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Gi-Wook Shin
Joyce Lee
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The following article first appeared on The Diplomat.

With the historic U.S.-North Korea summit on the immediate horizon, we must recognize that denuclearization will not and cannot be permanent or irreversible as long as there is a desire to reverse it. U.S. President Donald Trump may strike a “grand deal” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to denuclearize North Korea, but Kim can — and most likely will — reverse course at his convenience to construct new nuclear weapons. By focusing solely on denuclearization, we risk losing sight of the bigger, more important picture — that is, transforming North Korea into a normal state that no longer sees the need to pursue nuclearization for deterrence, survival, or any other reason.

Much of debate has centered on why Kim suddenly emerged from long-held silence to take the world’s center stage through a series of summits. Was he pressured by toughened sanctions, as Trump credits himself for? Or was it an expression of Kim’s confidence as a leader of a now de facto nuclear power, with more leverage for negotiation? Or has he simply been trying to buy time to avoid war — to get through the unpredictable and ruthless Trump’s tenure as U.S. president? Yet, what really matters now is not so much the question of why Kim came to the table, but rather how we can make the latest détente sustainable without repeating the failures of the past. Will it be different this time?

With the Trump-Kim summit now back on the track after a 24-hour drama of cancellation then resumption, each side seems to have softened its stance by lowering the bar. Next week in Singapore, both leaders will be sorely tempted by clear political and economic interests to paint the meeting as a success. Real challenges, however, will arise as the logistical details of North Korea’s denuclearization are discussed following the summit. The Trump team is unlikely to abandon its goal of the CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) of North Korea, while Kim and his men will stand firmly against this all-out approach so as not to follow the footsteps of Libya, Iraq, or Ukraine. North Korea has reportedly demanded a CVIG (complete, verifiable, and irreversible guarantee) of the security of the current regime, but there is a great danger that these deals, if made, will be nothing more than another sheet of paper full of empty words. The deep mistrust between the two countries cannot be overcome overnight, especially considering that both leaders have pretty bad track records of reneging on previous commitments. Neither CVID nor CVIG has much chance of being realized in the current context, from either a technical or a practical perspective.

With all this skepticism, why should we still bother playing this game with North Korea again? It is because we see a window of opportunity to guide North Korea into the international community through processes of diplomatic communication, exchange, and engagement. North Korea’s summit diplomacy has revealed its desire to appear a normal state. Kim vigorously showcased four summit meetings  — twice each with China’s Xi Jinping and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in — and numerous high-level meetings, within two months, all within the parameters of conventional “state-to-state” relationships, departing from past practices. Standing side-by-side with the South Korean president to read out a joint declaration, immediately releasing news of Kim’s summit meetings through its media, presenting Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, as the state’s first lady — all of this would have been unthinkable in his father or grandfather’s generation.

North Korea’s latest efforts at international recognition as a normal state may be insincere and ill-intentioned, but even so, we should continue to allow North Korea and Kim to experience firsthand what it feels like and means to be treated as a normal state and a normal leader according to the ordinary conventions of international diplomacy. Although the goal seems so far away and unreachable, we should strive to normalize North Korea in all respects — its economy, its domestic and international politics, its integration into international institutions, and its adherence to international laws, norms, rights, duties, orders, etc.

CVID can still serve as a short- to mid-term goal, but not as a definitive solution to the long-standing North Korean threat. Whatever is decided at the upcoming summit, a more comprehensive roadmap should be set for enacting desirable transformations in security and economic relations with North Korea, putting the country on a path to become a stable and normal state increasingly integrated into the international community, where it would feel secure without a need for nuclear armament. As Trump says, he is starting a “process” of dealing with North Korea; the upcoming summit should be the beginning of an opportunity to advance this goal. After all, a normal North Korea can achieve CVID, but CVID cannot achieve a normal state.

Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and Joyce Lee is a research professional in the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

 

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Gender inequality in the workplace is still a reality and an issue that must be tackled head-on in Silicon Valley and Japan. In 2017, the World Economic Forum reported for the first time in 10 years, a widening of the global gender gap. Numerous efforts to break this cycle have been announced and implemented to varying degrees of success in both countries making it clear that we must do more, together.

While women in the United States comprise 59% of the total workforce, they only make up 30% of major technology companies and only 11% of the executive positions in Silicon Valley are held by women. An industry that prides itself on innovative thinking and breakthroughs that can fundamentally improve quality of life has yet to find its way to disrupt gender inequality in its ranks. In recent years, Silicon Valley has been rocked by a number of high-profile sexual discrimination and harassment cases. In 2016, women tech leaders created the “Elephant in the Valley” survey to gather data on women’s experiences. The result was a bleak picture of Silicon Valley’s pervasive gender discrimination atmosphere but also the creation of a platform for women to share stories and build networks of support and activism based on shared experience.

As Japan faces a shrinking and aging population, it must pursue productivity growth to remain a wealthy nation. Women, long underutilized in Japan’s workforce, are receiving renewed attention with the Abe administration’s slogan of Womenomics as part of his Abenomics economic reform package. This political pledge has yielded some momentum with a number of concrete policy measures. Prime Minister Abe has even gone so far as to say “Abenomics is Womenomics.” There is still progress to be made. The Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT), spearheaded by Governor Yuriko Koike, the first female governor of Tokyo, aims to counter this narrative by providing opportunities for women entrepreneurs to build networks, receive mentoring, and become a focal point for dynamism.

The Break Through conference aims to create a dialogue that will spark innovative ideas for narrowing the gender gap by bringing together women thought leaders and entrepreneurs from Stanford, Silicon Valley and Japan to cultivate interpersonal support networks and collaboration.

This conference will:

  • Provide tools for branding and building support networks
  • Discuss progress and challenges in women’s advancement in Silicon Valley and Japan
  • Share practices and organizational features that better enable the hiring and retaining of women
  • Showcase Silicon Valley and Japanese women entrepreneurs

This conference is organized by Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC) Japan Program thanks to the generous support of the Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT), Tokyo Metropolitan Government.

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Agenda

9:30-10:00       Registration

10:00-10:05     Opening & Welcome Remarks

10:05-10:35     Women Entrepreneurs in the United States

- Judy Gilbert, Chief People Officer, Zymergen   

10:35-11:00     Womenomics in Japan

- Yuko Osaki, Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office, Japanese Government              

11:00-11:30     Fireside Chat 1

- Yoky Matsuoka, Chief Technology Officer, Nest

with Frances Colón, CEO, Jasperi Consulting

11:30-12:00     Fireside Chat 2

- Claire Chino, President & CEO, Itochu International Inc.

with Haruko Sasamoto, Assistant Manager Silicon Valley Branch, Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas)

12:00-13:00     Lunch

13:00-14:00     Start-up Showcase Group 1 (5 Japanese Startups)

14:00-14:15     Break

14:15-15:15     Start-up Showcase Group 2 (5 Silicon Valley Startups)

Feedback for both showcases given by:

- Allison Baum, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Fresco Capital

- Atsuko Jenks, Managing Direction-Japan, GSV Labs

- Jaclyn Selby, Research Scholar, Stanford University

15:15-16:15     Workshop: Leveraging Your Personal Brand to Effectively Lead

How others—from team members to board members—perceive you directly affects your ability to effectively lead and get results. For this reason, and especially for women entrepreneurs, it is crucial to understand your personal brand and carefully manage it. In this hands-on workshop, we will use Design Thinking as a framework to help you identify your strengths, skills and unique differentiators and how to effectively communicate these in your work environment.

Workshop Facilitator:

- Sylvia Vaquer, Co-founder and Chief Creative Officer, SocioFabrica

16:15     Closing Remarks 

 

Arrillaga Alumni Center, McCaw Hall

326 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA

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Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, said Stanford scholars in an in-depth report released by the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
 
Instead, denuclearization should be phased over a 10-year period to allow the United States to reduce and manage risks, said Siegfried Hecker, who authored the study with his research assistant Elliot Serbin and Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at CISAC.
 
In the report, the scholars laid out a “roadmap” for denuclearization, recommending what they call a “halt, roll back and eliminate” approach. Their advice – which includes informative color charts and detailed, qualitative analysis – emerged from a longer-term project about the nuclear history of North Korea between 1992 and 2017.
 
According to the research, the most important steps toward denuclearization include halting nuclear tests, stopping intermediate or long-range missile tests, stopping the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and banning all export of nuclear weapons, materials or technologies to North Korea.
 
“The roadmap lays out a reasonable timeline for denuclearization, but politics may delay final denuclearization as much as 15 years,” said Hecker, who worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for almost two decades, where he served as its directors for 11 of those years. He joined CISAC as a senior fellow in 2005.
 
Building trust and interdependence
In the short term, North Korea and the United States should take steps to build trust and interdependence, which the researchers believe are pivotal for a viable long-term solution like complete demilitarization of North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea, they argue, will likely want to retain some parts of its nuclear program as a hedge should any potential agreement fall apart. This is a manageable risk, they said.
 
The scholars also encourage Pyongyang to front-load its concrete plan towards  permanent nuclear dismantlement to make a phased approach more appealing to the US administration. This would include actions like halting nuclear and missile tests for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
 
According to Hecker, North Korea’s recent demolition of its nuclear test site is a significant step in that direction.
 
“The so-called ‘Libya model’ – complete and immediate denuclearization – is not a viable solution,” Hecker said. “Our approach leaves each party with a manageable level of risk. Even though it takes longer, it is safer for the world.”
 
Hecker also encouraged the US to recognize North Korea’s desire for civilian programs, including energy production, the use of radioactive substances in medical research, diagnosis and treatment, and a peaceful space program. These types of civilian programs can also foster opportunities for a collaborative relationship between the United States and North Korea. Further, increased cooperation –including with South Korea – can help make efforts for verification and monitoring with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more reliable. The verification process that will confirm to what extent North Korea dismantles and destroys its military nuclear program is a big issue for negotiations, the scholars said.
 
Recent reconciliation
Critically, the researchers note that recent détente between North Korea and South Korea provides a window of opportunity to accomplish denuclearization – and that the US should take advantage of that window smartly. They  said they hope that the risk-management approach outlined in the report can maximize chances for a successful agreement.
 
“In the past, the US has missed opportunities to manage incremental risk,” Hecker said. “Now is the time to pay attention to that history and be prepared to implement a risk-management approach to denuclearization.”
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Siegfried Hecker meets with members of North Korea’s nuclear scientific community during a visit to Yongbyon.
Siegfried Hecker meets with members of North Korea’s nuclear scientific community during a visit to Yongbyon. | Courtesy Siegfried Hecker
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Young Russian and U.S.-based scholars from a variety of science and social science disciplines met at Stanford to tackle emerging issues in nuclear security.

How can a new generation of scholars from around the world work together to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, from nuclear terrorism to developments in North Korea? A summit hosted at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation sought answers to that question—and more.

The third meeting of the Stanford-National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute) Young Professionals Nuclear Forum, held May 2-4 at CISAC, brought together young Russian and U.S.-based scholars from a variety of science and social science disciplines to explore how to use thoughtful, cooperative approaches to solve these pressing international nuclear security issues.

Dr. Siegfried Hecker, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, emeritus, and an internationally recognized expert in nuclear risk reduction, organized the summit. Opening the forum, Dr. Hecker stressed that while U.S.-Russian relations continue to be complicated and cooperation in the nuclear sphere has virtually come to a stop, “the younger generation of nuclear professionals should be prepared to collaborate again once the relations between the two governments turn for the better.”

The group of Stanford and Russian scholars took part in two day-long exercises. Day one included an exercise in risk analysis of the threat of radiological terrorism from the perspective of the attacker, tasking the participants with comparing the risks of carrying out an attack using a radiological dispersal device versus carrying out an attack on a spent nuclear fuel cask. On the second day, scholars engaged in a detailed simulation of U.S. and North Korean approaches to the denuclearization of North Korea to be discussed at the proposed June summit between the U.S. and North Korea. CISAC affiliates Larry Brandt, Chaim Braun, and former national lab experts Len Connell (SNL) and James Toevs (LANL) joined Dr. Hecker to advise the teams.

Working in mixed groups of Russian and Stanford scholars, one group represented the U.S. perspective; the other the North Korean. They explored the risks of maintaining or eliminating different nuclear facilities and activities in North Korea. In the exercise, it quickly became clear that the North Korean team was aiming to keep a hedge for the future and not give away all nuclear options. Meanwhile, the U.S. team sought to eliminate much of the immediate risk posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, claiming some peaceful nuclear facilities and activities might eventually be possible but they cannot allow North Korea the ability to reconstitute its weapons quickly.

So—who won the exercise?

For Dr. Hecker: “nobody won.” That wasn’t the point. But, he said,  “what was really interesting was that they came up with really reasonable compromises—on both the North Korean and American sides.”

View photos from the summit

About CISAC

The Center for International Security and Cooperation tackles the most critical security issues in the world today. Founded in 1983, CISAC has built on its research strengths to better understand an increasingly complex international environment. It is part of Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Though scholarly research, fellowships, and teaching, CISAC is educating the next generation of leaders in international security and creating policy impact on a wide variety of issues to help build a safer world.

 

 

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Stanford and Russian young nuclear experts gathered for a forum at CISAC in May 2018.
Stanford and Russian young nuclear experts gathered for a forum at CISAC in May 2018. | Rod Searcey
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New Study Examines How Stanford Alumni’s Entrepreneurship Rates Differ by Ethnicity and Nationality, Finding Substantial Gap between Asian Americans and Non-American Asians

The role of Stanford University as a leading hub for innovation and the wide impact of the university’s entrepreneurship education and opportunities on Silicon Valley and beyond are well recognized. Less explored, however, is the question of how the entrepreneurship rates of Stanford alumni differ by ethnicity and nationality. In particular, how do Asian Americans and non-American Asians alumni compare in their entrepreneurship activities, and how do their entrepreneurship rates change with participation in university entrepreneurship education programs?

Yong Suk Lee, deputy director of the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC and the SK Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Charles (Chuck) Eesley, associate professor and W.M. Keck Foundation faculty scholar in the Department of Management Science and Engineering, had the perfect data set to answer these questions. They analyzed a representative sample constructed from the Stanford Innovation Survey, a novel survey administered in 2011 to over 140,000 Stanford alumni—all living Stanford graduates since the 1930s. The survey asks about respondents’ entrepreneurship status and whether they were active investors, and provides rich information on alumni’s ethnicity and nationality, as well as on parental entrepreneurship. 

Lee and Eesley describe the results of their analysis in a new study, “the persistence of entrepreneurship and innovative immigrants,” published in Research Policy. This is the first journal article to use the Stanford Innovation Survey. Lee sat down with Noa Ronkin, APARC’s associate director for communications and external relations, to discuss the study’s findings and policy implications.

How did you get involved with this research project and with using the Stanford Innovation Survey?

I had already been studying entrepreneurship when I happened to meet Chuck Eesley, whose research focuses on the role of the institutional and university environment in technology entrepreneurship. I learned that Chuck had conducted the Stanford Innovation Survey and that he had not yet had the opportunity to dig fully into the data.

One question I had in mind was: What does entrepreneurship look like among Stanford alumni when you compare Asian Americans to non-American Asians, who were enrolled at Stanford as foreign students? The Stanford Innovation Survey provides an appropriate empirical framework for examining this question. That is how our research paper originated, and it turned out to be the beginning of a productive collaborative relationship between Chuck and me. We are now working together on a number of other projects as part of the Stanford Cyber Initiative.   

What does the Stanford Innovation Survey allow you to research that other data sets do not?

One substantial challenge in studying entrepreneurship is that there is little available information about young startups and their founders. In many cases researchers therefore look at ex post entrepreneurs, who constitute a highly select population that limits what you can study; it doesn’t allow you to examine the question of who becomes an entrepreneur. While this question isn’t new to the literature, the Stanford Innovation Survey allows us to offer empirical advances in addressing it.

First, our data set comprises a representative sample of alumni regardless of whether or not one became an entrepreneur. Second, the survey’s detailed data on alumni enables us to distinguish those from entrepreneurial families as well as examine immigrants and first-generation Americans of similar ethnicity. Third, the survey allows us to examine the relatively little-explored question of how the rate of entrepreneurship changes with participation in university entrepreneurship education programs.

Thanks to the survey’s detailed demographic data, we can compare the differences in entrepreneurship both across and within ethnicity and nationality. For example, we look at how intergenerational correlation of entrepreneurship—that is, the relationship between one’s choice to become an entrepreneur and his/her parental entrepreneurship experience—differs by nationality. This question speaks to how flexible a society is to increasing entrepreneurship and how rigid the job structures are in different societies.

What are your main findings?

First, we find that, among Stanford alumni, Asian Americans are quite entrepreneurial, even more so than white Americans (with 3.3% higher startup rate), but that Asians of foreign nationality are substantially less so (they have about 12% lower entrepreneurship rate than Asian Americans). Such discrepancy also holds for investing as an angel investor or venture capitalist, or utilizing Stanford networks to find funding sources or partners. So despite the similar cultural traits that Asian subgroups may share, the societal institutions one faces and one’s upbringing create a major gap in entrepreneurship rate.

In addition, we see that non-American Asians have lower participation rates in Stanford’s entrepreneurship education programs compared to their Asian American counterparts, and that participation in these programs does little to reduce the gap in entrepreneurship rate between Asian Americans and non-American Asians. We cannot draw from this any conclusion about the value of the university’s entrepreneurship education programs. All we can say is that mere exposure to them as a student doesn’t diminish the gap in entrepreneurship between Asian Americans and non-American Asians.

Finally, we find that parental entrepreneurship status is a strong predictor of one’s decision to become an entrepreneur; that parental entrepreneurship is lowest among Asians, especially non-American Asians; and that the degree of intergenerational persistence in entrepreneurship is substantially higher among non-American Asians compared with Asian Americans. The correlation between one’s entrepreneurship status and one’s parents’ entrepreneurship experience is particularly high for East Asians (e.g., Koreans and Chinese) compared to U.S. citizens, for whom it doesn’t differ by ethnicity.

Do your findings apply in any way to populations beyond Stanford alumni?

Clearly the sample of Stanford alumni isn’t representative of the general population, but results based on it may generalize to other samples of selective-admission college-educated alumni. Moreover, Stanford does play a significant role in entrepreneurship and innovation in Silicon Valley and beyond, and understanding entrepreneurship activity among students from a research university such as ours is critical to understanding high-growth entrepreneurship and how social environments influence entrepreneurs.

What are the policy implications of your study?

First, this study speaks to the need to develop a more nuanced discourse of immigration policy. Current discussions of immigration policy are often consumed by debates about low-skilled immigrants. Our findings suggest that high-skill immigration policy should be examined and evaluated separately from low-skill immigration policy. They also suggest that we should not just narrowly look at entrepreneurship and job creation by immigrant entrepreneurs, but also consider long-run effects. We see that young Asian immigrants who grow up in the United States are significantly more entrepreneurial than Asian foreign students, despite similar educational credentials. Allowing immigrants to settle in and attain the cultural and institutional features of the American education system at a young age could therefore positively influence entrepreneurship and innovation, at least among high-skilled populations.

Second, there may be lessons here for Asian countries that are pursuing various policies to promote entrepreneurship and innovation. The low levels of parental entrepreneurship and the high intergenerational persistence in entrepreneurship that we see among non-American Asians in our sample bring to relief the underlying socio-economic constraints on entrepreneurship in Asian countries. Sending their young people for education abroad with the goal of bringing them back home isn’t enough to break out from these constraints. A different approach is to develop policies that promote transnational bridging, encouraging high-skilled Asian Americans and emigrants that choose to remain here after education to engage with their home countries.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Changes in Clinical Practice Among Physicians with Legal Problems

David Studdert, LLB, ScD, MPH with Co-Authors Michelle Mello, PhD, JD & Matthew Spittal, PhD

Recent evidence indicates that a small group of physicians accounts for a surprisingly large share of all malpractice claims and patient complaints.  Next to nothing is known about the career trajectories of these claim-prone physicians.  Do they continue to practice, and if so, do they alter their clinical load?  Do they cut ties—voluntarily or involuntarily—with hospitals and large practice groups?  Do they seek to put their checkered history behind them by relocating—interstate or to areas where clinicians are in short supply?  We explore these questions in a large cohort of US physicians. 

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