In this presentation Professor Takenaka will demonstrate how the House of Councillors has restrained Japanese prime ministers in formulating the Japanese security policy since the 1990s.

Japan has drastically changed its security policy since the 1990s. This is symbolized by the dispatch of the SDF to PKO in Cambodia in 1992 as well as deployment of the SDF in Iraq after the Iraq War in 2004. There have been three fundamental changes. First, Japan has become more positive in making use of SDF in UN peace keeping operations. Second, it has allowed the SDF to play more active roles in supporting US military operations worldwide. Third, it has decided to permit the exercise of the rights of collective defense, which had been completely restricted, under some conditions.

Such changes have gathered much academic attention. Many have pointed to reforms of political institutions from the 1990s as important factors in bringing shifts in security policy. They argue that reforms have provided Japanese prime ministers with enough political clout to make more profound changes in security policy.

Such arguments contribute greatly to enhancing understanding of the process in which the Japanese security policy is formulated. Yet, it is necessary to take into account the role of the House of Councillors to obtain a full picture of security policy formulation process. This is because the House of Councillors has imposed constraints over prime ministers in designing security policy. By examining security policy formulation process since the 1990s until now from the legislation of PKO bill in 1992 to the most recent legislation of security related bills in 2015, I show how prime ministers often had to compromise the substance of several policies, giving up some of his original ideas. Further, prime ministers often had to become delayed in implementing various policies because of the second chamber.

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He received a B.A. from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.  He is the author of Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime, (Stanford University Press, 2014), and Sangiin to ha [What is House of Councillors], (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2010).

Abstract:  Institutions like LLNL are part of an enterprise established in the mid-twentieth century to enable teams of scientists and engineers to deliver technological capabilities to address challenges to U.S. national security.  The steadily increasing pace of technological change, the reduced proportion of U.S. government funding invested in research and development relative to private sector investments, and the accelerating resources and programs for research globally have dramatically changed the context for this enterprise. Operational practices established to meet the national security needs of the last century must be updated to ensure that the national security science and technology enterprise can continue to deliver high quality capabilities to meet future threats and innovation to enhance U.S. national and economic security. Possible approaches for updating research careers and the structure of institutions include revamping policies for domestic and international partnerships, more effectively managing dual use technologies, and updating enterprise elements to draw on cutting-edge developments in academia and industry.

About the Speaker:  Patricia Falcone is the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and Chief Technology Officer, of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). From 2009 to 2015, she served in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, including as the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs.  Earlier she worked at the Sandia National Laboratories in Livermore, CA.  She earned a Ph.D. working in the High Temperature Gasdynamics Laboratory in Stanford’s mechanical engineering department.

Abstract: To what extent will multipolar institution building undermine the US-led international order? Recent Chinese initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and similar efforts by Russia and even Venezuela, might be seen as attempts to build alternatives to American hegemony. We suggest that we can learn from past rival hierarchies to understand contemporary politics. Some scholars highlight international hierarchy, in which a dominant state exerts a limited degree of political control over one or more subordinate states. We contend that certain patterns of international cooperation and conflict between dominant states cannot be fully understood without reference to their rival hierarchies. We identify three distinct mechanisms through which one hierarchy can influence the internal workings of a second hierarchy: competitive shaming, outbidding, and inter-hierarchy cooperation.

We illustrate the plausibility of our argument by exploring the politics of nuclear technology sharing by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. We show that Soviet competitive shaming of the United States was a major motivation for the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. In response, the Soviet Union attempted to outbid the United States with its own technology sharing program. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington cooperated in founding the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The paper is co-authored with Nicholas Miller, Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at Brown University.

About the Speaker: Jeff D. Colgan is the Richard Holbrooke Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.  His research focuses on two main areas: (1) the causes of war and (2) global energy politics. His book, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War, was published in 2013 by Cambridge University Press. An article that previews the book's argument won the Robert O. Keohane award for the best article published in International Organization (Oct 2010) by an untenured scholar. He has published other articles in International Organization, World Politics, International Security and elsewhere.

Abstract: The conventional wisdom about current space dynamics paints a picture of a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and a drifting United States. It also argues that international governance mechanisms in space are failing and not worth U.S. efforts to repair. Thus, it suggests that nationalist and protectionist responses are the best policy directions for the United States. This presentation posits that both arguments are wrong. First, it makes the case that as 21st century space power shifts toward the commercial sector, the United States is well suited to compete with its rivals through innovation, international engagement, and network-building in space. Such efforts are more likely to succeed under emerging conditions in space than traditional, state-led efforts. Second, it argues that the possible breakdown of international space governance mechanisms poses a serious threat to American interests and will require the attention of both the U.S. government and the expanding commercial space sector.  

About the Speaker: James Clay Moltz holds a joint appointment as a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and in the Space Systems Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. He also serves as the NSA Department’s Associate Chairman for Research and directs the DTRA-funded Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, based at NPS. He is the author of the recent books Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (Columbia University Press, 2014), Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (Columbia University Press, 2012), and The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford University Press, 2008 and 2011 editions). Prof. Moltz holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley and an M.A. and B.A. (with Distinction) from Stanford University. He has served as an advisor to the NASA-Ames Research Center and to the U.S. Department of Energy and has provided expert testimony on space issues before the U.S. Congress. His commentary on space topics has appeared in such periodicals as Aviation Week and Space Technology, Nature, and the New York Times.  At NPS, his honors include the 2015 Carl E. and Jesse W. Menneken Award for Excellence in Scientific Research and Sustained Contribution to the Navy and the Defense Department and the 2010 Richard W. Hamming Award for Interdisciplinary Achievement.