To support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is offering up to ten research assistant internships for summer 2020 and up to three predoctoral fellowships for the 2020-21 academic year. The Center will review applications starting April 15 and expects to fill the positions by April 30, 2020. 

Amid the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, students are facing summer internship cancelations and hiring freezes. They are left wondering about the long-term implications of the current crisis for their academic careers and their access to future jobs and valuable work experience.

At Shorenstein APARC, we want to do all we can to support Stanford students. That’s why we are announcing new internship and fellowship opportunities for current students working in the area of contemporary Asia: research assistant internships for the summer quarter of 2020 and predoctoral fellowships for the 2020-21 academic year.

The summer internships are all remote: research assistants will work as telecommuters. Regarding the predoctoral fellowships, we hope we can all have a normal 2020-21 academic year, in which case we expect the fellows to be in residence, but we will reassess the evolving COVID-19 situation closer to the appointment start dates and shift to flexible, online options as needed.

APARC will review applications for both opportunities on a rolling basis starting April 15, 2020. The Center will select up to ten research assistants and up to three predoctoral fellows by April 30, 2020.

Read on to learn more about these offerings and the application requirements, and follow the guidelines below to submit your candidacy.

Summer 2020 APARC Research Assistant Internships

Shorenstein APARC is seeking highly motivated and dedicated undergraduate and graduate students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the summer quarter of 2020. Research assistants will work with assigned APARC faculty members on projects focused on contemporary Asia, studying varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

All positions will be for eight weeks starting late June or early July 2020. The hourly pay rate is $17 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

Research assistant positions are open to current Stanford students only. Undergraduate- and graduate-level students are eligible to apply.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these two (2) required attachments:
  • CV;
  • A cover letter (up to 1 page).
• Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to APARC. Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only complete applications that include all the abovementioned supporting documents.  

2020-21 Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowships

APARC is inviting applications from current Stanford students for the 2020-21 Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowship. The fellowship supports predoctoral students working within a broad range of topics related to contemporary Asia. 

Up to three fellowships are available to Ph.D. candidates who have completed all fieldwork and are nearing the completion of their dissertation. The Center will give priority to candidates who are prepared to finish their degree by the end of the 2020-21 academic year.

Shorenstein APARC offers a stipend of $36,075 for the 2020-21 academic year, plus Stanford's Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) fee for three quarters. We expect fellows to remain in residence at the Center throughout the year and to participate in Center activities.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these three (3) required attachments:
  • CV;
  • A cover letter including a brief description of your dissertation (up to 5 double-spaced pages);
  • A copy of your transcripts. Transcripts should cover all graduate work and include evidence of recently-completed work.
• Arrange for two (2) letters of recommendation from members of your dissertation committee to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC. Please note: the faculty/advisors should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only complete applications that include all the abovementioned supporting documents. 

Technology companies in South Korea helped tackle COVID-19. The U.S. government can incentivize U.S. tech companies do the same.

As a resident of Silicon Valley heading into our second week under the shelter in place order, what surprises me is the sudden low profile of the tech companies that dominate this area. Until just a month ago it seemed like these companies were taking over the world - churning out new products, connecting people online, providing information and news, and in turn driving equity and real estate prices to unprecedented new highs. But as the COVID-19 cases explode in the US, we rarely hear about them. Public health workers are at the frontlines fighting the war against COVID-19, and grocery stores and retailers are stepping up to the challenge of trying to maintain normalcy of life and providing for the people.

I wonder whether Apple is still pre-occupied with the development of the next iteration of the iPhone, and Google with the development for better search algorithms. Wouldn’t today’s tech companies with their vast resources, creative minds, and technical skill be able to help minimize the impact of COVID-19?

Tech companies in South Korea have played an important role in containing the spread of the virus and reducing casualties. Soon after the first COVID-19 case was confirmed within South Korea, at least four tech companies have launched apps that provide detailed information of the movement of all people who tested positive for COVID-19 – from which restaurant the person visited at what time, to the seat number the person sat in which movie theatre.

The information was collected from a variety of sources including smartphone location data and credit card transactions. The names were anonymized but providing such detailed information raised privacy concerns. However, the South Korean government was swift to declare COVID-19 a public health emergency, which ultimately gave the people the right to information for their safety, and companies to use such data. Moreover, the government allowed companies to by-pass traditional regulatory hurdles.

When Seegene, a biotech company in Seoul, used artificial intelligence to develop South Korea’s first COVID-19 test kit, it needed to get government approval for use. The approval process typically can take over a year, but the Korea Center for Disease Control approved it in a week. Though COVID-19 cases surged in South Korea soon after its first case, the aggressive testing policy and the information provided through these apps have helped South Korea to quickly “flatten the curve,” that is, slow the rate of new infections.

So why don’t we see U.S. tech companies developing new technologies and innovation that can help contain the spread of the virus, minimize the impact, and develop strategies that help people cope with the crisis? It’s because such actions would not generate immediate returns to the company. Despite the greater societal benefit of slowing down the spread of the virus, unless there are clear private returns CEOs and shareholders will be unlikely to devote their resources to fighting a virus with so much uncertainty.

In simple economics terms, it’s a classic case of market failure; and the standard remedy in cases of market failure is government intervention. The government needs to provide incentives, either through relaxing regulatory hurdles or by subsidizing research and development, to encourage tech companies to help contain the virus and minimize the impact of COVID-19 on our society. It is not an issue of big vs. small government, but governments creating the right incentives when private firms can’t easily make the right call.

The U.S. has finally taken measures in the manufacturing sector to fight COVID-19. The White House after several days of going back and forth, eventually invoked the Defense Production Act to order GM to produce ventilators. But hospitals around the country also need masks and personal protection equipment. Unlike smaller countries without a strong manufacturing base, the U.S. has the manufacturing capacity to produce these goods, if the will is there. These manufactured goods are essential for our doctors and nurses in helping patients and fighting the virus.

However, we need more innovative approaches, beyond traditional public health approaches, to fight COVID-19 and future pandemics. Tech companies, in addition to pharmaceuticals and biotech companies that are developing vaccines and cures, can play a significant role in fighting pandemics. Tech companies can use information and communication technology (ICT) to inform the public and reduce the spread of diseases, use machine learning to diagnose new diseases, predict future outbreaks and the spread of current outbreaks, and predict when and which resources would be in need in different parts of the country. Furthermore, there may be more innovative ways to tackle the virus that many of us have not yet thought of. The government can induce tech companies to actively take action by offering R&D grants and loans, providing access to critical information and data, and reducing red-tape.

The South Korean government recognized the urgency of the situation and enlisted the help of private tech firms allowing them to do what they do best with minimal red tape and access to the necessary resources. The European Union has recently put out a call for startups that are developing technologies and innovation related to COVID-19 to apply for fast-track funding.

Chinese tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent, potentially through explicit or implicit government directive, have been actively involved in fighting the COVID-19 crisis. Alibaba has deployed an AI algorithm that predicts COVID-19 from lung CT scans. The procedure only takes a few seconds, which not only substantially speeds up diagnosis but also reduces the risk of doctors and nurses being exposed to the virus. Tencent has committed over 1.5 billion Yuan (over 210 million USD) to help fight COVID-19, which will be spent on prevention and control but also on funding companies that are developing new ways to overcome the pandemic and help with the recovery.

People are sacrificing their individual rights and income. Small businesses are closing doors. All this for the good of the greater public. U.S. tech companies, together with the right push from the federal and state governments, should be able to put aside private returns and short-termism for the moment and work towards an innovative approach to mitigating the impact of today’s crisis.

Yong Suk Lee is an Economist at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Deputy Director of the Korea Program at Stanford University.

On Feb. 12, White House National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien announced that the U.S. government has “evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the world.” This represents the latest attempt by the Trump administration to support an argument that allied governments—and the businesses they oversee—should purge certain telecommunications networks of Huawei equipment. The position reflects the preferred approach in the United States, which is to issue outright bans against select companies (including Huawei) that meet an as-yet-unknown threshold of risk to national security.

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog

In Summer 2020, three of the top students of the Fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan distance-learning course will be honored at an event at Stanford University. The three Stanford e-Japan Day honorees—Ayano Hirose (Okayama Sozan High School), Chisaki Sano (Gunma Kokusai Academy), and Natsumi Shindo (Keio Girls Senior High School)—will be recognized by Stanford e-Japan Instructor Meiko Kotani for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “Three Basic Ways to Promote Cross-Cultural Understanding in Japanese Education,” “U.S.–Japan Relations: Economic Interdependence Seen in 7-Eleven Operations,” and “The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Its Preservation and the Responsibilities of Both Countries.”

Yuta Myojo (Rikkyo Ikebukuro High School) received an Honorable Mention for his coursework and research paper on “How Could Japanese Society Achieve Increased Biculturalism: From the Aspects of Education Reform and Self-Awareness.”

In the Fall 2019 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools successfully completed the course: Aiko Gakuen (Ehime), Gunma Kokusai Academy (Gunma), Hiroshima High School (Hiroshima), Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Junior/Senior High School (Hiroshima), Hitachi First Senior High School (Ibaraki), Ichikawa Junior and Senior High School (Chiba), Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo), Keio Senior High School (Kanagawa), Mita International High School (Tokyo), Nishiyamato Gakuen High School (Nara), Okayama Prefecture Asahi Senior High School (Okayama), Okayama Sozan High School (Okayama), Rikkyo Ikebukuro High School (Tokyo), Ritsumeikan Uji High School (Kyoto), Sendai Shirayuri Gakuen (Miyagi), Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo), Senior High School at Kyoto University (Kyoto), Shibuya Kyouiku Gakuen Shibuya Senior High School (Tokyo), Shibuya Makuhari Senior High School (Chiba), Shirayuri Gakuen Senior High School (Tokyo), Takada High School (Mie), Takatsuki Senior High School (Osaka), Tokyo City University Senior High School (Tokyo), Waseda University Senior High School (Tokyo), Yokohama Science Frontier High School (Kanagawa), and Zushi Kaisei High School (Kanagawa).

For more information about the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit stanfordejapan.org.

To stay informed of news about Stanford e-Japan and SPICE’s other programs, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

SPICE offers separate online courses for U.S. high school students. For more information, please see the Reischauer Scholars Program (online course about Japan), Sejong Scholars Program (online course about Korea), and China Scholars Program (online course about China).

Related articles:

• Spring 2020 Session of Stanford e-Japan Online Course Begins
• Winners Announced for the Spring 2019 Stanford e-Japan Award
• SPICE’s Stanford e-Japan Instructor Waka Takahashi Brown Honored with the Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award
• Stanford e-Japan: My Window to the Wider World

The Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU), the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and the APARC China Program jointly hosted a workshop on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in early March. The workshop, held on March 2 and 3, welcomed researchers from around the world with expertise in the Initiative. Unfortunately, because of the rapidly developing health emergency related to the coronavirus, participants from not only China, but also Japan, were prevented from attending. As described by Professor Jean Oi, founding director of SCPKU and the China Program, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, director of CDDRL and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, who co-chaired the workshop, the meeting aimed to provide a global perspective on the BRI, consolidate knowledge on this opaque topic, and determine the best method and resources for future research.  

The workshop began with presentations from several of the invited guests. Dr. Atif Ansar from the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School kicked off the first day by describing not only the tremendous opportunity that the BRI presents to developing economies, but also the serious pitfalls that often accompany colossal infrastructure projects. Pointing out the poor returns on investment of mega infrastructure projects, Ansar examined the frequest cost and schedule overruns, random disasters, and environmental degradation that outweigh the minimal benefits that they generally yield. China’s own track record from domestic infrastructure projects does little to mitigate fear of these risks, Ansar claimed. In response, he urged professional management of BRI investments, institutional reforms, and intensified deployment of technology in BRI projects. Dr. Ansar was followed by Dr. Xue Gong of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Gong’s analysis centered on the extent to which China’s geopolitical motivations influenced its outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Although her research was still in the early stages, her empirical analysis of China’s OFDI inflows into fifty BRI recipient countries from 2007-2018 nevertheless revealed that geopolitical factors often outweigh economic factors when it comes to China’s OFDI destinations.

Image

Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt and Scholar-in-Residence Jeffrey Ball, both at Stanford Law School, followed with individual presentations on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the BRI and the emissions impact of the BRI on climate change, respectively. Professor Milhaupt  characterized Chinese SOEs as both geopolitical and commercial actors, simultaneously charged with implementing Party policies and attaining corporate profits. Chinese SOEs are major undertakers of significant overseas BRI projects, acting not only as builders but also as investors, partners, and operators. This situation, Milhaupt asserted, carries significant risks for SOEs because these megaprojects often provide dismal returns, have high default rates, and can trigger political backlash in their localities. Milhaupt highlighted the importance of gathering firm-level data on businesses actually engaged in BRI projects to better infer geostrategic, financial, or other motivations. Jeffrey Ball turned the discussion to carbon emissions from BRI projects and presented preliminary findings from his four-country case studies. He concluded that, on aggregate, the emissions impact of the BRI is still “more brown than green.” Twenty-eight percent of global carbon emissions may be accounted for by BRI projects, Ball asserted, underscoring the importance of the BRI to the future of global climate change.

The day concluded with presentations by  Michael Bennon, Managing Director at the Stanford Global Projects Center, and Professor David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Bennon first presented findings from two empirical case studies of BRI projects and then went on to describe how the BRI is now practically the “only game in town” for infrastructure funding for developing countries. Lengthy environmental review processes at Western multilateral banks have turned the World Bank, for example, from a lending bank into a “knowledge bank,” he argued. He also highlighted that, in general, economic returns on BRI projects for China are very poor, even though recipient countries may accrue macroeconomic benefits from these projects. Finally, Professor Lampton turned the discussion back to Southeast Asia, where China is currently undertaking massive cross-border high-speed rail projects through eight ASEAN countries. He described how each host country had varying capacity to negotiate against its giant neighbor, and how the sequential implementation of these cross-border rail projects also had varying impacts on the negotiating positions of these host countries. BRI played out differently in each country, in other words, eliciting different reactions, push-backs and negotiated terms.

The second day of the workshop was dedicated to working toward a collaborative approach to future BRI research. The group discussed the key gaps in the existing research, including how to know what China’s true intentions are, how to measure those intentions, who the main players and their interests in both China and the host countries are, and even what the BRI is, exactly. Some cautioned that high-profile projects may not be representative of the whole. Participants brainstormed about existing and future sources of data, and stressed the importance of diversifying studies and seeking empirical evidence.