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Schwab Residential Center

Vidalakis Dining Hall

680 Serra Street

(between Galvaz & Campus Dr. East)

Shorenstein APARC

Encina Hall, E301

Stanford, CA 94305-6055
(325) 660-4220
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Senior Military Fellow
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Prior to the start of his Senior Military Fellowship at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), Lt Col Sumangil was the commander of a B-1 squadron and led Airmen through two combat deployments in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, INHERENT RESOLVE, and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL in the United States Central Command area of responsibility.  He has served in a variety of operational assignments as a Weapon Systems Officer and Instructor Weapon Systems Officer at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho and Dyess AFB, Texas and he was a joint staff officer at Headquarters United States Strategic Command at Offutt AFB, Nebraska where he was the lead planner for the combatant command’s space campaign plan.

At Stanford, Sumangil is examining China’s actions in the South China Sea and the Philippines arbitration case regarding Chinese actions there. He seeks to offer perspectives and policy and strategy options to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.

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Shorenstein APARC

Encina Hall, E301

Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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Senior Military Fellow
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Prior to the start of his Senior Military Fellowship at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), Lt Col Blake was the commander of a flight test squadron, where he was responsible for the flight test of many new Air Force programs.  Lt Col Blake is a pilot with over 2400 flying hours in over 40 aircraft.  He is a graduate of the US Air Force Test Pilot School and has had a number of flight test assignments testing multiple aircraft (including F‑15C/D, F-15E, F-16).  He has also had two operational F-15E assignments, including combat deployments in support of Operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.  Lt Col Blake has also had an assignment at the Pentagon (where he was responsible for acquisition matters related to the F-22 and F-35) and at the Office of Security Cooperation in Baghdad, Iraq (where he was on the staff of the Army 3-star General in charge of all security cooperation and assistance efforts in Iraq).

At Stanford, Blake is researching the U.S. policy toward China and its relation to Northeast Asia. He aims to discover areas of cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese militaries.

Shorenstein APARC

Encina Hall, E301

Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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Senior Military Fellow
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John Chu was born in Seoul, Korea in 1972. The son of an immigrant, he grew up in California where he calls home.  John attended West Point and graduated with honors in 1995 and a commission as a Military Intelligence officer. John has held critical leadership and staff positions at every echelon, from platoon to Army staff. John has deployed twice to Iraq and once to Bosnia, with multiple overseas assignments to Korea, Germany, and Turkey. Prior to the start of his Senior Military Fellowship at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), John served on the Department of the Army, Intelligence (G-2) staff as the Chief of Intelligence Training. He hopes to deploy to Afghanistan for his follow-on assignment.

At Stanford, Chu is researching the Korean armistice agreement and the United Nations mission to South Korea. He will also examine U.S. policy toward North Korea, particularly analyzing the “brink of war” tension and developing strategic deterrence measures to reduce risk of unwanted military escalation on the Korean Peninsula. For both research streams, Chu aims to produce analyses and recommendations that could inform a policy audience.

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Last Tuesday in the hotly contested South China Sea (SCS), ignoring fierce objections coming from China, the American guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen cruised within 12 nautical miles of Subi and Mischief Reefs.   One day later, in The Hague, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled unanimously that it does have jurisdiction over a “suit” brought by the Philippines against China regarding China’s claims in the SCS.  The court must now approve or reject Manila’s position that Beijing’s (in)famous “nine-dash line” (actually now a ten-dash line) is incompatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—that the line is, in effect, illegal under international law.  The court must also adjudicate Manila’s additional request for rulings on the status of certain land features in the SCS that are controlled by Beijing.  Beijing’s efforts to prevent the maritime penetration and the judicial judgment have failed.

Will these events be remembered as having marked the start of a Sino-American Cold War II?  What do they imply for China’s relations with the five other parties that claim land features and/or sea space there, i.e. Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam?  Was the US wrong to have breached China’s red lines and the court also wrong to have accepted jurisdiction?  Why?  Why not?  And how will these events impact the imminent Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit and Related Summits, as well as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting—gatherings to be held, respectively, in Kuala Lumpur and Manila between 18 and 22 November?

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Donald K. Emmerson is a Senior Fellow Emeritus in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).  At Stanford he also works with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.  His latest writing on the SCS is “Reading between the Lines: China & the South China Sea,” CSIS cogitASIA [Washington, DC], 21 July 2015, http://cogitasia.com/reading-between-the-lines-china-the-south-china-sea/.  Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  His degrees are from Yale (Phd) and Princeton (BA).

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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Affiliated Faculty, CDDRL
Affiliated Scholar, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
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At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

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Medical researchers must work together across disciplines to provide better health care to those who need it most, according to panelists at Stanford Medicine’s Annual Population Health Sciences Colloquium.

The symposium, hosted by the Stanford Center for Population Health Sciences, brought together working groups from across the Stanford campus to showcase the latest findings in population health research.

“Population health science at Stanford is likely to make the most important contributions when we cross traditional intellectual expertise disciplines,” said Paul H. Wise, a core faculty member at the Center for Health Policy/Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research (CHP/PCOR).

Many of the scholars at the daylong conference on Tuesday stressed that an interdisciplinary approach to health care is crucial to understanding and aiding underserved populations.

“To deal with life-course questions we need to create-life course observational windows,” said Mark Cullen, chief of the Division of General Medical Disciplines and director of the Stanford Center for Population Health Sciences.

Instead of trying to create an all-encompassing care plan for the human population as a whole, panelists demonstrated that studying the needs of particular groups, or smaller populations, can better serve individuals within populations that may not receive the best care.

Douglas K. Owens, director of CHP/PCOR, said the U.S.  Preventive Services Task Force, of which he is a member, has “often faced a real paucity of data trying to develop prediction guidelines for both the very young and the old.”

The Task Force, a panel of experts that makes recommendations for medical prevention services, is generally able to make guidelines for large populations like adults, but suggestions for specialized groups like children and the elderly are more challenging. Though Stanford researchers like Wise are working to improve care for particular sectors like children, more study is needed.

Several speakers at the conference said the underserved population of poor children could benefit from research targeted toward their population group.

“We don’t really understand the biology of the life-course, why things taking place in gestation and early life actually affect healthy aging and adult onset disease,” said Wise, adding, “We have a very poor understanding of how to translate this understanding into effective interventions for communities in need.”

Panelists agreed that big data can help them understand smaller, poorly served populations, such as young children in impoverished communities. By collecting large amounts of data from the general population, researchers will increase the amount of data available for more specific groups. This allows researchers to study these populations more closely and help create better outcomes.

Abby King, a professor of health research and policy and of medicine, and Jason Wang, director of the Center for Policy, Outcomes and Prevention (CPOP) and a CHP/PCOR core faculty member, believe life-course digital applications can provide individualized care while collecting data on a large-scale.

According to King, a life-course app, or a device to track health and provide care throughout one’s life, would grow with the user and help them through important developmental stages.

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Wang has taken a first step toward creating such an app with PLAQUEMONSTER.  Intended for children eager for Halloween candy, the PLAQUEMONSTER app provides kids with a “tooth pet” they must keep safe from “plaquemonsters” and the so-called evil candy corporation. By flossing and brushing their teeth each day, kids earn points, and Wang’s team hopes the game will encourage good dental hygiene.

Health-care techniques using mobile devices, known as mHealth, could be particularly useful in underserved populations. King notes that even low-income populations have cell phones, so using phones as health-care tools could help decrease the gap between higher- and lower-income populations.

“I think for us one of the major challenges of the century is to really close that health-disparities gap and mHealth can help.”

However, each app must be tailored to the user.

“There’s no reason to believe that an African-American 16-year-old is going to be motivated the same way as a 45-year-old white man,” said Wang. “You need to involve patients in the design of the app.” When the app fits the specific patient’s needs, they are more likely to use it regularly, and knowing the needs of their population helps determine their preferences.

As the world continues to become more connected, the panelists said that reaching across disciplines and incorporating technology may hold the key to effective health care in the 21st century.

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A podcast from the book event on Jan. 15 is available at the link above. An earlier interview with author Michael Armacost was first published in Oct. 2015 and is reposted below.

When it comes to elections, politics can supersede strategy. But what is often overlooked is the process through which the United States selects their commander in chief and its impact on policy – particularly, foreign policy.

What then shapes foreign policy during that time? “Events, my dear boy, events,” Harold Macmillan, a former British prime minister, famously replied when asked what could change a government's directions. To which Michael Armacost agrees and explores the interplay between campaign politics and foreign policy in his new book.

“Since World War II, the United States has consistently pursued a global role, but the tempo of its engagement with the world has been repeatedly adjusted to reflect circumstances and domestic moods,” Armacost wrote.

A veteran scholar, former ambassador and undersecretary of state for political affairs, Armacost is an expert on the U.S. government system and policy process. In the book, he examines ideology and the struggle for power in the six elections that have taken place since 1948, ending with Barack Obama’s re-election in 2012.

The book, which reads somewhat like a guide, largely began as a project for students, he said. 

Armacost initially came to Stanford in 1994, and in 2002, returned as a distinguished fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He co-teaches a graduate course on U.S. policy in Northeast Asia.

“When I left government, I found a lot of literature on how foreign policy affects elections but little in the reverse,” Armacost said. “So my aim behind the research was to not only satisfy my own curiosity but to offer a comprehensive and accessible analysis for students.”

Armacost’s career in government began in 1983 when an advisor encouraged him to apply for a White House fellowship. His fellowship in the deputy secretary of state’s office – which was only set to be a single year in Washington – led to 24 years of public service.

He went on to serve as the U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1989 to 1993 and the Philippines from 1982 to 1984, and was a member of the National Security Council.

Armacost said he remains positive about the electoral system, while also suggesting a few reforms. The system ensures a cyclical chance to step back and assess where America stands in the world, he said.

“Our system provides regular opportunities to put the spotlight on troubling foreign policy problems,” he wrote. “And supplies an incentive to consider course corrections for costly, inconclusive foreign as well as domestic policies, or offers a chance to select new management to fix them.”

Shorenstein APARC asked him a few questions about his research in the context of the 2016 election cycle. His answers are posted below.

Will Obama attempt a “sprint to the finish line” on foreign policy?

He is well embarked on that sprint. In the fourth quarter of his presidency, he is eager to burnish his foreign policy legacy. President Obama’s agenda is clear. It includes the normalization of relations with Cuba, implementation of the Iran nuclear agreement, ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement, and promotion of further international cooperation on climate change. He will also seek to avoid losing ground in geopolitical competition with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the Russians in the Ukraine and elsewhere, and China in the South China Sea.

A president’s power to effectively undertake controversial initiatives at home and abroad tends to ebb as his tenure runs out. Those requiring Congressional support are particularly problematic. And events will play a large role in determining the problems and opportunities that come his way before Jan. 20, 2017.

Does the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) stand a chance of getting ratified?

It stands a chance, but it will not be easy. Fortunately, Trade Promotion Authority has been secured from the Congress. Hence, it will be limited to an up or down vote without amendments.

Opposition from labor unions and environmental groups assures that there will be very limited Democratic support for the TPP, and Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders and Martin O’Malley have publicly expressed their opposition. There has also been some erosion of support for free trade among the Republicans, whose leaders have mostly expressed misgivings about some of the TPP’s provisions.

I believe the TPP will advance U.S. economic and strategic interests, but whether its ratification will be achieved before or after the 2016 election is at this point uncertain.

How do the politics of the TPP differ from that of George H.W. Bush’s pursuit of the NAFTA agreement in 1992?

In 1992 President Bush didn’t hesitate to push hard for NAFTA throughout his campaign. And the Mexican and Canadian governments also regarded the U.S. election day as a convenient deadline for getting the agreement finished. The president’s GOP Party believed in free trade, and considered the push for an embryonic hemispheric market a worthy and historic objective. A NAFTA accord could be portrayed as extending a helping hand to a friendly neighbor. The Party’s business constituency was supportive; the bulwark of opposition to the deal were labor and environmental groups, which were unlikely to vote for Bush anyway.

Promoting NAFTA also offered the president a chance to put the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton, who had made public remarks supporting such an agreement, on the spot. If he reversed his position and opposed the accord, he could be accused of “waffling;” if he didn’t, he would risk alienating his labor and environmental constituencies. Bush nearly got the deal finished, but side letters on labor and environmental issues remained to be completed after Clinton won the election.

This year, a Democratic president is confronting major opposition from his own party, and widespread support from Congressional Republicans is therefore indispensable to his chances of ratifying the agreement. A number of Republican leaders who are generally supportive of free trade, however, contend that President Obama was so eager to wrap up the deal on his own watch, that he missed a chance to drive a harder bargain. Others are reluctant to hand the president a foreign policy victory during a presidential campaign.

And as November 2016 nears, the Democratic candidate is likely to be reluctant to buck unions and environmental groups who not only provide much needed financial support, but supply the volunteers who perform crucial “get out the vote” duties on election day.

Where does foreign policy fit into the 2016 campaign? 

Foreign policy is likely to feature very prominently in the coming election, particularly if the economy continues its steady, if modest, rate of growth. The reason is simple. The United States faces serious challenges in the Middle East, the Ukraine, South Asia and the South China Sea. And many voters who favored retrenchment in 2008, now fear it is now perceived increasingly by friends and adversaries as weakness and/or retreat.

One should not, however, expect the presidential campaign to illumine the strategic choices we face abroad. Presidential contenders typically articulate a wide range of aspirational foreign policy goals. But they rarely outline priorities among these declared aims, let alone their potential costs and risks, or the trade-offs among them. To address these core elements of strategy might offend one or another potential voting bloc. Candidates, therefore, tend to focus upon the appeal of their foreign policy objectives at home, rather than their efficacy abroad.

A wide field of candidates has emerged early on. What foreign policy issues are not being addressed that should figure in the debates?

It’s a bit early to say. The first primaries are still three months away. Few debates have yet been held. The election is likely in any event to be in part a referendum on President Obama’s record. But Hillary Clinton, who served for four years as the Secretary of State, is differentiating her position from that of Obama’s on a number of foreign policy matters. And as I noted above, the focus in most campaigns is on laudable goals rather than the key elements of strategy, i.e. the operational tests of foreign policy for anyone who occupies the Oval Office.

What will happen to the U.S. “pivot back to Asia” strategy?

President Obama performed a useful service in underlining America’s growing stake in Asia. I would expect the candidates of both major parties to affirm their intent to devote more time, attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region. The problems the current administration has experienced in Asia are a by-product of the policy’s implementation. Many Asian leaders wonder whether the policy has been forgotten or overtaken by events. Adjustments in our regional security policy have been essentially symbolic.

With China, we are still looking for a sustainable balance between constructive engagement and prudent hedging. The diplomatic opening to Myanmar was timely, but progress has been complicated by ethnic struggles in that country. American leaders visit Asia periodically, but the United States is still perceived as primarily preoccupied with problems in the Middle East. Conclusion of the TPP will lend credibility to the policy, but only if the agreement is ratified. So it will be up to the next president to put some meat on the bones of this strategic initiative.

How do election cycles in the United States and South Korea mesh, and what might the coming cycle mean for U.S.-Korean relations?

America has a four-year election cycle for the presidency. The Republic of Korea elects its presidents for a five-year term. We have experienced several occasions when our cycles appeared out of sync, i.e. when the United States elected more conservative candidates to the White House as the Koreans chose more liberal contenders for the Blue House. George W. Bush, a conservative, served during a period when the South Korean presidents – Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun – were both liberals or progressives. American and South Korean perspectives on policy toward North Korea diverged sharply. Nonetheless, they joined hands in launching the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and formulated plans for a major redeployment of U.S. military forces away from the Seoul metropolis to bases further south. And President Obama, a liberal, fashioned a close relationship with Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, both conservatives.

Thus, shared national interests have a way of tempering the ideological predilections of our respective leaders, enabling them to collaborate when dangers loom or when opportunities beckon.

South Korea now trades twice as much with China as it does with the United States and Japan combined. So its economy is tied more closely to China now, though it still looks to Washington for protection. Seoul will not want to choose between its economic interests and its strategic concerns. The United States has no reason to force such a choice on its ally, but it is clear that Beijing hopes to use its economic leverage to influence the Republic of Korea’s strategic decisions, for example, its readiness to deploy a THAAD, high altitude ballistic missile defense system. This is the kind of issue that could feed back into our election-year politics.

Related links

WNYC Brian Lehrer Show (Audio): How Elections Derail Foreign Policy (Aug. 4, 2015)

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Confetti on stage as U.S. President Barack Obama celebrates after winning the U.S. presidential election in Chicago, Illinois, Nov. 7, 2012.
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A Lecture-Concert by

Professor Jindong Cai, Music Director and Conductor, Stanford Symphony Orchestra

In collaboration with members of

The Peking University Symphony Orchestra

 

NOV 12, 2015

19:30 – 21:00

Stanford Center at Peking University

At the turn of the twentieth century, the foundations of traditional Chinese society were crumbling. Many patriotic and idealistic young people went overseas to seek inspiration and education, determined to learn from the outside world and forge a new path forward for China. Beethoven was introduced to China during this period by a series of remarkable artists and intellectuals who learned about the composer while studying in Japan. The polymath artist, writer, and monk Li Shutong was the first Chinese to write about Beethoven in a short, but revealing, article called  “The Sage of Music.”  Xiao Youmei was the first Chinese to bring the sound of Beethoven to Chinese people.  After his studies in Japan and Germany, Xiao came back to China in 1921 and began promoting music education at Peking University, where he created the first Chinese symphony orchestra to perform Beethoven’s music. Since then, Beethoven has become an iconic figure in China and played a role in many major historical events from the May Fourth Movement to the normalization of US-China relations.  Beethoven became a hero to reformers, intellectuals, music lovers, and party cadres alike. The new Penguin Special “Beethoven in China,” by Stanford professor and orchestra conductor Jindong Cai and culture journalist Sheila Melvin tells the compelling story of Beethoven and the Chinese people.

In the first part of this special lecture-concert, Professor Cai will share his own experience of hearing Beethoven’s music for the first time in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. He will also briefly tell the story of how Beethoven and his music became so deeply rooted in modern China. The second part of the event will feature a 15-member ensemble of musicians from the Peking University Orchestra – a first-ever re-creation of the 1922 orchestra that premiered Beethoven in Beijing. The performance, conducted by Maestro Cai, will give the audience a unique historical experience and allow them to travel back in time and hear how Beethoven’s music sounded when it was first performed at Peking University.  

 

Stanford Center at Peking University, The Lee Jung Sen Building, Langrun Yuan, Peking University

Peking University is a closed campus, please bring a photo ID and enter PKU through the Northeast Gate. 

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Forty-eight national security and foreign policy leaders urged U.S. government and businesses to take action to fight climate change in a statement released by the Partnership for a Secure America. Thomas Fingar, a distinguished fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, is a signatory. The statement can be accessed by clicking here.

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