In this presentation Professor Takenaka will demonstrate how the House of Councillors has restrained Japanese prime ministers in formulating the Japanese security policy since the 1990s.

Japan has drastically changed its security policy since the 1990s. This is symbolized by the dispatch of the SDF to PKO in Cambodia in 1992 as well as deployment of the SDF in Iraq after the Iraq War in 2004. There have been three fundamental changes. First, Japan has become more positive in making use of SDF in UN peace keeping operations. Second, it has allowed the SDF to play more active roles in supporting US military operations worldwide. Third, it has decided to permit the exercise of the rights of collective defense, which had been completely restricted, under some conditions.

Such changes have gathered much academic attention. Many have pointed to reforms of political institutions from the 1990s as important factors in bringing shifts in security policy. They argue that reforms have provided Japanese prime ministers with enough political clout to make more profound changes in security policy.

Such arguments contribute greatly to enhancing understanding of the process in which the Japanese security policy is formulated. Yet, it is necessary to take into account the role of the House of Councillors to obtain a full picture of security policy formulation process. This is because the House of Councillors has imposed constraints over prime ministers in designing security policy. By examining security policy formulation process since the 1990s until now from the legislation of PKO bill in 1992 to the most recent legislation of security related bills in 2015, I show how prime ministers often had to compromise the substance of several policies, giving up some of his original ideas. Further, prime ministers often had to become delayed in implementing various policies because of the second chamber.

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He received a B.A. from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.  He is the author of Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime, (Stanford University Press, 2014), and Sangiin to ha [What is House of Councillors], (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2010).

Abstract:  Institutions like LLNL are part of an enterprise established in the mid-twentieth century to enable teams of scientists and engineers to deliver technological capabilities to address challenges to U.S. national security.  The steadily increasing pace of technological change, the reduced proportion of U.S. government funding invested in research and development relative to private sector investments, and the accelerating resources and programs for research globally have dramatically changed the context for this enterprise. Operational practices established to meet the national security needs of the last century must be updated to ensure that the national security science and technology enterprise can continue to deliver high quality capabilities to meet future threats and innovation to enhance U.S. national and economic security. Possible approaches for updating research careers and the structure of institutions include revamping policies for domestic and international partnerships, more effectively managing dual use technologies, and updating enterprise elements to draw on cutting-edge developments in academia and industry.

About the Speaker:  Patricia Falcone is the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and Chief Technology Officer, of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). From 2009 to 2015, she served in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, including as the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs.  Earlier she worked at the Sandia National Laboratories in Livermore, CA.  She earned a Ph.D. working in the High Temperature Gasdynamics Laboratory in Stanford’s mechanical engineering department.

Abstract: To what extent will multipolar institution building undermine the US-led international order? Recent Chinese initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and similar efforts by Russia and even Venezuela, might be seen as attempts to build alternatives to American hegemony. We suggest that we can learn from past rival hierarchies to understand contemporary politics. Some scholars highlight international hierarchy, in which a dominant state exerts a limited degree of political control over one or more subordinate states. We contend that certain patterns of international cooperation and conflict between dominant states cannot be fully understood without reference to their rival hierarchies. We identify three distinct mechanisms through which one hierarchy can influence the internal workings of a second hierarchy: competitive shaming, outbidding, and inter-hierarchy cooperation.

We illustrate the plausibility of our argument by exploring the politics of nuclear technology sharing by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. We show that Soviet competitive shaming of the United States was a major motivation for the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. In response, the Soviet Union attempted to outbid the United States with its own technology sharing program. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington cooperated in founding the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The paper is co-authored with Nicholas Miller, Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at Brown University.

About the Speaker: Jeff D. Colgan is the Richard Holbrooke Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.  His research focuses on two main areas: (1) the causes of war and (2) global energy politics. His book, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War, was published in 2013 by Cambridge University Press. An article that previews the book's argument won the Robert O. Keohane award for the best article published in International Organization (Oct 2010) by an untenured scholar. He has published other articles in International Organization, World Politics, International Security and elsewhere.

Abstract: The conventional wisdom about current space dynamics paints a picture of a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and a drifting United States. It also argues that international governance mechanisms in space are failing and not worth U.S. efforts to repair. Thus, it suggests that nationalist and protectionist responses are the best policy directions for the United States. This presentation posits that both arguments are wrong. First, it makes the case that as 21st century space power shifts toward the commercial sector, the United States is well suited to compete with its rivals through innovation, international engagement, and network-building in space. Such efforts are more likely to succeed under emerging conditions in space than traditional, state-led efforts. Second, it argues that the possible breakdown of international space governance mechanisms poses a serious threat to American interests and will require the attention of both the U.S. government and the expanding commercial space sector.  

About the Speaker: James Clay Moltz holds a joint appointment as a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and in the Space Systems Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. He also serves as the NSA Department’s Associate Chairman for Research and directs the DTRA-funded Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, based at NPS. He is the author of the recent books Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (Columbia University Press, 2014), Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (Columbia University Press, 2012), and The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford University Press, 2008 and 2011 editions). Prof. Moltz holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley and an M.A. and B.A. (with Distinction) from Stanford University. He has served as an advisor to the NASA-Ames Research Center and to the U.S. Department of Energy and has provided expert testimony on space issues before the U.S. Congress. His commentary on space topics has appeared in such periodicals as Aviation Week and Space Technology, Nature, and the New York Times.  At NPS, his honors include the 2015 Carl E. and Jesse W. Menneken Award for Excellence in Scientific Research and Sustained Contribution to the Navy and the Defense Department and the 2010 Richard W. Hamming Award for Interdisciplinary Achievement. 

Abstract: For four years running now, the Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress has led with cyber threats to national and international security.  Under statute, the several National Intelligence Officers constitute the most senior advisors of the US Intelligence Community in their areas of expertise.  This discussion with the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues will begin by highlighting the technology trends that are having a transformational change on cyber security and the future of intelligence.  It will then assess strategic developments in international relations and their implications for deterring malicious activity in cyberspace.  The analysis will focus on the (in)applicability of existing arms control mechanisms and deterrence principles to modern information and communication technologies.

About the Speaker: Sean Kanuck was appointed as the first National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues in May 2011.  Mr. Kanuck came to the National Intelligence Council after a decade of experience in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Information Operations Center, including both analytic and field assignments.  In his Senior Analytic Service role, he was a contributing author for the 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review, an Intelligence Fellow with the Directorates for Cybersecurity and Combating Terrorism at the National Security Council, and a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on international information security.

Prior to government service, Mr. Kanuck practiced law with Skadden Arps et al. in New York, where he specialized in mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance, and banking matters.  He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and his academic publications focus on information warfare and international law.  Mr. Kanuck holds degrees from Harvard University (A.B., J.D.), the London School of Economics (M.Sc.), and the University of Oslo (LL.M.).

Lecture and Book Signing

Abstract:

ISIS behadings, AL Qaeda bombings, killing of cartoonists, flogging of bloggers, or stoning of women... Such disturbing news have shaped the image of Islam in the West in the past two decades. Buy what do they really tell us? Is Islam, the religion of 1.6 billion people, on a destructive mission against the West, as some claim? Or is there a battle, and a crisis, within the Islamic civilization itself? And are liberal Western values inherently incompatible with this youngest Abrahamic religion? Mustafa Akyol, Turkish writer and contributing columnist for the New York Times, will tackle these questions honestly, by granting the troubles in his own religious tradition, but also showing the reasons for hope. 

Speaker Bio:

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This event is co-sponsored by CDDRL in partnership with Stanford's Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies. 

Abstract: What drives jihadi violence in Europe? Terrorists of today are seen as pursuing social rather than political revolt, motivated by failed integration, identity crisis and nihilism. Europe's segregated suburbs are regarded as incubators for violent radicalization, and some suggest online propaganda produces 'lone wolves' who act in unpredictable, volatile fashions.  An examination of jihadi terrorist plots in Europe between 1994 and 2015 contradicts such assumptions. Terrorist cells emerge through intricate interplay between jihadi groups in war zones and European extremists.  Most cells are traced to the same transnational network, which has evolved and expanded since the early 1990s. The plots are linked in time and space through people involved, and there are striking similarities between cases. This talk will reveal that lone wolves are largely a myth in Europe, as most perpetrators have network ties and interact with militants during radicalization. Terrorist cell formation is not confined to gritty suburbs and disenfranchised immigrants are not necessarily key actors. On the contrary, cells emerge in diverse settings where resourceful, well-connected and ideological entrepreneurs (cell builders) are present. Entrepreneurs recruit misfits and drifters as manpower, and embody the foremost driving force for the occurrence of plots and attacks.

About the Speaker: Petter Nesser (Cand. Polit, Dr. Philos) is a senior research fellow with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Trained in social science, Middle East studies and Arabic at the University of Oslo and The American University in Cairo, Dr Nesser has conducted extensive research on jihadism in Europe for more than twelve years. His work focuses mainly on radicalization processes and terrorists’ modus operandi. Nesser communicates findings through conferences, speeches, and the media. He teaches at academic institutions and acts as advisor for Norwegian authorities on issues related to extremism. His most recent publication, Islamist Terrorism in Europe, A History (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2015), provides a comprehensive account of the emergence and evolution of transnational militant Islamism in Western Europe.

Abstract:

There is a general consensus that institutions do matter in development. Rule of law, property rights enforcement and participatory political institutions are necessary conditions for implementing market-oriented policies such as financial liberalization, trade openness, and increasing private sector involvement. There is also an alternative argument suggesting that integration to the global market has an impact on domestic institutions. Yet there is still little attention given to how institutions are evolving in the developing world in the context of an integrated world market. Specifically, do institutions evolve as a given economy becomes more integrated in the global markets or do they remain unchanged? Also, how do they change and what are the key determinants of this change? In answering these questions, this talk examines the different experiences of liberalization in the Arab World. It investigates the impact of trade and capital flows on different types of institutions. It also addresses the role of existing institutions in the success or failure of these experiences of economic liberalization.  

Speaker Bio:

Samer Atallah is an Assistant Professor of economics at the School of Business of the American University in Cairo since 2011.He was a visiting scholar at the University of Chicago Center in Paris during the winter of 2014.

He has earned his PhD and Masters of Arts in economics from McGill University. The title of his PhD thesis is “Essays on resource-dependent economies: Political economy and strategic behavior”.  He also holds a Masters of Science from University of California at Berkeley.

His research interests are in development economics and political economy. His research work in development economics covers intergenerational mobility, education policy and quantitative analysis of household surveys. His research also covers game theory applications on the political economy of democratization and quantitative analysis of election results.

He is a research fellow at the Economic Research Forum and a member of the Canadian Economics Association and the Middle East Economic Association.

This event is co-sponosred by the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy.