Authors
Beth Duff-Brown
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

African-American doctors could help reduce cardiovascular mortality among black men by 19 percent — if there was more racial diversity among physicians, according to a new study led by Stanford Health Policy’s Marcella Alsan.

After conducting a randomized clinical trial among 1,300 black men in Oakland, the researchers found that the men sought more preventive services after they were randomly seen by black doctors for a free health-care screening compared to non-black doctors.

“We found that, once African-American men were at the clinic, even though all services were free, those assigned to a black doctor took up more services,” such as flu shots and diabetes and cholesterol screenings, said Alsan, an economist and infectious disease physician who focuses on  health and socioeconomic disparities here at home and around the world.

“It was surprising to see the results,” said Alsan, an associate professor of medicine at Stanford Medicine, a faculty fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and an investigator at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System. “Prior to doing the study, we really were not sure if there would be any effect, much less the magnitude. The signal in our data ended up being quite strong.”

Those signals include the men were 29 percent more likely to talk with black doctors about other health problems and seeking more invasive screenings that likely required more trust in the person providing the service. They found subjects assigned to black doctors increased their uptake of diabetes and cholesterol screenings by 47 percent and 72 percent, respectively.

The researchers calculated that black doctors could reduce cardiovascular mortality by 16 deaths per 100,000 per year, accounting for 19 percent of the black-white gap in cardiovascular-related deaths. They believe that the results would be even larger if extrapolated to other leading causes of death that are amenable to prevention, such as cancer and HIV/AIDS. 

“I was definitely surprised,” said Owen Garrick, president and COO of Bridge Clinical Research, an Oakland-based organization that helps clinical researchers find patients from targeted ethnic groups. “If you ask most people, they feel that there is some impact of black men seeing black doctors — but it has never been quantified using an experimental design.”

Alsan and Garrick, along with U.C. Berkeley graduate student Grant Graziani, published their findings in this working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Garrick, himself an African-American physician, said black doctors tend to present themselves in a manner that puts a black patient at ease, making him more willing to open up and agree to certain care. “The black doctor might explain the medical services in a way that the black patient more clearly understands.”

Garrick called the findings “astounding,” but he warned that increasing the number of black doctors and getting black men to routinely see them are no small tasks.

There is a yawning gap between white physicians and those of color. While African-Americans comprise about 13 percent of the population, only 4 percent of physicians and less than 6 percent of medical school graduates are black, according to the study.

This is compounded by African-American men having the lowest life-expectancy in the country, due to lack of health insurance, lower socioeconomic status and structural racism. 

And there remains a distrust of the U.S. healthcare system at least partially attributed to the infamous Tuskegee study that began in 1932, when the U.S. Public Health Service began following about 600 African-American men in Tuskegee, Alabama. Some two-thirds of the men had syphilis, and USPHS declined to inform those afflicted by the disease. Even after penicillin became the standard of care for syphilis treatment in the mid-1940s, the USPHS continued to withhold treatment. The study was finally halted when a whistleblower went to the press in 1972.

Alsan— with her colleague Marianne Wanamaker at the University of Tennessee — published a study in The Quarterly Journal of Economics in February that found the 1972 Tuskegee study revelation was correlated with a reduction in health-seeking behavior and increases in medical mistrust and mortality among African-American men.

Image

The men who participated in the recent study were recruited from barbershops and flea markets in Oakland, a city known for its diversity, yet plagued by a 20 percent rate of poverty.

Field officers —including minority and low-income pre-med students from around the Bay Area — approached men to enroll in the study. After obtaining written consent, the men were given a short survey about socio-demographics, health care and mistrust. For completing the survey, the men received a voucher with up to $25 for their haircut or, in the flea market, a cash incentive.

The men were also given a coupon to receive a free health-care screening for blood pressure, BMI, cholesterol and diabetes at the clinic where the Stanford team operated on Saturdays in the fall and winter of 2017-2018. The patients who did not have transport to the clinic were given free rides courtesy of Uber. Attendance at the clinic was encouraged with another $50 incentive.

Subjects and the 14 participating doctors were told that they were taking part in a Stanford study designed to improve preventive health-care for African-American men.

On top of the significant increases in patients who agreed to diabetes or cholesterol screenings if suggested by a black doctor, the researchers found that the men were 56 percent more likely to get a flu vaccine if randomized to one of the African-American doctors.

The results suggested the more invasive the test, the greater the advantage of being assigned a black doctor. And the findings were even stronger among subjects who had a high mistrust of the medical system as well as those who had limited prior experience with routine medical care.

“In curative care, the patient feels ill and then may seek out medical care to fix the problem,” Alsan said. “But in preventive care, the patient may feel just fine — but must trust the doctor when he is told that certain measures must be taken to safeguard health.” 

The policy implications would suggest that medical schools need to open the pipeline to students from diverse backgrounds who are training for health-care professionals. 

Garrick recommends exposing more young people of color to the field of medicine and helping them to become more competitive applicants through tutoring and interview prep.

“And you need advocates,” he said. “Since much of the medical school selection process is subjective, you need to get people on the selection committees who will relate and see the potential of black applicants as much as people relate to other applicants.”

Some links to other media outlets that have written about this research: 

The New York Times

Harvard Business Review

The Daily Mail

ColorLines

 

Hero Image
gettyimages black doctor Getty Images
All News button
1
Encina Hall, C147 616 Jane Stanford Way Stanford, CA 94305-6055
0
CDDRL Predoctoral Fellow, 2018-20
Fellow, Program on Democracy and the Internet, 2018-20
jakli.jpg

​I am a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. Starting in 2023, I will be an Assistant Professor at Harvard Business School's Business, Government and the International Economy (BGIE) unit.

My research examines political extremism, destigmatization, and radicalization, focusing on the role of popularity cues in online media. My related research examines a broad range of threats to democratic governance, including authoritarian encroachment, ethnic prejudice in public goods allocation, and misinformation. 

​My dissertation won APSA's Ernst B. Haas Award for the best dissertation on European Politics. I am currently working on my book project, Engineering Extremism, with generous funding from the William F. Milton Fund at Harvard.

My published work has appeared in the American Political Science Review,  Governance,  International Studies QuarterlyPublic Administration Review, and the Virginia Journal of International Law, along with an edited volume in Democratization (Oxford University Press). My research has been featured in KQED/NPRThe Washington Post, and VICE News.

I received my Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley in 2020. I was a Predoctoral Research Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University and the Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet. I hold a B.A. (Magna Cum Laude; Phi Beta Kappa) from Cornell University and an M.A. (with Distinction) from the University of California, Berkeley.

CV
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

"In what may be looked back upon as the most important election in the United States in 2018, the voters of Maine rejected political cynicism on Tuesday and preserved ranked-choice voting (RCV) for its future elections. To appreciate the historic significance of this vote for greater democratic choice, it’s important to understand what Mainers were up against—a two-party duopoly in which “all the levers of power” (in the words of one grassroots activist) were overtly or covertly working to block political reform," writes Larry Diamond in American Interest. Read here

Hero Image
survey 1594962 1920
All News button
1
-

NOTE: If you are interested in a panel,  please email to hjahn@stanford.edu to see if a seat is available.  Sorry Panel 6, Korean Wave, in the afternoon of November 2 has reached its capacity.

This 2-day workshop is organized by the Korea Program of Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) to bring together leading scholars working in the fields of language education, literature, history, social science, and library studies. Each panel will consist of three or four panelists who will be presenting a report on the state of the field. The purpose of the panels is to generate discussion around some of the following questions:

  • What are the research trends in each field?
  • What kinds of directions can we expect in the near future?
  • What are some of the disciplinary or other challenges in each field?
  • How does each field interact with related fields?
  • What are some of the limitations and possibilities around graduate student training?
  • How can faculty with graduate students cultivate supportive and critical scholarly communities?
  • ​How are junior faculty encouraged, and what institutional structures may offer better support?

Thursday, November 1
9:20am-11:30am, Panel 1: Literature
1:00am-3:30pm, Panel 2: Social Sciences
3:50pm-5:30pm, Panel 3: Language Education

Friday, November 2
9:00am-10:50am, Panel 4: History
11:05-12:20, Panel 5: Library Collections and Services
1:00pm-2:30pm, Panel 6: Korean Wave (Conversation with Choi Si-won: K-Pop Super Junior)

For schedule of the event, please download the draft of the agenda below.

Opportunities for junior scholars:

This workshop also invites junior faculty, post-doctoral fellows, and graduate students in Korean studies to apply for Travel Awards. For the details of the applicatoin process, please visit the Travel Awards site.

Paul Brest Hall
555 Salvatierra Walk
Stanford University

Conferences
Authors
Donald K. Emmerson
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

The 2018 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, June 1-3. Shorenstein APARC's Donald Emmerson was in attendance; some of his observations from the the 17th Asia Security Summit are provided below.

NOTE: This post is forthcoming from YaleGlobal.

 

The 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue on 1-3 June in Singapore might as well have been renamed the “Indo-Pacific Dialogue.” In the plenaries and the panels, in the Q&As, corridors, and coffee breaks, not even the imminent Trump-Kim summit hosted by Singapore could compete with the “Indo-Pacific” among the attendees. Although the toponym itself is old, its sudden popularity is new, reflecting new geopolitical aspirations for the region. 
 
What explains the latest revival and rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in the international relations of Asia? What does the term now mean, and why does it matter?  In March, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the “Indo-Pacific” as “an attention-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like ocean foam.”  Is he right?  And is the “Indo-Pacific” purely maritime, or does it have legs on land as well?  Is the strategy Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s way of labeling his shift from “looking east” to “acting east” – and perhaps his hope of looking and acting westward past Pakistan toward Africa as well?  Does the term frame a potential rival to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road?  Is it an American rebranding of former President Barack Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia?  In the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that Washington favors, what do the adjectives imply?  Is the “Indo-Pacific” a phoenix – a Quadrilateral 2.0 meant to reunite Australia, India, Japan and the US in leading roles?  Could the strategy someday morph into a five-sided “win-win” arrangement with “Chinese characteristics”? 
 
Understandably, the officials who spoke at Shangri-La preferred not delve into such controversial and speculative questions. Satisfactory answers to some of them are not possible, let alone plausible, at least not yet. But the dialogue, a summit on Asian security, did stimulate thought and discourse about just what the “Indo-Pacific” means, for whose purposes, and to what effect.
 
It is easy to load the “Indo-Pacific” with geopolitical intent. Having accepted the invitation to keynote the dialogue on 1 June, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to speak at Shangri-La since the event’s inception in 2002.  Many at the gathering read the prefix “Indo-“ as a geopolitical invitation to India to partner more explicitly with states in an “Asia-Pacific” region from which it had been relatively absent, and thereby to counterbalance China within an even larger frame. 
 
Perhaps aiming to mend relations with China after the Wuhan summit, held in April, Modi unloaded the loaded term. “The Indo-Pacific,” he said, “is a natural region. …  India does not see [it] as a strategy or as a club of limited members.  Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate.  And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be.”  Modi flattened the Indo-Pacific to a mere page in an atlas – the two dimensions of a map – while widening it to include not only all of the countries located inside “this geography” but “also others beyond who have a stake in it.”  Modi thus drained the toponym of controversially distinctive meaning. India’s rival China could hardly object to being included in a vast “natural” zone innocent of economic or political purpose or design. 
 
Not so, countered US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. Unlike Modi, he explicitly linked ideology to geography by repeatedly invoking a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Nor did these qualifiers apply only to external relations – a state’s freedom from foreign interference and its freedoms of navigation and overflight under international law. For Mattis, “free and open” implied internal democracy as well – a state’s accountability to an uncensored society. In Singapore during his question and answer period, Mattis acknowledged the “free and open press” that had thronged to cover the dialogue.   
 
In corridor conversations, understandings of the “Indo-Pacific” ranged widely, from an inoffensively natural region on the one hand, to a pointedly ideological one on the other. Will the real Indo-Pacific please stand up?  
 
The rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in American policy discourse amounts to a rejection, a resumption, and a desire.  Because Donald Trump cannot abide whatever his predecessor did or said, Barack Obama’s “rebalance” to the “Asia-Pacific” could not survive. The “Indo-Pacific” conveniently shrinks Obama’s “Asia” to a hyphen while inflating the stage on which a celebrity president can play. Yet Mattis also, without saying so, reaffirmed the result of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by assuring his audience that “America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater.” Alongside that rejection-cum-resumption, the prefix “Indo-” embodies the hope that India as a major power can help rebalance America’s friends against what Mattis called China’s “intimidation and coercion,” notably in the South China Sea. 
 
In Honolulu, en route to the dialogue, Mattis had added the prefix to the US Pacific Command – now the Indo-Pacific Command. But continuity again matched change in that the renamed INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility was not extended west of India to Africa. As for Modi, while recommitting his country to “a democratic and rules-based international order,” both he and Mattis ignored the Quad – the off-and-on-again effort to convene the United States, India, Japan and Australia as prospective guardians and agents of the Indo-Pacific idea.
 
The first effort to create the Quad died at the hands of Beijing and Canberra.  Quietly in May 2007, on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Manila, the four governments met at a sub-cabinet level, followed that September by an expanded Malabar naval exercise in the Indian Ocean among the four along with Singapore. Early in 2008, however, then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, bowing to pressure from Beijing, withdrew Australia from Quad 1.0 and it collapsed. 
 
It took the subsequent upbuilding and arming of land features in the South China Sea by China to re-embolden the quartet. Beijing’s maritime militancy, Trump’s disdain for Obama-style “strategic patience,” the worsening of Japan’s relations with China, and alarm in Australia over signs of Beijing’s “sharp power” operations there all came together to motivate a low-key, low-level meeting of a could-be Quad 2.0 on the margins of another ASEAN gathering in Manila in November 2017.  
 
The question now is whether the quartet will reconvene in Singapore during the upcoming November ASEAN summitry and if it does, whether the level of representation will be nudged upward to cabinet status. Trump’s addiction to bilateralism, mano a mano, may be tested in this four-way context. Or his one-on-one real-estate developer’s proclivity could cripple the Quad from the start. 
 
More grandiose is the idea that the “Indo-Pacific” could shed its cautionary quote marks and become a rubric for building infrastructure on a scale rivaling China’s own Belt and Road Initiative to lay down railroads, roads and ports from Kunming potentially to Kenya. That surely is, so to speak, a bridge too far.  
 
In short, the temptation to read multilateral diplomatic content into a map of the “Indo-Pacific” drawn in Washington should be resisted. Having objected to any reference to “the rules-based international order” in the June G7 communiqué that he refused to sign, Trump is unlikely to fit the “Indo-Pacific” into any such frame. Nor is it likely to think that he would wish to augment a resuscitated Quad by adding China. Not to mention that Beijing might fail to see the humor in belonging to a five-sided “Pentagon” whose name is a metonym for the American Department of Defense. 
 

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University where he is also affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

Hero Image
mattis iiss 2018 U.S. Embassy in Singapore
All News button
1
Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
Joyce Lee
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

 

The following article first appeared on The Diplomat.

With the historic U.S.-North Korea summit on the immediate horizon, we must recognize that denuclearization will not and cannot be permanent or irreversible as long as there is a desire to reverse it. U.S. President Donald Trump may strike a “grand deal” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to denuclearize North Korea, but Kim can — and most likely will — reverse course at his convenience to construct new nuclear weapons. By focusing solely on denuclearization, we risk losing sight of the bigger, more important picture — that is, transforming North Korea into a normal state that no longer sees the need to pursue nuclearization for deterrence, survival, or any other reason.

Much of debate has centered on why Kim suddenly emerged from long-held silence to take the world’s center stage through a series of summits. Was he pressured by toughened sanctions, as Trump credits himself for? Or was it an expression of Kim’s confidence as a leader of a now de facto nuclear power, with more leverage for negotiation? Or has he simply been trying to buy time to avoid war — to get through the unpredictable and ruthless Trump’s tenure as U.S. president? Yet, what really matters now is not so much the question of why Kim came to the table, but rather how we can make the latest détente sustainable without repeating the failures of the past. Will it be different this time?

With the Trump-Kim summit now back on the track after a 24-hour drama of cancellation then resumption, each side seems to have softened its stance by lowering the bar. Next week in Singapore, both leaders will be sorely tempted by clear political and economic interests to paint the meeting as a success. Real challenges, however, will arise as the logistical details of North Korea’s denuclearization are discussed following the summit. The Trump team is unlikely to abandon its goal of the CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) of North Korea, while Kim and his men will stand firmly against this all-out approach so as not to follow the footsteps of Libya, Iraq, or Ukraine. North Korea has reportedly demanded a CVIG (complete, verifiable, and irreversible guarantee) of the security of the current regime, but there is a great danger that these deals, if made, will be nothing more than another sheet of paper full of empty words. The deep mistrust between the two countries cannot be overcome overnight, especially considering that both leaders have pretty bad track records of reneging on previous commitments. Neither CVID nor CVIG has much chance of being realized in the current context, from either a technical or a practical perspective.

With all this skepticism, why should we still bother playing this game with North Korea again? It is because we see a window of opportunity to guide North Korea into the international community through processes of diplomatic communication, exchange, and engagement. North Korea’s summit diplomacy has revealed its desire to appear a normal state. Kim vigorously showcased four summit meetings  — twice each with China’s Xi Jinping and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in — and numerous high-level meetings, within two months, all within the parameters of conventional “state-to-state” relationships, departing from past practices. Standing side-by-side with the South Korean president to read out a joint declaration, immediately releasing news of Kim’s summit meetings through its media, presenting Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, as the state’s first lady — all of this would have been unthinkable in his father or grandfather’s generation.

North Korea’s latest efforts at international recognition as a normal state may be insincere and ill-intentioned, but even so, we should continue to allow North Korea and Kim to experience firsthand what it feels like and means to be treated as a normal state and a normal leader according to the ordinary conventions of international diplomacy. Although the goal seems so far away and unreachable, we should strive to normalize North Korea in all respects — its economy, its domestic and international politics, its integration into international institutions, and its adherence to international laws, norms, rights, duties, orders, etc.

CVID can still serve as a short- to mid-term goal, but not as a definitive solution to the long-standing North Korean threat. Whatever is decided at the upcoming summit, a more comprehensive roadmap should be set for enacting desirable transformations in security and economic relations with North Korea, putting the country on a path to become a stable and normal state increasingly integrated into the international community, where it would feel secure without a need for nuclear armament. As Trump says, he is starting a “process” of dealing with North Korea; the upcoming summit should be the beginning of an opportunity to advance this goal. After all, a normal North Korea can achieve CVID, but CVID cannot achieve a normal state.

Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and Joyce Lee is a research professional in the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

 

Hero Image
Building in Pyongyang
All News button
1
-

Gender inequality in the workplace is still a reality and an issue that must be tackled head-on in Silicon Valley and Japan. In 2017, the World Economic Forum reported for the first time in 10 years, a widening of the global gender gap. Numerous efforts to break this cycle have been announced and implemented to varying degrees of success in both countries making it clear that we must do more, together.

While women in the United States comprise 59% of the total workforce, they only make up 30% of major technology companies and only 11% of the executive positions in Silicon Valley are held by women. An industry that prides itself on innovative thinking and breakthroughs that can fundamentally improve quality of life has yet to find its way to disrupt gender inequality in its ranks. In recent years, Silicon Valley has been rocked by a number of high-profile sexual discrimination and harassment cases. In 2016, women tech leaders created the “Elephant in the Valley” survey to gather data on women’s experiences. The result was a bleak picture of Silicon Valley’s pervasive gender discrimination atmosphere but also the creation of a platform for women to share stories and build networks of support and activism based on shared experience.

As Japan faces a shrinking and aging population, it must pursue productivity growth to remain a wealthy nation. Women, long underutilized in Japan’s workforce, are receiving renewed attention with the Abe administration’s slogan of Womenomics as part of his Abenomics economic reform package. This political pledge has yielded some momentum with a number of concrete policy measures. Prime Minister Abe has even gone so far as to say “Abenomics is Womenomics.” There is still progress to be made. The Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT), spearheaded by Governor Yuriko Koike, the first female governor of Tokyo, aims to counter this narrative by providing opportunities for women entrepreneurs to build networks, receive mentoring, and become a focal point for dynamism.

The Break Through conference aims to create a dialogue that will spark innovative ideas for narrowing the gender gap by bringing together women thought leaders and entrepreneurs from Stanford, Silicon Valley and Japan to cultivate interpersonal support networks and collaboration.

This conference will:

  • Provide tools for branding and building support networks
  • Discuss progress and challenges in women’s advancement in Silicon Valley and Japan
  • Share practices and organizational features that better enable the hiring and retaining of women
  • Showcase Silicon Valley and Japanese women entrepreneurs

This conference is organized by Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC) Japan Program thanks to the generous support of the Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT), Tokyo Metropolitan Government.

Image
tokyo 2193354 1920

Agenda

9:30-10:00       Registration

10:00-10:05     Opening & Welcome Remarks

10:05-10:35     Women Entrepreneurs in the United States

- Judy Gilbert, Chief People Officer, Zymergen   

10:35-11:00     Womenomics in Japan

- Yuko Osaki, Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office, Japanese Government              

11:00-11:30     Fireside Chat 1

- Yoky Matsuoka, Chief Technology Officer, Nest

with Frances Colón, CEO, Jasperi Consulting

11:30-12:00     Fireside Chat 2

- Claire Chino, President & CEO, Itochu International Inc.

with Haruko Sasamoto, Assistant Manager Silicon Valley Branch, Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas)

12:00-13:00     Lunch

13:00-14:00     Start-up Showcase Group 1 (5 Japanese Startups)

14:00-14:15     Break

14:15-15:15     Start-up Showcase Group 2 (5 Silicon Valley Startups)

Feedback for both showcases given by:

- Allison Baum, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Fresco Capital

- Atsuko Jenks, Managing Direction-Japan, GSV Labs

- Jaclyn Selby, Research Scholar, Stanford University

15:15-16:15     Workshop: Leveraging Your Personal Brand to Effectively Lead

How others—from team members to board members—perceive you directly affects your ability to effectively lead and get results. For this reason, and especially for women entrepreneurs, it is crucial to understand your personal brand and carefully manage it. In this hands-on workshop, we will use Design Thinking as a framework to help you identify your strengths, skills and unique differentiators and how to effectively communicate these in your work environment.

Workshop Facilitator:

- Sylvia Vaquer, Co-founder and Chief Creative Officer, SocioFabrica

16:15     Closing Remarks 

 

Arrillaga Alumni Center, McCaw Hall

326 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA

Conferences
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, said Stanford scholars in an in-depth report released by the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
 
Instead, denuclearization should be phased over a 10-year period to allow the United States to reduce and manage risks, said Siegfried Hecker, who authored the study with his research assistant Elliot Serbin and Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at CISAC.
 
In the report, the scholars laid out a “roadmap” for denuclearization, recommending what they call a “halt, roll back and eliminate” approach. Their advice – which includes informative color charts and detailed, qualitative analysis – emerged from a longer-term project about the nuclear history of North Korea between 1992 and 2017.
 
According to the research, the most important steps toward denuclearization include halting nuclear tests, stopping intermediate or long-range missile tests, stopping the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and banning all export of nuclear weapons, materials or technologies to North Korea.
 
“The roadmap lays out a reasonable timeline for denuclearization, but politics may delay final denuclearization as much as 15 years,” said Hecker, who worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for almost two decades, where he served as its directors for 11 of those years. He joined CISAC as a senior fellow in 2005.
 
Building trust and interdependence
In the short term, North Korea and the United States should take steps to build trust and interdependence, which the researchers believe are pivotal for a viable long-term solution like complete demilitarization of North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea, they argue, will likely want to retain some parts of its nuclear program as a hedge should any potential agreement fall apart. This is a manageable risk, they said.
 
The scholars also encourage Pyongyang to front-load its concrete plan towards  permanent nuclear dismantlement to make a phased approach more appealing to the US administration. This would include actions like halting nuclear and missile tests for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
 
According to Hecker, North Korea’s recent demolition of its nuclear test site is a significant step in that direction.
 
“The so-called ‘Libya model’ – complete and immediate denuclearization – is not a viable solution,” Hecker said. “Our approach leaves each party with a manageable level of risk. Even though it takes longer, it is safer for the world.”
 
Hecker also encouraged the US to recognize North Korea’s desire for civilian programs, including energy production, the use of radioactive substances in medical research, diagnosis and treatment, and a peaceful space program. These types of civilian programs can also foster opportunities for a collaborative relationship between the United States and North Korea. Further, increased cooperation –including with South Korea – can help make efforts for verification and monitoring with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more reliable. The verification process that will confirm to what extent North Korea dismantles and destroys its military nuclear program is a big issue for negotiations, the scholars said.
 
Recent reconciliation
Critically, the researchers note that recent détente between North Korea and South Korea provides a window of opportunity to accomplish denuclearization – and that the US should take advantage of that window smartly. They  said they hope that the risk-management approach outlined in the report can maximize chances for a successful agreement.
 
“In the past, the US has missed opportunities to manage incremental risk,” Hecker said. “Now is the time to pay attention to that history and be prepared to implement a risk-management approach to denuclearization.”
Hero Image
Siegfried Hecker meets with members of North Korea’s nuclear scientific community during a visit to Yongbyon.
Siegfried Hecker meets with members of North Korea’s nuclear scientific community during a visit to Yongbyon.
Courtesy Siegfried Hecker
All News button
1
Subscribe to North America