The problem, Fayyad said, is that a two-state solution has never been defined with adequate precision. “Part of this is to be expected if something is going to be the product of negotiations,” as was not the case in prior years with proposals such as the Oslo Accords.

On Oct. 7, 2023, Palestinian militants led by Hamas attacked Israel, killing almost 1,200 people, and Israel responded by launching an invasion of Gaza that has killed more than 34,000 Palestinians as of April 2024. With the war ongoing for seven months now, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict goes back many decades to 1948, when Israel was established. The question now is, what does the future hold for Gaza, the Palestinian people, Israel, and stability in the Middle East?

Fayyad raised the issue of what the key organizing principle to determine a future State of Palestine and a peaceful solution with Israel could be.

He said, “That process must be preceded by formal recognition of our rights as a people, our national rights. It's very important. Oslo was not about that. Oslo was very transactional.”

‘Voices in these discussions’

Sallam, a moderator, said in an email prior to the event that “the ongoing war has caused a grave humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza with tens of thousands of deaths, a serious risk of famine, and a pressing public health crisis. It is important for us to advance as many conversations as possible about how we got to this reality and how we can find a peaceful exit out of it. And it is imperative to elevate and center Palestinian voices in these discussions.”

He added, “Dr. Fayyad’s visit to CDDRL’s Program on Arab Reform and Democracy promises to shed light on a host of pressing questions that the Stanford community has been grappling with since last year. It is a timely opportunity to learn, engage, and deliberate.”

Fayyad is an economist who served as minister of finance for the Palestinian Authority from 2002 to 2005 and as prime minister from 2007 to 2013. During his tenure, he introduced a number of economic and governance reforms. Afterward, he founded "Future for Palestine," a nonprofit development foundation. He also worked for the International Monetary Fund, including as the resident representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Currently, he is a Visiting Senior Scholar and Daniella Lipper Coules '95 Distinguished Visitor in Foreign Affairs at the Princeton School of Public Affairs. He is also a distinguished statesman at the Atlantic Council and a distinguished fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Recognition of Rights

Fayyad said that the recognition of Palestinian rights is critical to any future negotiations. “One of the key lessons learned is that it's a mistake to engage in a problematic process that is not defined well in terms of outcome – what it is supposed to lead to if it is not based particularly from our point of view, or on recognition of our national rights as a people? Because so far, we have gotten none of that.”

He added, “I, like many Palestinians, would find it reasonable to engage in a process that could take us there in agreement and through negotiation.”

Fayyad said that if Palestinians' interests and those of all countries in the region are ultimately to live in peace and sustainable harmony, then the process must be recalibrated. “It has to be more principled.”

Asymmetry and Conflict History

Fayyad said that asymmetry exists between Palestinians and Israelis. “You see this everywhere, in terms of power relations, you see it everywhere, all facets of life. You see it on college campuses; you see it everywhere.”

For example, he said that Israel, over 75 years, has built a strong, vibrant economy with a strong military. “So, to deny people (Palestinians) the right to self-determination, which is a right that is absolute for us under international law, just like any other people anywhere in the world,” is asymmetrical.

He noted, “It is equally important, if not more important, for us Palestinians to understand that just because we are the weaker party in this balance of power … that we must actively assume full agency in the act of our liberation. We must.”

During the conversation, Diamond told Fayyad, “Everything you've talked about was challenging enough on Oct. 6.” But, he asked, how have the last seven months after a devastating terrorist attack affected everything, including the war in Gaza that has leveled much of the physical infrastructure of the country? “Where do we go from here?”

Fayyad described Oct. 7 as a “major shock” that has made a solution more difficult and distant than it already was. He added that Israel’s response to eliminate Hamas is likely impossible to extremely unlikely.

A Sisyphean Task

Our freedom is an inalienable right, Fayyad said about the Palestinian people, and it's an inseparable component of them as human beings. 

“As human beings and members of the human race, like everyone, we have that to share with everyone else. You have to have that kind of recalibration.”

Future conversations between Palestinians and Israelis have to begin from the recognition that two equal parties exist to this disagreement, he said. “Not the oppressor, not the oppressed, not the master and the slave. Not the master and the surrogate.”

Fayyad compared the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to a Sisyphean task of sorts. 

“But I never really understood Sisyphus to be an exercise in futility myself,” he said. “You learn something every time that boulder rolls back on. It's really about empowerment. That’s why it is most inspiring to try it. Even if you fail, even if you know you’re going to fail, you learn from it, you learn from it, and you keep pushing that boulder up the hill. There will come a point in time when the stars align for that which is just.”

The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University examines the different social and political dynamics within Arab countries and the evolution of their political systems, focusing on the prospects, conditions, and possible pathways for democratic reform in the region.

Read the article in the December 2023 issue of Stanford Magazine.

Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”