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The Roots of Health Inequality: The Value of Intra-Family Information


Maria Polyakova, PhD

Assistant Professor of Health Research and Policy

Maria Polyakova, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Health Research and Policy at the Stanford University School of Medicine. Her research investigates questions surrounding the role of government in the design and financing of health insurance systems. She is especially interested in the relationships between public policies and individuals’ decision-making in health care and health insurance, as well as in the risk protection and re-distributive aspects of health insurance systems. She received a BA degree in Economics and Mathematics from Yale University, and a PhD in Economics from MIT.

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Gary Mukai
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As Stacy Shimanuki delivered her presentation about the Pacific War (1941–45), I was reflective of the fact that the 73rd anniversary of the surrender of Japan, August 15, 1945, was five days away. Stacy was one of several American and Japanese high school students who were honored by SPICE during an annual event called “Japan Day” at Stanford University on August 10, 2018. The top three students of Stanford e-Japan (fall 2017 cohort) and three students of the Reischauer Scholars Program (2018 cohort) gave presentations on their course research papers. The Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) is a distance-learning course on Japan and U.S.–Japan relations that is offered annually to high school students in the United States, and Stanford e-Japan is a distance-learning course on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations that is offered twice annually to high school students in Japan.
 
For me, Japan Day is not only a day of recognition of students but is also symbolic of the close friendship between the United States and Japan that has evolved from a once-bitter rivalry. Though the six students had met their instructors Naomi Funahashi (RSP instructor; Dr. Rie Kijima taught the latter part of the 2018 RSP course) and Waka Takahashi Brown (Stanford e-Japan instructor) in online “virtual classrooms,” it was their first time meeting face-to-face. Although they had never met before, it was remarkable to me how the students on both sides of the Pacific seemed almost like old friends by the end of the day.
 
Japan Day opened with comments by the Honorable Tomochika Uyama, Consul General of Japan in San Francisco. He stated,  
 
The Japan–U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of security, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. As we look at the global challenges we face today, I believe that we must strive to ensure that our special relationship remains strong and vital. One way to accomplish this is by preparing the best and brightest of our young people with the kind of learning opportunities that will deepen mutual understanding. It is my belief that the Reischauer Scholars Program and Stanford e-Japan are admirably working toward this goal by providing the knowledge and expertise our young people will need as future leaders in Japan–U.S. relations. 
Before the student presentations, Consul General Uyama took the time to speak with each of the honorees.
 
  RSP honorees Stanford e-Japan honorees
  • Grace Rembert, Bozeman High School, Bozeman, Montana
  • Stacy Shimanuki, Amador Valley High School, Pleasanton, California
  • Valerie Wu, Presentation High School, San Jose, California
  • Amane Kishimoto, Kyoto Prefectural Rakuhoku Senior High School, Kyoto
  • Yurika Matsushima, Keio Girls Senior High School, Tokyo
  • Jun Yamasaki, Shibuya Kyoiku Gakuen Senior High School, Tokyo
 
The students presented on topics ranging from open innovation, employment and people with disabilities, and the U.S. and Japanese educational systems to language and nationalism, literature on the atomic bombing of Japan, and urbanization in Japan. Brown and Funahashi had high praise for their students. “I’m always so proud of our e-Japan award winners,” stated Brown. “Their level of research is at such a high level, and to be able to conduct their presentations in English and with such poise is an amazing achievement for students at such a young age.” During the presentations by her students, Funahashi reminded the audience, “These are high school students!” Without fail on Japan Day, Funahashi hears audience members complimenting the intellect of her students and how articulate they are. 
 
Waka Brown and Naomi Funahashi at podium Waka Brown and Naomi Funahashi at podium
Attendees represented people from the Stanford community and the U.S.–Japan community in the Bay Area, including Dr. Takeo Hoshi, Director, Japan Program, and Junichiro Hirata, Visiting Scholar, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, FSI; and Dr. Kazuhiko Hasegawa, Executive Director, San Francisco Office, Osaka University, Kathleen Kimura, Japan Society of Northern California, and Dr. Yoichi Aizawa, Executive Director, San Francisco Office, Waseda University. Amanda Minami Chao and David Chao were recognized for their many years of support to SPICE.   
 
Following the formal program, the students enjoyed a tour of Stanford University. The SPICE staff and I were left hoping that someday we would see them again as undergraduate or graduate students on campus and more importantly, hoping that they will remain friends to further strengthen the decades of friendship between Japan and the United States. 
 
To stay informed of SPICE-related news, follow SPICE on Facebook and Twitter.

Funding for SPICE’s distance-learning courses is generously provided by Amanda Minami Chao and David Chao, and Jean Mou and Yoshiaki Fujimori. Funding for the 2018 RSP was generously provided by Gen Isayama, the Center for Global Partnership/The Japan Foundation, and The Japan Fund, FSI. Funding for the Stanford e-Japan 2017 courses was generously provided by the United States-Japan Foundation, and for the Stanford e-Japan spring 2018 course by Noriko Honda Chen, Harry Gunji, Akira Horiguchi, Paul Li, Tomonori Tani, and the Capital Group Companies. 

 
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The Honorable Tomochika Uyama with six student honorees
The Honorable Tomochika Uyama with six student honorees | Rylan Sekiguchi
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Rodney C. Ewing
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Q&A with Rodney C. Ewing, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor in the School of Earth, Energy and Environmental Sciences. Written with Nicole Feldman.

With the Trump-Kim Summit fresh in our minds, Americans are ready to confront nuclear challenges that have been on hold for decades. What many may not realize is that one of the biggest challenges is on the home front. Since the Manhattan Project officially began in 1942, the United States has faced ever-increasing stores of nuclear waste. In Part Three of our series on the consequences of nuclear war, expert Rodney C. Ewing tells us how the U.S.’s failure to implement a permanent solution for nuclear waste storage and disposal is costing Americans billions of dollars a year.

Where does our nuclear waste come from, and what is being done with it?

Broadly speaking, there are two types of nuclear waste.

The first is spent fuel from nuclear reactors used to generate electricity. Those reactors have left us with about 80,000 metric tonnes of used spent fuel, and we don’t have a way forward for the disposal of this waste. It’s stored at more than 75 sites in 35 states around the country, so many of us have some in our state, including California.

The second category is the waste generated by our nuclear weapons complex. That defense waste has accumulated since the earliest days of the Manhattan Project. The highly-radioactive waste from chemical processing is mainly stored in very large metal tanks. They are located at the Savannah River site in South Carolina, the Hanford site in Washington State, at Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho, and Nuclear Fuel Services site at West Valley in New York State.

I think it’s discouraging that we continue to release radioactivity to the environment because after more than 40 years we still have not developed a successful plan for going forward.

What’s wrong with what’s happening now?

This waste is problematic because the volume is large, many hundreds of thousands of cubic meters. The tanks in Hanford and Savannah River are way beyond their design lifetimes, so they’re corroding and some have leaked. The radioactive fluid is being released to the environment. The rates are not high, but I think it’s discouraging that we continue to release radioactivity to the environment because after more than 40 years of effort we still have not developed a successful plan for going forward.

The spent fuel from commercial power plants is much smaller, some 80,000 metric tonnes, but the total amount of radioactivity is roughly 20 to 30 times greater than defense waste. Today, it’s the spent fuel that demands the most attention as an immediate problem, particularly financially.

How much is nuclear waste costing American taxpayers?

The two categories of waste are separated in the budget. At the moment, the budget for the Department of Energy is about $30 billion. Of that budget, about $12 billion is for the nuclear weapons programs. That leaves us $18 billion to use for all things related to energy — nuclear power, fossil fuel, wind, and solar. About $6 billion, one third, is used to deal with the legacy high-level waste from the Manhattan Project. We as taxpayers pay $6 billion every year to address that problem, a huge cost that we will incur for many decades into the future. The projected total cost of clean-up after the Manhattan Project is well over $300 billion. That’s more than the original cost of the weapons programs and the actual total will be even higher. That’s just the defense waste.

What about the waste from nuclear energy? Is that clean-up cost also high?

In short, very. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 created a tax on electricity generated by nuclear power plants. This tax would accumulate into the Nuclear Waste Fund for us to build a geologic repository — a mined facility deep within the earth — to safely dispose of the waste. What’s happened to that?

The fund has a balance of more than $40 billion. It’s controlled by Congress on an annual basis, and congressional budget rules make it very difficult to use those funds. It’s not a lockbox where the money goes and waits to be spent. Instead, it’s been applied against our national debt, so even though the fees have been collected, they haven’t been used for their intended purpose.

We pay about half-a-billion dollars a year to the utilities for their simply keeping the fuel because there’s no place for it to go.

The Department of Energy was to take ownership of this fuel on January 1, 1998, but they didn’t because there was no geologic repository. Now the utilities who have the fuel have to continue to deal with it onsite. They have sued the federal government for its failure to take ownership of the fuel, so now we pay about half-a-billion dollars a year to the utilities for their simply keeping the fuel because there’s no place for it to go. The projected cost of this penalty, let’s say, is something on the order of many tens of billions of dollars, depending on how long the spent fuel has to remain at the reactor sites. The cost of doing nothing over time will be equivalent to what we charge the rate payers, $40 billion over time. That doesn’t even include compensation to workers in defense facilities, soldiers exposed during atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and so on.

Clearly, the financial cost to taxpayers is high. What about the cost to the environment?

For the spent fuel, the volume — 80,000 metric tons — sounds like a lot, but compared to Gigatonnes of carbon emitted by burning fossil fuels, its volume is not so great. It’s well-contained, but there are some difficulties with how it’s stored. In some cases, the used fuel is kept in pools. Those pools have filled, and they weren’t meant for extended storage. We should be trying to get that fuel into what are called dry casks: obelisks concrete and metal.

Are there other challenges people may not be aware of?

What people don’t realize is that it is actually a serious technical challenge.

It’s very common for people to say there are no technical problems, that it’s just political. They say, “We know how to do it. It’s just a difficult public. Strict regulations. No one will let us solve this problem.”

I think what people don’t realize is that it is actually a serious technical challenge. The half-lives of some of these elements stretch into tens, if not hundreds of thousands of years. We’re asked to design solutions that will last as long as the risk. That’s not something we usually do. The technical and scientific challenge for nuclear waste is, whatever our solution, that we will never see whether we were correct or not. Designing a system where you don’t have feedback is very difficult.

What will happen if we don’t find a solution?

There will not be an immediate catastrophe; I don’t expect anything to explode. There will be environmental contamination, but the biggest problem is financial. We’re spending $6 billion a year trying to deal with the problem, and we’ll continue to spend $4.5 to $5 billion a year without solving the problem. That $5 billion could go to education or research. Imagine if instead of working on waste, we were working on solving our future energy needs.

What’s the best way for us to move forward?

At Stanford, over a two-year period we had a series of meetings to ask just this question: how does the U.S. break out of its gridlock situation and move ahead? We brought in international experts, members of the public, really quite an extraordinary effort, over 75 speakers in five meetings. We have a number of recommendations. We need a new, single purpose nuclear waste management organization. We need a new process for engaging not only the scientific and technical communities, but also the public. We need a new regulatory framework that recognizes the challenges of predicting repository performance over hundreds of thousands of years. Most importantly, we need to realize that dealing with nuclear waste is not only a technical issue, but also requires careful attention to social issues. It is very important to design an approach that engages local communities, states, and tribes. This report, Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policies, will be released this summer.

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Nuclear waste is accumulating at sites across the country, and we have no permanent solution, says nuclear waste expert Rodney Ewing. | Charissa Van Straalen/Getty Images
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Gi-Wook Shin
Joyce Lee
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While the Trump administration may still believe in CVID, Gi-Wook Shin and Joyce Lee argue that–at present–it is no longer a realistic goal.

In an article for for 38 North, Shin and Lee explain why it may be too late for CVID, explore Kim Jong-un’s possible agenda, and provide their thoughts on what the goal of negotiations should now be going forward.

Article is available online without subscription or login
 

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Beth Duff-Brown
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African-American doctors could help reduce cardiovascular mortality among black men by 19 percent — if there was more racial diversity among physicians, according to a new study led by Stanford Health Policy’s Marcella Alsan.

After conducting a randomized clinical trial among 1,300 black men in Oakland, the researchers found that the men sought more preventive services after they were randomly seen by black doctors for a free health-care screening compared to non-black doctors.

“We found that, once African-American men were at the clinic, even though all services were free, those assigned to a black doctor took up more services,” such as flu shots and diabetes and cholesterol screenings, said Alsan, an economist and infectious disease physician who focuses on  health and socioeconomic disparities here at home and around the world.

“It was surprising to see the results,” said Alsan, an associate professor of medicine at Stanford Medicine, a faculty fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and an investigator at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System. “Prior to doing the study, we really were not sure if there would be any effect, much less the magnitude. The signal in our data ended up being quite strong.”

Those signals include the men were 29 percent more likely to talk with black doctors about other health problems and seeking more invasive screenings that likely required more trust in the person providing the service. They found subjects assigned to black doctors increased their uptake of diabetes and cholesterol screenings by 47 percent and 72 percent, respectively.

The researchers calculated that black doctors could reduce cardiovascular mortality by 16 deaths per 100,000 per year, accounting for 19 percent of the black-white gap in cardiovascular-related deaths. They believe that the results would be even larger if extrapolated to other leading causes of death that are amenable to prevention, such as cancer and HIV/AIDS. 

“I was definitely surprised,” said Owen Garrick, president and COO of Bridge Clinical Research, an Oakland-based organization that helps clinical researchers find patients from targeted ethnic groups. “If you ask most people, they feel that there is some impact of black men seeing black doctors — but it has never been quantified using an experimental design.”

Alsan and Garrick, along with U.C. Berkeley graduate student Grant Graziani, published their findings in this working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Garrick, himself an African-American physician, said black doctors tend to present themselves in a manner that puts a black patient at ease, making him more willing to open up and agree to certain care. “The black doctor might explain the medical services in a way that the black patient more clearly understands.”

Garrick called the findings “astounding,” but he warned that increasing the number of black doctors and getting black men to routinely see them are no small tasks.

There is a yawning gap between white physicians and those of color. While African-Americans comprise about 13 percent of the population, only 4 percent of physicians and less than 6 percent of medical school graduates are black, according to the study.

This is compounded by African-American men having the lowest life-expectancy in the country, due to lack of health insurance, lower socioeconomic status and structural racism. 

And there remains a distrust of the U.S. healthcare system at least partially attributed to the infamous Tuskegee study that began in 1932, when the U.S. Public Health Service began following about 600 African-American men in Tuskegee, Alabama. Some two-thirds of the men had syphilis, and USPHS declined to inform those afflicted by the disease. Even after penicillin became the standard of care for syphilis treatment in the mid-1940s, the USPHS continued to withhold treatment. The study was finally halted when a whistleblower went to the press in 1972.

Alsan— with her colleague Marianne Wanamaker at the University of Tennessee — published a study in The Quarterly Journal of Economics in February that found the 1972 Tuskegee study revelation was correlated with a reduction in health-seeking behavior and increases in medical mistrust and mortality among African-American men.

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The men who participated in the recent study were recruited from barbershops and flea markets in Oakland, a city known for its diversity, yet plagued by a 20 percent rate of poverty.

Field officers —including minority and low-income pre-med students from around the Bay Area — approached men to enroll in the study. After obtaining written consent, the men were given a short survey about socio-demographics, health care and mistrust. For completing the survey, the men received a voucher with up to $25 for their haircut or, in the flea market, a cash incentive.

The men were also given a coupon to receive a free health-care screening for blood pressure, BMI, cholesterol and diabetes at the clinic where the Stanford team operated on Saturdays in the fall and winter of 2017-2018. The patients who did not have transport to the clinic were given free rides courtesy of Uber. Attendance at the clinic was encouraged with another $50 incentive.

Subjects and the 14 participating doctors were told that they were taking part in a Stanford study designed to improve preventive health-care for African-American men.

On top of the significant increases in patients who agreed to diabetes or cholesterol screenings if suggested by a black doctor, the researchers found that the men were 56 percent more likely to get a flu vaccine if randomized to one of the African-American doctors.

The results suggested the more invasive the test, the greater the advantage of being assigned a black doctor. And the findings were even stronger among subjects who had a high mistrust of the medical system as well as those who had limited prior experience with routine medical care.

“In curative care, the patient feels ill and then may seek out medical care to fix the problem,” Alsan said. “But in preventive care, the patient may feel just fine — but must trust the doctor when he is told that certain measures must be taken to safeguard health.” 

The policy implications would suggest that medical schools need to open the pipeline to students from diverse backgrounds who are training for health-care professionals. 

Garrick recommends exposing more young people of color to the field of medicine and helping them to become more competitive applicants through tutoring and interview prep.

“And you need advocates,” he said. “Since much of the medical school selection process is subjective, you need to get people on the selection committees who will relate and see the potential of black applicants as much as people relate to other applicants.”

Some links to other media outlets that have written about this research: 

The New York Times

Harvard Business Review

The Daily Mail

ColorLines

 

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Encina Hall, C147 616 Jane Stanford Way Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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CDDRL Predoctoral Fellow, 2018-20
Fellow, Program on Democracy and the Internet, 2018-20
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​I am a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. Starting in 2023, I will be an Assistant Professor at Harvard Business School's Business, Government and the International Economy (BGIE) unit.

My research examines political extremism, destigmatization, and radicalization, focusing on the role of popularity cues in online media. My related research examines a broad range of threats to democratic governance, including authoritarian encroachment, ethnic prejudice in public goods allocation, and misinformation. 

​My dissertation won APSA's Ernst B. Haas Award for the best dissertation on European Politics. I am currently working on my book project, Engineering Extremism, with generous funding from the William F. Milton Fund at Harvard.

My published work has appeared in the American Political Science Review,  Governance,  International Studies Quarterly, Public Administration Review, and the Virginia Journal of International Law, along with an edited volume in Democratization (Oxford University Press). My research has been featured in KQED/NPR, The Washington Post, and VICE News.
​
I received my Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley in 2020. I was a Predoctoral Research Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University and the Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet. I hold a B.A. (Magna Cum Laude; Phi Beta Kappa) from Cornell University and an M.A. (with Distinction) from the University of California, Berkeley.

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"In what may be looked back upon as the most important election in the United States in 2018, the voters of Maine rejected political cynicism on Tuesday and preserved ranked-choice voting (RCV) for its future elections. To appreciate the historic significance of this vote for greater democratic choice, it’s important to understand what Mainers were up against—a two-party duopoly in which “all the levers of power” (in the words of one grassroots activist) were overtly or covertly working to block political reform," writes Larry Diamond in American Interest. Read here. 

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NOTE: If you are interested in a panel,  please email to hjahn@stanford.edu to see if a seat is available.  Sorry Panel 6, Korean Wave, in the afternoon of November 2 has reached its capacity.

This 2-day workshop is organized by the Korea Program of Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) to bring together leading scholars working in the fields of language education, literature, history, social science, and library studies. Each panel will consist of three or four panelists who will be presenting a report on the state of the field. The purpose of the panels is to generate discussion around some of the following questions:

  • What are the research trends in each field?
  • What kinds of directions can we expect in the near future?
  • What are some of the disciplinary or other challenges in each field?
  • How does each field interact with related fields?
  • What are some of the limitations and possibilities around graduate student training?
  • How can faculty with graduate students cultivate supportive and critical scholarly communities?
  • ​How are junior faculty encouraged, and what institutional structures may offer better support?

Thursday, November 1
9:20am-11:30am, Panel 1: Literature
1:00am-3:30pm, Panel 2: Social Sciences
3:50pm-5:30pm, Panel 3: Language Education

Friday, November 2
9:00am-10:50am, Panel 4: History
11:05-12:20, Panel 5: Library Collections and Services
1:00pm-2:30pm, Panel 6: Korean Wave (Conversation with Choi Si-won: K-Pop Super Junior)

For schedule of the event, please download the draft of the agenda below.

Opportunities for junior scholars:

This workshop also invites junior faculty, post-doctoral fellows, and graduate students in Korean studies to apply for Travel Awards. For the details of the applicatoin process, please visit the Travel Awards site.

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Donald K. Emmerson
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The 2018 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, June 1-3. Shorenstein APARC's Donald Emmerson was in attendance; some of his observations from the the 17th Asia Security Summit are provided below.

NOTE: This post is forthcoming from YaleGlobal.

 

The 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue on 1-3 June in Singapore might as well have been renamed the “Indo-Pacific Dialogue.” In the plenaries and the panels, in the Q&As, corridors, and coffee breaks, not even the imminent Trump-Kim summit hosted by Singapore could compete with the “Indo-Pacific” among the attendees. Although the toponym itself is old, its sudden popularity is new, reflecting new geopolitical aspirations for the region. 
 
What explains the latest revival and rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in the international relations of Asia? What does the term now mean, and why does it matter?  In March, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the “Indo-Pacific” as “an attention-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like ocean foam.”  Is he right?  And is the “Indo-Pacific” purely maritime, or does it have legs on land as well?  Is the strategy Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s way of labeling his shift from “looking east” to “acting east” – and perhaps his hope of looking and acting westward past Pakistan toward Africa as well?  Does the term frame a potential rival to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road?  Is it an American rebranding of former President Barack Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia?  In the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that Washington favors, what do the adjectives imply?  Is the “Indo-Pacific” a phoenix – a Quadrilateral 2.0 meant to reunite Australia, India, Japan and the US in leading roles?  Could the strategy someday morph into a five-sided “win-win” arrangement with “Chinese characteristics”? 
 
Understandably, the officials who spoke at Shangri-La preferred not delve into such controversial and speculative questions. Satisfactory answers to some of them are not possible, let alone plausible, at least not yet. But the dialogue, a summit on Asian security, did stimulate thought and discourse about just what the “Indo-Pacific” means, for whose purposes, and to what effect.
 
It is easy to load the “Indo-Pacific” with geopolitical intent. Having accepted the invitation to keynote the dialogue on 1 June, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to speak at Shangri-La since the event’s inception in 2002.  Many at the gathering read the prefix “Indo-“ as a geopolitical invitation to India to partner more explicitly with states in an “Asia-Pacific” region from which it had been relatively absent, and thereby to counterbalance China within an even larger frame. 
 
Perhaps aiming to mend relations with China after the Wuhan summit, held in April, Modi unloaded the loaded term. “The Indo-Pacific,” he said, “is a natural region. …  India does not see [it] as a strategy or as a club of limited members.  Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate.  And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be.”  Modi flattened the Indo-Pacific to a mere page in an atlas – the two dimensions of a map – while widening it to include not only all of the countries located inside “this geography” but “also others beyond who have a stake in it.”  Modi thus drained the toponym of controversially distinctive meaning. India’s rival China could hardly object to being included in a vast “natural” zone innocent of economic or political purpose or design. 
 
Not so, countered US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. Unlike Modi, he explicitly linked ideology to geography by repeatedly invoking a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Nor did these qualifiers apply only to external relations – a state’s freedom from foreign interference and its freedoms of navigation and overflight under international law. For Mattis, “free and open” implied internal democracy as well – a state’s accountability to an uncensored society. In Singapore during his question and answer period, Mattis acknowledged the “free and open press” that had thronged to cover the dialogue.   
 
In corridor conversations, understandings of the “Indo-Pacific” ranged widely, from an inoffensively natural region on the one hand, to a pointedly ideological one on the other. Will the real Indo-Pacific please stand up?  
 
The rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in American policy discourse amounts to a rejection, a resumption, and a desire.  Because Donald Trump cannot abide whatever his predecessor did or said, Barack Obama’s “rebalance” to the “Asia-Pacific” could not survive. The “Indo-Pacific” conveniently shrinks Obama’s “Asia” to a hyphen while inflating the stage on which a celebrity president can play. Yet Mattis also, without saying so, reaffirmed the result of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by assuring his audience that “America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater.” Alongside that rejection-cum-resumption, the prefix “Indo-” embodies the hope that India as a major power can help rebalance America’s friends against what Mattis called China’s “intimidation and coercion,” notably in the South China Sea. 
 
In Honolulu, en route to the dialogue, Mattis had added the prefix to the US Pacific Command – now the Indo-Pacific Command. But continuity again matched change in that the renamed INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility was not extended west of India to Africa. As for Modi, while recommitting his country to “a democratic and rules-based international order,” both he and Mattis ignored the Quad – the off-and-on-again effort to convene the United States, India, Japan and Australia as prospective guardians and agents of the Indo-Pacific idea.
 
The first effort to create the Quad died at the hands of Beijing and Canberra.  Quietly in May 2007, on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Manila, the four governments met at a sub-cabinet level, followed that September by an expanded Malabar naval exercise in the Indian Ocean among the four along with Singapore. Early in 2008, however, then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, bowing to pressure from Beijing, withdrew Australia from Quad 1.0 and it collapsed. 
 
It took the subsequent upbuilding and arming of land features in the South China Sea by China to re-embolden the quartet. Beijing’s maritime militancy, Trump’s disdain for Obama-style “strategic patience,” the worsening of Japan’s relations with China, and alarm in Australia over signs of Beijing’s “sharp power” operations there all came together to motivate a low-key, low-level meeting of a could-be Quad 2.0 on the margins of another ASEAN gathering in Manila in November 2017.  
 
The question now is whether the quartet will reconvene in Singapore during the upcoming November ASEAN summitry and if it does, whether the level of representation will be nudged upward to cabinet status. Trump’s addiction to bilateralism, mano a mano, may be tested in this four-way context. Or his one-on-one real-estate developer’s proclivity could cripple the Quad from the start. 
 
More grandiose is the idea that the “Indo-Pacific” could shed its cautionary quote marks and become a rubric for building infrastructure on a scale rivaling China’s own Belt and Road Initiative to lay down railroads, roads and ports from Kunming potentially to Kenya. That surely is, so to speak, a bridge too far.  
 
In short, the temptation to read multilateral diplomatic content into a map of the “Indo-Pacific” drawn in Washington should be resisted. Having objected to any reference to “the rules-based international order” in the June G7 communiqué that he refused to sign, Trump is unlikely to fit the “Indo-Pacific” into any such frame. Nor is it likely to think that he would wish to augment a resuscitated Quad by adding China. Not to mention that Beijing might fail to see the humor in belonging to a five-sided “Pentagon” whose name is a metonym for the American Department of Defense. 
 

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University where he is also affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

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