In the article “Debate Over Trump’s Fitness Raises Issue of Checks on Nuclear Power,” published in The New York Times on August 4th, CISAC senior fellow Scott D. Sagan discusses historical evidence showing a close nuclear call – and how it was diverted – during Nixon’s presidency. Highlighting the ambiguous state of nuclear checks and balances, Sagan claims that the U.S. “would be in uncharted waters if a president ordered the use of nuclear weapons and the secretary of defense refused”. To read the full article, click here.
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A White House military aide and member of the US Navy carries a briefcase known as the 'football,' containing emergency nuclear weapon codes, as US President Barack Obama departs on Marine One from the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, DC, September 30, 2012.
This book discusses issues in large-scale systems in the United States and around the world. The authors examine the challenges of education, energy, healthcare, national security, and urban resilience. The book covers challenges in education including America's use of educational funds, standardized testing, and the use of classroom technology. On the topic of energy, this book examines debates on climate, the current and future developments of the nuclear power industry, the benefits and cost decline of natural gases, and the promise of renewable energy. The authors also discuss national security, focusing on the issues of nuclear weapons, terrorism and cyber security. Urban resilience is addressed in the context of natural threats such as hurricanes and floods.
Doomed to Cooperate tells the remarkable story of nuclear scientists from two former enemy nations, Russia and the United States, who reached across political, geographic, and cultural divides to confront, together, the new nuclear threats that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using the lingua franca of science and technology, the brilliant minds and unparalleled scientific nuclear programs of Russia and the United States embarked upon more than two decades of cooperation to avert the loss of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, nuclear weapons expertise, and the export of sensitive nuclear technologies during a time of economic and political turmoil in the newly formed Russian Federation— a herculean endeavor known as lab-to-lab cooperation.
Abstract: Nuclear war and climate change present the two most serious threats to global security since World War II. This talk shows that nuclear weapons research and climate science were historically connected in deep, sometimes intimate ways. Each developed its own knowledge infrastructure, including people, technical systems, and organizations, with surprising parallels and frequent exchanges across the classified/civilian divide. From the 1940s on, nuclear weapons research and climate science both relied heavily on computer models, used related physics and numerical methods, and shared human as well as technical resources. Radiocarbon from nuclear weapons tests contributed to understanding of the global carbon cycle, while fallout monitoring networks produced critical knowledge about the stratosphere. In the 1980s, the potential for “nuclear winter” — a war-induced climatic catastrophe — became a major political issue, but the groundwork for this concern had been laid long before.
This interplay not only continued, but became even more significant after the Cold War’s end, when the weapons labs’ expertise, equipment, and observing systems were partially repurposed. Several US national laboratories now play essential roles in climate and Earth system science. Among these roles are the Program on Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, based at Livermore and responsible for the important Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), a major unifying force in climate modeling for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessments. The cyberinfrastructure underlying CMIP and similar projects must address mounting challenges related to data access controls, software support, and the security of huge data collections, while their institutional and human bases depend on ongoing national support. Crafting effective climate policy, I argue, will require understanding and rethinking the dynamics of these knowledge infrastructures for the present, rapidly evolving context.
About the Speaker: Paul Edwards is a Professor in the School of Information (SI) and the Dept. of History at the University of Michigan. SI is an interdisciplinary professional school focused on bringing people, information, and technology together in more valuable ways.
His research explores the history, politics, and cultural aspects of computers, information infrastructures, and global climate science. His current research focuses on knowledge infrastructures for the Anthropocene.
Dr. Edwards is co-editor (with Geoffrey C. Bowker) of the Infrastructures book series (MIT Press), and he serves on the editorial boards of Big Data & Society: Critical Interdisciplinary Inquiries and Information & Culture: A Journal of History. His most recent book is A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2010).
Paul Edwards
Professor of Information and History
University of Michigan
Abstract: On 13 February 2016, in a widely-reported interview for the BBC, Ashton Carter, the US Secretary of Defense, made clear that the US Government supported the maintenance and renewal of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent force of Trident submarines. According to Carter, Trident enabled Britain to ‘continue to play that outsized role on the world stage that it does because of its moral standing and its historical standing.’ However, during the early 1960s, attitudes in Washington to the UK’s independent nuclear capabilities were altogether different. This paper will begin with a re-examination of Robert McNamara’s famous address at Ann Arbor in June 1962 when he openly criticised the existence of independent allied nuclear forces. Using new evidence, it will chart the background to the speech, the reception it was accorded, and how it helped to intensify tensions in Anglo-American relations when the Skybolt missile system was cancelled by the US at the end of the same year. The paper will also show how by the end of the Johnson administration, and the tenure of McNamara’s period as Secretary of Defense, the US had become reconciled to the continued existence of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent and even begun to take steps to assist with its improvement.
About the Speaker: Matthew Jones is Professor of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science. After receiving his DPhil from St Antony's College, Oxford, he was appointed to a Lectureship in the History Department at Royal Holloway, University of London in 1994, and subsequently promoted to Reader in International History before moving to the University of Nottingham in 2004, and then to the LSE in 2013. His interests span post-war British and US foreign policy, nuclear history, and the histories of empire and decolonization in South East Asia. His books include Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (Macmillan, 1996), Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), andAfter Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965, (CUP, 2010). In 2008, Jones was commissioned by the Cabinet Office to write a two-volume official history of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent, covering the period between 1945 and 1982, the first volume of which has now been completed.
Matthew Jones
Professor of International History
Speaker
London School of Economics and Political Science
A shadowy terror group smuggles a crude nuclear bomb into the United States, then detonates it right in the heart of Washington D.C., setting off a 15 kiloton explosion.
Eighty thousand Americans are killed instantly, including the president, vice president and most of the members of Congress, and more than a hundred thousand more are seriously wounded.
News outlets are soon broadcasting a message they’ve all received from a group claiming responsibility.
It says there are five more bombs hidden in five different cities across the America, and one bomb will be set off each week for the next five weeks unless all American troops based overseas are ordered to immediately return to the U.S. homeland.
The nation is thrown into chaos, as millions scramble to flee the cities, clogging roads and choking telecommunications systems.
The stock market crashes, before trading is halted altogether.
Martial law is declared, amid widespread looting and violence.
That was just one of the nightmare scenarios for a potential nuclear disaster that former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry vividly described as he delivered the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s annual Drell Lecture on Wednesday.
“My bottom line is that the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe today is greater than it was during the Cold War,” Perry said.
Most people were “blissfully unaware” of the danger that simmering conflicts in geopolitical flash points around the globe – including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan – could easily turn nuclear, Perry told the Stanford audience.
A new nuclear arms race with Russia
Perry said he had tried to foster closer cooperation between the U.S. and Russia when he headed the Pentagon during the mid ‘90s and helped oversee the joint dismantling of four thousand nuclear weapons.
“When I left the Pentagon, I believed we were well on the way to ending forever that Cold War enmity, but that was not to be,” he said.
William J. Perry shares a video depicting the threat of nuclear terrorism with a Stanford audience.
Since then, relations between the West and Russia have soured badly, prompting Russia to modernize its nuclear arsenal and assume a more aggressive nuclear posture.
“They’re well advanced in rebuilding their Cold War nuclear arsenal, and it is Putin’s stated first priority,” Perry said.
“And they have dropped their former policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and replaced it with a policy that says nuclear weapons will be their weapon of choice if they are threatened.”
While Perry said he believed Russian president Vladimir Putin did not want to engage in a military conflict with NATO forces, he said he was concerned about the possibility of Russia making a strategic miscalculation and stumbling into a conflict where they might resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
“If they did that there’s no way of predicting or controlling the escalation that would follow thereafter,” Perry said.
Chinese economic problems increasing tensions
In Asia, a slowing Chinese economy could exacerbate domestic political tensions over issues such as wealth inequality and pollution, and encourage Chinese leaders to divert attention from problems at home by focusing on enemies abroad.
“China has had more than 10 percent growth now for almost three decades, but I think there’s trouble ahead,” Perry said.
“The time-proven safety valve for any government that’s in trouble is ultra-nationalism, which in the case of China translates into anti-Americanism and anti-Japanese.”
China has seen a major growth in military expenditures over the last decade, and it has used that investment to build a blue water navy and develop effective anti-ship missiles designed to drive the U.S. Navy hundreds of miles back from the Chinese coastline.
One potential flash point for a conflict between China and the U.S. are the artificial islands that China has been building in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
“In a sense, China is regarding the South China Sea as a domestic lake, and we regard it and most other countries regard it as international waters, so their actions have been challenged by the U.S. Navy and will continue to be challenged,” Perry said.
North Korea’s growing nuclear threat
Meanwhile, China’s neighbor North Korea has continued to defy the international community and conducted another nuclear test in January.
“North Korea is today building a nuclear arsenal, and I would say clearly it’s of the highest priority in their government, and they have adopted outrageous rhetoric about how they might use those nuclear weapons,” Perry said.
William J. Perry delivers the Drell Lecture in an address entitled "A National Security Walk Around the World."
North Korea followed up its latest nuclear test with a satellite launch earlier this month – an important step towards developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States mainland.
“These missiles today have only conventional warheads that are of no significant concern, but they are developing nuclear warheads,” Perry said.
“They already have developed a nuclear bomb, and the latest test, as well as tests to come, will be designed to perfect a bomb small enough and compact enough and durable enough to fit into a warhead. If they succeed in doing that, then the bluster will become a real threat.”
Perry said he hoped China and the United States could combine forces and adopt a “carrot and stick” diplomatic approach to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program – with the United States offering aid and international recognition, and China threatening to cut off supplies of food and aid.
He said he expected to see “more acting out” from the North Korean regime in the coming months, in the form of further nuclear and rocket tests.
Like it or not, the Iran deal is the only deal we’ll get
The landmark deal reached last year, where Iran agree to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions, was a better resolution than Perry had expected to the negotiations, but it has met with significant resistance from groups he described as “strange bedfellows.”
“The opposition in Israel and the United States opposed the deal because they fear it will allow Iran to get a bomb,” Perry said.
“Whereas the opposition in Iran opposed the deal because they fear it will prevent Iran from getting a bomb. Both cannot be right.”
Many Republican presidential hopefuls have publicly stated on the campaign trail that they would withdraw from the deal if they got elected to the White House, but Perry said that would be a strategic mistake.
“The opposition in the United States has a simple formula – we should withdraw from the deal, we should reinstate sanctions, and we should renegotiate a better deal,” Perry said.
“Let me be as blunt as I can, this is a pure fantasy. There is not the remotest possibility that the sanction could be reapplied if the United States withdraws from this deal, because the day we withdraw from the deal, our allies are gone, the sanctions are gone, there will be no renegotiations without sanctions, so this deal, like it or not, is the only deal we will ever get.”
Another “Mumbai” attack could spark regional nuclear war
Nuclear rivals India and Pakistan have more than a hundred nuclear weapons on each side, as well as the missiles to deliver them, and a conventional military conflict between them could quickly escalate into a regional nuclear war, Perry said.
Another large-scale terror attack, like the coordinated assault in Mumbai that killed more than 163 people in 2008, could lead India to retaliate militarily against Pakistan (which India blames for encouraging the terror groups operating in Pakistani territory).
Perry said he was concerned that Pakistan would then use tactical nuclear weapons against invading Indian troops, and that India might then respond with a nuclear attack of its own on Pakistan.
“So this is the nightmare scenario of how a regional nuclear war could start,” Perry said.
“A nightmare that would involve literally tens of millions of deaths, along with the possibility of stimulating a nuclear winter that would cause widespread tragedies all over the planet.”
A ray of hope
Despite all the potential for nuclear disaster in the current geopolitical environment, Perry said he was still hopeful that nuclear catastrophe could be avoided.
"While much of my talk today has a doomsday ring to it, that truly is not who I am,” Perry said.
“I’m basically an optimist. When I see a cloud, I look for a ray to shine through that cloud.”
One important step toward reducing the nuclear threat would be improving relations between the U.S. and Russia, he said.
“My ray of sunshine, my hope, is I believe we can still reverse the slide in U.S. Russia relations, he said.
“We must begin that by restoring civil dialog. We must restore cooperation between the United States and Russia in areas where we have mutual interest…If we succeed in doing that, then we can work to stop and reverse the drift to a greater and greater dependence on nuclear weapons.”
Perry ended his speech by urging the audience to keep striving to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons.
“We must pursue our ideals in order to keep alive our hope – hope for a safer world for our children and for our grandchildren,” he said.
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William J. Perry answers questions from the audience during the annual Drell Lecture at Stanford, as CISAC co-director David Relman (right) looks on.
Why did Iran agree to send the bulk of its low-enriched uranium out of the country and remove the core of its Arak reactor? Those actions significantly lengthen the time it would take to build up a nuclear weapon program.
Iranian nuclear negotiators meet with international representatives at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters in Vienna, Austria on January 16, 2016.
Can the U.S. find the right balance between cooperation and containment, so it can realize the long-term benefits of the nuclear deal with Iran? CISAC visiting fellow Nicholas Burns, who helped to negotiate sanctions against Iran for the Bush administration a decade ago, offers his opinion in this piece for The New York Times.
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U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry takes his seat across from Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on January 16, 2016, at the Palais Coburg Hotel in Vienna, Austria, before a meeting about the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action outlining the shape of Iran's nuclear program.
For the past 15 years, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has stored transuranic waste from the US nuclear-defense programme. The facility, located 650 meters below ground in the bedded salt deposits of southeastern New Mexico, is run by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and will be permanently sealed in 2033. Yet an arms-control agreement made with Russia in 2000 requires the United States to dispose of 34 tonnes of weapons plutonium, which a recent DOE panel recommended should be stored at WIPP. Tripling the amount of plutonium held at WIPP could increase the risk of release of radioactive material to the biosphere. Safety assessments have so far not adequately considered chemical interactions of this material with that already stored in the repository. In 2014, for example, plutonium-contaminated nitrate salts reacted with a wheat-based kitty litter used to absorb liquid wastes, resulting in a small radioactivity leak to the surface. Reassessment of the risk of potential human ‘intrusion’ in the future is also necessary. Inadvertent drilling through the repository, in the search for oil and gas, could release brine into the tunnels, spreading radioactivity to groundwater. The addition of this weapons plutonium will require expansion of the repository, increasing the probability of intrusion, and will increase the amount and chemical complexity of the radioactive material that might interact with the brine. The DOE should reassess its confidence in WIPP’s performance over the millennia during which this material will remain a threat to environmental safety before adding an additional 34 tonnes of plutonium to its inventory.
North Korea claimed it successfully tested a hydrogen bomb on Jan. 6, according to a broadcast from the nation’s Korean Central Television. Experts at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offered their analyses to media.
In a Q&A, Siegfried Hecker answered nine questions, offering perspective on the situation and how the United States should respond. Hecker, a CISAC senior fellow, is a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and has visited North Korea seven times since 2004.
David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, commented on the North Korean nuclear program in an NK News article. He said the timing of the nuclear test, now the nation’s fourth, was likely only marginally influenced by external factors such as Kim Jong-un’s birthday. The primary factor is technical, he said. Straub also spoke with Yonhap News on Feb. 12. In the interview, Straub said "although the United States and the People's Republic of China certainly have differences [in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue], they pale in comparison to U.S.-Soviet differences."
Straub also offered, in an extended interview with South Korea's Segye Ilbo newspaper, his thoughts on Pyongyang's motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. He argued that the appropriate policy response is to continue to increase pressure on the regime. Pressure applied by Washington is meant to convince Pyongyang that nuclear weapons will bring more cost than benefit, while holding open the door to good-faith negotiations to resolve peninsular issues.
Shorenstein APARC Associate Director for Research Daniel Sneider talked with Al Jazeera America and Slateabout the developments. He said the nuclear test signified North Korea’s uneasiness and was largely an accommodation of domestic politics.
In early February, South Korea announced temporary closure of Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), a jointly held project with North Korea. In Chosun Ilbo newspaper, Straub argued that South Korea's closure of KIC was a necessary response to North Korea's fourth nuclear test and latest satellite rocket launch. Two articles were published in Korean; the first is available here and the second here.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un provides field guidance at the newly built National Space Development General Satellite Control and Command Centre in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, May 3, 2015.