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No último domingo (4), 125 milhões de brasileiros e brasileiras foram às urnas para dizer que futuro vislumbram para o país. Seus votos renovaram as Assembleias Legislativas, a Câmara dos Deputados e dois terços do Senado Federal, elegeram governadores em parte dos estados e levaram a disputa presidencial ao segundo turno. O senador Flávio Bolsonaro, filho do ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro, terminou em primeiro lugar, com 47% dos votos válidos, contra 45% do presidente Lula, resultado que contrariou as pesquisas que apontavam o petista à frente. Outros 33 milhões de eleitores não compareceram, a maior abstenção desde 1998.

O retrato que emerge é o de uma enorme insatisfação com o estado atual da democracia e de um país voltado à extrema direita. Com o novo desenho do Congresso — em que a extrema direita e seus aliados mais próximos ocuparão mais da metade das cadeiras nas duas Casas —, a profunda crise em torno do Supremo Tribunal Federal e o risco de ascensão de um governo antidemocrático ao poder, o Brasil nunca esteve tão perto de esfacelar o pacto democrático consagrado na Constituição de 1988.

Para o público internacional, a percepção do eleitorado de que a democracia brasileira não vai bem pode soar contraintuitiva. Afinal, nos últimos quatro anos, o Brasil foi apontado por muitos como exemplo de resiliência democrática — reputação associada, em grande parte, à responsabilização daqueles que tentaram um golpe de Estado em janeiro de 2023 e ao retorno do país à sua tradição diplomática. Mas a democracia brasileira vai muito além do que ocorreu em 2023, e é preciso dar um passo atrás para compreender o tamanho do desafio que se aproxima.

A Constituição Cidadã


A Constituição de 1988 estabeleceu um ordenamento jurídico marcado pela ampla garantia de direitos universais e por uma abertura inédita à participação da sociedade civil na construção das instituições do país. Durante o processo constituinte, cerca de 10 mil pessoas circulavam diariamente pelo Congresso Nacional, cerca de 9 milhões visitaram o Congresso ao longo dos trabalhos e foram apresentadas 122 emendas populares, que reuniram mais de 12 milhões de assinaturas. Mas a Constituição não se limitou a ampliar direitos e canais de participação: também lançou as bases para o equilíbrio entre os Três Poderes da República — Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário —, ao distribuir competências, estabelecer mecanismos de controle mútuo e buscar evitar a concentração de poder.

O arranjo que emergiu desse desenho ficou conhecido como presidencialismo de coalizão, expressão cunhada pelo cientista político Sérgio Abranches. Nesse modelo, o Executivo federal tem papel forte no controle do orçamento, mas depende de uma coalizão pluripartidária para levar adiante seu projeto de país. Como é praticamente impossível para um único partido obter maioria isolada nas duas Casas, as coalizões são necessárias para construir, no Congresso Nacional, maiorias capazes de aprovar a agenda do governo eleito. O Judiciário, por sua vez, atuou historicamente para solucionar questões constitucionais que não haviam sido resolvidas pelos outros dois Poderes.

A balança começa a se inclinar: a contestação eleitoral e a ascensão do Legislativo


Esse equilíbrio começou a rachar de maneira contundente em 2014. Pela primeira vez desde a redemocratização, o candidato derrotado na eleição presidencial colocou em dúvida a lisura do sistema eleitoral, até então motivo de orgulho nacional. Esse grave precedente deixou marcas em nossa democracia e abriu caminho para narrativas antidemocráticas que, desde então, se reproduzem de maneira cada vez mais sofisticada.

Pouco tempo depois, o rompimento histórico entre o então presidente da Câmara dos Deputados, Eduardo Cunha, e a presidenta Dilma Rousseff resultou na deflagração de um processo de impeachment por supostos crimes de responsabilidade ligados a práticas fiscais que, quando analisadas, tinham precedentes em gestões anteriores sem que jamais tivessem motivado um processo dessa natureza. Nesse sentido, o impeachment de Rousseff diverge do processo sofrido pelo ex-presidente Fernando Collor de Mello em 1992, no qual veio à tona um esquema de corrupção que custeava despesas pessoais do presidente.

Em outras palavras, não era a prática em si o motivo do processo, mas a insatisfação política de parte da base governista que decidiu, pela primeira vez, punir uma prática fiscal até então amplamente aceita por toda a classe política. A insurreição de parte da base de Rousseff no Congresso não apenas a tirou do poder: inaugurou um choque aberto entre o Legislativo e o Executivo, com a anuência, à época, do Judiciário, no que se desenhou como um “grande acordo nacional”.

Aquele período deixou outro legado importante de desequilíbrio entre os Poderes. Em 2015, o Congresso Nacional aprovou uma emenda constitucional que obrigava o Executivo a executar as emendas parlamentares individuais. Emendas parlamentares são instrumentos que permitem a deputados e senadores propor alterações na Lei Orçamentária Anual, direcionando recursos públicos para obras, projetos e benfeitorias nos estados e municípios que representam. Elas se dividem de acordo com quem as propõe: as emendas individuais são apresentadas por cada parlamentar; as de bancada estadual, pelos deputados e senadores de cada estado em conjunto; as de comissão, pelas comissões permanentes do Congresso; e as de relator, pelo relator-geral, parlamentar responsável pelo projeto de lei orçamentária. A obrigatoriedade aprovada em 2015 — o chamado orçamento impositivo — alcançava apenas as emendas individuais, limitadas a 1,2% da receita corrente líquida da União.

Com a chegada de Jair Bolsonaro ao poder, esse desequilíbrio ganha outra proporção. Em 2019, duas novas emendas constitucionais aprofundam o movimento. A primeira torna obrigatória também a execução das emendas de bancada estadual. A segunda divide as emendas individuais em duas modalidades. As emendas com finalidade definida continuam vinculadas a um projeto específico, como um posto de saúde ou a pavimentação de uma rua. Já as novas transferências especiais, apelidadas de “emendas Pix”, permitem enviar recursos do Congresso diretamente a estados e municípios sem mecanismos claros de transparência.

As emendas de relator mudam ainda mais. Até então, o relator-geral as utilizava sobretudo para ajustes técnicos no projeto, muitas vezes para recompor recursos de programas do próprio Executivo. Em 2020, elas ganham um identificador próprio no orçamento, o RP9, e se tornam o núcleo do chamado “orçamento secreto”: bilhões de reais distribuídos a pedido de parlamentares cujos nomes não eram divulgados. Depois que o Supremo declara a prática inconstitucional, em dezembro de 2022, o Congresso eleva o teto das emendas individuais para 2% da receita corrente líquida. Também passa a usar as emendas de comissão, até então pouco relevantes, como o novo canal desses recursos.
 


 

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Budget amendments committed by type, 2014—2026. Source: Central das Emendas, adapted. Painel de Dados accessed on October 7, 2026; it draws on Portal da Transparência (CGU) amendment and expenditure-document data.

 

Emendas parlamentares empenhadas por tipo, 2014—2026. Fonte: Central das Emendas, adaptado. Painel de Dados acessado em 7 de outubro de 2026, com base em dados de emendas e de documentos de despesa do Portal da Transparência (CGU).



A anuência do Executivo, então sob a liderança de Bolsonaro, a essa cessão de controle sobre o orçamento federal deu ao Congresso Nacional um poder jamais previsto no equilíbrio desenhado em 1988 e transformou a dinâmica política do país. As bancadas parlamentares perdem o interesse em compor a base governista e passam a priorizar a influência dentro do próprio Congresso, onde acessam grandes montantes de recursos sem transparência nem intermediação do Executivo.

O maior controle do orçamento, porém, não explica todo o processo de empoderamento do Legislativo: um relatório recente da Fundação FHC mostra que o Congresso vem ganhando terreno sobre o Executivo há duas décadas, impulsionado pela emenda constitucional de 2001 que pôs fim à reedição indefinida de medidas provisórias, pelo fortalecimento de sua capacidade técnica e por práticas informais que concentraram poder nas mãos do presidente da Câmara.

Esse conjunto de elementos consolidou uma nova correlação de forças entre os Poderes da República. Quando Lula da Silva retorna ao poder em 2023, o Executivo está muito mais dependente do Legislativo para operar o orçamento federal e avançar sua agenda de governo.

Judiciário: de bastião da democracia a alvo de descrédito


Durante o governo de Jair Bolsonaro, o Judiciário teve papel central na contenção de retrocessos, à medida que Executivo e Legislativo avançavam com pautas flagrantemente contrárias à Constituição de 1988. Esse crescimento de atuação é compatível com o conceito de democracia militante de Karl Loewenstein, cunhado em 1937, no qual um mecanismo institucional do Estado é ativado para defender a ordem democrática de atores que usam de suas liberdades democráticas para destruir o próprio sistema.

Essa ativação, porém, não contou com a ação da Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR), órgão com a prerrogativa legal de promover ações penais contra autoridades com foro privilegiado — inclusive o Presidente da República. O procurador-geral da República durante a maior parte do mandato de Bolsonaro foi Augusto Aras, procurador escolhido pelo Presidente que teve sua gestão marcada pela omissão sobre ações perpetradas pelo Governo Federal e pelo Legislativo. Coube à sociedade civil, e outros setores importantes do país, o uso da litigância estratégica para ativar esse cordão de isolamento protagonizado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Como resultado, houve uma desaceleração no grave processo de desintegração de direitos econômicos, sociais, culturais, ambientais e políticos naquele período.

Em resposta às ações mais robustas do Judiciário, o governo Bolsonaro e sua base passaram a promover sérios ataques contra o STF e seus ministros, inaugurando uma etapa em que um campo político questiona abertamente a lisura do Judiciário e chega a perseguir determinados juízes da Corte. Só em 2021, Bolsonaro chamou de “imbecil” o ministro Luís Roberto Barroso, então presidente do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, por se opor ao voto impresso, e pediu ao Senado o impeachment do ministro Alexandre de Moraes.

A tensão entre o campo político do ex-presidente e o Judiciário atingiu novos patamares nas eleições de 2022 e na subsequente tentativa de golpe de Estado, que culminou no ataque às sedes dos Três Poderes. As ações incisivas do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral e do Supremo Tribunal Federal foram centrais para evitar a ruptura da ordem institucional, garantindo tanto a segurança de um pleito diretamente afetado pelo governo em exercício quanto a responsabilização jurídica dos envolvidos na tentativa de golpe.

A maior barreira de contenção das crises até então passou a enfrentar o descrédito da opinião pública e a ser alvo de uma nova arma da extrema direita: a ameaça de impeachment de ministros do Supremo pelo Senado, que detém essa prerrogativa constitucional, desde que a condenação seja aprovada por dois terços de seus membros.

Se as acusações da extrema direita contra a Suprema Corte não encontravam respaldo nos fatos quando se tratava da defesa das eleições e da responsabilização pelos crimes contra a democracia, um enorme escândalo de corrupção complicaria esse cenário. Em 2025, o país conheceu o caso do Banco Master, instituição financeira utilizada para a venda de títulos bancários sem lastro e associada ao desvio bilionário de recursos públicos de diversas origens, além de relações suspeitas com pessoas em todos os Poderes da República, incluindo ministros do Supremo. Um dos nomes mencionados na investigação é o de Alexandre de Moraes, o mesmo ministro que presidiu o Tribunal Superior Eleitoral nas eleições de 2022 e conduziu os processos de responsabilização pelos crimes contra o Estado de Direito após a tentativa de golpe — e que, embora seja comumente associado ao presidente Lula, foi indicado anos antes pelo então presidente Michel Temer. A cobertura da investigação também citou outros cinco ministros ou seus familiares: Dias Toffoli, que deixou a relatoria do caso Master em fevereiro, André Mendonça, Gilmar Mendes, Kassio Nunes Marques e Luiz Fux. Todos negam irregularidades.

Isso coloca a população brasileira diante de um dilema: como podem as ações corretas do Judiciário na proteção da democracia em 2022 e 2023 terem sido conduzidas pela mesma Corte cujos integrantes hoje estão sob escrutínio por supostas ligações com atores privados responsáveis pelo desvio de bilhões de reais dos contribuintes?

2026: a tempestade perfeita e a resposta das urnas


O Brasil chega a 2026 sob uma tempestade perfeita: um Legislativo com amplos poderes sobre o orçamento federal, um Executivo enfraquecido, um Judiciário exposto em suas contradições e uma população esgotada por uma guerra de narrativas alimentada pela desinformação e pelo uso intensivo de recursos tecnológicos para amplificá-la. Esse cenário é agravado pelo imenso poder concentrado nas big techs, cujas práticas seguem marcadas pela falta de transparência sobre os critérios de moderação de conteúdo e as escolhas algorítmicas que moldam o debate público. Em meio a esse ambiente de fragmentação, bolhas, desconfiança e conflito permanente, há cada vez menos espaço para discutir projetos de país, construir consensos mínimos ou imaginar coletivamente saídas para a crise.

Um exemplo concreto do esfacelamento do equilíbrio entre os Poderes foi a rejeição, pelo Senado, do nome indicado pelo Presidente da República ao Supremo Tribunal Federal em abril deste ano — algo que não acontecia desde 1894. O Brasil dá sinais claros de que o pacto de 1988 está se desfazendo, e serão as forças vencedoras das eleições de 2026 que ditarão o que virá depois.

Com o resultado de 4 de outubro, o eleitorado consolidou a extrema direita como a maior força na Câmara dos Deputados e no Senado. As ameaças de impeachment de ministros do Supremo ganham concretude, e o próximo Presidente da República terá a prerrogativa de nomear quatro ministros para a Corte: a vaga aberta com a aposentadoria de Luís Roberto Barroso, ainda não preenchida, e outras três que se abrirão à medida que ministros atingirem a idade de aposentadoria compulsória, 75 anos.

Em um contexto em que os ministros do Supremo têm sido escolhidos cada vez mais por afinidade política com o Presidente da República, um eventual governo de Flávio Bolsonaro, somado a uma ampla base extremista no Senado, poderá consolidar uma maioria sólida de juízes conservadores na Suprema Corte do país.

O 25 de outubro e o dia seguinte


O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e o senador Flávio Bolsonaro disputarão o segundo turno em 25 de outubro. Se a candidatura de extrema direita prevalecer, o equilíbrio entre os Poderes desenhado em 1988 dificilmente resistirá, já que as ameaças de alterar o texto constitucional começam a ser feitas às claras. Se o projeto democrático de Lula vencer, as fraturas em nossa democracia continuarão tão profundas que tampouco haverá garantia de que essa ordem se mantenha.

A decisão a ser tomada no próximo dia 25 não é difícil. O difícil começa no dia 26: encontrar um caminho que impeça uma das experiências democráticas mais vanguardistas do mundo de entrar em colapso.

Esse caminho começa por levar a sério o descontentamento que o primeiro turno escancarou. Parte da desconfiança dos brasileiros em relação às suas instituições foi deliberadamente fabricada, como demonstra a campanha de ataques ao sistema eleitoral ao longo da última década. Mas parte dela também está enraizada na realidade concreta do país. Somos uma sociedade profundamente desigual, marcada por relações sociais forjadas em quase quatro séculos de escravidão e, consequentemente, por estruturas persistentes de autoritarismo, violência e concentração de poder baseadas em classe, raça, gênero e heterocisnormatividade. Somam-se a isso instituições que ainda carecem de transparência, um Congresso que passou a controlar uma fatia crescente do orçamento federal por meio de mecanismos frequentemente questionados por sua opacidade e sucessivos casos de corrupção envolvendo diferentes Poderes e esferas do Estado — fragilidades institucionais que escândalos recentes, como o caso do Banco Master, voltaram a trazer ao centro do debate público.

A extrema direita não criou essa frustração, mas soube explorar com habilidade os ressentimentos que sustentam nossas relações sociais e nossa relação com as instituições, aprendendo a canalizá-los e a transformá-los em força política. E os 33 milhões de brasileiros que não foram às urnas em 4 de outubro, assim como os quase 6 milhões de votos brancos e nulos — mais do que o número de votos obtidos pelo candidato Augusto Cury, terceiro colocado na disputa presidencial — nos lembram que a desilusão também pode assumir a forma do silêncio ou do voto de protesto.

Nossas instituições não são imunes a críticas, e defender a democracia não pode significar defendê-las como estão, com todas as suas deficiências, falhas e contradições. Nenhum governo, ou quem quer que o lidere, encontrará esse caminho sozinho. Reconstruir o equilíbrio estabelecido em 1988 dependerá de instituições capazes de reconquistar a confiança perdida e de uma sociedade disposta a continuar disputando a forma como essas instituições e as políticas públicas são construídas, bem como a defender as regras do jogo, mesmo quando elas não favorecem o seu lado.

Natália Neris é Gerente de Advocacy no Pacto pela Democracia e doutora em Direitos Humanos pela Universidade de São Paulo. Sami Sternberg é Coordenador de Articulação Internacional no Pacto pela Democracia e mestre em Relações Internacionais pela Columbia University.

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Natália Neris e Sami Sternberg, representantes do Pacto pela Democracia — organização que participou da edição inaugural do Democracy Garage, da DAL —, argumentam que, independentemente de quem vença o segundo turno de 25 de outubro, o pacto democrático brasileiro enfrenta sua ameaça mais grave desde a promulgação da Constituição de 1988.

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On Sunday, October 4, 125 million Brazilians went to the polls to say what future they envision for their country. Their votes renewed state legislatures, the Chamber of Deputies, and two-thirds of the Federal Senate; elected governors in several states; and sent the presidential race to a runoff. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, finished first, with 47% of the valid votes to President Lula's 45%, a result that defied polls showing the incumbent ahead. Another 33 million voters stayed home, the highest abstention rate since 1998.

The picture that emerges is one of deep dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy, and of a country turning to the far right. Given the new makeup of Congress — in which the far right and its closest allies will occupy over half of the seats in both chambers — the profound crisis surrounding the Supreme Federal Court, and the risk of an anti-democratic government rising to power, Brazil has never been so close to shattering the democratic pact enshrined in its 1988 Constitution.

To international observers, Brazilian voters' sense that their democracy is not doing well may seem counterintuitive. After all, over the past four years, many have pointed to Brazil as an example of democratic resilience — a reputation largely tied to holding accountable those who attempted a coup in January 2023 and to the country's return to its diplomatic tradition. But Brazilian democracy goes far beyond what happened in 2023, and we need to take a step back to grasp the size of the challenge ahead.

The Citizen Constitution


The 1988 Constitution established a legal framework characterized by broad guarantees of universal rights and an unprecedented opening for civil society participation in shaping the country's institutions. During the constituent process, around 10,000 people circulated through the National Congress each day, about 9 million visited Congress over the course of the proceedings, and 122 popular amendments were submitted, gathering more than 12 million signatures. But the Constitution did more than expand rights and channels for participation: it also laid the foundations for a balance among the three branches of government — the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary — by distributing powers, establishing mechanisms of mutual oversight, and seeking to prevent the concentration of power.

The arrangement that emerged from this design became known as “coalition presidentialism,” a term coined by political scientist Sérgio Abranches. Under this model, the federal Executive plays a strong role in controlling the budget but depends on a multiparty coalition to carry out its agenda for the country. Since it is virtually impossible for a single party to win a majority on its own in either chamber, coalitions are needed to build majorities in Congress capable of passing the elected government's agenda. The Judiciary, for its part, historically acted to resolve constitutional questions that the other two branches had left unsettled.

The Scales Begin to Tip: Electoral Challenges and the Rise of Congress


This balance began to crack in earnest in 2014. For the first time since Brazil's return to democracy, the losing presidential candidate cast doubt on the integrity of the electoral system, which until then had been a source of national pride. This serious precedent left its mark on our democracy and paved the way for anti-democratic narratives that have since grown ever more sophisticated.

Shortly afterward, the historic rupture between then-Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Cunha and President Dilma Rousseff led to the opening of impeachment proceedings over alleged “crimes of responsibility,” Brazil's equivalent of impeachable offenses, tied to fiscal practices that, on closer inspection, had precedents in previous administrations without ever having triggered a process of this kind. In this sense, Rousseff's impeachment differs from the one faced by former President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992, which uncovered a corruption scheme that paid for the president's personal expenses.

In other words, the practice itself was not the reason for the process; it was the political discontent of part of the governing coalition that decided, for the first time, to punish a fiscal practice until then widely accepted across the political class. The revolt of part of Rousseff's base in Congress did not merely remove her from office: it opened an era of open confrontation between the Legislature and the Executive, with the acquiescence, at the time, of the Judiciary, in what came to be described as a “grand national agreement.”

That period left another important legacy of imbalance between the branches. In 2015, Congress passed a constitutional amendment requiring the Executive to fund individual budget amendments. Budget amendments are instruments that allow deputies and senators to change the annual budget law, directing public funds to public works, projects, and improvements in the states and municipalities they represent, much like what Americans know as earmarks. They are classified by who proposes them. Individual amendments come from each legislator. State delegation amendments come from the lawmakers of each state acting together. Committee amendments come from the standing committees of Congress. Rapporteur amendments come from the general rapporteur, the legislator in charge of the budget bill. The 2015 requirement, known as the “mandatory budget,” applied only to individual amendments, capped at 1.2% of the federal government's net current revenue.

With Jair Bolsonaro's rise to power, this imbalance took on a new dimension. In 2019, two new constitutional amendments deepened the trend. The first made funding for amendments from state congressional delegations mandatory as well. The second split individual amendments in two. Amendments with a defined purpose remained tied to a specific project, such as a health clinic or a paved road. The new “special transfers,” nicknamed “Pix amendments” after Brazil's instant payment system, allow money to flow from Congress directly to states and municipalities without clear transparency mechanisms.

Rapporteur amendments changed even more. Until then, the general rapporteur had used them mostly for technical adjustments to the bill, often to restore funding for the Executive's own programs. In 2020, they received their own budget code, RP9, and became the core of the so-called “secret budget”: billions of reais distributed at the request of lawmakers whose names were not disclosed. After the Supreme Court struck down the practice in December 2022, Congress raised the cap on individual amendments to 2% of net current revenue. It also turned to committee amendments, which, until then, had carried little weight, as the new channel for these funds.
 


 

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Budget amendments committed by type, 2014—2026. Source: Central das Emendas, adapted. Painel de Dados accessed on October 7, 2026; it draws on Portal da Transparência (CGU) amendment and expenditure-document data.

 

Budget amendments committed by type, 2014—2026. Source: Central das Emendas, adapted. Painel de Dados accessed on October 7, 2026; it draws on Portal da Transparência (CGU) amendment and expenditure-document data.



The Executive's consent, then under Bolsonaro's leadership, to this surrender of control over the federal budget gave Congress a power never foreseen in the balance designed in 1988 and transformed the country's political dynamics. Congressional blocs lost interest in joining the governing coalition and began to prioritize influence within Congress itself, where they could access large sums of money without transparency or Executive mediation.

Greater control over the budget, however, does not fully account for the Legislature's growing power: a recent report by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation shows that Congress has been gaining ground on the Executive for two decades, helped by a 2001 reform that limited the president's power to rule by decree, stronger in-house technical staff, and informal practices that concentrated power in the Speaker's hands.

Together, these developments entrenched a new balance of forces among the branches of government. By the time Lula da Silva returned to power in 2023, the Executive was far more dependent on the Legislature to manage the federal budget and advance its agenda.

The Judiciary: From Bulwark of Democracy to Target of Distrust


During Jair Bolsonaro's administration, the Judiciary played a central role in containing setbacks, as the Executive and Legislative branches advanced agendas flagrantly at odds with the 1988 Constitution. This expanded role is consistent with the concept of militant democracy coined by Karl Loewenstein in 1937, in which an institutional mechanism of the State is activated to defend the democratic order against actors who use their democratic freedoms to destroy the system itself.

This activation, however, took place without the involvement of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Procuradoria-Geral da República, PGR), the body legally empowered to bring criminal proceedings against authorities entitled to special jurisdiction (foro privilegiado), including the President of the Republic. For most of Bolsonaro's term, the Prosecutor General was Augusto Aras, a prosecutor hand-picked by the President whose tenure was marked by inaction in the face of measures taken by the Federal Government and the Legislature. It fell to civil society and other key sectors of the country to use strategic litigation to activate this cordon sanitaire, spearheaded by the Federal Supreme Court (STF). As a result, the serious erosion of economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political rights slowed during that period.

In response to the Judiciary's more forceful actions, the Bolsonaro government and its base launched serious attacks against the Supreme Court and its justices, opening a new phase in which one political camp openly questions the integrity of the Judiciary and has even gone as far as persecuting specific justices. In 2021 alone, Bolsonaro called Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, then head of the Superior Electoral Court, "an imbecile" for opposing printed ballots, and asked the Senate to impeach Justice Alexandre de Moraes.

Tensions between the former president's political camp and the Judiciary reached new heights in the 2022 elections and the subsequent coup attempt, which culminated in the storming of the buildings that house the three branches of government, a Brazilian echo of January 6. The decisive actions of the Superior Electoral Court and the Supreme Federal Court were central to preventing a breakdown of the institutional order, ensuring both the security of an election directly affected by the sitting government and the legal accountability of those involved in the coup attempt.

What had been the main barrier against the crises up to that point came to face public distrust and became the target of a new weapon of the far right: the threat of impeachment of Supreme Court justices by the Senate, which holds this constitutional prerogative, provided that a conviction is approved by two-thirds of its members.

If the far right's accusations against the Supreme Court found no basis in fact when it came to defending the elections and holding accountable those who committed crimes against democracy, a massive corruption scandal would complicate that picture. In 2025, Brazilians learned of the case of Banco Master, a financial institution used to sell unbacked bank securities and associated with the diversion of billions in public funds from various sources, as well as with suspicious ties to people across all branches of government, including Supreme Court justices. One of the names mentioned in the investigation is that of Alexandre de Moraes, the very justice who presided over the Superior Electoral Court in the 2022 elections and led the cases on crimes against the rule of law after the coup attempt. Although he is commonly associated with President Lula, Moraes was appointed years earlier by then-President Michel Temer. Reporting on the investigation has also named five other justices or their relatives: Dias Toffoli, who stepped down as rapporteur of the Banco Master case in February; André Mendonça; Gilmar Mendes; Kassio Nunes Marques; and Luiz Fux. All deny wrongdoing.

This leaves Brazilians with a dilemma: how could the Judiciary's correct actions to protect democracy in 2022 and 2023 have been carried out by the same Court whose members now face scrutiny over alleged ties with private actors responsible for diverting billions of reais from taxpayers?

2026: The Perfect Storm and the Voters' Response


Brazil entered 2026 amid a perfect storm: a Legislature with sweeping powers over the federal budget, a weakened Executive, a Judiciary exposed in its contradictions, and a population exhausted by a war of narratives fueled by disinformation and the intensive use of technology to amplify it. This scenario is further exacerbated by the immense power concentrated in Big Tech companies, whose practices remain marked by a lack of transparency regarding content moderation criteria and the algorithmic choices that shape public debate. Amid this environment of fragmentation, echo chambers, distrust, and constant conflict, there is increasingly little room to discuss visions for the country's future, build minimum consensus, or collectively imagine ways out of the crisis.

A concrete example of the breakdown in the balance between the branches was the Senate's rejection of the President's nominee to the Supreme Federal Court in April of this year, something that had not happened since 1894. Brazil is showing clear signs that the 1988 pact is unraveling, and the winners of the 2026 elections will determine what comes next.

With the October 4 results, voters consolidated the far right as the largest force in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Threats to impeach Supreme Court justices are becoming more concrete, and the next president will have the power to appoint four justices to the Court: the seat left by Luís Roberto Barroso's retirement, still unfilled, and three more that will open as justices reach the mandatory retirement age of 75.

At a time when Supreme Court justices have increasingly been chosen for their political affinity with the president, a potential Flávio Bolsonaro administration, combined with a large extremist base in the Senate, could consolidate a solid conservative majority on the country's highest court.

October 25 and the Day After


President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro will face each other in the runoff on October 25. If the far-right candidate prevails, the balance between the branches designed in 1988 is unlikely to survive, as threats to change the constitutional text begin to take public form. If Lula's democratic project wins, the fractures in our democracy will still run so deep that there is no guarantee this order will endure either.

The choice on the 25th is not a difficult one. The hard part begins on the 26th: finding a path that keeps one of the world's most pioneering democratic experiments from collapsing.

This path begins by taking seriously the discontent that the first round laid bare. Some of Brazilians' distrust of their institutions has been deliberately manufactured, as demonstrated by a decade-long campaign of attacks on the electoral system. But some of it is also rooted in the country's concrete realities. We are a profoundly unequal society, shaped by social relations forged through nearly four centuries of slavery and, consequently, by persistent structures of authoritarianism, violence, and concentrations of power rooted in class, race, gender, and hetero-cisnormativity. Added to this are institutions that still lack transparency, a Congress that has come to control a growing share of the federal budget through mechanisms frequently questioned for their opacity, and successive corruption cases involving different branches and levels of the state — institutional weaknesses that recent scandals, such as the Banco Master case, have once again brought to the center of public debate.

The far right did not create this frustration, but it skillfully tapped into the resentments that underpin our social relations and our relationship with institutions, learning how to channel them and turn them into political force. And the 33 million Brazilians who did not go to the polls on October 4, along with the nearly 6 million blank and invalid ballots — a figure that is higher than the population of many US states — remind us that disillusionment can also take the form of silence or a protest vote.

Our institutions are not immune to criticism, and defending democracy cannot mean defending them as they are, with all their shortcomings, failures, and contradictions. No government, and no one who leads it, can find that path alone. Rebuilding the balance struck in 1988 will depend on institutions capable of earning back the trust they have lost, and on a society willing to continue contesting how these institutions and public policies are shaped, as well as defending the rules of the game, even when they do not favor its side.

Natália Neris is the Advocacy Manager at Pacto pela Democracia, and holds a PhD in Human Rights from the University of São Paulo. Sami Sternberg is the International Affairs Coordinator at Pacto pela Democracia, and holds a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University.

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Beatriz Magaloni interviews a voter on April 12, election day, at a polling station in the province of Anta, Cusco. Several interviews were conducted that same day inside and outside polling stations in this southern Andean region.
Blogs

Colonialism, Extractivism, and Institutional Fragility Shaped the Elections in Peru

A Democracy Action Lab fieldwork mission to Lima and Cusco around Peru's first-round 2026 election finds a democracy whose deepest fractures predate the ballot.
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Illustration of diverse young activists emerging from a garage carrying books and a raised-fist flag, with a network of connected stars overhead, symbolizing the Democracy Garage.
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Democracy Action Lab Launches First Cohort of the Democracy Garage

The first democracy accelerator of its kind in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Democracy Action Lab Launches First Cohort of the Democracy Garage
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Property damage to the National Congress building, invaded on January 8, 2023, by Bolsonaro supporters. | Pedro França/Agência Senado
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Natália Neris and Sami Sternberg, representatives of Pacto pela Democracia, an inaugural participant in DAL’s Democracy Garage, argue that whoever wins the October 25 runoff, Brazil’s democratic pact faces its gravest threat since the 1988 Constitution was enacted.

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Property damage to the National Congress building, invaded January 8, 2023, by Bolsonaro supporters.
Caption Property damage to the National Congress building, invaded on January 8, 2023, by Bolsonaro supporters. | Photo credit Pedro França/Agência Senado
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  • In Brazil’s 2026 presidential election, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro edged out President Lula in the October 4 first round (47% to 45% of valid votes), sending the race to an October 25 runoff, while abstention reached its highest level since 1998. Natália Neris and Sami Sternberg of Pacto pela Democracia argue that, whoever wins, Brazil’s democratic pact faces its gravest threat since the 1988 Constitution.
  • The authors trace how the balance among the three branches has eroded since 2014: Congress has steadily expanded its control over the federal budget through mandatory and opaque amendments, weakening the Executive, while the Supreme Court, once a bulwark against democratic setbacks, now faces distrust amid the Banco Master corruption scandal.
  • With the far right set to hold over half the seats in both chambers and the next president positioned to appoint four Supreme Court justices, the authors warn that threats to the Court are becoming more concrete, and they call for institutions to earn back public trust and for a society that keeps contesting how they are shaped while defending the rules of the game.
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A diagonal split image in duotone. On the left, an aerial view of Serbia’s National Assembly in Belgrade in grey; on the right, in red, a nighttime crowd at Slavija Square holding up phone lights.
K / Pexels (National Assembly, 2025); Stefan Miljuš / VOA, public domain (Slavija Square, 22 December 2024)

Serbia goes to the polls on October 25 in an early parliamentary election, called after nearly two years of sustained protest. A presidential election will follow by the end of December, after President Vučić resigned in September to run for prime minister. A list emerging from the student movement leads in independent polling, and most opposition parties have stepped back to support it. It will contest seats against a party that has, over the past decade, consolidated control over broadcast media, the security apparatus, electoral administration, the public sector and the regulatory bodies.

The conditions are heavily uneven. National broadcasters and the tabloid press are aligned with the ruling party, while the regulatory bodies that might act as a corrective to this have repeatedly declined to act. Public funds, public employment and public contracts are used as leverage on voters. Questions about the accuracy of the voter register remain unresolved from previous cycles. International observers have issued the same recommendations election after election, and they have gone largely unimplemented. Recent local elections were marked by intimidation, and in some places by open violence at polling stations. The last major group of media not aligned with the government has changed hands to investment vehicles that have bought critical outlets elsewhere, only to quietly end their criticism.

Despite this, the outcome is not settled, and the election is worth watching closely. This panel brings together Serbian civil society organizations working on election observation and investigative journalism, along with a political sociologist who has written on Serbia’s captured institutions, its elections, and social movements. Nine days before the parliamentary vote, it asks what conditions are like on the ground and what is at stake.

This event is co-sponsored by the Democracy Action Lab at CDDRL and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

SPEAKERS

Raša Nedeljkov

Raša Nedeljkov

Program Director, CRTA (Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability), Belgrade

Raša Nedeljkov is the Program Director of CRTA (Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability), an independent, non-partisan civil society organization that monitors electoral processes and the rule of law in Serbia. Since 2016, Nedeljkov has led CRTA’s election observation mission, coordinating its teams in monitoring campaigns and voting in presidential, parliamentary, city, and local elections, including this year’s parliamentary election. He has extensive knowledge of the media environment in the country, as well as of citizens’ perceptions, attitudes and habits in consuming information and media outputs. He has presented CRTA’s findings to the EU Affairs and the Culture and Media committees of the German Bundestag, the European Economic and Social Committee in Brussels, and gave the keynote address at International Democracy Day Brussels in 2025. CRTA recently conducted a large survey in collaboration with CDDRL's Democracy Action Lab.

Gazela Pudar Draško

Gazela Pudar Draško

Director and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade

Gazela Pudar Draško is a political sociologist serving as Senior Research Fellow and Director at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, which is widely recognized for its commitment to engaged scholarship. Her work focuses on deliberative democracy and participatory politics, and she studies how institutions — universities, parties, public administration — remain oriented toward the common good against political capture. Her research on Serbia’s student plenums — faculty-level direct assemblies through which the student protest movement makes decisions — suggests that in a hybrid regime renewal is more likely to come from outside pressure, forced by mobilized citizens, than to be facilitated from within. Pudar Draško has also written on Serbian elections and is co-editing, with Florian Bieber and Vujo Ilić, a volume on the 2024–25 protests. In 2026–27 she is a fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna.

Dragana Žarković Obradović

Dragana Žarković Obradović

Director, BIRN Serbia (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network)

Dragana Žarković Obradović is the Director of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in Serbia. BIRN is a regional network of local non-governmental organizations and the publisher of Balkan Insight. With more than two decades of experience in journalism, media development, and project management, she leads a team of investigative journalists and media experts dedicated to strengthening independent journalism. Under her leadership, BIRN Serbia has earned some of the most prestigious national and international awards. Žarković Obradović is also the founding manager of BIRN’s Fellowship for Journalistic Excellence. In 2025, Amnesty International confirmed that two BIRN journalists had been targeted with Pegasus spyware, and BIRN Serbia has faced strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) aimed at silencing its reporting.

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Francis Fukuyama

Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir was published in September 2026.

Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama

Online panel on Zoom; registration required.

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On May 15, the Stanford Society for Latin American Politics (SSLAP) and the Democracy Action Lab (DAL) at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) co-hosted Professor Alberto Vergara for a discussion on “Democratic Hollowing in Peru: The Underexplored Pathway of Democratic Erosion” as part of the DAL series Democracy at the Ballot Box: The 2026 Electoral Cycle in Latin America. The talk offered key reflections on Peru's political trajectory over the past decade and the emerging threats to its democracy.

Peru's 2026 General Elections


Over the past decade, Peru has had eight presidents — a clear indicator of ongoing political and institutional instability driven by recurrent impeachments by the Peruvian Congress. As a result, there has been massive social unrest, state repression, and an unprecedented rise in organized criminal activity. 

Peru held general elections April 12-13, 2026. On the morning of May 15, the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) confirmed the presidential runoff election on June 7 between Keiko Fujimori, leader of the right-wing populist party Fuerza Popular, and Roberto Sánchez of Juntos por el Perú, a left-wing coalition. This runoff closely resembles the 2021 election, when Fujimori faced Pedro Castillo in a highly polarized contest. However, the electoral process itself revealed the depth of democratic deterioration. The release of official results took about one month due to serious logistical failures by ONPE. Problems distributing electoral materials in several districts of Lima forced voting to extend into a second day, further undermining confidence in an already fragile electoral process.

Almost a week after Peru's runoff election, the country did not have official results of who would take office as president on July 28 (Independence Day). With 98% of votes counted, the June 7 runoff between Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sánchez has revealed a highly polarized election, with a vote difference of only 0.008%. Early in the week, as vote counting began, Sánchez appeared to hold a lead. However, the results shifted dramatically when election officials began processing ballots from over 309,000 Peruvians living abroad across 73 countries. This shift has put Fujimori ahead, yet without any official declaration from ONPE, the result remains deeply contested. As Peruvians say, it is better to “no cantar victoria” — don't claim victory yet.

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ONPE election results graphic for Peru's 2026 general elections, with 99.64% of ballots processed. Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular) leads with 17.17% and 2,867,638 votes, followed by Roberto Sánchez (Juntos por el Perú) with 12.00% and 2,004,207 votes, a gap of 863,431 votes. Rafael López A. (Renovación Popular) is third with 11.91% and 1,989,515 votes, trailing Sánchez by 14,692 votes.

ONPE's near-final tally of Peru's 2026 general election, with 99.64% of ballots processed, showed Keiko Fujimori leading Roberto Sánchez and Rafael López A. ahead of the June 7 runoff. Credit: La Republicá

Democratic Hollowing 


Alberto Vergara, along with his colleague Rodrigo Barnechea, introduced a new key political concept, democratic hollowing, to better explain Peru's democratic erosion and the political crisis during the past decade. Most of the current academic literature argues that “democracy backsliding” occurs when there is a structural shift toward authoritarianism and the concentration of power in the hands of a lone strongman or a political party. Across Latin America, this trend has been particularly visible in Venezuela under Chavismo, in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega, and in Cuba under Communist Party rule. In Peru, however, Vergara argues that democracy can also die through the dissolution of power, which he calls democratic hollowing. This political landscape has been shaped by fragmented political parties, amateur politicians with no long-term incentives, and a weakened rule of law, producing chronic, self-reinforcing political instability.

Politicians do not get into office because of a past career. And they know that they will most likely not have a future either. They don't have a past; they don't have a future; they have a present — and they must maximize what they can grab today.
Prof. Alberto Vergara

Therefore, weak political representation and breaches of the rule of law have disincentivized the current political system from protecting and representing Peruvian citizens' interests. During the lethal repression of the 2022 and 2023 protests in Peru, under Dina Boluarte's regime, the Peruvian police and army left around 50 civilian protesters dead and more than 1400 people injured. These acts remained unpunished, with no justice delivered and no reparations provided to the victims or their families. Vergara argues that control over the judiciary becomes essential because politicians are implicated in informal or criminal activity, and in the outgoing Congress, 68 of 130 congressmen were under judicial investigation; in the current one, 60, for crimes including money laundering, criminal organization, and rape.

There are three main characteristics of democratic hollowing that Vergara has included:

Electoral fragmentation: Political parties have become "mere legal entities" with no real roots in society, and politicians have learned to rely on personal resources and reputations rather than party structures to get elected. The result is a system where loyalty to parties is almost nonexistent, politicians split off and regroup constantly, and each electoral cycle effectively “resets” the political landscape. The current Congress includes members from 12 different political parties and 11 unaffiliated congressmen. 

Personalistic amateurism: Amateurism arises from the lack of established political parties that do not sustain political careers. Presidents Boluarte, Castillo, Sagasti, Merino, Vizcarra, and Kuczynski all had almost no political experience before the presidency. Without organizational ties or long-term incentives, these amateurs are prone to miscalculation, predatory behavior, and short-term rent-seeking that deepens Peru's institutional decay with every new government.

Absence of political linkages: Since Fujimori's authoritarian regime and the collapse of the party system, political parties have been replaced not by political identities but by "anti-identities.” Vergara argues that the most stable bond between politicians and citizens is not a shared agenda but a shared rejection, whether of Fujimorismo or, more recently, of the left. This is precisely what he observes in the current election. Rather than offering a vision or a program, both runoff candidates campaign purely on the message that the other is worse. Parties that are little more than names on a poster cannot hold politicians accountable, and outsiders who reach office have nothing to sustain them once they get there — no organization, no ideology, no base. The result is a political system where representation is performed but never actually delivered.

It looks very hard to imagine that these elections, whoever is elected, will alter the trajectory in which the country is involved. The elections do not look like a turning point, but rather as another instance of a path marked by instability.
Prof. Alberto Vergara

Professor Alberto Vergara's discussion of democratic hollowing in Peru invites us to reflect on how practices such as impunity, lack of access to justice, rent-seeking, and repeated breaches of the rule of law continue to be institutionalized. In this context, elections function only as a “band-aid” that, once removed, reveals the nation’s underlying fracture. Unfortunately, these patterns are historically rooted in the fact that “equality before the law never took deep root in Peru.” The State has never credibly guaranteed equal civil and political rights, which has deeply weakened citizens’ trust in institutions. This distrust is reinforced when those who claim to protect citizens are often the same actors who repress them during protests, or favor laws on illegal mining, criminal organizations, and money laundering. While these structural problems persist, Peruvians continue working hard to sustain their households amid growing insecurity and the rise of organized crime, often without any guarantee that they will return home safely. Ultimately, Peru’s democratic hollowing is not only a political crisis but a social reality that shapes everyday life, exposing the fragility of democracy and the urgent need for a state that can truly guarantee justice, representation, and security for all.

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Beatriz Magaloni interviews a voter on April 12, election day, at a polling station in the province of Anta, Cusco. Several interviews were conducted that same day inside and outside polling stations in this southern Andean region.
Blogs

Colonialism, Extractivism, and Institutional Fragility Shaped the Elections in Peru

A Democracy Action Lab fieldwork mission to Lima and Cusco around Peru's first-round 2026 election finds a democracy whose deepest fractures predate the ballot.
Colonialism, Extractivism, and Institutional Fragility Shaped the Elections in Peru
Woman at a polling station in Peru.
Reports

Missing Voters? An Analysis of the Effects on Turnout of the Election Administration Delays in the 2026 Peru First Round Presidential Elections

Missing Voters? An Analysis of the Effects on Turnout of the Election Administration Delays in the 2026 Peru First Round Presidential Elections
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Alberto Vergara addresses a largely student audience at Stanford during his talk on democratic hollowing on May 15, 2026.
Alberto Vergara addresses a largely student audience at Stanford during his talk on democratic hollowing on May 15, 2026. | Nora Sulots
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Political scientist Alberto Vergara argues Peru's crisis stems not from a power grab, but from the dissolution of power itself.

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  • Peru's 2026 elections exposed deep democratic strain, with a month-long delay in results and a razor-thin 0.008% margin between runoff candidates Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sánchez.
  • Political scientist Alberto Vergara argues Peru is experiencing "democratic hollowing" rather than backsliding — democracy eroding through the dissolution of power rather than its concentration.
  • Three forces drive this hollowing, per Vergara: electoral fragmentation, personalistic amateurism among politicians with no long-term stake in office, and the replacement of political identities with shared "anti-identities."
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Less than 24 hours after Colombians cast their first-round ballots in the presidential election, CDDRL’s Democracy Action Lab (DAL) convened four scholars for a webinar launching its new series, “Democracy at the Ballot Box: The 2026 Electoral Cycle in Latin America.” Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, DAL's co-director, moderated a conversation with Michael Weintraub (Universidad de los Andes, director of CESED, the Center for the Study of Security and Drugs), Javier Mejía Cubillos (Stanford University, Department of Political Science and the Stanford Civics Initiative), Oliver Kaplan (University of Denver's Korbel School, 2025-26 Visiting Scholar at CDDRL), and María Ignacia Curiel (Stanford University, research scholar at CDDRL and research manager of DAL).

The election results were jarring. Abelardo de la Espriella, an independent lawyer running hard on security, had taken 43.75 percent of the vote to Iván Cepeda's 40.90 percent — with Uribista Paloma Valencia a distant third at roughly 7 percent, and centrists Sergio Fajardo and Claudia López splitting another 5 percent between them. A runoff was set for June 21. The panel had one day to make sense of it.

The numbers and the map beneath them


Weintraub opened with data he had scraped that morning, and the maps told a story of a country voting almost exactly along the lines it already knew. Cepeda's support mapped with striking precision onto Gustavo Petro's 2022 coalition — he flipped essentially no municipality where the combined right-wing vote had exceeded Petro's four years earlier — while De la Espriella's strength traced the same geography as the “No” vote in Colombia's 2016 referendum on the FARC peace agreement. Turnout, oddly, had risen more in Petro's 2022 strongholds than in the right's, which Weintraub read less as good news for Cepeda than as a sign his coalition may already be close to its ceiling, with more untapped voters available to De la Espriella heading into the runoff. Modeling out several scenarios for how Valencia's, Fajardo's, and López's voters might split, most of his projections had De la Espriella winning comfortably — though, as he noted, Colombian elections have a way of moving in the three weeks between rounds.

What the numbers don't show


Mejía pushed back on two points he felt the quantitative read was missing. First, the Pacto Histórico's cohesion: a Colombian left with a long history of fragmentation had, remarkably, stayed unified behind a famously self-centered leader in Petro — though Mejía flagged early signs that some in the movement were quietly urging Cepeda to distance himself, a tension he expected to shape the run-up to the runoff and, potentially, Colombian politics well past this election cycle.

Second, and more pointedly, Mejía argued against reading De la Espriella as simply Colombia's version of an internationally franchised populism — Bukele, Milei, Trump — with the usual explanations about fear and security anxiety layered on top. There's some of that, he allowed. But he made the case that De la Espriella had tapped something more specifically Colombian: a cultural premium on hard work as the individual, personally-earned marker of social standing — a value Mejía argued Petrismo's more abstract, structural language about labor and capital simply doesn't speak to — paired with a live-and-let-live, self-reliant streak that runs across class lines. He pointed to a viral interview De la Espriella gave the streamer Westcol, where he defended a truck driver's right to carry a gun against highway robbers in strikingly plain, non-ideological terms, as the clearest illustration of a message landing well beyond the demographic most analysts assumed was his base.

A clean vote, an anxious moment


Kaplan drew on firsthand observation, having been in Colombia both eighteen months earlier and again just weeks before the vote, where he watched supporters of every camp convince themselves their candidate would win. He was careful to note the good news first: Colombia's electoral authority and EU observers both called the vote clean, turnout was strong, and — in a detail that made the local news cycle that morning — Colombian voters get paid time off work for each round they vote in. But the deeper story, in his read, was a political system whipsawed by unmet expectations since the 2016 peace deal, Petro's stalled “total peace” negotiations, and a personal, legal feud between Cepeda and former president Álvaro Uribe layered on top of an election that had become, in effect, a referendum on Petro himself. Cepeda's central problem, Kaplan argued, echoed Kamala Harris's in the 2024 U.S. election: tied to an unpopular incumbent's record without ever having been able to fully break from it. Whether he could move toward the center — a softer task against De la Espriella than it might have been against the more centrist Valencia — was, in Kaplan's view, the pivotal question of the next three weeks. He closed by naming the deeper worry running under both campaigns: real, if differently shaped, concerns about what either winner might do to Colombia's political institutions.

A regional pattern, and a geopolitical wildcard


Curiel widened the lens. She was careful not to flatten every recent right-populist surge in Latin America into a single story, but she argued it's hard to ignore a regional pattern all the same — strikingly similar candidates, rhetorical strategies, and now fraud allegations recurring across countries (Honduras, Peru, Bolivia among them) whose underlying security and political problems differ substantially. She suggested it might be worth studying today's crop of outsider-right figures the way scholars once studied the diffusion of Latin America's leftist movements in the 1960s and '70s — as a phenomenon with its own cross-border mechanics, not just parallel domestic stories.

On the United States, Curiel expected rhetorical engagement from the Trump administration — De la Espriella is an open admirer who had already met with Trump officials in Miami — but was skeptical it would prove decisive; Cepeda, by contrast, might govern more in the pragmatic, arm's-length mode of Mexico's Claudia Sheinbaum, building on the more accommodating turn Petro's own relationship with Washington had taken since earlier in the year. She also flagged a looming energy question neither candidate had addressed in any detail: an anticipated El Niño-driven drop in hydroelectric capacity, and the resulting scramble for imported natural gas — from the United States or, potentially, Venezuela — that whoever won would inherit almost immediately. And she pointed to a genuine irony in De la Espriella's biography: a right-wing candidate whose past legal work had tied him personally to a figure associated with the Maduro government, complicating any simple ideological reading of what a De la Espriella presidency would mean for Colombia–Venezuela relations.

Where the center went, and what comes next


The discussion that followed ranged widely: why Paloma Valencia's campaign collapsed after polling near 20 percent just weeks earlier (the panel's rough consensus: a hard right that structurally tends to outflank the establishment right across the region, compounded by a Petrista strategy that concentrated its fire on De la Espriella as the tougher runoff opponent, leaving Valencia to absorb collateral damage); whether Colombia's center had simply disappeared with the 2016 peace agreement; and how much weight to put on U.S. involvement or even World Cup-driven national sentiment as runoff wildcards. Nobody thought either would be decisive on its own.

Asked directly what a De la Espriella or a Cepeda presidency would mean for the health of Colombian democracy, Weintraub was candid about his concern — less because either candidate is uniquely dangerous, he said, than because Colombia's political system has grown exhausted, its 1991 constitutional settlement showing diminishing returns and a public “willing to experiment” after the unfulfilled promise of Petro's own presidency. Curiel and Kaplan both located genuine grounds for hope in the same place: an unusually fragmented political landscape, without a single unchallenged caudillo on either side, and courts and regulatory institutions that had — so far — held their independence through repeated stress tests. On violence specifically, the panel's closing predictions diverged by scenario. Under De la Espriella, Weintraub and Kaplan worried that a rupture in Petro's ongoing peace talks would trigger retaliatory violence, that a return to aerial coca fumigation would collide head-on with the Constitutional Court, and that elite or paramilitary backlash would follow if Cepeda had instead pursued land reform and a constituent assembly. Under Cepeda, the concern ran more toward armed groups continuing to exploit ceasefires and extortion economies, and toward the durability of institutional checks on a government still tied to Petro's unfinished agenda.

Díaz-Cayeros closed the session on a note that has stayed with the panel since: a viewer's comment in the chat had framed the choice as one between “the devil you know and the devil you don't.” Fair enough, he said — but democracy remains one of the few systems humanity has built that lets a society get rid of either devil, peacefully, and try again.

Postscript: what actually happened


Set against the news since, the panel's read holds up better in its worries than in its point estimates.

The margin was the first surprise. Weintraub's scenario modeling, built the morning after round one, had De la Espriella winning comfortably in most transfer scenarios. The actual runoff, held as scheduled on June 21, was instead a nail-biter: 49.66 percent to 48.70 percent, a gap of roughly 246,000 votes out of some 26 million cast — under one percentage point, and close enough that Cepeda initially declined to concede, contesting results from close to a quarter of polling stations before formally accepting the outcome on June 24 with a pledge to “exercise a democratic, vigilant and constructive opposition.” Election night itself brought clashes between protesters and police in Cali, an early sign of the social tension the panel had flagged as a risk under either outcome.

Weintraub's own post-election analysis, published the day of the runoff, put hard numbers behind the panel's “entrenched spatial blocks” thesis — and, in the process, revised one of the panel's own central premises. Only 26 of Colombia's more than eleven hundred municipalities changed which candidate won between the two rounds (14 flipping to De la Espriella, 12 to Cepeda), and nearly all of those flips came in places that were already razor-thin in round one. The country that voted for De la Espriella — Norte de Santander at 77 percent, Casanare at 69, Santander at 65, Antioquia at 64 — and the country that voted for Cepeda — Chocó and Vaupés both above 80 percent, Putumayo at 79, Nariño at 77, Cauca at 76 — barely overlapped at all. Bogotá told a version of the story Weintraub had flagged live on the panel, now with exact numbers: Cepeda carried the capital 52.5 percent to 45.4, a margin of about 302,000 votes, solid but well short of what Petro had won there in 2022, even as Cepeda gained ground in every other major city between rounds — up 8.7 points in Medellín, 8.2 in Cali, 8.0 in Cartagena, 7.1 in Barranquilla.

The more important correction concerns the “pivotal center” the panel spent so much of its discussion on the day after round one — the roughly 2.8 million voters who had backed Valencia, Fajardo, and López. Weintraub's later numbers show both campaigns' gains between rounds exceeded that entire pool on their own: De la Espriella added nearly 2.6 million votes beyond his first-round total, more than Valencia's whole first-round universe by itself, while Cepeda added over 3 million, more than the combined Fajardo-López vote. The runoff, in other words, wasn't decided mainly by which side won over centrist defectors but by each campaign's ability to pull entirely new voters to the polls, a dynamic already visible in round one, when turnout had risen 2.25 million over 2022, disproportionately in Cepeda's Caribbean and Pacific strongholds. Between rounds, turnout climbed further, up 5.6 points to 63.5 percent (3.6 million more voters than the 2022 runoff), and Cepeda's operation mobilized more of them in absolute terms than De la Espriella's. It simply wasn't enough to close a gap that had already opened in round one. As Weintraub summarized: De la Espriella won a close, high-turnout election on the strength of an intact regional coalition plus modest gains in the center; Cepeda outgrew his first-round vote proportionally, but never closed the gap he faced.

Washington reacted exactly as Curiel expected, if more enthusiastically than her cautious framing implied: Trump declared on Truth Social that De la Espriella had “Won, BIG!,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the president-elect to discuss regional security cooperation, immigration, and trade. Precisely, the rhetorical engagement Curiel predicted, delivered with more warmth than skepticism.

Despite initial post-election tensions, transfer of power went ahead on schedule, if uneasily. De la Espriella was sworn in on August 7, not in Bogotá, but in Cali, under an unprecedented security operation of some 11,000 troops and a drone ban, with Javier Milei and José Antonio Kast among the foreign leaders in attendance.

On policy, the new president has moved fast to confirm Weintraub's most specific fears. He has vowed to end the Petro government's peace negotiations with armed groups, resume aerial fumigation of coca crops (a practice suspended for more than a decade), and the exact flashpoint Weintraub predicted would trigger a “choque” with the Constitutional Court — and expand the military's role against criminal organizations, alongside new large-scale prison construction. Analysts are now warning, in terms that echo Weintraub and Kaplan's closing remarks almost exactly, that abandoning negotiations could backfire: an estimated 27,000 members of armed groups currently have no reintegration pathway if talks collapse entirely. On foreign policy, De la Espriella has aligned closely with the Trump administration, backing its military strikes on suspected drug vessels in the Caribbean, expediting extraditions, severing relations with Cuba, and restoring ties with Israel. 

Six weeks into the new administration, the question the panel closed on that afternoon has stopped being hypothetical and started being lived: can Colombia's institutions absorb what comes next? It's the story DAL's "Democracy at the Ballot Box" series intends to keep following.

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Venezuela After Maduro, Explained

A Democracy Action Lab panel weighed competing scenarios for Venezuela’s political future amid elite continuity, economic crisis, and international intervention.
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A man in a Colombian football jersey casts his vote in the presidential election on May 31, 2026, in Bogotá, Colombia.
A man in a Colombian football jersey casts his vote in the presidential election on May 31, 2026, in Bogotá, Colombia. | Leonardo Castañeda/Getty Images
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Convened one day after the first round, four scholars forecast a referendum on Petro's presidency and a system running out of patience. The vote that followed was far closer than their models predicted.

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A man in a Colombian football jersey casts his vote in the presidential election on May 31, 2026, in Bogotá, Colombia.
Caption A man in a Colombian football jersey casts his vote in the presidential election on May 31, 2026, in Bogotá, Colombia. | Photo credit Leonardo Castañeda/Getty Images
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  • One day after Colombia's first-round vote, four scholars from CDDRL's Democracy Action Lab and partner institutions analyzed the results and projected a comfortable win for Abelardo de la Espriella.
  • Their broader diagnosis — that Colombia's political system was showing diminishing returns after years of unmet expectations — held up better than their projected margin, as the runoff was decided by under one percentage point.
  • Since taking office, the new administration has ended peace talks and resumed coca fumigation, triggering a clash with the Constitutional Court that one panelist had specifically predicted.
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This fall, Stanford Continuing Studies will present its third annual Reimagining Democracy course, a six-part speaker series produced with the Office of Community Engagement, the Stanford Democracy Hub, and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). The free public series runs weekly starting October 7 and is hosted by Debra Satz, Vernon R. and Lysbeth Warren Anderson Dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences, and CDDRL's Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

The series features Stanford scholars who help us understand democracy: how America’s founding 250 years ago shapes public life today, and where we go from here in reimagining and strengthening democratic values and governance, at home and around the world. This year’s series features constitutional, electoral, social science, and humanities experts with conversations connecting to the US November midterm elections and beyond.


The series draws heavily on CDDRL's bench of democracy scholars. Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Senior Fellow at FSI and Co-Director of CDDRL's Democracy Action Lab, joins Anna Grzymala-Busse, Senior Fellow at FSI, for the October 14 conversation on global democracy and elections, drawing on their comparative work on democratic decline and resilience. Didi Kuo, Center Fellow at FSI and program manager of CDDRL's Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective, joins the October 21 session on money in politics, bringing her research on political parties and institutional reform. Nate Persily, James B. McClatchy Professor of Law and Senior Fellow at FSI, brings his expertise in election law to the October 28 session on voting rights and electoral reform. Other sessions bring in Stanford colleagues working across law, history, and public service.

All sessions will be recorded, and videos will be available afterward for those unable to attend live.

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Weekly conversations hosted by Larry Diamond and Debra Satz will explore America's founding principles and their relevance to the 2026 midterms.

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Encina Hall, E106
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Einstein Moos Postdoctoral Fellow, 2026-27
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Frances Cayton is a scholar of democracy and civil society. For the 2026-27 academic year, she is the Einstein Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). In 2027, she will join the University of South Carolina as an Assistant Professor of Political Science.

Frances' book project, "How Civic Consciousness Shapes Democratic Resilience," examines how, why, and under what conditions civil society encourages individuals to depolarize and resist democratic erosion. Combining extensive organizational and bureaucratic data, elite and mass surveys, experiments, and interview evidence, she demonstrates how informal and apolitical subsets of civic life retain critical latent democratic potential. The project primarily focuses on Poland and Hungary, though it also draws comparisons with cases across East-Central Europe and globally.

More broadly, Frances works on questions about the drivers and consequences of democratic engagement, particularly concerning conspiracy theories, opposition media, and the challenges of post-backsliding redemocratization. Her research is published or forthcoming in numerous outlets, including the American Journal of Political Science and Perspectives on Politics. Her work has been supported by the US Departments of State and Education, as well as the American Political Science Association. She is also the co-founder of EEPGW, a monthly online workshop on East European politics.

Frances holds a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University. She earned her AM from Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and a BA from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

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Introduction and Contribution


Nearly half of the world (46%) lives in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections — compared to 28% who live in autocracies without elections and 26% who live under democracy. In these “electoral autocracies,” the ruling party can theoretically lose power, but its ability to repress and co-opt its opponents makes defeat unlikely. Incumbent executives and parties in electoral autocracies have become increasingly sophisticated in their repressive techniques and increasingly connected to other regimes that share similar fears of democracy. “How can electoral authoritarianism be resisted?” is thus a pressing question for domestic opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) as well as international actors seeking to promote democracy, including governments, nonprofits, think tanks, and academics. 

In “Opposition strategies and electoral challenges under autocracy,” Oren Samet analyzes five strategies opposition parties use to fight electoral authoritarianism during campaigns, on election day, and after polls have closed. These are: joining multiparty coalitions, strengthening their party organization, mobilizing mass protests, boycotting elections, and seeking international assistance. Samet shows that each strategy entails tradeoffs, increasing opposition competitiveness while making authoritarian repression more likely or efficient. For example, joining a multiparty coalition can both increase the incumbent’s likelihood of defeat and increase his propensity to repress — insofar as he perceives the opposition as popular and threatening.

Samet shows that each strategy entails tradeoffs, increasing opposition competitiveness while making authoritarian repression more likely or efficient.

Samet offers several prescriptions for international democracy promoters. First, they must collaborate with domestic opposition parties, because only they — and not CSOs — can win elections. Yet many international actors avoid this approach; for instance, some opposition parties may care more about power than democracy, or collaborating with them may invite criticism that democracy promotion is partisan. While these risks cannot be ignored, neither can political parties.

A second prescription follows from the fact that oppositions have at least five tools at their disposal: there can be no single “best practice” in democracy promotion; it requires flexibility, adaptability, and an integrated approach. Finally, because autocrats continue to become more sophisticated, democracy promoters must take steps to prepare for the repression of their partners. 

Five Approaches and Their Pitfalls


Otherwise effective strategies for winning democratic elections — such as running savvy campaigns on primetime television that are informed by public opinion polling — will not work for opposition parties under electoral autocracy. This is because the system is structurally biased toward incumbents. As such, one common approach has been for individual opposition parties to join together in a coalition: sharing policy platforms, endorsing joint candidates, and merging their party organizations. And indeed, multiparty coalitions are statistically associated with higher vote shares and a higher likelihood that autocrats are defeated. At the same time, however, such coalitions are difficult to form and sustain due to ideological differences and polarization. In especially repressive electoral autocracies, such as Ethiopia or Cambodia, incumbent parties are often able to neutralize or eliminate coalitions. Finally, when coalitions pose a serious challenge on election day but without winning, autocrats may repress even harder.

A second strategy involves strengthening party organization, for example, by improving its geographic reach or recruiting more professional candidates. These efforts can increase competitiveness and popular appeal, but they risk providing the incumbent with a large amount of information that he can use to more efficiently target his opponents. This includes formal lists of members, candidates, and party branch locations. Meanwhile, more organized opposition parties may inadvertently legitimize the system by affording it some semblance of democracy.

Encouraging mass protests is a third strategy available to opposition parties. As the number of protesters grows, authoritarian repression becomes more costly and more likely to backfire, while the incumbent’s allies become more likely to defect and join the opposition. Parties help with this process by translating protester demands into coherent party platforms. However, and especially after the 2010-12 Arab Uprisings, electoral authoritarian regimes have become highly sensitive to and ready to combat protests. This may be accomplished via surveillance or assistance from powerful third parties such as China or Russia.

A fourth, common strategy has been for parties to boycott the autocrat’s electoral facade. Doing so signals to the international community that the playing field is skewed and the system illegitimate. Yet boycotts can lead to missed opportunities for the opposition to build electoral strength, influence policy change as legislative minorities, or monitor the autocrat from inside government. In addition, they rob oppositions of the chance to take advantage of the autocrat’s miscalculations, which may even lead to his defeat. 

Finally, opposition parties can reach out to international actors for support. This may involve requesting that they sanction the regime or intervene in the name of democracy. International pressure can indeed encourage political openings and is especially useful for oppositions with low visibility. However, autocrats are adept at demonizing those who use this strategy as agents of malign foreign influence. These appeals can strengthen the autocrat’s domestic support base among those who see him as protecting the nation. In all, these tradeoffs suggest that effective democracy promotion requires a deep understanding of the political context in which oppositions operate.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Sandra Seitamaa
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [3.5-minute read]

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Introduction and Contribution


Democracies face a host of ongoing challenges, including the rise of elected autocrats, income inequality, mainstreamed forms of xenophobic nationalism, and political apathy. All of these challenges pose threats to democratic participation — elected autocrats restrict it, inequality makes it easier for oligarchs to sway election outcomes, and xenophobia can discourage cultural outsiders from voting.

Apart from practical threats to democratic participation, an established intellectual tradition has viewed participation with deep skepticism. In this view, democracy is good simply because it ensures peaceful transfers of power and protects individual rights. Collective decisions, however, cannot be meaningfully viewed as representing the “will of the people” owing to manipulation, apathy, and the high costs of acquiring political knowledge. Is this “realist” vision the best one can hope for in democratic life?

In “Can deliberation have lasting effects?,” James Fishkin, Valentin Bolotnyy, Joshua Lerner, Alice Siu, and Norman Bradburn show how a three-day deliberative experiment in late 2019 had large and long-term effects on turnout and voting behavior. Those most likely to exhibit these civic behaviors nearly a year later had come to follow politics more closely and see their political opinions as valuable. At the same time, the experiment’s effects on participants’ policy views were significant only in the short term — most deliberators eventually reverted to their previously held policy positions.

That three days of deliberation had such lasting civic effects suggests that efforts to create more inclusive forms of democratic participation are both possible and scalable. Moreover, it suggests that academic skepticism about democratic participation is not an argument against citizens’ capacities for reasonable decision-making; rather, it is an argument against our imperfect contexts of participation. Deliberative experiments may offer hope for improving these contexts.

Academic skepticism about democratic participation is not an argument against citizens’ capacities for reasonable decision-making; rather, it is an argument against our imperfect contexts of participation.

The Deliberative Experiment and Its Effects on Policy Views


In September 2019 — one week prior to the experiment — a treatment group (i.e., those who would deliberate) of 523 registered voters from around the US and a control group of 844 voters were surveyed on their political attitudes. Members of the treatment group then deliberated on five issue domains (the economy, environment, immigration, health care, foreign policy) in small groups and on 47 policy proposals (e.g., redistributing wealth in some way). 26 of these proposals were characterized by extreme partisan polarization, meaning significant numbers of those who identified as Democrats or Republicans held the most extreme views. After the deliberations ended, both the treatment and control groups were surveyed. Then, three subsequent surveys were conducted in late 2020.

Among the treatment group, deliberation produced significant, short-term depolarization on 20 of the 26 (polarized) policy proposals. In other words, the averages for participants who identified with each party moved closer together (though not necessarily toward the center). These changes were large, sometimes 40 percentage points, as in the case of Republicans abandoning extreme positions on immigration. Meanwhile, the control group’s policy positions changed hardly at all — pointing to the key role played by deliberation. Within the five issue areas, averages among deliberators shifted leftward on all but the economy.
 


 

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Figure 1. Policy-Based Score (PBS) Changes over Time

 

Figure 1. Policy-Based Score (PBS) Changes over Time
Note: Policy-based score (PBS) is constructed for each individual based on responses to 26 questions identified as the most polarizing. The upper chart shows the participant group, and the lower chart shows the control group. T1 is the survey wave prior to the deliberations, T2 is right after the deliberations, and T3 is 10 months after, in July 2020.
 



By late 2020, however, the treatment group’s policy positions mostly reverted to their pre-deliberation levels. The differences between these two points in time were still significant compared with the control group, yet relatively small in absolute terms. These policy reversions are perhaps unsurprising: deliberators returned to an environment of heightened polarization and aggressive campaigning during the 2020 election cycle. (To be sure, and from the standpoint of finding solutions to collective problems, policy reversion is not especially concerning — the aim of deliberation is to bring citizens together to reason and compromise, which the experiment accomplished.)

A Civic Awakening?


The lack of long-term policy effects suggests that three-day deliberations may be limited in their ability to create a more encompassing, participatory society. However, the treatment group demonstrated large and persistent changes in their intention to vote (i.e., turnout) and their candidate of choice. Among the control group, Joe Biden was favored over Donald Trump by about four percentage points — very close to Biden’s actual margin in the popular vote. Among the treatment group, however, Biden was favored by 28 percentage points. The gaps in turnout were similarly large. (Note that these are intentions, not reports of actual decisions. However, Tables 6 and 7 in the article show similar effects for recollected votes after the election.)
 


 

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Table 2. Voting Intention for Participant and Control Groups, Time 4

 

Table 2. Voting Intention for Participant and Control Groups, Time 4
 



These civic outcomes are especially surprising because (a) voting behavior is thought to be stable and deeply rooted in one’s psychology and social context, and (b) experimental efforts to increase turnout have been most successful when undertaken shortly before elections, as opposed to one whole year prior. The effects were most pronounced among political moderates and those without college degrees — perhaps pointing to the educative effects of deliberation.
 


 

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Figure 5. Effects on Vote Intention Captured by Predictive Modeling, by Education

 

Figure 5. Effects on Vote Intention Captured by Predictive Modeling, by Education
Note: Middle are those participants who have Policy-Based Scores between 3 and 5 (inclusive) at Time 1. Non-middle participants are all other participants. Positive prediction error shows that, on average, participants were more likely to vote for Biden than predicted by the model. Vote intention data are collected at Time 4, in October, 2020. Full calibrated model used to construct this figure can be found in the APSR Dataverse.
 



Why did deliberation produce only short-term policy effects but long-term effects on voting behavior? The authors posit that deliberation caused an “awakening of civic capacities.” They reason that deliberation was a transformative experience in terms of stimulating political engagement and a sense of efficacy. And indeed, the treatment group was, in the long term, more likely than the control group to follow the 2020 election campaign, believe their political opinions mattered, and acquire general information about American politics. (The latter is measured in terms of knowing which party controlled the House and Senate.)
 



 

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Figure 9. Having “Political Opinions Worth Listening to”

 

Figure 9. Having “Political Opinions Worth Listening to”
Note: Policy-based score is constructed for each individual based on responses to 26 questions identified as the most polarizing. Responses to the question “How strongly would you disagree or agree with the following statement?”[I have opinions about politics that are worth listening to.] were collected at T1 (just before deliberations), T2 (just after), and T3 (10 months later, July 2020).
 



The authors close by discussing efforts to scale up civic engagement, such as the Stanford Online Deliberation Platform. In all, “Can deliberation have lasting effects?” provides a rigorous case for the value of deliberation in strengthening democratic participation.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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A group deliberating during the America in One Room national Deliberation Poll in Dallas, TX, 2019
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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Caption A group deliberating during the America in One Room national Deliberation Poll in Dallas, TX, 2019
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This essay explains how a party less than two years old toppled Viktor Orbán's Fidesz in Hungary's April 2026 election after sixteen years of autocratization. Beyond the usual explanations—economic discontent, scandals, and Péter Magyar's charisma—the author identifies an underappreciated force: a network of more than 2,500 semi-autonomous local civic groups, the "Tisza Islands," that sprang up within eighteen months and supplied the nationwide campaign capacity the opposition otherwise lacked. Their rise is a puzzle, since Fidesz had deliberately gutted opposition parties and independent civil society. The case carries two lessons: Prodemocracy civic capacity may be latent rather than absent, emerging when participation seems likely to matter; and loosely structured grassroots organization is a powerful model for opposition mobilization. It works best, the author concludes, in competitive authoritarian settings where elections remain unfair but still winnable—less so where bans, fraud, or harsh repression foreclose electoral turnover.

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Journal of Democracy
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Hanna Folsz
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Number 3, July 2026
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