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Big Data China 3rd Annual Conference (Virtual)


The Turning Point? U.S.-China Relations, Economic Growth, and the Race for Technology Leadership


The event will be broadcast live from this webpage and YouTube.

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Join the third annual conference of Big Data China, a collaborative project by CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics and Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions (SCCEI). China experts in the policy and academic communities will discuss the key challenges in U.S.-China relations, recent shifts in China's economic governance, and the global implications of technology competition with China.

 


AGENDA
 

8:00 - 8:30 am: Keynote Speech: Craig Allen, President, U.S.-China Business Council
 

8:45 - 9:45 am: Panel 1: Charting U.S.-China Relations: Key Challenges and Choices for the Incoming Administration


Moderator: Scott Kennedy, CSIS

Panelists:
Wendy Cutler, Asia Society Policy Institute
Bonnie S. Glaser, German Marshall Fund Indo-Pacific
Dennis Wilder, Georgetown University

10:00 - 11:00 am: Panel 2: China’s Economic Stimulus: A Short-Term Fix or Path to Sustainable Recovery?


Moderator: Scott Rozelle, Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions

Panelists:
Ling Chen, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Andrew Polk, Trivium China
Margit Molnar, OECD
Logan Wright, CSIS

11:15 - 12:15 pm: Panel 3: Decoupling vs. De-risking: The Competitive Dilemma in Tech Innovation


Moderator: Ilaria Mazzocco, CSIS

Panelists:
Greg Allen, CSIS
Rebecca Arcesati, MERICS
Samm Sacks, Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center
Kevin Xu, Interconnected
 


FEATURING
 

Craig Allen keynote speaker Big Data China conference December 10, 2024 Big Data China Conference panelists for December 10, 2024.

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Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election has reignited debates about the United States' role in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, and democratic recession. The return of Trump to the White House will have profound implications for Asia. To assess the stakes for the region, APARC convened a panel of experts who weighed in on the potential risks and opportunities the second Trump administration’s policies may pose for Asian nations and how regional stakeholders look at their future with the United States. Another panel, organized by APARC’s China Program, focused on what’s ahead for U.S.-China relations.

High Stakes for the Asia-Pacific

APARC’s panel, The 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections: High Stakes for Asia, examined how the return of Trump’s political ideology and the macroeconomic effects of his foreign policy will affect Asia.

“We are witnessing the solidification of Trumpism as an influential political ideology,” stated APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin at the opening of the discussion, “one that has begun to transcend traditional  American conservatism. Trumpism — marked by a blend of economic nationalism, nativism, and a strongman approach to leadership —could have a huge impact not only in American society but also on the liberal global order.”

According to Shin, Trump’s policies, particularly his focus on unilateralism and economic self-interest, could significantly alter the political and economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region.

Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, argued that Trump’s victory was no longer an anomaly but part of a larger trend of working-class voters shifting allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Fukuyama expressed concerns about Trump’s aggressive economic policies, including imposing broad tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, and warned that such policies could result in inflation, trade tensions, and long-term economic instability. In addition, he asserted that Trump’s reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts could undermine the United States’ commitments to security alliances, particularly in Asia.

APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui emphasized the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s policies, noting that Trump’s "America First" approach could further erode the international liberal order. He suggested that Japan would face significant challenges navigating the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policies. According to Tsutsui, “There might be greater pressure to line up with the United States in dealing with China economically, which would  put a great deal of strain on the Japanese economy.” Such an alignment might also muddle Japan’s own diplomatic and security interests.

Gita Wirjawan, a visiting scholar with Stanford's Precourt Institute for Energy and former visiting scholar at APARC, focused on the stakes for Southeast Asia. Wirjawan argued that Trump’s economic policies, such as protectionism and prioritizing economic growth over democratic principles, could embolden right-wing populist movements in Southeast Asia. He suggested that parts of Southeast Asia could be a natural beneficiary of a reallocation of financial capital from the U.S. as companies diversify supply chains by establishing operations outside China in response to Trump’s planned tariffs. Yet, growing economic inequality in Southeast Asia, particularly in urban areas, could fuel the rise of similar nationalist policies, undermining efforts to promote inclusive, democratic development.

Shin highlighted the challenges South Korea might face under a second Trump presidency. Trump will likely demand higher defense payments from South Korea, potentially straining the U.S.-ROK alliance. This could put President Yoon in a tough spot, especially as trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation has been progressing well but faces uncertainty. Economically, South Korean firms may struggle if U.S. policies like the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act are rolled back, as subsidies were crucial for their investments in the U.S. On North Korea, Shin noted that Trump may resume summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, leaving South Korea sidelined and potentially sparking an arms race in Northeast Asia. 

The panelists all emphasized that Asia, with its diverse political landscapes, would need to navigate a new era of economic nationalism and geopolitical unpredictability, with potential challenges to economic stability and democratic norms.

A Focus on U.S.-China Relations 

The second panel, "Crossroads of Power: U.S.-China Relations in a New Administration," focused specifically on the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China relations in the wake of the election. Moderated by APARC China Program Director Jean Oi, the discussion featured Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, and Peking University's Yu Tiejun, the APARC's China Policy Fellow during fall 2024. The panelists analyzed the potential trade, security, and diplomacy shifts between the two global superpowers, particularly in light of Washington's bipartisan consensus on China. 

Central to the discussion was the continuity of U.S. policy toward China under the first Trump administration and the Biden administration. Examples of this continuity included recent tariff increases on Chinese imports, a new U.S. Department of the Treasury program to screen U.S. outbound foreign investments in key sectors, and tighter export controls on critical technologies like quantum computing and advanced semiconductors. The panelists explored the economic and strategic ramifications, noting that these policies could disrupt existing trade patterns. 

Another area of concern was China’s uneven implementation of the 2020 Phase One  trade deal it negotiated with the U.S., in which China had committed to domestic reforms and $200 billion of additional U.S. imports. This failure could buttress the new administration’s plan to increase tariffs, complicating diplomatic efforts between Washington and Beijing. Fingar noted that while China has made efforts to diversify its supply chains, these changes might not be enough to shield it from the effects of U.S. economic policies, which could include escalating tariffs or additional restrictions on Chinese exports. 

The conversation also touched on broader geopolitical considerations, particularly concerning China’s role in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The panelists discussed the potential for cooperation or de-escalation in U.S.-China relations, with China’s positioning on the war serving as both a point of contention and a possible avenue for diplomatic engagement. 

Underscoring the deepening complexities in U.S.-China relations post-election, the panelists highlighted the uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy under a second Trump administration, particularly regarding the role of people-to-people exchanges in fostering mutual understanding.

Both events emphasized the multifaceted consequences of Trump’s return to power for Asia and the global international order. While the discussions highlighted the challenges posed by the rise of economic nationalism, trade tensions, and shifting security priorities, they also pointed to potential areas of cooperation and the evolving dynamics of global diplomacy.


In the Media


From Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro:

What a Second Trump Term Means for the World
OnPoint – WBUR, Nov 12 (interview)

Race to the White House: How the US Election Will Impact Foreign Policy
UBS Circle One, October 23 (interview)

From Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman:

On Korea-U.S. Economic Cooperation in the Era of Walking Out
Yonhap News, Nov 20 (featured)

Trump Looking for Trade 'Reset' with Most Countries: Ex-USTR Official
Nikkei, Nov 16 (interview)

How Southeast Asia Can Weather the Trump Trade Typhoon
The Economist, Nov 14 (quoted)

Read More

Gi-Wook Shin, Evan Medeiros, and Xinru Ma in conversation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab Engages Washington Stakeholders with Policy-Relevant Research on US-China Relations and Regional Issues in Asia

Lab members recently shared data-driven insights into U.S.-China tensions, public attitudes toward China, and racial dynamics in Asia, urging policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C. to rethink the Cold War analogy applied to China and views of race and racism in Asian nations.
Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab Engages Washington Stakeholders with Policy-Relevant Research on US-China Relations and Regional Issues in Asia
group of people standing on steps of Encina Hall at the 2024 Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue
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Driving Climate-Resilient Infrastructure and Inclusive Industrialization: Highlights from the Third Annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue

Held at Stanford and hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the third annual Dialogue convened global leaders, academics, industry experts, and emerging experts to share best practices for advancing Sustainable Development Goal 9 in support of economic growth and human well-being.
Driving Climate-Resilient Infrastructure and Inclusive Industrialization: Highlights from the Third Annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue
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APARC recently hosted two panels to consider what a second Trump presidency might mean for economic, security, and political dynamics across Asia and U.S. relations with Asian nations.

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The literature has shown that cognitive and non-cognitive development before the age of three is associated with children’s levels of development at later ages. However, the extent to which the different pathways of cognitive and non-cognitive development before age three (between 6–12 months and 22–30 months of age) are associated with developmental outcomes at primary school age remains unknown. This study aims to examine this research question using three waves of longitudinal data collected from 1087 children aged 9 to 10 years and their primary caregivers in rural China. Results demonstrated four pathways of cognitive and non-cognitive development between 6–12 months and 22–30 months of age. The four pathways include: “never delayed”, “persistently delayed”, “improving”, or “deteriorating.” Children that experienced either persistently delayed or deteriorating development had lower levels of cognitive and non-cognitive development and performed worse academically than children that were never delayed when they were 9–10 years old. Maternal education attainment, family assets, and whether the child was born prematurely all predicted the child’s entry into different developmental pathways. Findings suggest that early childhood development screening and interventions that aim to facilitate healthy early development among children under three years old are needed for rural China’s young children.

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Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
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Scott Rozelle
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SCCEI Seminar Series (Winter 2025)


Friday, January 17, 2025 | 12:00 pm -1:20 pm Pacific Time
Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall, 616 Jane Stanford Way



Effects of Referring Business Partners on Firm Networks and Performance


Firms often struggle to find and connect with suitable suppliers and clients, hindering growth and industrial development.  We surveyed 700 Chinese brush pen industry firms to understand their supplier-client networks and implemented a targeted referral program to address these barriers. The program introduced four treatment groups: screened referrals between likely compatible firms with a subsidy for the first transaction, random referrals with a subsidy for the first transaction, screened referrals without a subsidy, and control where firms were observed but received no referrals. We found that screened referrals with subsidies significantly increased subsequent transactions while partially crowding out prior partnerships; information-only referrals showed no impact. The referrals increase revenue, profit, and work hours among suppliers and growth-oriented clients. Suppliers upgraded product quality, while clients expanded product variety into higher-quality offerings, indicating complementary improvements within the supply chain. The intervention also shifted firms’ beliefs about the value of partnerships, spurring increased search efforts and forming additional non-referred partnerships, suggesting pessimistic beliefs as a critical friction in firm-to-firm access. Overall, the referrals yielded substantial private and social returns, underscoring the potential of targeted matchmaking interventions to drive industrial development.

Preview Prof. Cai’s research in a recent VoxChina article on Firm-to-Firm Referrals.

Please register for the event to receive email updates and add it to your calendar. Lunch will be provided.



About the Speaker 
 

Jing Cai headshot

Jing Cai is an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland. She received her PhD from the University of California at Berkeley in 2012. Her research areas are development economics and household finance. Her current research examines the growth of micro-enterprises and SMEs, impacts of tax incentives on firm behavior, and diffusion and impacts of financial innovations in developing countries. Dr. Cai is a Co-Chair of the firm sector of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and a fellow of the Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD). She currently serves as an associate editor of the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, the Journal of Development Economics, and the Economic Development and Cultural Change.


A NOTE ON LOCATION

Please join us in-person in the Goldman Conference Room located within Encina Hall on the 4th floor of the East wing.



Questions? Contact Xinmin Zhao at xinminzhao@stanford.edu
 


Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall

Jing Cai, Associate Professor, University of Maryland
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Shorenstein APARC's annual report for the academic year 2023-24 is now available.

Learn about the research, publications, and events produced by the Center and its programs over the last academic year. Read the feature sections, which look at the historic meeting at Stanford between the leaders of Korea and Japan and the launch of the Center's new Taiwan Program; learn about the research our faculty and postdoctoral fellows engaged in, including a study on China's integration of urban-rural health insurance and the policy work done by the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL); and catch up on the Center's policy work, education initiatives, publications, and policy outreach. Download your copy or read it online below.

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The event will be webcast live from this page.

In this online event, set for November 19, 6:30-7:30 am US PT, the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions (SCCEI) and the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics are releasing a new Big Data China feature that reviews recent literature evaluating the successes and failures of industrial policy in China and the conditions that shaped policy outcomes.

Trustee Chair Deputy Director Ilaria Mazzocco will moderate a discussion among experts on industrial policy in China today and its implications for the Chinese economy, global trade, and how policymakers in other countries should respond. Panelists will include Lee Branstetter (Carnegie Mellon University), Panle Jia Barwick (UW-Madison), Chloé Papazian (OECD), and Gerard DiPippo (Bloomberg Economics).  

FEATURING

Panle Jia Barwick
Todd E. and Elizabeth H. Warnock Distinguished Chair and Professor, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Ilaria Mazzocco
Senior Fellow, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics
Lee Branstetter
James Walton Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University
Gerard DiPippo
Senior Geo-Economics Analyst, Bloomberg Economics
Chloé Papazian
Trade Policy Analyst, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, OECD
 

EVENT PARTNERS
 

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Virtual Livestream 

Panle Jia Barwick
Lee Branstetter
Gerard DiPippo
Ilaria Mazzocco
Chloé Papazian
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SCCEI Seminar Series (Fall 2024)


Friday, November 22, 2024 | 12:00 pm -1:20 pm Pacific Time
Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall, 616 Jane Stanford Way



Response to Competition: Gender, Domains, and STEM Choice
 

Women’s lower performance in competitive environments has been advanced as an explanation for gender inequalities in the labor market. Using broadly representative Chinese administrative data, and measuring response to competition (RC) by performance changes from a mock exam to the competitive High School Entrance Exam, we document higher RC for boys in STEM and for girls in non-STEM subjects, with the male STEM RC advantage weakened by random exposure to high-performing female classmates in STEM. Both domain-specific RC measures significantly predict subsequent STEM track choice, accounting for 26% of the adjusted gender gap in STEM specialization, a known precursor to the gender pay gap.

Please register for the event to receive email updates and add it to your calendar. Lunch will be provided.



About the Speaker 
 

Jane Zhang headshot.

Jane Zhang is an Associate Professor at the University of New South Wales and a Visiting Scholar (2024-25) at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions. Her research examines how preferences and beliefs are shaped by policy, how they interact with incentives, and the role that they play in determining a wide-range of social outcomes. Her approach combines the use of tools from the experimental economics field, with the exploitation of natural experiments, field experiments, and controlled lab manipulations to make causal inferences about the determinants of preferences and beliefs. Her work has been published in outlets such as the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political Economy, the American Economic Review: Insights, the Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, and the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. She received her PhD in Economics from U.C. Berkeley and BA in Economics from Stanford University.


A NOTE ON LOCATION

Please join us in-person in the Goldman Conference Room located within Encina Hall on the 4th floor of the East wing.



Questions? Contact Xinmin Zhao at xinminzhao@stanford.edu
 


Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall

Jane Zhang, Associate Professor of Economics, University of New South Wales
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A country’s national income broadly depends on the quantity and quality of workers and capital. But how well these factors are managed within and between firms may be a key determinant of a country’s productivity and its GDP. Although social scientists have long studied the role of management practices in shaping business performance, their primary tool has been individual case studies. While useful for theory-building, such qualitative work is hard to scale and quantify. We present a large, scalable dataset measuring structured management practices at the business level across multiple countries. We measure practices related to performance monitoring, target-setting, and human resources. We document a set of key stylized facts, which we label “the international empirics of management”. In all countries, firms with more structured practices tend to also have superior economic performance: they are larger in scale, are more profitable, have higher labor productivity and are more likely to export. This consistency was not obvious ex-ante, and being able to quantify these relationships is valuable. We also document significant variation in practices across and within countries, which is important in explaining differences in the wealth of nations. The positive relationship between firm size and structured management practices is stronger in countries with more open and free markets, suggesting that stronger competition may allow firms with more structured management practices to grow larger, thereby potentially raising aggregate national income.

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Hongbin Li
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A warming planet. Backsliding in democracy at home and abroad. Competition with China. And active war in Europe. Broadening conflicts in the Middle East.

The world today is facing no shortage of overlapping, multilateral challenges. At a recent panel titled, “Global Threats Today: What's At Stake and What We Can Do About It,” scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) had an opportunity to delve deeper into what the data says about how these global threats are evolving, and how we should be thinking about how to address them.

The discussion, which was held as part of Stanford University's 2024 Reunion and Homecoming weekend, was moderated by Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute, and featured Marshall Burke, Didi Kuo, Amichai Magen, Oriana Skylar Mastro, and Steven Pifer.

In the highlights below, each scholar shares what they wish people understood better about climate change, the war in Ukraine and Russia's aggression, China's strategy for building power, the health of American democracy, and how the fighting between Israel and Hamas fits into the geopolitical struggle between democracies and autocracies.

Their full conversation can be heard on the World Class podcast, and the panel can be watched in its entirety on YouTube.
 

Follow the link for a full transcript of "Global Threats Today: The 2024 Edition."


Illiberal Actors Are on the Move  |  Amichai Magen


Around the world, we are seeing a new axis of influence coalescing. Some have called it the "axis of misery" or the "axis of resistance." It is composed of Russia and Iran and North Korea, with a lot of Chinese involvement as well. It is transforming our international system in unbelievable ways. It is united by the desire to dismantle the liberal international order, and we're starting to see the nature and the interconnectivity of this new axis of chaos much more clearly. 

You see North Korean soldiers fighting for Putin in Ukraine. You see Putin helping the Houthis attack international Western shipping in Yemen. We see North Korean tunnel technology turn up in Lebanon with Hezbollah and then with Hamas in Gaza. The interconnectivity is something that we really need to know much more about.

Historically, emperors, kings, dukes, used to spend 50% of their resources on preparing for war or waging war. But in the post-Second World War era, we built a critical norm that we've called the liberal international order. And the miracle of the liberal international order is that we've managed to take global averages of defense spending from about 50% to a global average of about 7%. And the resulting surplus wealth has allowed us to invest in education, health, and scientific discovery.

What is at stake now is the possibility of a return of a norm where states are destroyed and disappear. And we have currently three states in the international system, at the very least — Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan — that are at risk of annihilation. To that end, we must articulate a positive strategic vision for the Middle East that will strive towards a two state solution, that would give the Palestinian people the dignity and the freedom that they deserve alongside a safe and secure Israel, and that will leverage the new spirit of cooperation that exists in the Middle East.

If we allow the norm of the non-disappearance of state to erode and collapse, we will go back to the law of the jungle, where we will have to spend so much more money on the wrong things. That is what is at stake in Ukraine, in the Middle East, and with Taiwan.
 

Amichai Magen

Amichai Magen

Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies at the Freeman Spogli Institute
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Challenges to Democracy Come From Within |  Didi Kuo


Many people think that the threat to democracy comes from outside our borders, particularly from countries like Russia and China that are asserting themselves in new and aggressive ways.

But the real threat to democracies that we're seeing across the globe is coming from within. Leaders come to power through democratic means, but then they begin to erode power from within. They attack the electoral system and the process of democratic elections, and they take power from other branches of government and aggregate it to themselves within the office of the executive. 

The good news is there are examples of countries like France, Brazil, and Poland where illiberal leaders have been stopped by pro-democracy coalitions of people who came together. These coalitions don't necessarily agree with each other politically, but they've come together and adapted in order to foreclose on these anti-democratic forces. 

That flexibility and adaptability is the reason democracies succeed. We see this over and over again in the the United States. When our institutions have become out of date, we've changed them. We extended suffrage, first to Black Americans who were formerly enslaved, then to women, then to Native Americans. We eliminating poll taxes and rethought what it means to have a multiracial democracy. We have a long track record of making changes.

Today in 2024, some of our democratic institutions are antiquated and don't reflect our contemporary values. This is a moment where we should lean into that flexible strength of democracy and think about institutional reforms that will both strengthen our system against illiberal creep and help us better achieve the ideals that we aspiring to as a people.
 

Didi Kuo

Didi Kuo

Center Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Ukraine Is Not Fated to Lose |  Steven Pifer


There's a narrative that's taking place that Russia is winning the war, Ukraine is losing, and it's only a matter of time. And it is true that Russia has captured a bit more territory than they occupied at the start of the year. But they've only achieved that at enormous cost.

As of September, the Pentagon says Russia had lost 600,000 dead and wounded soldiers. To put that in context, in February of 2022 when this major invasion began, the total Russian military — not just the army, but the total Russian military — was 1.1 million people. And the British Ministry of Defense earlier this week assessed that Russia now is losing 1,200 soldiers killed or severely wounded per day. You have to ask how long that's sustainable.

When I talk to Ukrainians, they still regard this war as existential. They're very determined to win, and we need to do a better job of supporting that. A stable and secure Europe is vital to America's national security interests, and you're not going to have a stable and secure Europe unless there's a stable and secure Ukraine. So we need to both provide them the weapons they need and relieve some of the restrictions we currently have and allow the Ukrainians to use those weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

Because we have to ask ourselves: what does an emboldened Vladimir Putin do if he wins in Ukraine? I don't think his ambitions end with Ukraine, perhaps not even with the post-Soviet space. There's going to be a much darker Russian threat hovering over Europe if Putin wins. So let's not count the Ukrainians out.
 

Man smiling

Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
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China Isn't Going Away Anytime Soon  |  Oriana Skylar Mastro


There is a lot of discussion right now about the fact that the economy in China is slowing down and its demography is undergoing significant changes. What I'm here to tell you is that the challenge of China is not over, and is not going to be over any time soon. China has built power in a different way than the United States, and we have to reassess how we understand that power if we want to effectively deter, blunt, and block them from acting out in ways that threaten our partners and allies.

Since the 1990s, China has developed a significant amount of political, economic, and military power. They've gone from having an economy smaller than France’s  to the second largest in the world. They've gone from not being involved in international institutions to a great degree, not even having diplomatic relations with major countries like South Korea, to now having stronger and greater diplomatic networks, especially in Asia, than the United States.

What we really need to understand is that the U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China; it's about the rest of the world, and how the rest of the world sees us and how China interacts with us. The balance of power is shifting, and we have to be a lot smarter and a lot faster if we want to make sure it shifts in favor of our interests.

The United States hasn't had a comprehensive strategy towards the developing world in a long time. And we are running out of time to get that balance right in Asia. We don't have the right stuff. We don't have it in the right numbers, and it's not in the right place. Some of this is about deterring war over Taiwan, but it's also about generally maintaining peace and stability in Asia.
 

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Oriana Skylar Mastro

FSI Center Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Full Profile


We're Doing Better (But Not Enough) on Climate Change |  Marshall Burke


Many people don't recognize how much progress we're actually making on climate issues. Emissions have fallen by 20% since 2005. We're actually speeding up the amount of substantial progress being made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and dealing with the core climate change problem, which is the human emission of greenhouse gasses.

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act and the subsequent implementation of various rules the Biden administration has championed has given a huge boost in transitioning our economy to greener energy technologies, transportation technologies, and other kinds of infrastructure. We're moving a lot of cash to get that done, and the president is trying to get as much of it out the door as he can before his term ends.

Globally, the progress has been less rapid. Emissions are roughly flat. But overall, we're still making progress. I co-teach an undergraduate class on climate change, and we've had to update our slides on how much warming we're expecting over the next century. We thought it was going to be four degrees Celsius. Now we think it's going to be something between two and three degrees Celsius.

But the flip side of that is that we're still going to get warming of two to three degrees Celsius. We're already experiencing warming of about a degree Celsius, which is about two degrees Fahrenheit, and it's projected that we're going to get another three to five degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century. That is a lot of warming, and we are not prepared to deal with it. We need to do much more on mitigation and much more on adaptation if we're going to meet the realities of living in a changing climate.

So we've had progress on the one hand, but there's still a lot of work left to do in the coming decades.
 

Marshall Burke

Marshall Burke

Deputy Director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment
Full Profile


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[Left to right]: Michael McFaul, Marshall Burke, Steven Pifer, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Didi Kuo, and Amichai Magen on stage.
Scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offered their insights on climate change, the war between Russia and Ukraine, China's ambitions, the current conflicts in the Middle East, and the state of global democracy during a panel held at Stanford's Reunion weekend. | Melissa Morgan
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At a panel during Stanford's 2024 Reunion weekend, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies shared what their research says about climate change, global democracy, Russia and Ukraine, China, and the Middle East.

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Decentralized Economic Statecraft


Speaker: Alicia Chen, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Stanford University

Economic statecraft requires countries to trade off security and economic gains. This study provides a framework to explain how China manages this dilemma by considering the allocation of Chinese foreign aid. The study documents how, unlike Western donors, Chinese aid is allocated by local politicians rather than central policymakers in Beijing, and that these politicians are subject to a competitive promotion system centered around generating economic growth and fiscal revenue. Under this incentive scheme, local politicians use foreign aid to meet economic targets at home for career advancement. The theory is tested using provincial- and contractor-level aid data and a regression discontinuity design that exploits age restrictions in China’s promotion system. The results show that promotion-eligible politicians commit nearly $20 million more in aid annually compared to their ineligible counterparts.


About the Workshops


Our Young Researcher Workshops offer emerging China scholars an opportunity to engage directly with interdisciplinary faculty and peers from across campus to discuss and receive feedback on their research. Each workshop features one or several PhD students presenting their latest empirical findings on issues related to China’s economy. Past topics have included college major selection as an obstacle to socioeconomic mobility, the effect of a cooling-off period on marriage outcomes, and factors contributing to government corruption. Faculty and senior scholars provide comments and feedback for improvement. This event series helps to build and strengthen Stanford’s community of young researchers working on China.

Workshops are held on select Fridays. Lunch will be provided! 

Visit the Young Researcher Workshops webpage for more information on the content and format of the series and to learn how to sign up to present. 



Questions? Contact Ragina Johnson at raginaj@stanford.edu
 


Goldman Room, Encina Hall, E409

Alicia Chen, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Stanford University
Workshops
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