Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) is proud to announce the incoming fellows who will be joining us in the 2021-2022 academic year to develop their research, engage with faculty and tap into our diverse scholarly community.

The pre- and postdoctoral program will provide fellows the time to focus on research and data analysis as they work to finalize and publish their dissertation research while connecting with resident faculty and research staff at CDDRL. 

Fellows will present their research during our weekly research seminar series and an array of scholarly events and conferences.

Learn more about each of our fellows below.

Alejandra Aldridge

CDDRL Predoctoral Scholar, 2021-22

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Hometown: Southington, CT

Academic Institution: Stanford University

Discipline and degree conferral date: PhD in Political Science, expected June 2022

Shortlist of Research Interests: Presidential influence, executive politics, public opinion, democratic norms, experimental methods

Dissertation Title: Presidential Influence on Democratic Norms

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre/post-doctoral program? I admire the center's commitment to studying foundational ideas from a wide variety of perspectives, and I knew that my work could benefit greatly in that environment.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? I look forward to finishing my dissertation that studies democratic norms in the United States, as well as developing the project further into a book project.

Fun fact: I am a CrossFitter and burpees are my favorite movement.

Aytuğ Şaşmaz

CDDRL Post-doctoral Fellow 2021-22

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Hometown: Istanbul, Turkey

Academic Institution: Harvard University

Discipline and degree conferral date (or expected): Government, July 2021 (expected)

Shortlist of Research Interests: Political parties, social welfare policies, local governance

Dissertation Title: Explaining the Weakness of Secular Parties in the MENA Region: The Role of Political Selection and Organizational Cohesion

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre/post-doctoral program? Certainly the people in and affiliated with the center. Looking forward to interacting with top minds on Arab democratization, Turkish politics, and political parties.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? I am hoping to turn my dissertation chapters into two good journal publications, coming closer to turning it into a finished book manuscript, and taking the first steps into the new big project.

Fun fact: In the last 2-3 years I have become obsessed with volleyball! Both playing it and following the most important international competitions. If you see me tweeting in Turkish, I probably say something about the Turkish league (one of the best leagues in the world – especially the women's league).

Carlos Schmidt-Padilla

Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford Impact Labs (SIL), affiliated with PovGov at CDDRL, 2021-22

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Hometown: San Salvador, El Salvador

Academic Institution: University of California, Berkeley

Discipline and degree conferral date: Political Science (Summer 2021)

Shortlist of Research Interests: crime, human capital, migration, policing

Dissertation Title: Essays on Gangs and Development

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre/post-doctoral program? CDDRL’s interdisciplinary approach to the study of the challenges facing democratic governance and development.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? I hope to conclude various projects on citizen security and policing in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as commence new field experiments on reducing gender-based violence in the region.

Hans Lueders

CDDRL Postdoctoral Scholar, 2021-22

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Hometown: Tangermuende, Germany

Academic Institution: Stanford University

Discipline and degree conferral date: Political Science (June 2021)

Shortlist of Research Interests: Migration, political representation, authoritarian regimes, democratic backsliding, European politics

Dissertation Title: Political Representation in Democratic and Autocratic Regimes

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre/post-doctoral program? The great community of scholars who work on some of the most pressing challenges that democratic governance is facing today.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? I hope to work on a book manuscript on the political consequences of domestic migration. The book argues that domestic migration is a little-acknowledged cause of political polarization and inequality in representation. In addition, I hope to publish the three papers that are part of my dissertation.

Fun fact: I have run several half marathons in the past. One of my life goals is to run a full marathon soon.

Nicholas Kuipers

CDDRL Predoctoral Scholar, 2021-22

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Hometown: Falls Church, VA

Academic Institution: University of California, Berkeley

Discipline and degree conferral date: Political Science, expected 2021-22

Shortlist of Research Interests: State-building, Nation-building, Ethnic politics, Bureaucracy, Meritocracy

Dissertation Title: Failing the Test: The Politics of Civil Service Recruitment in Asia

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre/post-doctoral program? I was drawn to the CDDRL both for the group of scholars working on topics related to my research, and for the access to the broader community of researchers at Stanford. At the moment, I’m particularly interested in exploring the tensions that arise from governments’ efforts at state-building on the one hand and nation-building on the other. This is a topic on which I can envision lots of productive conversations and collaborations with folks in the broader CDDRL community.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? I hope to finish writing my dissertation as a book manuscript and work on several related article-length projects.

Fun fact: I once coincidentally met someone in Jakarta, Indonesia who had lived in my parents’ house before they bought it.

Samantha Bradshaw

CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow, 2021-22

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Hometown: Kitchener, Canada

Academic Institution: Oxford

Discipline and degree conferral date (or expected): Degree completed September 2020

Shortlist of Research Interests: Disinformation, Social Media, Democracy

Dissertation Title: The Social Media Challenge for Democracy: Propaganda and Disinformation in a Platform Society

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre/post-doctoral program? I am excited by the opportunity to work with the community of scholars at the CDDRL who are thinking through some of the most critical challenges facing contemporary democracies.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? During my nine-month residency at CDDRL I will be working on a book project looking at digital suppression and disinformation targeting activists, journalists, and minority communities.

Fun fact: I am the proud owner of a newfie-poo puppy (aka a “newdle”) named Soba.

President Volodymyr Zelensky visits Washington next week, with the highlight being a White House call on President Joe Biden. That offers the opportunity to reinvigorate the U.S.-Ukraine relationship at the highest level, following four years of Donald Trump.

This can be a very good meeting for the Ukrainian president. He should, however, take care in what he seeks. If he wants to return home with a clear success and having boosted U.S.-Ukraine relations, he should not ask for things he knows—or should know—he cannot get. Moreover, the more convincing the message that he brings regarding Kyiv’s commitment to domestic reform, the better will be his time in Washington.

Aug. 31 will be Mr. Zelensky’s first time to the White House, even though Trump offered him such a visit more than two years ago. Sadly, the former president showed no understanding of the import of Ukraine for American national interests and instead sought to extort Kyiv into interfering in U.S. politics.

When it comes to Ukraine, Biden gets it. The discussions between the presidents will undoubtedly focus on the two central challenges facing Kyiv. First, the conflict that Russia has inflicted on Ukraine since 2014, which has claimed some 14,000 lives. Zelensky can expect a strong reiteration of American support for Ukraine, including for non-recognition of Moscow’s illegal seizure of Crimea and for a settlement in Donbas that restores Ukrainian sovereignty.

The tricky part for Zelensky will turn on the specific asks he makes.

In the past, the Ukrainian president has called for a NATO membership action plan (MAP). In one sense, that is not unreasonable. Ukraine has made as much progress as many other new alliance members had made when they received MAPs.

NATO members, however, remain reluctant to put Ukraine, when it is engaged in a low-intensity war with Russia, on a membership track—despite the fact that NATO has stated that the question of membership is between the alliance and the prospective member, not any third party, i.e., not the Kremlin. That may seem unfair in Kyiv, but it is the reality.

So Zelensky should not seek a MAP. He could ask for an intensified and continuing discussion on the practical steps that Kyiv should take now so that, when a window opens for progress toward membership, Ukraine is fully ready to seize it. Mr. Zelensky can, in effect, have a MAP … if he accepts that it will not be called a MAP.

Ukraine—the biggest potential loser when Nord Stream 2 begins operation—understandably opposes it. Biden opposes it as well but remains unready to sanction German or European companies and risk a rift with Berlin and Brussels. (Kyiv should not want such a rift, which would erode U.S.-European Union unity on supporting Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.)

Zelensky thus should not urge sanctioning European companies to block the pipeline. He should instead ask how Washington, working with Berlin, intends to build with specifics on the July U.S.-German statement on supporting Ukraine, Europe’s energy security and climate goals and ensure that Russia will not use the pipeline against Kyiv. He could also propose continuing the discussion begun on Aug. 23 by the Ukrainian, German and American energy ministers about steps to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security.

Many in Kyiv have expressed frustration with the lack of progress toward settling the Donbas conflict in the “Normandy process” led by the Germans and French, and some even suggest alternative formats. Washington does not want to displace Berlin and Paris, and it benefits Kyiv to keep those key European Union members engaged. Still, Zelensky can and should press Biden to engage U.S. diplomacy more forcefully in support of the Germans and French.

He also may have an opening to ask for more. Washington reportedly has considered contingency military assistance for Ukraine. Given the Russian build-up last April, which was only partially drawn down, and the prospect that the September Zapad exercise will bring even more Russian troops close to Ukraine’s border, new U.S. military assistance would send a powerful signal of U.S. commitment to Ukraine as well as bolster its defensive capabilities.

The second central challenge facing Kyiv is putting in place the critical mass of reforms that will allow Ukraine’s economy to accelerate growth and realize its full potential, including encouraging open competition, strengthening the rule of law, curbing the outsized political and economic influence of the oligarchs, and beating back corruption. Kyiv’s record over the past two years has been mixed. These questions concerned  Biden when he had the senior lead on Ukraine in the Obama administration. If  Zelensky brings a credible, compelling message of his commitment to reform accompanied by specific ideas, he will find a receptive audience.

Zelensky’s U.S. visit can produce a major success for him and for U.S.-Ukraine relations. He should position himself to achieve such an outcome. That requires not overreaching by setting the bar impossibly high. And it means bringing a persuasive vision for how Kyiv will realize the ambitions of the Ukrainian people to become a prosperous democracy and a “normal” European state.

Steven Pifer is an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

Originally for Kyiv Post

The COVID-19 crisis is the greatest shock to world order since World War II. Millions have been infected and killed. The economic crash caused by the pandemic is the worst since the Great Depression, with the International Monetary Fund estimating that it will cost over $9 trillion of global wealth in the next few years. Many will be left impoverished and hungry. Fragile states will be further hollowed out, creating conditions ripe for conflict and mass displacement. Meanwhile, international institutions and alliances already under strain before the pandemic are teetering, while the United States and China, already at loggerheads before the crisis, are careening toward a new Cold War. China’s secrecy and assertiveness have shattered hopes that it will become a responsible stakeholder in the international order.

Read the rest at Brookings

How will US-Russia relations develop within the next few years? Are we on the verge of a new cold war? What is needed to maintain strategic stability after the New START expires in 2026? What should be the format and aspects of the follow-on treaty? Do we really need depoliticization of negotiations? Is the elimination of all nuclear weapons is a realistic goal today? Can a nuclear-weapons-free world be really achieved? What will be the US policy on China within the next few years?

Pifer addresses these key international security questions.

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The Pacific islands are known for their tropical climate, lush landscape, and rich cultures, but as coterminal student Ma’ili Yee has learned, they also form a backdrop to multiple geostrategic agendas in the Pacific Ocean region. In her recent research, Yee focuses on the vital economic, military, and geopolitical roles the Pacific island nations play at a time when the U.S.-China great power competition is generating renewed interest in the region.

Yee received her BA in International Relations in 2020 and is completing her MA in East Asian Studies this summer. She has been interested in Sino-U.S. relations in the South Pacific and noticed the scarcity of materials that incorporate Pacific Islander perspectives on the geopolitical developments in the region and how the island nations are affected by and responding to the tensions in the U.S.-China relation. She set out to study these issues.

Yee’s research over the past year has been supported by the Shorenstein APARC Diversity Grant. As part of its commitment to promoting inclusion and racial justice at Stanford, APARC established the grant in summer 2020 to support students from underrepresented minorities interested in studying contemporary Asia. Yee is the grant’s inaugural recipient.

Yee originally intended to use the grant to conduct field research in Fiji and Tonga but had to adjust her plans due to restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. She ended up studying primary source materials shared online by country members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), an inter-governmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation between countries and territories of the Pacific Ocean region, including the formation of a trade bloc and regional peacekeeping operations.

Multiple Islands, One “Blue Continent”

Yee’s research reveals that Pacific island nations do not share the same strategic and diplomatic agendas of traditional powers. Rather, in recent years, they have developed a more assertive diplomatic posture, becoming highly involved in promoting blueprints that are vital to their objectives and creating their own framework for defining strategic priorities in the Pacific region. Most importantly, as Yee explained in a recent presentation to the APARC community, Pacific island nations reject being viewed as pawns in a power game by larger states, particularly amidst the intensifying U.S.-China competition.

Against the framework of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, island nations have endorsed a collective framework they call the Blue Pacific. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which was introduced by Japan and later formalized by the United States, is a strategic vision that often privileges the Indian Ocean over the Pacific Ocean and prioritizes U.S.-led maritime concerns.

By contrast, the Blue Pacific vision is grounded in Pacific island nations’ perspectives. It emphasizes the opportunity to leverage their collective oceanic presence and focuses on their concerns, foremost of which are climate change and sustainable development. The Blue Pacific advocates for a long-term foreign policy commitment to act as one “Blue Continent” while also calling for greater international coordination. PIF member countries are currently developing these priorities in their vision for the future, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. “The uncertainty of COVID-19,” write PIF Members, “only reinforces the need for a long-term strategy for how we work together as one Blue Pacific.”

By consolidating their interests as a unified political bloc, Yee concludes, Pacific Island nations now exercise significant agency in determining the trajectory of their region and using their voices to shape multilateral initiatives such as the Paris Agreement. External powers who seek to exercise influence in the Pacific Ocean region would do well to develop reciprocal relationships with island nations and consider their goals, she says.

Yee's research also examines the opportunities for fintech to promote sustainable development in the Pacific Ocean region and as an area for potential collaboration and competition amongst world powers as U.S.-China tensions continue to unfold.

“I am grateful to APARC for this Diversity Grant and for allowing me to do this kind of work,” says Yee. “It really would not be possible without such support, so it was cool to see this resource come out last summer.”