Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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Amir Magdy Kamel event

Amir Magdy Kamel joins ARD to discuss his recently released book, Floundering Stability: US Foreign Policy in Egypt (University of Michigan Press, 2023). 


The United States has a record of pursuing global stability through international relations. This commitment is reflected in a US type of foreign policy that uses economic tools to pursue stability goals. To better understand the effectiveness of this notion, this talk will unpack the conceptual and contextual foundations of what Amir Magdy Kamel refers to as the US ‘Stability Policy’—how it evolved over time and how it was implemented in Egypt. From here, Kamel will reflect on what his book’s findings demonstrate for the relationship between economics and stability, along with how and why the stability policy performed the way it did in Egypt.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Amir Magdy Kamel currently holds visiting roles at Stanford University and the University of San Francisco. He is also an Associate Professor in the School of Security Studies and a Fellow in the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King's College London. His research projects focus on two areas: political and economic issues across the Middle East, including EU and US foreign policy towards the region, and transformative technologies and how they impact states and policymaking. Dr. Kamel also has over a decade of experience providing advice, analysis, and consultations to various government agencies, economic consultancies, and NGOs.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Encina Hall E008 (Garden Level, East)     
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This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.


For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

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Military vehicles carrying DF-26 ballistic missiles drive through Tiananmen Square during a military parade in Beijing.
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Despite changes in China’s forces and the illegal invasion of Ukraine, the United States does not need to increase the numbers of its nuclear arsenal, argues Oriana Skylar Mastro in a new report.
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7th fleet cruisers transit Taiwan strait
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Can the U.S. Deter China? Lessons from Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine

In the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, how are Chinese strategists and scholars assessing U.S. deterrence strategy? What are the implications for Taiwan? Leading foreign affairs expert Oriana Skylar Mastro analyzes a newly translated article by a senior Chinese scholar which concludes that while the United States failed to deter Putin’s aggression, its actions in Ukraine are nonetheless impacting Beijing’s foreign policy calculations.
Can the U.S. Deter China? Lessons from Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine
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U.S. Seaman Xi Chan stands lookout on the flight deck as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) transits the Taiwan Strait during routine underway operations.
Seaman Xi Chan stands lookout on the flight deck as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) transits the Taiwan Strait during routine underway operations.
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For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

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This essay is part of the report "Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035," published by the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The volume addresses the question of how the United States should respond to deterring two peer competitors: Russia and China. 


Cover of the report "Project Atoms 2023"

This paper’s main contention is that the nature of U.S.-China military competition from 2035 to 2050 will exhibit some unique characteristics compared to the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship that require new thinking on these topics. As such, this paper differs from others in this volume by focusing on what changes in Chinese military posture, doctrine, and modernization mean for U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy, modernization, reassurance of allies, and arms control efforts. The reason for focusing on China is to challenge the premise that the United States should treat Russia and China as similar peers, and because assumptions among nuclear experts about what modernization efforts in China mean for Chinese nuclear policy are limiting thinking on ideal policy responses. The details of force modernization are consistent with the idea that China is maintaining the same nuclear policy it has had since 1964. This is advantageous for the United States, and thus most of this paper’s recommendations revolve around discouraging deviations. Admittedly, this piece raises more questions than it answers, but understanding which components of U.S. thinking will also serve the United States well in the future, and which require additional consideration, is the first step to devising any useful responses. Each section lays out relevant Chinese approaches, U.S. assumptions, and key issues that color best responses. While this paper focuses on Chinese nuclear modernization, what it means for U.S. strategy, and how the United States should respond, it should not be interpreted as dismissing the challenges of responding to Russian nuclear aggression and expansion. Rather, it focuses on challenging the premise that the United States needs to make significant changes in posture or policy to deter China.

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Erin and Brett Carter seminar

A dictator's power is secure, the authors begin in this muscular, impressive study, only as long as citizens believe in it. When citizens suddenly believe otherwise, a dictator's power is anything but, as the Soviet Union's collapse revealed. This conviction – that power rests ultimately on citizens' beliefs – compels the world's autocrats to invest in sophisticated propaganda. This study draws on the first global data set of autocratic propaganda, encompassing nearly eight million newspaper articles from fifty-nine countries in six languages. The authors document dramatic variation in propaganda across autocracies: in coverage of the regime and its opponents, in narratives about domestic and international life, in the threats of violence issued to citizens, and in the domestic events that shape it. The book explains why Russian President Vladimir uses Donald Trump as a propaganda tool and why Chinese state propaganda is more effusive than any point since the Cultural Revolution.

ABOUT THE SPEAKERS


Erin Baggott Carter (赵雅芬) is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. She is also a non-resident scholar at the UCSD 21st Century China Center. She has previously held fellowships at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and the Center for International Security and Cooperation. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University.

Dr. Carter's research focuses on Chinese politics and propaganda. Her first book, Propaganda in Autocracies, explores how political institutions determine propaganda strategies with an original dataset of eight million articles in six languages drawn from state-run newspapers in nearly 70 countries. She is currently working on a book on how domestic politics influence US-China relations. Her other work has appeared in the British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, and International Interactions. Her work has been featured by a number of media platforms, including the New York Times and the Little Red Podcast.

Brett Carter is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Brett received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University and has previously held fellowships at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law.

Brett's research focuses on politics in the world's autocracies. His first book, Propaganda in Autocracies, marshals a range of empirical evidence to probe the politics of autocratic propaganda. His second book project, Autocracy in Post-Cold War Africa, explores how Central Africa's autocrats are learning to survive despite the nominally democratic institutions they confront and the international pressure that occasionally makes outright repression costly. His other work has appeared in the Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, and Journal of Democracy, among others.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

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Erin Baggott Carter (赵雅芬) is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. She is also a non-resident scholar at the UCSD 21st Century China Center. She has previously held fellowships at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and the Center for International Security and Cooperation. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University.

Dr. Carter's research focuses on Chinese politics and propaganda. Her first book, Propaganda in Autocracies (Cambridge University Press), explores how political institutions determine propaganda strategies with an original dataset of eight million articles in six languages drawn from state-run newspapers in nearly 70 countries. She is currently working on a book on how domestic politics influence US-China relations. Her other work has appeared in the British Journal of Political ScienceJournal of Conflict ResolutionSecurity Studies, and International Interactions. Her work has been featured by a number of media platforms, including the New York Times and the Little Red Podcast.

Her research has been supported by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, and the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University.

Dr. Carter regularly tweets about Chinese politics and propaganda at @baggottcarter. She can be reached via email at baggott [at] usc.edu or ebaggott [at] stanford.edu.

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Brett Carter is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California, a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and a Faculty Affiliate at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. He received a Ph.D. from Harvard University, where he was a fellow at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.

Carter studies politics in the world's autocracies. His first book, Propaganda in Autocracies: Institutions, Information, and the Politics of Belief (Cambridge University Press), draws on the largest archive of state propaganda ever assembled — encompassing over eight million newspaper articles in six languages from nearly 60 countries around the world — to show how political institutions shape the propaganda strategies of repressive governments. It received the William Riker Prize for the Best Book in Political Economy, the International Journal of Press/Politics Hazel Gaudet-Erskine Best Book Award, Honorable Mention for the Gregory Luebbert Award for the Best Book in Comparative Politics, and Honorable Mention for the APSA Democracy & Autocracy Section's Best Book Award.

His second book, in progress, shows how politics in Africa’s autocracies changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and how a new era of geopolitical competition — marked by the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia — is changing them again.

Carter’s other work has appeared in the Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, Perspectives on Politics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy, and Foreign Affairs, among others. His work has been featured by The New York Times, The Economist, The National Interest, and NPR’s Radiolab.

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This September, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea for a weekend summit at Camp David. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and tensions between the U.S. and China over trade, militarization, and Taiwan, the meeting was a notable step in ongoing efforts by the U.S. to increase trilateral cooperation amongst its allies in East Asia.

To contextualize the summit and its implications for the U.S.-South Korea-Japan relationship, Gi-Wook ShinDaniel SneiderThomas Fingar, and Oriana Skylar Mastro — scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) — explain the evolution of the relationship and how the summit may impact the dynamic moving forward.



A Complicated History


While South Korea and Japan are both long standing partners and allies with the United States, their bilateral relationship with each other has historically been strained.

In an interview with Asia Experts ForumGi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) explained:

“Japanese colonialism was instrumental to the formation of Korean national identity. The Korean peninsula is surrounded by big powers such as China, Japan, and Russia. Even today, these influences are still very strong. A sense of threat is still there.”

In particular, issues stemming from the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula between 1910 and 1945 remain a political third rail in both countries. The use of Korean nationals as forced laborers and soldiers in Japanese industry and the Japanese military remains an unresolved legacy, as do demands for the recognition of and restitution for Korean women who were taken into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 40s.

The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea, 1945.
The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea, 1945. | Mainichi Newspapers Company via Wikimedia Commons

In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court passed a series of rulings requiring Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel of Japan to compensate 14 Korean citizens for their unpaid labor. As of yet, neither company has agreed to comply with the ruling. The South Korean government has since announced plans to compensate survivors who were forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period, but this remains a unilateral decision on the part of the Yoon administration, not a bilateral position between South Korea and Japan.

These tensions have ripple effects far outside of East Asia. Writing for Toyo KeizaiDaniel Sneider, an FSI Lecturer in International Policy with a focus on Asia, explains the broader geopolitical implications of these issues:

“The Americans have been urging the two countries to settle these problems in order to ease the way to the kind of security cooperation that has become visible in recent months. Joint military exercises for missile defense and other small steps to intensify trilateral coordination are taking place and a resolution of the history of problems may be key to moving ahead.”


Steps Forward


The last year has seen increased efforts to restore more functionality to the South Korea-Japan relationship. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida met briefly on the sidelines of the September 2022 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, which was followed by respective visits of Yoon to Tokyo in March 2023 and Kishida to Seoul two months later in May, the first such visits in over 11 years.

The Camp David summit, which brought the U.S., South Korea, and Japan together as strategic partners, is the latest step on the hoped-for road to institutionalized security cooperation between the three nations.

Speaking to NBC, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar explained the significance of the weekend.

“The importance of this [summit] is that it was a genuine trilateral meeting, which means the Japanese and the Koreans are talking to one another as opposed to the U.S. dealing separately with each of them.”

In contrast to the idyllic Camp David setting, the three leaders are faced with a weighty set of issues, noted Sneider, including the crisis triggered by the Ukraine war, North Korea’s aggressive posture, as well as growing concerns about China.

The war in Ukraine has done a lot to open leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries. It's pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.
Oriana Skylar Mastro
FSI Center Fellow

Oriana Skylar Mastro, an FSI Center Fellow and an expert on security, conflict resolution, and the Chinese military elaborated further on the mutual pressures South Korea, Japan, and the United States face:

“Since President Biden came into office, he’s really stressed strengthening alliances and partnerships as a way of protecting U.S. interests abroad. I'm sure there has been much work behind the scenes to try to get these two countries to come together. In terms of the timing [of this summit], it's of course partially because of the accumulation of these concerns over China. I think also the war in Ukraine has done a lot to really open up leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries that could potentially be undeterred from using force. I think it's fair to say that this has also pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.”


An Uncertain Future


The official summit documents outline both a vision of partnership and offer a variety of practical agreements on everything from annual leadership summits to meetings on economic and cyber security, and a proposal for how to move forward with joint military exercises. Notably, the two-paragraph ‘commitment to consult’ on responses to ‘regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security’ — while not a fully embodied collective security agreement — is nonetheless a “stunning achievement,” says Daniel Sneider.

Despite agreeing on a hefty laundry list of shared concerns and security goals, the way forward for additional trilateralization between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not necessarily clear. Oriana Mastro explained: 

“Even though they might have shared threat perceptions, there is still a lot of trust that has to happen between nations for them to take coordinated military approaches. If two countries, for example, exercise together — and that's one of the things that the Biden administration is hoping to get out of this summit: more routine trilateral exercises — you get to learn a lot about another country's military, and that only really happens between friends. That’s also true of intel sharing. When you share intelligence, you’re not only sharing information, you're sharing how you get intelligence, which can also be sensitive. So while they've shared these threats for a while, it hasn't really gotten to the level in which they were willing to take risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and Japan to become closer in the security space in a way that would help them combat these issues together.”

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio arrive for a joint news conference following three-way talks at Camp David.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio arrive for a news conference following three-way talks at Camp David. | Getty

Besides the challenges of international diplomacy, Yoon, Kishida, and Biden also face domestic hurdles that could hinder further cooperation.

In a comment to the Wall Street Journal, Gi-Wook Shin noted that, “Yoon only entered politics a few years ago. If his party loses the election, I don’t know who will stay with him.” Improving South Korea-Japan relations was a major platform of the Yoon campaign, and backlash against his administration could yield disinterest or even renewed hostility toward continuing his efforts. 

Daniel Sneider sees similar challenges for Biden and Kishida. Writing in East Asia Forum, he cautioned:

“President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media. . . Imprisoned by domestic politics, the White House will likely be unable to give substance to this emergent partnership.”

In the case of Kishida, the decision to release wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear site, which came just days after the conclusion of the summit, has been particularly counterproductive. Sneider continued:

“Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls. The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.”

Where is the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship headed next? Follow FSI scholars to stay informed about the latest developments. Register to receive alerts to your inbox either weekly or monthly.   

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The Cost of the "Taiwan Contingency" and Japan's Preparedness

The ultimate choice that must be made.
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Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab team members at Encina Hall, Stanford
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South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio hold a joint news conference following three-way talks at Camp David on August 18, 2023.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio hold a joint news conference following three-way talks at Camp David on August 18, 2023.
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The trilateral summit between the United States, South Korea, and Japan was an important marker in deepening coordination among the allies, but work still remains to create a solid security partnership.

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Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili seminar

This presentation examines the failure of state-building efforts in Afghanistan and argues that the international community's focus on building state capacity quickly led to the resurrection of centralized state institutions from Afghanistan's Soviet past. These institutions emphasized national governmental power and fiscal control, which significantly widened the disconnect between the Afghan state and society, posing substantial challenges to building political stability and economic development. Centralized models are in conflict with societies that have strong norms of local self-governance or are skeptical of the state. The Afghan bureaucracy, which shaped individual interactions with the state, was also overlooked. Paradoxically, efforts to build a strong state undermined it, and Afghanistan remains trapped in a vicious cycle of state collapse. This dilemma is not unique to Afghanistan but is also faced by other countries, such as Somalia and Ethiopia, where Soviet-era institutions cast a strong shadow on governance. The argument highlights that bridging the gap between de facto and de jure institutions is the key to stability, legitimacy, and development.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili is the Founding Director of the Center for Governance and Markets and a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Her research focuses on issues of self-governance, security, political economy, and public sector reform. She is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was named one of the world's top global thinkers by Prospect Magazine (UK).

Murtazashvili is the author of Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2016), which received the Best Book Award in Social Sciences from the Central Eurasian Studies Society and received honorable mention from the International Development Section of the International Studies Association. She is also the author of Land, the State, and War: Property Institutions and Political Order in Afghanistan (with Ilia Murtazashvili) (Cambridge University Press, 2021) and several other books. Murtazashvili has advised the United States Agency for International Development, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, World Bank, the US Department of Defense, the United Nations Development Program, and UNICEF. She served as a US Peace Corps Volunteer in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

She is the past-president of the Central Eurasian Studies Society and was elected board member of the Section for International and Comparative Public Administration of the American Society of Public Administration. She is also a member of PONARS Eurasia, a research organization focused on security issues in Eurasia. She previously served as a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili Professor of International Affairs, Director, Center for Governance and Markets, University of Pittsburgh Professor of International Affairs, Director, Center for Governance and Markets, University of Pittsburgh
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Maria Curiel seminar

Peace settlements ending civil wars often pursue political solutions that require violent actors to transition to political parties and engage with politics peacefully. Some provide reserved seats, quotas, or guaranteed cabinet positions to safeguard these electoral transitions. What are the consequences of safeguards on rebel party grassroots? Scholarship on political affirmative action generally concludes that reservations are beneficial. However, safeguards may hinder the consolidation of rebel parties by generating counterproductive incentives, demobilizing the party base. I study the case of the former FARC-EP party Comunes, who were granted 10 legislative seats in the 2016 peace agreement. I implement a priming experiment with this crucial but difficult to reach population to assess the consequences of this provision. On average, primed participants reported less interest in a range of party-building activities. However, heterogeneity suggests these safeguards may come at the cost of civilian grassroots specifically, further concentrating rebel party activism among ex-combatants.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


María Ignacia Curiel is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. She is an empirical scholar using experimental, observational, and qualitative data to study violent conflict and elections, peacebuilding, and representation.

Her recent work analyzes political parties with rebel origins and the conditions that shape their commitment to electoral competition. This work draws both from an in-depth empirical study of Comunes, a Colombian political party formed by the former FARC guerrilla, and from the study of broad patterns in rebel party behaviors across contexts. She received her PhD in Political Science from the Department of Politics at New York University.

She has previously conducted research for the United Nations University Center for Policy Research on excombatant reintegration into civilian life, the Inter-American Development Bank on the evolution of Venezuela’s energy infrastructure, and a Caracas-based organization on state-sponsored killings and police militarization. She was born in Caracas, Venezuela, and lived in New York from 2011-2023.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Encina Hall, Suite 052
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Research Scholar
Research Manager, Democracy Action Lab
Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab Research Affiliate, 2024-25
CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow, 2023-24
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María Ignacia Curiel is a Research Scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Research Affiliate of the Poverty, Violence and Governance Lab at Stanford University. Curiel is an empirical political scientist using experimental, observational, and qualitative data to study questions of violence and democratic participation, peacebuilding, and representation.

Her research primarily explores political solutions to violent conflict and the electoral participation of parties with violent origins. This work includes an in-depth empirical study of Comunes, the Colombian political party formed by the former FARC guerrilla, as well as a broader analysis of rebel party behaviors across different contexts. More recently, her research has focused on democratic mobilization and the political representation of groups affected by violence in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

Curiel's work has been supported by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Institute for Humane Studies, and the APSA Centennial Center and is published in the Journal of Politics. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and dual B.A. degrees in Economics and Political Science from New York University.

Date Label
Maria Curiel
Seminars
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Michele Gelfand seminar

Over the past century, we have explored the solar system, split the atom, and wired the Earth, but somehow, despite all of our technical prowess, we have struggled to understand something far more important: our own cultural differences. Using a variety of methodologies, our research has uncovered is that many cultural differences reflect a simple, but often invisible distinction: The strength of social norms. Tight cultures have strong social norms and little tolerance for deviance, while loose cultures have weak social norms and are highly permissive. The tightness or looseness of social norms turns out to be a Rosetta Stone for human groups. It illuminates similar patterns of difference across nations, states, organizations, and social class, and the template also explains differences among traditional societies. It’s also a global fault line: conflicts we encounter can spring from the structural stress of tight-loose tension. By unmasking culture to reveal tight-loose dynamics, we can see fresh patterns in history, illuminate some of today’s most puzzling trends and events, and see our own behavior in a new light. At a time of intense political conflict and rapid social change, this template shows us that there is indeed a method to the madness, and that moderation – not tight or loose extremes – has never been more needed.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Michele Gelfand is the John H. Scully Professor of Cross-Cultural Management and Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Stanford Graduate School of Business School and Professor of Psychology by Courtesy. Gelfand uses field, experimental, computational and neuroscience methods to understand the evolution of culture and its multilevel consequences. Her work has been published in outlets such as Science, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Psychological Science, Nature Human behavior, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychology, Academy of Management Journal, among others. Gelfand is the founding co-editor of the Advances in Culture and Psychology series (Oxford University Press). Her book Rule Makers, Rule Breakers: How Tight and Loose Cultures Wire the World was published by Scribner in 2018. She is the Past President of the International Association for Conflict Management and co-founder of the Society for the Study of Cultural Evolution. She received the 2016 Diener award from SPSP, the 2017 Outstanding International Psychologist Award from the American Psychological Association, the 2019 Outstanding Cultural Psychology Award from the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, the 2020 Rubin Theory-to-Practice award from the International Association of Conflict Management, the 2021 Contributions to Society award from the Academy of Management, and the Annaliese Research Award from the Humboldt Foundation. Gelfand was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Stanford Graduate School of Business 
655 Knight Way 
Stanford, CA 94305 

650.497.4507
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John H. Scully Professor in Cross-Cultural Management and Professor of Organizational Behavior, Stanford GSB
Professor of Psychology (by courtesy), School of Humanities and Sciences
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Michele Gelfand is a Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and Professor of Psychology by Courtesy at Stanford University. Gelfand uses field, experimental, computational, and neuroscience methods to understand the evolution of culture — as well as its multilevel consequences for human groups. Her work has been cited over 20,000 times and has been featured in the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Boston Globe, National Public Radio, Voice of America, Fox News, NBC News, ABC News, The Economist, De Standard, among other outlets.

Gelfand has published her work in many scientific outlets such as Science, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the Royal Society B, Psychological Science, Nature Scientific Reports, PLOS 1, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, Research in Organizational Behavior, Journal of Applied Psychology, Annual Review of Psychology, American Psychologist, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Current Opinion in Psychology, among others. She has received over 13 million dollars in research funding from the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, and the FBI.

She is the author of Rule Makers, Rule Breakers: How Tight and Loose Cultures Wire the World (Scribner, 2018) and co-editor of the following books: Values, Political Action, and Change in the Middle East and the Arab Spring (Oxford University Press, 2017); The Handbook of Conflict and Conflict Management (Taylor & Francis, 2013); and The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture (2004, Stanford University Press). Additionally, she is the founding co-editor of the Advances in Culture and Psychology Annual Series and the Frontiers of Culture and Psychology series (Oxford University Press). She is the past President of the International Association for Conflict Management, past Division Chair of the Conflict Division of the Academy of Management, and past Treasurer of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. She has received several awards and honors, such as being elected to the National Academy of Sciences (2021) and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2019), the 2017 Outstanding International Psychologist Award from the American Psychological Association, the 2016 Diener Award from the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, and the Annaliese Research Award from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

CDDRL Affiliated Faculty
Michele Gelfand
Seminars
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Andres Uribe seminar

Violent non-state actors frequently intervene in democratic politics, producing waves of political violence against voters, candidates, and elected officials. How do we understand these interventions? I argue that armed actors confront a tradeoff between two impulses: to discredit democracy as a political project or to bend elections and the policymaking process to their political agenda. How groups navigate that tradeoff is a function of how compatible their goals are with the democratic process and how much coercive power they can muster to compel voters and elected officials to meet their demands. I evaluate this theory through a paired comparison of two leftist insurgent groups: Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the FARC in Colombia. Archival evidence and computational content analysis illustrate the ideological divergence between the two groups. Leveraging variation in local military capacity caused by exogenous shifts in coca cultivation income, I demonstrate the effects of ideology and coercive capacity on violence and election outcomes. These results have implications for theories of political violence and democratic accountability.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER


Andres Uribe is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2023. His book project, "Coercion and Capture in Democratic Politics," examines how armed non-state groups seek to influence the democratic process. Through quantitative, computational, and archival analysis of rebel, paramilitary, and criminal groups in Latin America, he identifies the conditions that lead these actors to intervene in electoral politics, the structural forces that determine whether they succeed or fail, and the consequences of these interventions for democratic institutions and policy outcomes. Other projects explore processes of modern state-building, governance by non-state actors, and the political strategies of anti-democratic politicians.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Andres Uribe
Seminars
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Chris Walker and William Dobson Seminar

The world’s dictators are no longer content with shoring up control over their own populations—they are now exploiting the openness of the free world to spread disinformation, sow discord, and suppress dissent. In Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power, editors William J. Dobson, Tarek Masoud, and Christopher Walker bring together leading analysts to explain how the world’s authoritarians are attempting to erode the pillars of democratic societies—and what we can do about it. Far from offering a counsel of despair, the international contributors in this collection identify the considerable resources that democracy provides for blunting sharp power’s edge.

ABOUT THE SPEAKERS


Christopher Walker is Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world. In this capacity, he oversees the department responsible for NED’s multifaceted analytical work. He has a particular focus on authoritarian regimes and has been at the forefront of the discussion of how authoritarian powers exert influence on open systems, including in the context of sharp power. His articles have appeared in numerous publications, including the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the Journal of Democracy. Walker is co-editor (with Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner) of Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016) and co-editor (with William J. Dobson and Tarek Masoud) of Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power (2023, Johns Hopkins University Press).

William J. Dobson is the coeditor of the Journal of Democracy. Prior to assuming this position, he was the Chief International Editor at NPR, where he led the network’s award-winning international coverage and oversaw a team of editors and correspondents in 17 overseas bureaus and Washington, DC. Dobson is the author of The Dictator’s Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy, which examines the struggle between authoritarian regimes and the people who challenge them. It was selected as one of the “best books of 2012” by Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic, The Telegraph, and Prospect, and it has been translated into many languages, including Chinese, German, Japanese, and Portuguese. Dobson has published widely on international relations, democracy, and authoritarianism. His articles and essays have appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, The New Republic, Newsweek, and elsewhere. He has provided commentary and analysis on international politics for NPR, ABC, CNN, CBS, and MSNBC.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Perry Conference Room in Encina Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Perry Conference Room in Encina Encina Hall may attend in person.

Christopher Walker & Will Dobson
Seminars
Date Label
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