Abstract: Against a backdrop of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases of natural origin, fueled by changes in land use and global climate, there is an ongoing revolution in the life sciences with growing empowerment of the individual to decipher, genetically alter, and manufacture living things. In addition to widely-touted potential benefits, these events and developments pose challenges and risks of profound harm to humans and the rest of the planet. Yet, the United States and most other nations have failed to respond with a strategic plan, sustained resources, coherent leadership, critical self-assessment, and accountability. Why is this? A selected history of recent naturally-occurring disease outbreaks and advances in the life sciences that create new risks of potential misuse will be offered, differing perspectives from the science and policy communities described, and some of the efforts to address these challenges summarized. Forward-looking proposals for efforts to mitigate risk in the life sciences will be discussed.

Speaker Bio: David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in Medicine, and Microbiology & Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System. He is also Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and served as science co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation from 2013-2017. He is currently director of a new Biosecurity Initiative at FSI.

Relman identified several historically important and novel microbial disease agents, and was an early pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome). His lab group currently examines human microbial community assembly, and community stability and resilience.

Among policy-relevant activities, Relman is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board at the National Academies of Science (NAS), served as vice-chair of the NAS Committee that reviewed the science performed for the FBI 2001 Anthrax Letters investigation, and was a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. He was elected to the National Academy of Medicine in 2011. 

Co-sponsored by the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies and the Southeast Asia Program

For much of the 2000s, scholars and activists lauded Indonesia’s surprisingly successful transition to democracy. Unlike Yugoslavia’s disintegration into smaller ethno-nationalist states, Indonesia witnessed the political marginalization of the military, the moderation of Islamists, the resolution of some regional rebellions, and the resurgence of a vibrant, plural, civil society. Recent years, however, have made imperfections in Indonesian democracy visible to the point where the death of Indonesian democracy is imaginable if not yet underway. Prof. Menchik will outline the role that Indonesian Islamic civil society may play in the death of Indonesian democracy.

Drawing on original survey data and interviews, as well as case studies in which the preferences of Nahlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah leaders have become visible, Prof. Menchik will argue that their values are compatible with both democracy and authoritarianism. While NU and Muhammadiyah exemplify the civic associational ties and democratic culture that are necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their only value. NU and Muhammadiyah have a hierarchy of values that they promote and defend, and they are willing to forgo civic pluralism in order to defend against the blasphemy of Islam. As a result, if Indonesian democracy dies, it will likely be a result of a coalition of Islamists and autocrats using appeals to populism and the defense of Islam in order to capture the lower classes and moderate Muslims, including many members of NU and Muhammadiyah.

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Abstract: The threat of biological catastrophes-- stemming from natural, accidental or intentional causes-- looms ever larger as populations urbanize, global temperatures rise, and the access to biological weapons spreads. In fact, climate change and the increasing ease with which biological weapons may be obtained represent two significant threats to public health. As these threats materialize, they test nations’ resources, capabilities, and strength. Through an examination of the policy and scientific challenges posed by weaponized biological agents as well as by the growing public health risks stemming from climate change impacts, key gaps in bio-preparedness emerge. Bio-preparedness efforts, nationally and globally, do not currently keep pace with emerging biological risks. Will the scientific and policy communities find common ground to move the global health agenda forward through prevention, detection, and response?

Speaker Bio: Alice Hill is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.  She previously served at the White House as Special Assistant to President Barack Obama and Senior Director for Resilience Policy on the National Security Council.  Hill led the creation of national policy regarding catastrophic risk, including the impacts of climate change and biological threats.

Hill previously served as Senior Counselor to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  She headed the DHS Biological Leadership group and led development of Department strategies and policies regarding catastrophic biological and chemical incidents, ranging from pandemics to weapons of mass destruction.  Hill also founded and was the first Chair of the Blue Campaign, an internationally recognized anti-human trafficking campaign.

Earlier in her career, Hill has served as a supervising judge on the Los Angeles Superior Court and as chief of the white-collar crime unit in the Los Angeles US Attorney’s Office.

She is a frequent speaker and has been quoted in the NY Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times, among other publications. She has appeared on CBS, NPR, and MSNBC and her commentary has been published in Newsweek, LawFare, The Hill, and other media.  She has received numerous awards and commendations, including the Department of Justice’s highest award for legal accomplishment, Harvard’s Meta-Leader of the Year Award, and the San Fernando Valley Bar’s Judge of the Year.

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Six years after his succession to power, Kim has continued to defy international pressure, conducting four nuclear tests and firing eighty-five ballistic missiles. Recently, the world has witnessed an extraordinary, high-intensity war of words between President Trump and the North Korean leader. Military tension mounts higher than ever as we enter a new phase, arguably the most serious one in decades, in dealing with a dangerous and bellicose North Korea.

There are many questions: Will North Korea conduct an atmospheric nuclear test? When will their weapons program really be capable of hitting the continental United States? How will the U.S. government respond to that capability? Will the likely result be war on the Korean Peninsula? What about the China factor?

Ambassador Kim will discuss some of these questions through his personal experiences at the Six-Party Talks, the UN Security Council and through his contacts with North Korean officials.

Abstract: As the orbital space around earth becomes increasingly crowded, there is an increasing need to capture and manipulate objects ranging from satellites and antennas to “uncooperative” space debris. Robots have been proposed as a solution for clearing debris and manipulating objects in space. However, many of the traditional techniques used for robotic grasping and manipulation will not work. Gecko-inspired adhesives are promising technology, as they work in vacuum, at high and low temperatures, and do not require special hand-holds or other fixtures. Tests in microgravity and in the International Space station have shown that “gecko grippers” are a viable option for eliminating space debris in low Earth orbit and for enhancing missions in space.

Speaker Bio: Professor Mark Cutkosky applies analyses, simulations, and experiments to the design and control of robotic hands, tactile sensors, and devices for human/computer interaction. In manufacturing, his work focuses on design tools for rapid prototyping.

Abstract: This presentation will review research from two papers about Bitcoin.  The first paper uses data from the MIT digital currency experiment to shed light on consumer behavior regarding commercial, public and government surveillance. We find that the effect of small incentives may explain the privacy paradox, where people say they care about privacy but are willing to relinquish private data quite easily.  The second paper analyzes empirical evidence about the adoption and usage of Bitcoin, as well as forces that underly Bitcoin pricing.

Speaker Bio: Susan Athey is The Economics of Technology Professor at Stanford Graduate School of Business. She received her bachelor's degree from Duke University and her Ph.D. from Stanford, and she holds an honorary doctorate from Duke University. She previously taught at the economics departments at MIT, Stanford and Harvard.  In 2007, Professor Athey received the John Bates Clark Medal, awarded by the American Economic Association to “that American economist under the age of forty who is adjudged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge.” She was elected to the National Academy of Science in 2012 and to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.  Professor Athey’s research focuses on the economics of the internet, online advertising, the news media, marketplace design, virtual currencies and the intersection of computer science, machine learning and economics. She advises governments and businesses on marketplace design and platform economics, notably serving since 2007 as a long-term consultant to Microsoft Corporation in a variety of roles, including consulting chief economist.