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Stanford nuclear experts said they were skeptical of North Korea’s claim that it had detonated a hydrogen bomb this week.

However, they said the test was an important step forward for North Korea’s nuclear program and would have a destabilizing effect on the entire region.

“I don’t believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all,” said Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has “a track record of exaggerated statements, hyperbole and outright lies,” according to Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro professor of Political Science.

“The propaganda machine in North Korea has made all sorts of claims about Kim Jong-un’s personal prowess and his history, and it is totally unsurprising that he might make exaggerated claims about North Korea’s military prowess,” Sagan said.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said he also doubted that North Korea had detonated a two-stage hydrogen bomb.

“Whether it’s a hydrogen bomb or not, it’s very dangerous, destabilizing development,” said Perry.

“It’s obvious they’re working to increase the capability and size of their nuclear arsenal and that represents a huge danger to the region and creates major instability and major concerns on the part of South Korea and Japan.”

Many North Korea watchers had been anticipating another nuclear test.

“We’ve thought that the North Koreans could test at any time – that the tunnels were ready, that they could do this at any time – so it would be a political decision, not a technical decision,” said Thomas Fingar, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Hecker said North Korea’s latest nuclear test would move the country closer to being able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a missile, extending the reach of their nuclear weapons.

“They will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design – that is the most worrisome aspect,” Hecker said.

“At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles.”

On the diplomatic agenda, the U.S. and its allies will likely push for stronger sanctions in the wake of the tests, according to Kathleen Stephens, a former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and William J. Perry fellow at Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

“In the UN the U.S., Japan and South Korea will likely look for another, and stronger, UN Security Council resolution, presumably with some efforts to attach to it some teeth and strengthen sanctions,” Stephens said.

The U.S. Congress is currently considering financial sanctions that would cut of all access to U.S. banks for any banks dealing with the North Koreans.

But financial sanctions would likely be less effective in dealing with North Korea than they had been with Iran, according to Fingar.

“It’s like hitting a masochist,” said Fingar.

“North Korea is relatively insulated from the external economy, where Iran wasn’t. Iran had a middle class, you could make sanctions hurt, they could have a real effect. You could make it hard for the North Koreans to buy luxury goods, but at the end of the day, is that going to bring down the regime?”

Financial sanctions against North Korea could have the unintended consequence of also hurting China, said David Straub, associate director of the Korea program at APARC.

“This could be problematic for China because many of the transactions that North Korea conducts would be going thorough Chinese banks, and the Chinese, understandably might not be happy about the US financial sanctions on them, in effect,” Straub said.

Perry recommended that the U.S. reinvigorate diplomatic talks with North Korea in collaboration with China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

“I would not give up on negotiations with North Korea yet,” Perry said.

“What could have been done many years ago was following through on negotiations with North Korea at the turn of the Century, which were proceeding robustly in the last years of Clinton’s second term, but were abandoned by the Bush Administration...That was a geo-strategic error.”

But Hecker said those negotiations would be harder now.

“I have previously argued that we should focus on three “No’s” for three “Yes’s” – that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export – in return for addressing the North’s security concerns, its energy shortage and its economic woes,” said Hecker.

“This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now."

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A protester burns banners depicting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during an anti-North Korea rally in central Seoul, South Korea, January 7, 2016.
A protester burns banners depicting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during an anti-North Korea rally in central Seoul, South Korea, January 7, 2016.
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Former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker assesses North Korea’s claim to have detonated a hydrogen bomb in an underground nuclear test this week. Hecker is one of the world’s top experts on the North Korean nuclear program. He has visited North Korea seven times since 2004, and is the only Western scientist known to have ever been inside a North Korean uranium enrichment facility. He is currently a senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a research professor of Management Science and Engineering.

Do you believe that North Korea actually detonated a hydrogen bomb in its latest nuclear test?

I don’t believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all. Since this test worked, they will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design – that is the most worrisome aspect. This is their fourth test – with each test they can learn a lot.

What makes a hydrogen bomb a more threatening weapon than a conventional atomic bomb?

A hydrogen bomb can be a hundred or a thousand-fold more powerful than a fission bomb. Certainly a blast of a megaton will be much more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb, but the more important part is the ability to deliver at long range and to do it accurately. That is what would threaten the United States and its allies most; even with the size of nuclear blasts they have already demonstrated.

White House officials say that initial data from nearby monitoring stations are not consistent with a hydrogen bomb test. How will we know for sure whether it was a hydrogen bomb or not?

The short answer is that we may never know. The telltale signs of a hydrogen bomb are very difficult to pick up in a deeply buried test. Typically hydrogen bombs have greater explosive power or yield. This test is currently believed to have resulted in a seismic tremor of 5.1 on the Richter earthquake scale. That would make it roughly equivalent to the third nuclear test in February 2013. At that time, North Korea claimed it tested a miniaturized atomic bomb – there was no mention of a hydrogen bomb. My estimate of the yield for the 2013 test is roughly 7 to 16 kilotons – which is in the range of the 13-kiloton Hiroshima blast. As far as destructiveness, a Hiroshima-scale explosion is bad enough. Detonated in Manhattan, it may kill as many as a quarter million people. The power of the 2013 and the current explosion is more consistent with fission bombs than hydrogen bombs.

Can you rule out the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb?

I find it highly unlikely that the North tested a real hydrogen fusion bomb, but we know so little about North Korea’s nuclear weapons design and test results that we cannot completely rule it out. A modern hydrogen bomb is a two-stage device that uses a fission bomb to drive the second stage fusion device. A two-stage device is very difficult to design and construct, and is likely still beyond the reach of North Korea today. However, by comparison, China’s early nuclear weapon program progressed rapidly. It tested its first fission bomb in 1964 and less than three years later demonstrated a hydrogen bomb – and that was 50 years ago. North Korea has now been in the nuclear testing business for almost 10 years, so we can’t rule anything out for certain.

If it wasn’t a hydrogen bomb, what kind of bomb might it have been?

What may be more likely than a two-stage hydrogen bomb is that they took an intermediate step that utilizes hydrogen (actually hydrogen isotopes) fuel to boost the explosive yield of the fission bomb, a sort of turbocharging. Such a device has a fusion or “hydrogen” component, but is not a real hydrogen bomb. It allows miniaturization – that is making the bomb smaller and lighter. Moreover, it would be the first step toward eventually mastering a two-stage hydrogen bomb.

The most important aspect then is to miniaturize, whether it is a fission bomb, a boosted fission bomb, or a hydrogen bomb. The Nagasaki bomb weighed 5,000 kilograms. It was delivered in a specially equipped B-29 bomber. North Korea wants to demonstrate it has a deterrent. To do so, it needs to be able to credibly threaten the U.S. mainland or our overseas assets. For that, you have to make the bomb (more correctly, the warhead) small enough to mount on a missile. The smaller and lighter, the greater the reach. At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles.

How close is North Korea to being able to credibly threaten a nuclear strike against the mainland United States?

North Korea is still a long way off from being able to strike the US mainland. It has only had one successful space launch. It needs a lot more, but it has a large effort in that direction.

Do you think North Korea conducted this test for political or technical reasons?

North Korea had very strong technical and military drivers for this test, as well as follow-on tests. The political environment is mostly what has constrained it from testing earlier and more often. However, this test demonstrates that Pyongyang is willing to weather the political storm this test will bring. It has done so for all previous tests.

What are your current estimates on the size of North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials?

Much like in the area of sophistication of the bomb, we have little information of what North Korea actually possesses. The best we can do is to estimate how much bomb fuel, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, they may have produced and estimate how many bombs they can produce from that stockpile. My best estimate at this time is that they may have enough bomb fuel for 18 bombs with a capacity to make 6 to 7 more annually. That, combined with the increased sophistication they surely achieved with this test, paints a troublesome picture.

How should the U.S. respond?

I am concerned about we haven’t done to date. Washington has lost many opportunities we have had since North Korea began its nuclear weapon production in earnest in 2003. One thing that’s clear is that doing what we and the rest of the world have done so far – half-hearted diplomacy, ultimatums, and sanctions – have failed, so these are not the answer. I have previously argued that we should focus on three “No’s” for three “Yes’s” – that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export – in return for addressing the North’s security concerns, its energy shortage and its economic woes. This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now.

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CISAC senior fellow Siegfried Hecker on a tour of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility in 2008.
CISAC senior fellow Siegfried Hecker on a tour of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility in 2008.
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Brad Roberts's book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal.  

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This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal.  That conventional wisdom, argues Brad Roberts in The Case for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, has not been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world or of the Obama administration to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture.  A CISAC affiliate, Roberts served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy during the first Obama administration. He wrote the book, which draws heavily on his experience in government, during his time as a consulting professor and William J. Perry fellow at CISAC in 2014. To purchase the book, please visit: http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26137

Why did you write this book?

My main purpose was to reclaim the middle in the U.S. nuclear policy debate.  As in so much of the rest of our national political life, the middle has disappeared from this particular debate, leaving two deeply antagonistic camps to dominate it. One favors more disarmament now, while the other sees many enduring roles for U.S. nuclear weapons. The division didn’t matter so long as the United States could live off the investments of the Cold War.  It can no longer do so, as old weapons and delivery systems age out and expensive decisions must be made.  A coherent and centrist approach is needed to guide national choices, and this book attempts to fill that gap.

 

What is your main argument?

That the conditions do not now exist for the United States to safely take additional steps to further reduce the number and role of U.S. nuclear weapons. The Obama administration set out a strategy for creating those conditions in 2009, and the results have been disappointing. Russia has rejected further arms control. China has rejected further transparency.  Others have refused to join an international consensus against nuclear weapons. This experience must temper enthusiasm for the disarmament project. The conditions do not exist and are not proximate.

 

What is the case against nuclear weapons? And why do you think the case for nuclear weapons is more compelling?

The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds:  historical (‘these are nothing more than cold war relics’), moral (‘their use in war would violate the laws of war so deterrence is immoral as well’), and prudential (‘we can’t prove that deterrence works but we can prove that these are dangerous weapons’). The case for nuclear weapons derives first and foremost from the role the United States wants to play in the world—as a security guarantor to others and a projector of power to promote stability and our values. In today’s world, without nuclear weapons, the United States could not play that role.

 

Can you ever imagine a scenario where the U.S. would need to use nuclear weapons again?

We don't have nuclear weapons to fight and win wars with them; we have nuclear weapons to ensure they are never used against us or our allies—in other words, for deterrence.  The President would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances when the vital interests of the United States or an ally are at risk. Though extreme, such circumstances are not implausible. The cold-war vintage bolt-from-the-blue major strike isn’t the potential problem today; rather, the problem is a regional conflict that goes badly for an adversary who then tries to escalate his way out of failed aggression against a U.S. ally. At least three nuclear-armed potential adversaries have now long studied the common problem they face:  deterring and defeating a conventionally-superior nuclear-armed major power and its allies. They have developed theories of victory built around nuclear coercion, blackmail, and brinksmanship, aimed at breaking the will of the United States and its allies, including with limited nuclear strikes to demonstrate their resolve. Our deterrence strategy requires that we have an effective ability to respond and that the threat to employ it in the circumstances they create is credible. Moreover, let us distinguish the verb “employ” from “use.” U.S. nuclear weapons are used every day to cast a shadow of doubt over the thinking of potential challengers to U.S. interests and to assure our allies. 

 

President Obama set out a vision for a world free of nuclear weapons at a speech in Prague in April, 2009. Does your book contradict the President’s strategic vision?

President Obama is a pragmatist and this was reflected in the Prague speech. In 2009, we took some steps to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons and set out a plan for working with others to create the conditions for further reductions. But so long as nuclear weapons remain, the President is committed to ensuring that nuclear deterrence remains effective. Toward that end, the administration has expended considerable time, energy, and money.  This is the story of that effort and a distillation of key lessons.

 

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The Case for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century Stanford University Press
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Abstract: Iran under Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi undertook one of the most ambitious nuclear programs of any non-nuclear weapon state in the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the 1970s. Despite the Shah’s Cold War alliance with the United States, the emerging global nonproliferation order became a zone of contestation in U.S.-Iran relations. This paper is a condensed version of chapter two of this dissertation, covering U.S.-Iran nuclear cooperation agreements under the Nixon and Ford administrations, which explores the Shah's struggle to obtain Western nuclear technology, the ultimately unsuccessful U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, and the United States' efforts to use these negotiations to redefine the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

About the Speaker: Farzan Sabet is Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and holds a Swiss National Science Foundation Doctoral Mobility Fellowship for the 2015-2016 academic year. He is a doctoral candidate in international history at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, researching the Iranian nuclear program under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi and its evolving relationship with the global nonproliferation regime during the 1970s. His dissertation is based on multi-archival research in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada and combines diplomatic history with nonproliferation studies. He is affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP)

Farzan is also a co-founder and managing editor at IranPolitik.com, which focuses on key issues in Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics today. His work on Iranian politics has appeared in The Washington Post's "Monkey Cage" blog, The Atlantic, and War on the Rocks, among other outlets. 
Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: Why do states acquire nuclear weapons? Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process---i.e., credible agreements exist in which rival states make sufficient concessions to convince the potential rising state not to proliferate. I show the existence of that range of settlements and the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle and then provide two main explanations as to why states proliferate anyway. First, if the would-be proliferator expects to lose the ability to construct nuclear weapons in the future, the states face a commitment problem: the rival state would like to promise to continue providing concessions into the future but will renege once proliferation is no longer an option. And second, if the proliferator's rival faces some sort of uncertainty---whether regarding the potential proliferator's ability to go nuclear or regarding its previous proliferation activity---the optimal offer can entail positive probability of nuclear investment. However, the nonproliferation regime's mission to increase the cost of building often leads to Pareto improvement. Put differently, rising states sometimes benefit directly by making their nuclear options more costly.

About the Speaker: William Spaniel received a PhD in international relations, formal theory, and quantitative methodology from the University of Rochester in 2015. His research investigates the credibility of nuclear agreements in the absence of verifiable compliance. As a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC for 2015-2016, he is working on the potentially perverse effects of nuclear safeguards. His publications have appeared in International Studies Quarterly, International Interactions, and The Journal of Theoretical Politics.

Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC
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Abstract: The 1995 launch of a sounding rocket from Andoya in Norway allegedly misinterpreted as an attack in Russia and the so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis" in 1962 have one thing in common: they have both been referred to as "the closest we came to nuclear war." The 1962 crisis has mostly been studied from an American perspective due to the availability of documentary evidence and of the Kennedy tapes, until the 1990s when Cuba and the Soviet Union were given a voice, with the rest of the world still largely absent from the understanding of the event. The 1995 close call has been controversial and is remembered in conflicting ways: an alarmist and an untroubled one.

In this presentation, I will offer new findings on those two cases, based on previously untapped primary sources on the experience of and threat perception during the so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis" in 13 countries worldwide and on an oral history workshop I organized in London for the 20th anniversary of the 1995 "Black Brant event", which gathered for the first time Norwegian, American and Russian participants in the event. By focusing on those two events as exemplary cases of near use of nuclear weapons, I will outline a research program on such cases and its implication for social sciences and for the teaching of post-1945 world history to the next generations.

 

About the Speaker: Benoît Pelopidas is a CISAC affiliate and lecturer in International Relations at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS), University of Bristol. He was a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC for the 2011-2012 academic year.

He received his Ph. D. in political science from Sciences Po (Paris) and the University of Geneva in 2010 and was a postdoctoral fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in 2010-2011. Since 2005, he has been teaching international relations at Sciences Po (Paris), the University of Geneva and the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Graduate School of International Policy and Management).

In 2010, he won the "outstanding student essay prize" from the Doreen and Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Essay Competition and in 2011, he was awarded the "Best Graduate Paper 2010" from the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association. Also in 2011, he won the SNIS Award 2010 for the Best Thesis in International Studies from the Swiss Network for International Studies. A book based on his dissertation is forthcoming in French by Sciences Po University Press.

He published When Empire Meets Nationalism: Power Politics in the US and Russia (with Didier Chaudet and Florent Parmentier; Ashgate, 2009) as well as articles in The Nonproliferation Review, the European Journal of Social Sciences, the Swiss Political Science Review, and the French Yearbook of International Relations. His research focuses on epistemic communities in international security, renunciation of nuclear weapons as a historical possibility, the uses of nuclear history and memory and French nuclear policies.

Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) University of Bristol, United Kingdom
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After an American hostage was mistakenly killed in a CIA drone strike, Stanford historian Priya Satia argues that oversight of and attitudes toward the drone program should be examined in light of continuing civilian deaths in the AfPak region in the April 30, 2015 edition of The Huffington Post.

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In an NK News' series of interviews with a panel of U.S. experts on North Korea policy, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program and former State Department Korea director, analyzes the U.S. approach toward Pyongyang. With NK News' permission, downloadable PDF versions of the interviews are available below.

 

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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un provides field guidance at the newly built National Space Development General Satellite Control and Command Centre in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, May 3, 2015.
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Abstract: Many scholars contend that there was a specific German nuclear question. To them, asking the question “Was there a German nuclear question?” may be surprising and odd. In their view, there is no question that Bonn actively sought to transform non-nuclear West Germany into an atomic power and that Bonn had the capability to do it. This view is related to the late 1950s and early 1960s in particular. Most accounts do not address the question whether the postulated objective of Bonn’s nuclear policy remained the same throughout the 1960s. Furthermore, this narrative has led many scholars to believe that the German nuclear question came to an end when West Germany acceded to the NPT by signing the treaty in late 1969 after a change of government which heralded the beginning of Bonn’s ‘New Ostpolitik’. I will present a different narrative. Based on an historical approach and on new archival material, I will reappraise this complicated topic by introducing the analytical concept of West Germany’s limited nuclear revisionism. Thereby, I will postulate that the NPT had no nonproliferation effect regarding West Germany. And I will propose another understanding of the question whether there was a German nuclear question.

About the Speaker: Andreas Lutsch is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. In August 2015 he received his Doctor of Philosophy in history at the University of Mainz, Germany. His dissertation offers a new interpretation of West Germany’s nuclear policy during the 1960s and 1970s - from the controversy about the Non-Proliferation Treaty since the early 1960s until the agreement on NATO’s dual track decision in 1979. The dissertation is based on printed and edited sources and on multi-archival research in Germany, the U.S., the UK and Belgium, thus making use of recently declassified files. Besides completing the book manuscript, Andreas is engaged in a research project on the historical management of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence regarding NATO Europe. Andreas analyzes whether, why and to what extent mechanisms of nuclear consultation were important as tools of extended deterrence management. A previous research fellow at the University of Mainz, Germany, Andreas is an Assistant Professor (on leave in the academic year 2015-16) at the University of Würzburg, Germany. He organized three workshops for PhD students and postdocs and is affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP).

 

Was There a German Nuclear Question? A Critical Reappraisal
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Was There a German Nuclear Question? A Critical Reappraisal
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Andreas Lutsch Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC
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