This commentary first appeared in Foreign Affairs.

North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

An Unstable Triangle
 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise. 

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest. 

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States. 

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing. 

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed on to) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.” 

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

Let the Chips Fall

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.

On January 13, 2024, Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as its next president. Mr. Lai received 40.05% of the vote, the lowest winning percentage since 2000. In addition to the DPP’s losing control of parliament, President-elect Lai will face a litany of practical and existential challenges during his presidency, chief among them the looming threat of Chinese military and economic coercion. As Taiwan looks to the United States for support in deterring China, the United States, in turn, must continue to shore up its alliance network in East Asia, particularly with Japan, the most consequential partner in the region.

How should we assess efforts to adapt the U.S.-Japan security and technology alliance to meet these challenges? What should we look for in 2024 given Taiwan’s election results and the political uncertainty in the United States and Japan? The Japan Program at Shorenstein APARC and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA convened a panel discussion, titled “U.S.-Japan Alliance Adaptation to Intensifying Strategic Competition with China,” to weigh in on these questions.

The speakers included Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution; Matake Kamiya, professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan; Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and Jim Schoff, senior director of the US-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui moderated the discussion.

The panelists assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan security and technology alliance, examined current initiatives aimed at bolstering military cooperation, proposed additional measures to be taken, and considered various economic security policies related to supply chains, export controls, and high-tech industries. The speakers all acknowledged that Japan is the critical swing player in the gathering geopolitical storm in the Taiwan Strait and agreed that Japan's choices in responding to the increasing security challenge will be consequential, if not decisive. While each panelist suggested some form of strategic promotion and coordination of policies to address rising threats to the economic and national security of the United States and Japan, they asserted that enhanced communication with other like-minded partners is needed to achieve this objective.

A Consequential Election

Diamond noted that domestic issues were at the forefront of Taiwan’s elections. While the island's semiconductor industry is booming, other sectors struggle to keep pace, and citizens cite rising inequality, elder care, and energy policy as major domestic policy issues.

However, for Diamond, Taiwan’s active security challenge supersedes these domestic concerns, and Taiwan faces a grim reality. The U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are not prepared militarily, economically, or psychologically for a potential blockade or military confrontation with China, he said. Diamond argued that Taiwan must have more robust defenses to withstand pressure from Beijing.

Diamond invoked 20th-century history, issuing a warning: “I cannot underscore enough that this is a dangerous situation. We need to learn from the experience of the 1930s. Russia is trying to swallow Ukraine, a country with sovereignty. China, Russia, and Iran are cooperating. North Korea is sending supplies to Russia. We need to learn from history and take threats seriously in terms of rhetoric, action, and ideology. China is preparing for war against Taiwan; it is preparing to push the U.S. out of Asia, and it will likely happen in this decade.”

Diamond argued that Chinese intervention in Taiwan would not be the terminus of their expansion and suggested that “if you want to deter war, you better prepare for it. Anyone who believes that China would stop with Taiwan is breathtakingly naïve. We are running out of time. Urgent appeals are needed to get the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and the European public to exit from their wishful thinking and slow pace of preparation.”

Japan’s Role and Relevance

Kamiya remarked upon recent changes in Japan’s military stance, citing the residual influence of Japan's postwar pacifism. According to Kamiya, the Japanese public has gradually accepted the reactivation of its self-defense forces and a dramatic increase in defense spending over the coming years.

For Kamiya, increased military spending is ushering in new levels of strategic alignment and unlocking new opportunities for the U.S.-Japan collaboration. He asserted that the future success of the U.S.-Japan alliance in countering China depends on whether Japan can maintain its current changes to its defense policy and whether both nations can ensure the preservation of rules-based international order. The military has a role of deterrence in establishing peace, he said.

Ensuring a Collaborative Approach

Schoff agreed that increased interdependence is necessary in an era of strategic competition but asked, “How can we compete effectively without undermining other partners? There is a consensus that national security consists of territorial and economic aspects, so maintaining an advantage means maintaining and advancing technological development and economic security.”

Schoff argued that U.S.-Japan leaders' summits would help achieve such collaboration, citing “two plus two” meetings of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC) as particularly relevant. He highlighted semiconductor collaboration, government agency cooperation, and information sharing as some of the most helpful tools to confront this challenge.

Schoff also discussed U.S.-Japan joint security initiatives and some of the challenges to the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, including malware targeting critical infrastructure organizations in Guam and elsewhere carried out by Volt Typhoon, a state-sponsored actor based in China that typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. He argued that the United States and Japan must collaborate on information sharing to address this and other cyberthreats.

Schoff also commented on Japan’s development of a new joint force command, the nation’s first. “As Japan builds this capability, we can more effectively leverage U.S. forces in Japan with an operational command in Japan. We can plan together, train together, and exercise together, but it depends on how much INDOPACOM wants to participate,” he said.

Deterrence and Force

Mastro, like Diamond, painted a solemn portrait of the escalating tensions in the region. She indicated that over the past 25 years, the Chinese military has rapidly modernized, stating that “this isn't the 1990s; the military balance of power used to be in Taiwan's favor.”

Mastro also ruled out any sort of diplomatic resolution to the situation, arguing that there is nothing Taiwan or the DPP can do to placate Beijing. “It looks like a very real possibility of war over the Taiwan Strait. The conditions for peace and reunification have already failed.”

Citing U.S. deterrence as the most important action to defend Taiwan, Mastro asserted that “there is nothing more important than Japan for U.S. deterrence. The southern islands of Japan are the only options close to the conflict zone, as Australia and South Korea are too far away.” Being the only country with a geographic location and potential for aggregate military, naval, and air power, Japan is the critical nation in the equation.

“If Japan and the U.S. were to join the fight, China would never attack Taiwan, but if China does not attack Japan, Japan will not join,” Mastro said. “If the Chinese attack Taiwan, they will likely tell Japan not to worry and that the Senkaku islands are safe.” She added that any guarantees of non-aggression from China are not necessarily trustworthy.

When considering "how bad it would be for Japan and the international system if we lost Taiwan,” Mastro replied that “Dealing with a forceful China that has come to accept that aggression is a good way of doing business is bad in the long term.” She argued that a Taiwan contingency would directly affect Japan and that China and Russia are building a relationship to counter the U.S.-Japan security partnership.

As for the practical details of the U.S.-Japan security partnership, Mastro suggested that the United States would not make Japan a joint command unless the nation was “all in.” Mastro also provided a timeline for preparations, stating that, “we have to be ready by 2027 if we want this war to be prevented.”

The 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum met in San Francisco from November 11-17 at the APEC Leaders’ Week to discuss trade, sustainable development, technological innovation, and other pressing issues. The occasion also provided opportunities for APEC member leaders to hold bilateral meetings, of which perhaps the most highly anticipated was a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Shorenstein APARC experts explain the implications of the APEC convening, analyze the deliverables from the Biden-Xi meeting, and examine issues that cast a shadow on the U.S. relations with Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the world's fourth-most populous country. Continue reading below for a roundup of our experts’ analysis and commentary featured in U.S. and international media.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our experts' analysis >

Meeting face-to-face for the first time in a year on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, Biden and Xi discussed issues spanning military and trade relations, signaling a willingness to bring a degree of stability to the rocky U.S.-China bilateral relations. Ties between the two countries have deteriorated amid tensions like those in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, disputes about technology competition, and the February 2023 Chinese spy balloon incident. APARC fellows consider the significance of the Biden-Xi meeting in numerous articles and interviews in the press.

The United States and China each have reasons to meet now and reduce hostilities. For President Biden, the upcoming 2024 presidential election is ample impetus to work for a better relationship with the Chinese. For Beijing, as Center Fellow Thomas Fingar tells the Japan Times, the country’s “economic difficulties and their implications for social stability and regime legitimacy have made Beijing more eager to improve relations with countries important to its economy than was the case six to 12 months ago.” And Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro notes in the Christian Science Monitor that “both sides are trying to present to the rest of the world that they have things under control,” something that requires “predictable, high-level engagement.”

Most analysts, however, held low expectations for substantive outcomes from the meeting between the two leaders. According to Mastro, there is no indication of improvement in the tension between the two sides because neither the United States nor China is ready to make “any significant concession,” she argues on NBC News.

One reason for that is an aversion to political risk. As Mastro tells KCRW’s Madeleine Brand on Press Play: “There’s no political appetite for [thinking outside the box]. Political leaders want to make sure any policy will 100% work before they're willing to embark on it. But in the world of geopolitics, it's really hard to know that before you try things and experiment and assess and reassess.”

That said, just the very fact of the meeting taking place could represent an essential signal to Chinese officials, as Fingar points out to NBC News: “For there really to be a movement for lower levels of the [Chinese] system to engage in specifics, it needs a refreshed endorsement from Xi.” 

One outcome many were looking for was a resumption of U.S.-China military communications, what defense analysts call “mil-to-mil exchanges.” The Chinese severed these in 2022 when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. With close encounters between American and Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea becoming almost commonplace, communications at the military senior level are critical to prevent escalation. But restoring these ties would have limited value because, as Mastro tells NPR, “You can expect that, the next time [the Chinese] get unhappy about something, maybe after the Taiwan election, they cut them off again. So, unless we have some sort of commitment to sustained engagement, the mil-to-mil exchanges are unlikely to be sufficient to stabilize the relationship.”
 

The Biden-Xi meeting took place on the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The United States is concerned that China — as a good friend of Iran and one of the largest importers of its gas and oil — could complicate diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and potentially exacerbate tensions. However, Mastro argues that bringing up the Middle East in the context of the U.S.-China bilateral meeting only serves to aid Beijing in its propaganda efforts. As she says on KTVU Fox 2 News, “China does not really care what happens [in the Middle East]. But they are leveraging the support, especially in the developing world, in the Global South, for Hamas to push back against the United States and basically use Israel as a proxy for discontent about what they call ‘American unilateralism,’ ‘American hegemony.’” 

The conflict in the Middle East came up in another high-level meeting when Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited Biden in Washinton before heading to the APEC forum. Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, Jakarta is unhappy with the White House for several reasons. Among these, the war in Gaza was probably foremost in Widodo’s mind, writes Ambassador Scot Marciel, the Oksenberg-Rholen Fellow at APARC, in an essay for The Diplomat magazine. “Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire.” Thus, Indonesian public opinion has put Jakarta and Washington at odds over the Israel-Hamas crisis, explains Marciel.

Indonesians also remain upset by the snub of Biden skipping the recent East Asia Summit and by “what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership, under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy,” Marciel writes, urging Washington to engage Jakarta seriously on these issues before Indonesia is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024.

More Media Coverage

For more coverage of the APEC forum and Biden-Xi meeting with analysis by APARC scholars, visit the links below:

Kishida and Xi Aim for Trade Progress Despite Lingering Tensions
The Japan Times, November 17, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 17, 2023

Oriana Skylar Mastro on the Xi-Biden Meeting on the Sidelines of APEC 
BBC Sounds, November 15, 2023

Biden, Xi Eye Economic, Military Thaw in High-Stakes Meeting
Bloomberg Technology, November 15, 2023

US Grants Chinese Journalists Hundreds of Visas to Cover APEC
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

Xi’s Arrival in US Brings Protesters and Fans Onto Streets
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

U.S.-China: One Summit, Two Different Goals for Biden and Xi
Nikkei Asia, November 14, 2023

Presidents Xi and Biden Seek to Turn Back the Clock in San Francisco
Time Magazine, November 14, 2023

China's Xi Jinping to meet with Biden in San Francisco
NPR, November 11, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 11, 2023

Biden and Xi to Seek to Stabilize Relations in California Meeting
New York Times, November 10, 2023

APEC Offers Important Chance to Stabilize Tense U.S.-China Relations
San Francisco Examiner, November 10, 2023

Joe Biden, Xi Jinping Set to Steal APEC Spotlight with Talks to Steady Ties
Reuters, November 8, 2023