Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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Recently, former senior officials of South Korean President Roh's own administration have expressed serious concern about his approach to North Korea and to the alliance with the U.S. Mr. Straub will examine the prospects for the U.S.-South Korean alliance, especially in light of major differences between the two governments over how to deal with North Korea. He will also explain the origins and the nature of anti-Americanism in South Korea today, and offer his views on how the U.S. and South Korea could put their alliance on a sounder footing.

David Straub retired from the U.S. Department of State in 2006 as a Senior Foreign Service Officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. He worked over 12 years on Korean affairs, first arriving in Seoul in 1979, just months before the assassination of President Park Chung Hee. He served as head of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002 during popular protests against the U.S., and played a key working-level role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program as the State Department's Korea country desk director from 2002 to 2004.

Straub's final assignment was as the State Department's Japan country desk director in 2004, when he was co-leader of the U.S. delegation to talks with Japan on the realignment of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of U.S. military bases in Japan. He currently works as a consultant with Northeast Asia Associates, and lectures on U.S.-Korean relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is fluent in Korean, Japanese, and German.

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David Straub former Korea Country Director Speaker the United States Department of State
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The National Security Agency is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside a code. Secrets lie within. Located in Fort Meade, Md., it dwarfs the CIA. Its budget is black, unknown. And, most disturbing of all, it is the world's largest employer of mathematicians.

One of its secrets, recently revealed, is that it's monitoring millions of phone calls to learn just who was calling whom. (Technically, only telephone numbers are being recorded, but you don't have to be Q from James Bond to get a name from a number.) This information was being used to determine who might be a terrorist.

Legal or not, the spying program isn't worth violating our civil liberties for. The information one can glean will hardly help us win the war on terror.

With the NSA data, you can draw a picture with nodes or dots representing individuals, and lines between nodes if one person has called another. Mathematicians who work with pictures like this are called graph theorists. The field of social network analysis deals with trying to determine information about a group from such a graph, such as who the key players are or who the cell leaders might be.

But even when you know everyone in the graph is a terrorist, graphs don't contain information about the order or hierarchy of the cell. Researchers look instead for graph features like centrality: They try to identify nodes that are connected to a lot of other nodes, like spokes around the hub of a bicycle wheel. Monterey Naval Postgraduate School researcher Ted Lewis, in his textbook "Critical Infrastructure Protection," defines a critical node to be such a central hub.

There are two problems. First, the central player might not be as important as the hub metaphor suggests. Jafar Adibi of the University of Southern California looked at e-mail traffic between Enron employees before Enron collapsed, and drew the graph. He found that if you naively analyzed the graph, you could mistakenly conclude that one of the central players was CEO Ken Lay's ... secretary. But that wasn't the person who ran the company into the ground.

Second, as the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism reported in 2003, you can kill all the central players in a terrorist cell and still leave the cell with a complete chain of command -- still capable of carrying out a devastating attack.

Expert Kathleen Carley of Carnegie Mellon was able to correctly predict -- twice -- who would take over Hamas when its leaders were assassinated, and her analysis used detailed information about the individuals in the organization, not just what anonymous nodes were linked with what. The moral is that the graph theory approach is inadequate. For useful results, it's important to utilize the lattice theory approach, which takes into account order and hierarchy.

The other questionable aspect of the NSA spying program is that it seeks to work out who might be a terrorist based on their calling patterns. While I agree that anyone calling 1 (800) AL-QAEDA is probably a terrorist, guilt by association is not just bad law, it's bad mathematics, for three reasons.

The simplest reason is that we're all connected. Not in the Haight-Ashbury/Timothy Leary/late-period-Beatles kind of way, but in the sense of the Kevin Bacon game. Sociologist Stanley Milgram took individuals unknown to each other, separated by a continent, and asked one person to send a package to the other -- but only by sending the package to an individual he or she knew, who could then only send the package to someone he knew, and so on. While Milgram's interpretation of the results has since been questioned, the conclusion that emerged is that it took only six mailings, on average, for each package to reach its intended destination.

For example, President Bush is only three steps away from Osama bin Laden. And terrorist hermits like the Unabomber might be connected only to very few people. So much for guilt by association.

The second reason the NSA methodology is flawed is the concept "strength of weak ties," made famous by Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter. Robert Spulak of the Joint Special Operations University puts it this way: You might not see your college roommate for 10 years, but if he were to call you up and ask to stay in your apartment, you'd let him. This is the principle under which sleeper cells operate: There is no communication for years. The links between nodes that the NSA is looking for simply might not exist for the real threats.

Formal concept analysis, a branch of lattice theory, helps rectify this situation. Individuals who share many of the same characteristics are grouped together as one node, and links between nodes in this picture, called a concept lattice, indicate that all the members of a certain subgroup, with certain attributes, must also have other attributes. For instance, you might group together people based on what cafés, bookstores and mosques they attend, and then find out that all the people who go to a certain cafe also attend the same mosque (but maybe not vice versa). While this tool has in fact been used by researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory to sift through hundreds of terrorism-related reports, it's still dangerous to rely on the math.

The NSA data mining is flawed because, as Kennedy and Lincoln buffs know, two people can be a lot alike without being the same person. Even if there is only a 1 in 150 million chance that someone might share the profile of a terrorist suspect, it still means that, in a country the size of the United States, two people might share that profile. One is just minding his own business. The other is Cat Stevens.

This isn't to say mathematicians are useless. In September 2004 -- 10 months before the July 7 bombing of the London Underground -- mathematician Gordon Woo warned that London was a hotbed of jihadist radicalism. But Woo, who works for the Bay Area company Risk Management Solutions, didn't anticipate the bombings using math. He used his knowledge and experience of London, especially the Wood Green area. That's what law enforcement officials should be doing.

As for tracking terrorist financing, it may already be too late. The terrorism of the future, according to mathematician Stefan Schmidt of the Technical University in Dresden, Germany, may be the terrorism of the futures -- when bombs explode, the stock market drops. Schmidt wants to quantify the impact on the market of a terrorist incident. The only people who know when a bomb will explode are the terrorists. By playing the market, they may already have obtained as much money as they need -- in perfectly legitimate ways -- thus stifling Treasury Department efforts to cut off the source of their funding.

Math is just a tool. Used wisely, math can indeed help win the Battle of Britain (by breaking the German codes). But used unwisely -- as seems to be the case in the NSA telephone caper -- your approval rating might just hit an all-time low.

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CISAC faculty member Lawrence M. Wein works at solving mathematical problems posed by potential terrorist attacks.

It's been said that World War I was the chemists' war and World War II the physicists' war, but that World War III is destined to be the mathematicians' war.

With the gravest threat to U.S. security now posed by rogue terrorists who simultaneously hold a grudge and have access to weapons of mass destruction, some of this country's prime human calculators are on the case.

Combatting terrorism not with mortars and missiles but with mathematical models, they intend to prove this theorem: There literally is safety in numbers.

In their vanguard is an amiable Stanford University professor who, by devoting himself to the application of math principles to doomsday scenarios, is beginning to acquire the nickname "Dr. Doom." The attacks of Sept. 11 inspired mathematician Lawrence Wein to channel his expertise into some of the most compelling questions of our time.

He has ciphered the risks of our "woefully inadequate" inspection of container ships, assessed the effectiveness of border-control fingerprint checks to spot terrorists, and performed what may well be the first math analyses of hypothetical botulism, anthrax and smallpox contaminations.

Recall the agitation last year over warnings that the nation's milk supply was vulnerable, based on the calculation that one terrorist with a few grams of botulinum could contaminate a tanker and potentially poison 100,000 gallons of milk? That's just one of many tidings of comfort and joy brought to you by Wein.

Another such upper is that just about 6 percent of containers shipped into U.S. ports will be categorized as suspicious and subjected to tests for a nuclear device, based on a system that relies largely on reporting by the shipper. The rest, Wein noted, "just waltz right into the country without an inspector laying an eye on them."

At Stanford's Graduate School of Business, he teaches a core course in operations, and he says the parallels are strikingly similar: Just as McDonald's needs a well-designed distribution system to get its hamburgers out quickly, so the government needs a well-designed distribution system to get vaccines and antibiotics to citizens who might sicken or die from a bioterror attack. In math lingo, some of these computations rest on "queueing theory" -- the notion that a lot of needy people must line up behind a limited number of distributors.

And what do we do after crunching millions of numbers to arrive at specific prescriptions? Wein has taken on the role of necessary nag to a torpid federal bureaucracy and recalcitrant industries.

In fact, the feds scrambled to try to suppress publication of his damning milk study as a threat to national security -- an argument the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences rejected before publishing the work.

These days, Wein regularly testifies at congressional hearings, addresses scientific forums and pens op-ed pieces in national newspapers about precisely what the government should be doing -- and where it is falling short.

"I believe my work demonstrates that numbers really matter, and we need to pay attention to what they tell us," said Wein, a critic of the federal government's homeland security failures in key areas, particularly at the ports. "I really don't bring my own personal political views into this -- I would be just as critical of the federal bureaucracy if a Democrat were in the White House.

"Bureaucracy just isn't designed to respond nimbly."

On the other hand, politicians are eager to do something, anything, that might thwart a terror attack or save lives. But in an information vacuum, that makes them easy prey for entrepreneurs hawking all kinds of safety gadgets.

So, much of Wein's math analysis goes beyond documenting threats to assess the most effective, cost-efficient remedies.

Take the milk scare, for example. Wein urged the government to mandate that milk tanks and trucks be locked, that two people be present when it is transferred along each part of the supply chain, and that milk truck drivers use a 15 minute test to detect any toxins. The estimated cost of all this: 2 cents per gallon.

Some other experts disputed Wein's assumptions, and dairy industry groups insisted they already had taken extra steps such as raising pasteurization temperatures to secure the milk supply. They dismissed the scenarios Wein described as "highly unlikely or impossible."

To avoid being victimized by a radioactive device aboard a tanker -- otherwise known as a "poor man's missile" -- he and colleague Stephen Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations advocate using techniques such as gamma-ray imaging to screen 100 percent of containers. They calculate the cost at $7 per container.

Some of Wein's calculations have translated into real reform.

In 2004, he presented to the White House his findings that the system of collecting only two fingerprints from incoming foreign visitors ran a high risk of missing terrorists because so many prints turned out to be of poor quality. His solution was simple: Take prints from all 10 digits. The government adopted it.

His 2003 research into the most effective response to an anthrax attack prompted pilot programs that are now testing his finding that the best way to widely distribute antibiotics would be by mail carriers, who already go door to door.

Albert Einstein once observed: "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."

And sure enough, one of the impediments to fighting terrorists with mathematics is the paucity of hard data.

An anthrax scenario illustrates the point. Estimates of fatalities per kilogram of poisonous agent released vary from a low of zero to a high of 660,000. That's because of variables: the dose required to cause infection, the percentage of people who survive infection, the degree of aerosol dispersion, the density of the population, the environmental stability of the agent and the effectiveness of a public health system response.

As Wein acknowledges, "It's not like we can do massive clinical trials on this."

The trail of what-ifs is so convoluted that in 2002 the National Academy of Sciences cited "an irreducible uncertainly of several orders of magnitude in the number of people who will be infected in an open-air release."

This makes some experts suspicious of anybody's calculations, even from a researcher with a pedigree like Wein's.

"With so much uncertainly surrounding the outcome of a bioweapons attack, it does not make sense to plan extensive biodefense programs when more-certain public threats, particularly those involving nuclear weapons, require attention," argued Allison Macfarlane, research associate in the Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group at MIT.

But Wein is undeterred, and is busy on new assessments. Yet he insists his work has not impaired his ability to sleep soundly.

"People really are much more likely to suffer from cancer than a terrorist attack, but that doesn't merit the same attention," he said. "We should do what makes sense to protect ourselves from both."

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The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University has concluded its second year of Stanford Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development. This year's fellows - 26 outstanding civic, political, and economic leaders from 21 countries in transition - were selected from more than 800 applications.

The summer fellows program brought leaders from important, transitioning countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia to Stanford for three weeks (this year, July 31 to August 18). The new summer fellows included presidential advisers, prominent journalists, key figures in human rights and democracy movements, academics, and representatives of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The fellows participated in morning seminars with leading Stanford faculty, including CDDRL director Michael A. McFaul, Kathryn Stoner, Larry Diamond, Avner Greif, Erik Jensen, and Stanford President Emeritus Gerhard Casper. In the afternoons, fellows attended talks by keynote speakers and led class sessions themselves, sharing insight into how reform progressed (or failed to progress) in their home countries and exchanging ideas for positive change. This year's keynote speakers included Carl Gershman, the president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Joan Blades, co-founder of MoveOn.org; Marc Pomar, president of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); and Judge Pamela Rymer, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) seeks to promote innovative and practical research to assist transitioning countries design and implement policies that will foster democracy, promote balanced and sustainable growth, and advance the rule of law. It supports specialized teaching, training, and outreach to assist countries struggling with political, economic, and judicial reform, constitutional design, economic performance and corruption.

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An invigorating day of addresses, debate, and discussion of major sources of systemic and human risk facing the global community.

7:30 AMREGISTRATION
8:00 - 9:00 AMBREAKFAST AND WELCOME
John W. Etchemendy, Provost, Stanford University
Coit D. Blacker, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute

OPENING REMARKS
Warren Christopher, 63rd Secretary of State
William J. Perry, 19th Secretary of Defense
George P. Shultz, 60th Secretary of State
9:15 AM - 12:00 PMMORNING SESSION
PLENARY I
Understanding, Measuring, and Coping with Risk: What We Know Coit D. Blacker, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute, Chair
Understanding and Measuring Risk Elisabeth Paté-Cornell
The Collapse of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime? Scott D. Sagan
Keeping Fissile Materials Out of Terrorist Hands Siegfried S. Hecker

CONCURRENT BREAKOUT SESSIONS
Food Security and the Environment Rosamond L. Naylor, Chair
Pandemics, Infectious Diseases, and Bioterrorism Alan M. Garber, Chair
Insurgencies, Failed States, and the Challenge of Governance Jeremy M. Weinstein, Chair
12:30 - 2:00 PMLUNCHEON
Infectious Diseases, Avian Influenza, and Bioterrorism: Risks to the Global Community
Michael T. Osterholm, Director, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota
2:30 - 5:30 PMAFTERNOON SESSION
PLENARY II
Natural, National, and International Disasters Michael A. McFaul, Deputy Director, FSI and Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Chair
Terror, U.S. Ports, and Neglect of Critical Infrastructure Stephen E. Flynn
Energy Shocks to the Global System David G. Victor

CONCURRENT BREAKOUT SESSIONS
Responding to a World at Risk: U.S. Efforts at Democracy Promotion in Russia, Iraq, and Iran Michael A. McFaul, Chair
The European Union: Politics, Economics, Terrorism Amir Eshel, Chair
China's Rise: Implications for the World Economy and Energy Markets Thomas C. Heller, Chair
Cross Currents: Nationalism and Regionalism in Northeast Asia Daniel C. Sneider, Chair
6:00 - 8:00 PMCOCKTAIL RECEPTION AND DINNER
Cocktail Reception 6:00 - 7:00 PM
Dinner 7:00 - 8:00 PM
8:00 - 9:00 PMA WORLD AT RISK
Peter Bergen, CNN Terrorism Analyst
Author of Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Bin Laden
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Frances C. Arrillaga Alumni Center

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PESD director David G. Victor testifies to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that the U.S.-India nuclear deal currently being debated by Congress could have a large impact on greenhouse gas emissions and be a major step towards engaging developing countries in the fight against climate change.

David Victor shows that by displacing coal-fired electricity generation, the U.S.-India nuclear deal could realize carbon dioxide emission reductions that rival the European Union's efforts under the Kyoto Protocol and far exceed previous efforts to engage developing countries in combating climate change.

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Roland Hsu is director of research of the Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project.

Hsu’s research is dedicated to bringing creative and multi-disciplinary thinking to the challenges of international cultural dialogue, and post-conflict peace and reconciliation.  His own research focuses on migration and ethnic identity formation.  His publications combine humanistic and social science methods and materials to answer what displaces peoples, how do societies respond to migration, and what are the experiences of resettlement. 

Currently he is pursuing the subject of displaced peoples, with plans to publish three books.  The three books address ethnicity, migration, and diaspora.  His first book, “Ethnic Europe: Mobility, Identity, and Conflict in a Globalized World” (Stanford University Press, 2010) revealed what it means to lay claim to ethnic difference in the traditional national cultures of Europe.  “Ethnic Europe” combines essays by leading scholars whom Hsu with research partners brought to Stanford.  The book is edited and begins with an essay by Hsu on how we think about ethnicity, and why recognizing ethnicity unsettles social tradition in increasingly globalized Europe.  Hsu continues to foster public questioning of the meaning and use of ethnicity by sponsoring programming on European political and cultural initiatives, and with blog postings on diversity policy and the politics of immigration in such publications as Le Monde Diplomatique.

Hsu’s second book, “Migration and Integration: New Models for Mobility and Coexistence” (University of Vienna Press, 2016) asks what displaces people, and how do migrants return or resettle.  Co-edited with Christoph Reinprecht (University of Vienna) “Migration and Integration” compares international and internal migration in East and South-East Asia, North Africa and Southern Europe, Western and Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia.  Based on Hsu’s design with faculty partners of a series of visiting fellowships, workshops, and an international conference, Hsu and Reinprecht invited scholars from multiple disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences to contribute to this volume on the history, politics, and culture of migration and integration in an illuminating East-West comparison.

His third book in this series of studies on displaced peoples is “Global Diaspora: Communities of Mind and Place”, co-edited with Dag Blanck (Uppsala University) from Oxford University Press (in process).  Essays in this book will ask how models of resettled communities and diasporas should be revised to help us understand today’s migrant experience.  Combining thirty historical and contemporary case studies, this book on “Diaspora” to be published in the Oxford University Press Handbook series, will help us rethink what has been the consequence of labeling a migrant community as a diaspora, why contemporary displacements due to war, poverty, and climate change disperse peoples more widely, and how we can understand the emerging experience of real and virtual migrant communities.

A fourth project under consideration in this series will be a web-based, curated and dynamic clearing house of the new thinking from scholars, policy leaders, and non-governmental actors on migration and refugees in national, regional, and trans-national settings.

Hsu developed this interest through his teaching and lecturing at Stanford, the University of Chicago, and European universities, and working with scholars, and policy and civil society leaders who have been invited to co-sponsored programming.  Working with Stanford and international university, government, and NGO partners, the list of co-sponsored conferences, workshops, seminars, and public events includes:

  • Authors and artists: Ian McEwan, Orhan Pamuk, Aris Fioretos.
  • Conferences/workshops/seminars: Stanford Faculty Working Group on Responding to Refugees; New thinking on Nobel Laureate Nelly Sachs; Diversity and Community in Sweden in film and the arts; Writings and Response to Ayaan Hirsi Ali; Roundtable on Salmon Rushdie’s “Joseph Anton: A Memoir”; Hannah Arendt in the Humanities; Ethnic Europe; Conscience; Democracy in Adversity and Diversity; Migration and Integration
  • Scholars/Analysts: Francis Fukuyama, Vali Nasr, Olivier Roy, Timothy Garton Ash, Istvan Deak
  • Journalists: John Micklethwait (Editor, the Economist), Josef Joffe (Die Zeit), Frederick Mitterand. 
  • Policy leaders: Catherine Ashton (EU High Representative and Vice President), Jan Eliasson (former UN Secretary General), Jonathan Phillips (Permanent Secretary, UK Northern Ireland Office), Lionel Jospin (former French Prime Minister), Daniel Cohen Bendit, European Ambassadors to the US, Foreign Ministers and Presidents from Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Algeria, Ukraine, Spain, Basque Region

Hsu’s previous research and teaching explored a wide range of historical and cultural ruptures.  At the University of Chicago, Hsu taught courses on literature and the visual arts (including themes of “evil”, “revolution”, and the authorial “other” in world literature).  His dissertation on public monuments, history texts, and the political use of the French Revolution reveals the role of history and revolution in legitimizing modern French regimes.  This research inspires his work on conflict and reconciliation in Europe.

At the University of Idaho, Hsu was Assistant Professor of History, completing research on visual representations of revolution and reception theory in nineteenth-century France, and teaching undergraduate and graduate courses on nineteenth-century European intellectual and political history, world history (ancient through modern), empire, colonial and post-colonial eras, and the French Revolution.

At Stanford, Hsu was awarded a three-year Postdoctoral Teaching Fellowship in the Introduction to Humanities Program.  Serving as a Fellow he conducted research on collective memory, and was inspired by Stanford faculty and students to turn his focus to post-conflict and post-atrocity research.  He has increasingly focused on investigating the history and future of post-conflict studies and models for truth and reconciliation and emancipation, using material and methods from the humanities (history, philosophy, literary criticism, visual arts) and the social sciences (political science, sociology, anthropology.)

Hsu has more than twelve years of administrative leadership experience.  At FSI Hsu teamed with staff and faculty to build the Europe Center from its founding as the European Forum, to its growth into the Forum on Contemporary Europe, and ultimately a research center at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Hsu’s contributions to the growth of the Europe Center included building multiple research scholar exchange and fellowships (with new funding) for residencies at the Europe Center.  Hsu also cultivated institutional partnerships with more than six European universities for on-going cooperative programming and scholar exchange.

Currently, Hsu is Director of Research for the Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project at Stanford University. 

Previously at Stanford, Hsu has held the following appointments:

  • Associate Director of the Stanford Humanities Center
  • Associate Director of the Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Stanford Global Studies
  • Project Director, Division of Literatures, Cultures, and Languages
  • Senior Associate Director of Undergraduate Advising and Research
  • Acting Associate Director of the Introduction to Humanities Program
  • Post-doctoral Fellow, Introduction to Humanities Program
  • Research Coordinator, Program in Writing and Rhetoric

Hsu earned his Ph.D. in Modern European History at the University of Chicago.  He holds an M.A. in Art History from Chicago, and a dual B.A. in Art History and also English Literature from the University of California, Berkeley.

 

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Forty students from nine universities across Russia came to Yaroslavl, 150 miles northeast of Moscow, to participate in an arms control exercise led by CISAC director Scott D. Sagan. In a mock U.N. Security Council session, students addressed Iran's nuclear program, to cap off courses they took this year through FSI's Initiative on Distance Learning, funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

One day perhaps Marina Agaltsova will join the diplomatic corps at a foreign embassy, or help write policy positions for the Russian government. Coit Blacker hopes that the lessons from her Stanford-sponsored distance-learning course will stick.

Agaltsova was among a group of Russian students brought to the provincial city of Yaroslavl in late May for an academic conference that capped this year's five distance-learning courses offered at nine universities across Russia by the Initiative on Distance Learning at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Through videotaped lectures, web readings and online chat sessions with senior research scholar Kathryn Stoner-Weiss and 14 other Stanford instructors, students in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law explored democratic ideals and practices, studying examples in Latin America, Asia and the former Soviet Union. "The course taught me that there is a black side to the reforms" that followed perestroika in Russia, Agaltsova says. "I learned more about Russian history [in the course] than I had learned in school."

That's the idea, says FSI director Blacker, who wants to re-establish the teaching of critical analysis, lost under decades of Communist rule, in Russian universities. "The social sciences were disemboweled," he says. He wants to develop future generations of diplomats and policy makers whose worldview is shaped "by how they think, not what they're told to think."

This year, to cap off the courses, 40 students came to Yaroslavl to participate in a mock United Nations Security Council session addressing Iran's nuclear program. They traveled from the farthest reaches of the Russian hinterlands, like Amur State University in Blagoveschensk, 4,800 miles from Moscow.

The arms control simulation is a teaching tool developed for the Stanford undergraduate class International Security in a Changing World, taught by Blacker and Scott Sagan, a political science professor and director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation within FSI. Sagan has exported the simulation to several universities in the United States where his former graduate students now teach--UC-Berkeley, Dartmouth, Columbia, Duke--but this was the first one he has conducted overseas.

This year's scenario was the International Atomic Energy Agency's referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council for failure to fully disclose its nuclear activities. During the simulation, students submitted proposals to their heads of state, played by Blacker, Sagan and Russian faculty members. By the end of the two-day session, delegates had overcome seemingly intractable differences during four intensive sessions led by Stanford third-year law student Matthew Rojansky, acting as U.N. undersecretary-general for legal affairs. The council's resolution gave Iran three months to comply with the IAEA's requests and provided for Iran to obtain nuclear fuel from Russia, with the production and waste disposal to occur on Russian soil under IAEA controls.

After the session closed, students set aside their delegate roles to reflect on what they had learned. Narina Tadevosian, a student from Yakutsk State in far eastern Siberia, said she was surprised at "how strict Russia was" in taking a leading role in the session.

"If only it were so in real life," she added.

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A Chinese delegation is visiting Pyongyang to discuss the crisis set off by Kim Jong Il's missile launches. Whether it will exert any real pressure remains unclear. Pantech scholar Scott Snyder comments on the debate.

BEIJING - A message from President Bush to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il will be delivered Monday in Pyongyang -- via two Chinese officials. Beijing now meets quarterly with Mr. Kim, the most contact the unpredictable North has with any outside party. Whether Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and Vice Premier Hui Liangyu will surprise Kim Jong Il and exert real pressure is unclear.

With an international diplomatic effort under way a week after North Korea tested seven missiles, China has proposed informal six-party talks as a way to move the process along.

That is less than the US hoped for from China. But since China insists that it will veto any UN sanctions against the North, the US will accept such talks, according to envoy Christopher Hill.

All told, Beijing would appear key to shaping how the world deals with the defiant Kim. Yet from the moment Kim launched his missiles, China has denied it has clout; it politely insists that the US has the central role.

Since 2003, China has embarked on a historic effort to prop up and aid North Korea -- a state it had the frostiest relations with for more a decade. Now, $2 billion in aid gives Beijing unprecedented access -- something China is reluctant to squander, to "mix aid and diplomacy," as a Chinese scholar here puts it.

"China's influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit, but far less than outsiders tend to believe," says a recent report by the Seoul branch of the International Crisis Group.

To outsiders, it appears that a rising China -- running a lifeline of energy and food to its poor comrade - ought to have clout in Korea, as it holds more carrots and sticks than anyone. It seems axiomatic that Beijing can simply apply ancient Chinese wisdom and modern Chinese might to stop Kim's nuclear ambition. Both states are communist, wear green and red uniforms, fought the US together, and share borders and history. China is the only country with easy access, as well as trade and tourism, to the North.

"China does have leverage, but it is afraid it may overplay its hand," says Joseph Cheng, head of the political science department at City University in Hong Kong.

Since Kim Jong Il's July 4 missile shots, voices from Sandy Berger, President Clinton's security adviser, to John Bolton, US ambassador to the UN, have argued that "China is the key" to dealing with North Korean belligerence. It has become nearly a mantra in Washington. Twelve months ago, it was an article of faith in senior White House circles, misplaced or not, that China would deliver a deal with Kim to dismantle his nuclear program. Yet this did not happen.

Instead, with the US preoccupied in Iraq, China embarked on a quiet policy of self-interest: to strengthen North Korea. That policy helps to maintain the North as a "buffer state" between China and South Korea.

China does not want the North to collapse, and for US troops to fill the vacuum and appear on its northeast border. China has hosted Kim, and moved relations away from a bad patch in the 1990s, during the North's epic famine, when China asked for cash payments for food instead of barter.

In the past two years, Chinese officials have told Kim that he can reform his state along socialist lines just as China did. China has indicated it will help with economic aid, while he retains complete political control. To now castigate Kim could wreck that formula, sources say.

In the larger sense, Kim's launch of missiles, most of which could hit long-time nemesis Japan or US bases in East Asia, puts China in the position of choosing between its North Korean comrade and an evolving consensus in the international community. So far, China has tried to please both sides.

"I'm concerned that China isn't recognizing how serious this issue is," says Zhang Liangui, head of foreign studies at the Central Party School in Beijing, in a rare dissent. "China is taking a rigid position. Yet we have long said that if China wants to be viewed as a responsible superpower, it must not be isolated in the international community."

Adding to Beijing's problems is an unresolved ideological struggle in China -- where "neo-orthodox" hard-liners who maintain contact with North Korea want China to support its revolutionary posture. There is also genuine puzzlement in Beijing over how to deal with Kim, whose founder-father, Kim Il Sung, reputedly warned him many times that China would attempt to take over his regime one day.

"I hear often that China is the key, which involves a set of policy steps Beijing can take that will bring about the outcome the allies want," says Russell Leigh Moses of People's University. "But I have yet to see anyone show how if China does X, Pyongyang will do Y."

The White House seems to have abandoned its 2003 optimism that China will harness Kim. China may agree that a nuclear peninsula and a regime that test-fires rockets is not desirable. But it isn't clear on how to force Kim to open his highly controlled state and allow international inspectors to flood in, witness his system of gulags, and bring in potentially subversive material -- all to dismantle a nuclear program he's cherished for decades. The White House seems to understand this.

Scott Snyder of Stanford University argues the US is using the same strategy that it used with China in closing down Kim's accounts in Macau. China was forced to choose between the international regulatory authority, or North Korean money-laundering behavior.

Sunday, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns argued on FOX News Sunday that "It's time for China to exert its influence that it does have on North Korea." Also on Sunday programs, US and Japanese officials claimed they might have the votes to support a Japan-backed resolution for sanctions against the North.

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Despite its threat of severe consequences, the Bush administration has little leverage to use on North Korea to keep it from testing a long-range missile and few ways to punish the nuclear-armed nation if it proceeds. Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, comments.

WASHINGTON - Despite its threat of severe consequences, the Bush administration has little leverage to use on North Korea to keep it from testing a long-range missile and few ways to punish the nuclear-armed nation if it proceeds.

The United States has no diplomatic or economic ties with North Korea, the rudimentary U.S. missile-defense system is untested in real-world conditions and Pyongyang is regarded as having a right to test missiles, making any American attack to forestall a launch an act of war with potentially explosive consequences.

"The United States could try to shoot down the rocket, but good luck,'' said Wonhyuk Lim of the Brookings Institution, a policy-research organization in Washington.

The dearth of options illustrates the limits of the administration's pre-emption strategy and its need to rely on the cooperation of others -- especially given the strains on the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan -- to contain threats.

Washington hopes that the world's only Stalinist regime will heed demands by the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China to uphold a self-imposed 1999 moratorium on missile tests and rejoin talks on curbing its nuclear program in return for security guarantees and economic and political benefits.

At the same time, the administration is reviewing its options should the Kim Jong Il regime test-fire what U.S. officials describe as a multi-stage Taepodong-2 missile, thought to be capable of reaching Alaska.

"The launch of a missile would be a provocation,'' Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman said Thursday during a House Armed Services Committee hearing. "If such a launch took place, we would seek to impose some cost on North Korea.''

Rodman declined to say what Washington would do. Experts said that even the imposition of sanctions by the United States would be largely symbolic.

They think that North Korea would not have readied the missile for flight unless it had decided it could live with the consequences.

"It probably means they are not worried about the American reaction,'' said Daniel C. Sneider of Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. "There is nothing that the United States can do to them.''

The United States has no diplomatic relations or financial assistance it can threaten to cut, and it suspended contributions to international food aid for North Korea last year.

The administration has moved against Pyongyang by trying to halt its missile sales to other countries, its alleged international narcotics trafficking, and its alleged counterfeiting of U.S. currency, cigarettes and over-the-counter drugs.

Under American pressure, banking regulators in February froze North Korean accounts at the Banco Delta Asia, a Macao bank that the U.S. Treasury Department accused of laundering North Korea's ill-gotten gains.

Other banks, anxious to avoid American scrutiny, reportedly have curtailed business with North Korea.

David L. Asher, a former Treasury Department official who oversaw the crackdown on North Korea's alleged illicit dealings, said the United States could respond to a test with an intensified campaign against Pyongyang's alleged international criminal activities that would hurt the ruling elite.

"Do not underestimate the impact of the financial pressure we could put on them,'' said Asher, a scholar with the Institute for Defense Analyses, a policy-research organization.

Washington is counting on Japan, which also is threatened by Pyongyang's nuclear arms and missile programs, to react to a launch by closing ports to North Korean ships and shutting off remittances by ethnic Koreans to relatives in North Korea. But those measures are expected to have limited impact.

A North Korean missile test in 1998 prompted Japan to boost missile-defense cooperation with the United States, and experts said a new launch probably would prompt Washington and Tokyo to forge even closer military ties.

The only nations that could tighten the screws significantly are China and South Korea, North Korea's main foreign trading partners and aid donors.

But while Seoul and Beijing would be outraged, because a missile test would effectively kill hopes of restarting talks on containing North Korea's nuclear arms program, they are unlikely to take any step that could rock Pyongyang.

Both are anxious to avoid destabilizing their neighbor of 26 million people. China doesn't want to be overwhelmed by North Korean refugees, and South Korea would be unable to bear the economic and social costs of sudden reunification.

They also fear that Kim's government could lash out with its million-member army against the South, igniting a conflict that would drag in the United States and devastate the Asian-Pacific economy.

"China and South Korea fear instability more than they fear a nuclear North Korea,'' said Marcus Noland, an expert at the Economic Policy Institute.

Moreover, Beijing probably would be unwilling to jeopardize the budding commercial ties it has been pursuing with North Korea.

"China opposes sanctions on North Korea because it believes they would lead to instability, would not dislodge the regime but would damage the nascent process of market reforms and harm the most vulnerable,'' said a February report by the International Crisis Group, a conflict-prevention organization.

South Korea has been pursuing a policy of economic engagement and political exchanges with North Korea.

The United States has been consulting with members of the U.N. Security Council on a response to a North Korean test. But North Korea has the right under international law to test-fire missiles, making it tough for the United States to win more than words of chastisement of North Korea from the council.

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