government's failure to meet basic human needs create conditions of instability and loss of legitimacy. Hence, as long as neoliberal policies continue to undermine social and economic rights, democracies remain vulnerable to backsliding and authoritarianism.