Editor’s note: In late September, the National Interest organized a symposium on nuclear policy, nonproliferation, and arms control under the Biden administration. A variety of scholars were asked the following question: “Should Joe Biden seize the opportunity of his administration’s Nuclear Posture Review to redefine the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security planning? How should U.S. policy change to address the proliferation threats that the United States is facing?” The following article is one of their responses:

President Joe Biden should use the opportunity of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’ security policy and support a forward-looking arms control approach while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. He will have to make his views known if he wants the process to produce bold options for his consideration.

First, the NPR is the ideal place to consider the planned strategic modernization program. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the program’s cost over the next ten years at $634 billion.  Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent requires that certain programs proceed, including command and control updates, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the B-21 bomber, and the B61-12 bomb. However, some programs should be reconsidered. For example, while the United States should maintain a triad that includes an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg, the NPR should assess whether it is necessary to deploy four hundred ICBMs. It should also take an unbiased look at whether some portion of the Minuteman III force could be life-extended, allowing the Defense Department to push out to the future the question of building an expensive new ICBM. 

Pursuing all of these strategic programs would entail significant opportunity costs as less money would be available for conventional forces such as Virginia-class attack submarines, conventionally-armed missiles, and fighter aircraft. That matters. The most likely path to a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia or the United States and China is a conventional conflict that escalates into a nuclear conflict. American conventional military power that can deter conventional conflict with peer competitors in the first place will also greatly reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict.  

Second, the NPR will provide the basis for Washington’s approach in possible negotiations with Russia regarding further reductions and limitations on nuclear arms. American officials have said that the Biden administration would seek a limit covering all American and Russian nuclear arms. The NPR should set a level for American negotiators. How about 2,500 total nuclear warheads, with a sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads? That would require significant cuts by the United States and Russia but would still leave both with many more nuclear weapons than any other country. Such a reduction would position Washington and Moscow to effectively press China to moderate its nuclear plans. 

Moscow will likely not agree to any nuclear reduction, let alone a limit of 2,500, unless Washington addresses issues such as missile defense. With this in mind, decisions in the NPR should account for decisions regarding other non-nuclear weapon programs, and vice versa. 

Third, Biden has endorsed moving to a declaratory policy in which the sole purpose of the United States’ nuclear weapons would be to deter a nuclear attack on the United States or an ally or partner and, if necessary, retaliate for such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow now appear to believe the other is lowering the threshold for nuclear use. That should leave no one comfortable. Adopting a sole-purpose policy would signal a different approach from the United States. 

Critics of a sole-purpose policy argue that the ambiguity in America’s current declaratory policy means that the implicit threat of the first use of nuclear weapons can help deter a conventional attack. That is a serious point, but it is almost impossible to conceive of circumstances in which an American president would authorize first use, particularly against a nuclear-armed adversary that could strike back with its own nuclear arms. Moreover, given the effort that China and Russia are devoting to developing their conventional forces, Beijing and Moscow certainly seem to believe in the possibility of great power conventional conflict, regardless of the United States’ nuclear deterrent. 

The adoption of a sole-purpose policy will require consultation with allies who depend on the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. Those consultations may prove difficult, but there are offsets (for example, American boots on the ground) that could replace a dubious threat of first use. 

Right-sizing the United States’ nuclear forces (in part to free up funds for conventional forces), shaping a proposal for significant reductions with Russia, and adopting a sole purpose policy offer outcomes that a forward-looking NPR could advance. The review should offer these as options for the president’s consideration. He can then decide how bold he wishes to be. 

Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Originally for The National Interest

This commentary was originally published by the Lowy Institute.

When Barack Obama announced the rebalance to Asia in 2011, he also revealed the rotational deployment of US Marines to Darwin. In the intervening decade, however, additional changes to US regional posture have been few and far between. As a result, leading US defense expert Michèle Flournoy has observed, “Washington has not delivered on its promised ‘pivot’ to Asia.” Australian experts have expressed concern that “the Biden administration lacks a sense of urgency about China as a near-term military competitor”.

In light of these critiques, the AUKUS deal, the tripartite agreement for the sharing of sensitive nuclear technology between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, sends a badly needed signal that the United States is serious about rebalancing to Asia.

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Critics of AUKUS have expressed a number of valid concerns. They worry that eighteen months is a long time to wait for clarity on the plan, and eighteen years would be too long to wait for submarines. Nuclear-powered submarines will prove difficult and expensive for Australia to master, and could create non-proliferation concerns. Washington, Canberra, and London will have to mend ties with Paris as well as concerned friends in Southeast Asia, especially Jakarta. Others have argued that the deal ties Australia too closely to the United States or creates unnecessary tensions with China (although we would dispute these last two assertions).

Despite these concerns, we still believe that the strategic logic of Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines justified the agreement. But for those who disagree about the value of the submarines, this should not by itself obviate the logic of the larger AUKUS deal. Australia and many other US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have long sought a clearer US commitment to the region and to their defense. That is what AUKUS provides. This is not only about nuclear-powered submarines; it is about a strengthened US commitment to Australia, and a more robust shared capability for defending Australian and American interests.

Urgent action has been required because China has modernized its military at an impressive rate over the past two decades. The People’s Liberation Army has grown from “a sizable but mostly archaic military” which “lacked the capabilities, organization, and readiness for modern warfare” to one that could take on the United States in regional contingencies, in particular Taiwan. As a result, US conventional deterrence against China has eroded. Part of the challenge is that the United States is not a resident power in Asia – it largely relies on its allies for its ability to project power there. To bolster its regional military posture, it needs more base access and fewer restrictions on the use of those facilities.

The United States has prioritized interoperability with its allies since the Cold War, as the ability to fight together against a common adversary could determine victory or defeat. But Washington still prefers to keep much of its most sensitive information, including advanced technology, close hold. To achieve deep interoperability and ensure that allied forces can not only operate together but be truly interchangeable, the United States needs to share more and establish infrastructure for cooperation on emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. But none of this is possible if US partners aren’t willing to take the risk of upsetting Beijing. Countries in the region need to show China that they will not give in to its attempts at coercion – whether political, economic, or military.

The AUKUS agreement is a significant step towards meeting these demands. Australia will host US bombers on its territory and consider supporting US vessels at HMAS Stirling, two items that have long been on Washington’s wish list. Australia is also the first country to receive access to US naval reactors since the technology transfer to the United Kingdom in 1958 – a sign that the United States is shifting its mentality on sharing sensitive information with its closest allies. This is a critical step toward “pooling resources and integrating supply chains for defense-related science, industry, and supply chains” to ensure a technological edge over China. Through these efforts to build “federated” defenses, the Biden administration may finally be taking US alliances into the 21st century.

It is unsurprising that China responded to AUKUS with a canned claim that it harms regional stability, encourages arms races, undermines nonproliferation efforts, and reflects “an outdated zero-sum Cold War mentality”. But Chinese commentators also recognize that Australia plays a critical role in Asia, and view this as a sign that countries are willing to come together to push back against Beijing. Social media postings more directly express concern that a counterbalancing coalition is forming despite economic dependence on China. After all, rather than kowtowing to Chinese economic pressure, Australia has cooperated with the United States in two of the most sensitive military areas – nuclear power and undersea warfare.

As the United States, Australia, and other countries work to build resiliency against Chinese coercion and bolster deterrence against Chinese aggression, there are going to be tradeoffs. AUKUS is by no means perfect, but it demonstrates the Biden administration’s commitment to rebalancing its efforts towards Asia, and adjusting to a new strategic environment. Although the agreement will not change Chinese behavior, it sets Washington, Canberra, and London on an important course. Allied leaders should examine ways to strengthen the deal and built on it, lest this is seen as another false start in America’s long-promised rebalance to the region.

Senior Ukrainian officials have voiced concern that NATO has provided no clarity regarding Ukraine’s membership prospects.  Specifically, when might Kyiv receive a membership action plan, known as MAP?

Ukraine has already waited a long time. It will have to wait longer. That is unfair, but that is the reality.

Speaking in New York on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly meetings, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba complained that the MAP process “has been dragging on for an indecently long time…there can be no endless integration.  Everything must have its certainty and its clarity.”

President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed similar concerns earlier in the summer:  “If we are talking about NATO and MAP, I would really like to get specifics – yes or no.”

Kuleba and Zelensky’s frustrations are entirely understandable.  However, they will remain disappointed.

Over the past three decades, Ukraine’s interest in NATO has steadily grown.  In 1994, it was among the first to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  In 1997, NATO and Ukraine established a “distinctive partnership” aimed at deepening Kyiv’s relationship with the alliance.

In 2002, Ukraine announced that it would seek to join NATO, but Kyiv did little to prepare itself or follow up.  After the 2004 Orange Revolution, which led to the election of Viktor Yushchenko as president, the new Ukrainian government adopted a more serious approach. In the first half of 2006, it appeared headed for a MAP. Moscow did not express strong opposition, and many assumed that NATO leaders would approve a MAP at their November summit.  However, Yushchenko’s appointment of Victor Yanukovych as prime minister derailed things, especially in September when Yanukovych said he had no interest in a MAP.

Yushchenko asked again for a MAP in January 2008, with support from Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This time, the Kremlin made its opposition loud and clear. President George W. Bush nevertheless supported the request.  However, Washington curiously did no lobbying with other NATO members on Kyiv’s behalf.  Only when alliance leaders gathered in Bucharest in April did Bush urge his counterparts to approve a MAP for Ukraine, but having heard nothing from Washington, positions had set against the idea in key European capitals, including Berlin and Paris. Ukraine did not get a MAP, though NATO leaders stated “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”

The language about “becoming” members seemed a concession to Bush, who failed in his MAP goal since, 13 years later, Ukraine continues to wait.

NATO has no fixed checklist of what countries must do to qualify for a MAP, that is, an aspirant for a MAP cannot present a fully checked scorecard and automatically claim one.  The decision to bestow one ultimately is a political call by alliance members. What is unfair is that Ukraine today arguably has made as much progress toward meeting the criteria for membership as had other countries when they received their MAPs, for example, Bulgaria and Romania in 1999 or Albania in 2007.  Indeed, Ukraine has probably done more.

The reason why Ukraine waits is also unfair. NATO’s 1995 enlargement study said, “No country outside the alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions.”  Yet the Kremlin has, in effect, exercised such a veto. Allies appear unenthusiastic about a MAP now, particularly because there is no good answer to the question “if Ukraine joins NATO tomorrow, does the alliance then find itself at war with Russia?”

Unfortunately, life sometimes is not fair. That is the reality for Ukraine.  If the alliance could not reach a consensus on giving Kyiv a MAP in 2008, it will not do so now, when Ukraine remains mired in the low-intensity military conflict that Russia inflicted has inflicted on it since 2014.  Indeed, one reason why the Kremlin keeps that conflict simmering undoubtedly is to obstruct Ukraine’s efforts to forge stronger links with the West.

There should be candor between NATO and Ukrainian officials about the state of play with MAP, as there should be on Washington’s part.  True, corruption remains a problem that Ukrainians must deal more effectively with, but it does not block a MAP.

What should Kyiv do?  Here are three recommendations.

First, stop asking for a MAP, especially in public. In the current circumstances, the answer will either be silence or no. Neither helps NATO-Ukraine relations.

Second, load up Ukraine’s annual national program with the substance of a MAP – U.S., British, Polish, Lithuanian and Canadian diplomats at NATO can advise on this – but, critically, do not call it a MAP.  By all appearances, the negative reactions—both from Moscow and from within the alliance—are to the title, not the contents.

Third, having agreed a program with NATO, implement, implement and implement more.  Implementation has not always been Kyiv’s strong suit.  The more Ukraine does to strengthen interoperability with NATO military forces, meet alliance standards, and complete democratic, economic, military and security sector reforms, the better it will prepare itself for membership.

That should be Kyiv’s goal now.  It should seek, without a formal MAP, to do everything it can so that Ukraine is ready, when the political circumstances change, to take advantage and advance its membership bid.

Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. 

Originally for Kyviv Post

What we know for sure is that North Korea can build the bomb because the tremors from deep inside the Punggye-ri nuclear test-site tunnels have been detected around the world six times. The most recent blast in September 2017 was more than 10 times the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear explosions. With these explosions, North Korea joined seven other countries known to have detonated nuclear devices.

Read the rest at Global Asia

Rose Gottemoeller is the first female Deputy Secretary General of NATO and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation. As the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty, her new book Negotiating the New START Treaty is hailed by Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, as one “future negotiators would benefit from reading” and by William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, as “the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia.”

Read the rest at The Academy of Diplomacy

Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons pose a far greater threat to the safety and security of Americans than is reflected in our public discourse. While the United States must maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as an important tool of U.S. foreign and defense policy, an oversized global arsenal of nuclear weapons makes Americans equally unsafe. It is time to reinvigorate arms control discussions to seek reasonable reductions that will make us all more secure.

Too many nuclear weapons increase the risk of theft by terrorists or other nefarious actors, encourage more countries to develop nuclear arms, and raise the risk of nuclear war. Reasonable arms control measures, taken in conjunction with adversaries like Russia, make Americans safer by diminishing the large Russian nuclear arsenal, reinforcing norms against the development and use of nuclear arms, securing or eliminating nuclear material from theft or misuse by terrorists, and saving money that can be used to strengthen the United States military’s conventional deterrence against costly and destructive wars. 

In order to achieve those goals, Washington and Moscow have cut their strategic nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War. Through the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, which the U.S. and Russia recently extended, both countries each reduced their nuclear arsenals to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads arming no more than 700 deployed strategic ballistic missiles and bombers.

Yet, despite these historic cuts, the United States and Russia each still have far more nuclear weapons than either side could conceivably use in a conflict, and at least ten times more weapons than any other country in the world. This actually makes Americans less safe, rather than the other way around.

In 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the United States could safely reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third. The Biden administration should use that study—along with the current Nuclear Posture Review– to set the United States on the path to reasonable reductions. 

The Biden administration should aim for new negotiations between the United States and Russian to limit each country’s armed forces to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. The agreement can be executed incrementally, and the sides might informally agree once negotiations began to deploy no more than 1,400 strategic warheads, as an early confidence-building measure. This first step is an easy and safe one to take, as there have been times over the past decade when both countries already deployed fewer than 1,400 strategic warheads.

As part of a bold new vision for arms control and strategic stability, U.S. negotiators should seek an agreement that encompasses all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, including reserve (non-deployed) strategic warheads, and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Negotiators should work to limit all nuclear warheads to no more than 2,500 each, with an embedded sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads within the overall aggregate limit. Even with the dramatic arsenal reductions outlined here, the United States would maintain the ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against any global adversary.

Such a nuclear arms reduction agreement would have significant additional advantages for the United States:

First, it could position Washington and Moscow to press China to freeze or limit its build-up of nuclear arms as long as the United States and Russia are reducing their nuclear arsenals. 

Second, such an agreement could give the Pentagon additional resources to support wider force modernization requirements for nuclear and conventional forces alike, including new ballistic missile submarines and the B-21 bomber. If we have the forces to deter conventional conflict, we dramatically reduce the prospect of nuclear war.

Third, such an agreement would bolster America’s non-proliferation credentials and leadership. A new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions treaty may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program overnight, but it would increase the ability of U.S. diplomats to urge third countries to pressure and sanction outliers such as North Korea.

Right-sizing U.S. and global nuclear arsenals strengthens deterrence, reduces proliferation risks, and lowers the threat of nuclear war to the United States and our allies. The Biden administration has an opportunity to reduce that risk. It should seize it.

Rep. Ami Bera, D-Calif., is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation. Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Research Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Originally for Defense One