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(Updated Nov. 7, 2014)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported on Nov. 4 that the death toll from the Ebola outbreak in West Africa has risen to above 4,960 and that an estimated 8,168 people, mostly in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, have contracted the virus since March. It is the largest and most severe outbreak of the Ebola virus since it was first detected four decades ago. All but nine of the deaths were in those three countries; eight were in Nigeria and one patient died in the United States.

The CDC in October proclaimed that in the worst-case scenario, Sierra Leone and Liberia could have 1.4 million cases by Jan. 20, 2015, if the disease keeps spreading without immediate and immense intervention to contain the virus.

Two American aid workers infected with Ebola while working in West Africa were transported to a containment unit at Emory University in Atlanta for treatment, raising public fears about international spread of the highly virulent virus that has no known cure. The two were released from the hospital after being the first humans to receive an experimental Ebola drug called ZMapp. Another man who recently helped an Ebola victim in Liberia traveled to Texas and died in a Dallas hospital. Two of the nurses who treated him caught the virus as well, but have been released from the hospital. Some states have struggled with the moral 

We ask CISAC biosecurity experts David Relman and Megan Palmer to answer several questions about Ebola and the public health concerns and policy implications. Relman is the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation who has served on several federal committees investigating biosecurity matters. He is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University School of Medicine, and Past-President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

Palmer is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC and a Researcher at the UC Berkeley Center for Quantitative Biosciences (QB3), and served as Deputy Director of Policy & Practices for the Multi-University NSF Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (SynBERC).

The two of them have answered the questions together.

What is Ebola and how dangerous is it compared to other diseases?

Ebola is an acute viral infectious disease, often associated with severe hemorrhagic fever. While initial symptoms are flu-like, they can rapidly progress, and include vomiting, reduced ability to regulate immune responses and other physiological processes, sometimes leading to internal and external bleeding. The disease has an incubation period that can last up to 21 days, but patients typically become ill four to nine days after infection, and die about seven to ten days later. Fatality rates for the current Ebola outbreak are nearing 60% (according to the CDC), while past outbreaks in the Republic of Congo have seen rates as high as 90%. This outbreak to date has resulted in nearly 1,000 deaths, more than any previous Ebola outbreak.

Ebola virus is believed to reside in animals such as fruit bats where it does not cause disease, but is then transmitted to and among humans and other primates, in whom disease typically does occur. The route by which the virus crosses between species remains largely unknown. People become infectious once they become symptomatic. Ebola is transmitted via blood or bodily fluid, but can persist outside the body for a couple days. Infection can occur through unprotected contact with the sick, but also when contaminated equipment such as needles cut through healthcare workers’ protective gear, and also through contact with infected individuals postmortem.

David Relman
Photo Credit: Rod Searcey

Ebola’s horrific symptoms provoke public fear, and it becomes easy to lose perspective on the relative spread and toll of this outbreak. Ebola is relatively difficult to transmit. This means the latest Ebola outbreak is still small in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of people killed each year via more easily transmitted airborne influenza strains and other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. It’s important that we not lose sight of more chronic, but less headline-grabbing diseases that will be pervasive, insidious long-standing challenges for Africa and elsewhere.

Is there a vaccine or cure?

There is no vaccine for Ebola and no tried-and-true cure. Health workers can only give supportive care to patients and try to stop the spread to new victims.

Several experimental therapies for Ebola are under development. One receiving attention is ZMapp, a mix of antibodies produced by mice exposed to the virus that have been adapted to improve their human compatibility. Limited tests in primates show early promise, but the drug had not been tried on humans -- until now. Two Americans transported back to the U.S. from West Africa received the experimental therapy. While the two seem to be improving, it isn’t clear that ZMapp was responsible; another issue is that ZMapp and other potential therapies have not been cleared by the FDA for wider use in humans.

The process for approval, and who gets priority access to such drugs, are complex policy issues. The WHO will be convening leaders and medical ethicists next week to discuss how to develop and distribute experimental therapies. This is not a simple task; many factors need to be taken into consideration and balanced with limited information to guide decisions.

Successful or not, and despite any approval, it’s still uncertain whether enough of such drugs could even be produced quickly enough to respond to this particular outbreak, and if not - whether they’d be effective in a future outbreak.

 

You can listen to Relman in this KQED Public Radio talk show.

Relman joins other experts in a Stanford panel on Ebola

 

Why has this Ebola outbreak involved so many more people, and spread to a wider geographic area,  than previous outbreaks?

This is an evolving investigation and many potential contributing factors are being examined by scientists racing to collect information that can help them get ahead of the outbreak.

One factor is population density. This latest outbreak spread early into denser population areas within Liberia and Sierra Leone, rather than remain confined to isolated villages, as in earlier outbreaks in Central Africa. With a greater number of people being exposed within a smaller geographic area, the likelihood of transmission increases. Of particular concern is the prospect that the virus might take hold in Lagos, Nigeria, where a handful of cases have been recently identified. If this were to spread in Lagos, Africa’s most populous city, the death toll would likely increase dramatically.   

Another factor is the ability of affected regions to mount an effective public health response. This outbreak is occurring in three of the poorest African countries: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. Civil wars have likely contributed to degradation of an already relatively poor public health infrastructure. This is also the first Ebola outbreak in the region, and the inexperience of local authorities can delay responses and fuel fearful community responses, undermining the ability to deal with the outbreak early when it’s more easily contained.

Cultural practices around the care of the sick and the dead can also fuel progression of an outbreak. In some parts of Western Africa, washing deceased relatives is commonplace. Customs like these increase the likelihood of the infection spreading through proximity between infected individuals and their family members

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What can be done to curtail the outbreak?

Isolation and quarantine are key to fighting the spread of Ebola. Isolation involves removing infected individuals from the general population to prevent the spread of disease. Quarantine, however, involves removing uninfected or potentially infected individuals from the general population to limit the spread of disease.

Thus far, the strategy to fight Ebola is dependent on isolating infected patients. Unsurprisingly, isolation efforts have proven hard to enforce. Some families, faced with the prospect of being confined to their homes, have denied the existence of Ebola in their localities, or refuted doctors who claim that one of their family members is sick. This is not unique to Africa; Americans had violent reactions to quarantine during the spread of smallpox. Some regions are now taking more extreme measures: Sierra Leone has deployed its army to enforce isolation at clinics and infected families’ homes, but this also risks civil unrest.

These tensions underscore the necessity of improved education and enforcement mechanisms within public health strategies. Response measures involve fundamental tradeoffs between liberty and safety. Because negotiations occur through complex local, national and international processes, one of the biggest risks is that decisions don’t keep pace with disease spread.

It’s important that we not lose sight of more chronic, but less headline-grabbing diseases that will be pervasive, insidious long-standing challenges for Africa and elsewhere."

How likely is it that the disease will spread into and within the United States?

Currently, airports in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea are screening all outbound passengers for Ebola symptoms such as fever. This includes asking passengers to complete healthcare questionnaires. However, it is difficult to reliably know who has been infected until they are symptomatic. Individuals could theoretically board a plane before they show symptoms, but develop them upon landing in the United States or elsewhere. This makes containing Ebola difficult, but not impossible.

If the virus were to enter the United States, it would be easier to contain and harder to spread. This virus does not transmit that easily to other humans, especially in settings with good infection control and isolation.

As viruses spread, the chances of genetic variation increase. Yet despite all the concerns from the current outbreak, Ebola is relatively bad at spreading in comparison to respiratory viral diseases such as influenza or measles. The likelihood of a pandemic Ebola virus in the near future seems slim as long as it cannot be transmitted via air.  While it’s possible that the Ebola virus could evolve, there is little evidence to suggest major genetic adaptations at this time.

What are some broader lessons about the dynamics and ecology of emerging infectious diseases that can help prevent or respond to outbreaks now and in the future?

These latest outbreaks remind us that potential pathogens are circulating, replicating and evolving in the environment all the time, and human action can have an immense impact on the emergence and spread of infectious disease.

We are starting to see common factors that may be contributing to the frequency and severity of outbreaks. Increasing human intrusion into zoonotic disease reservoir habitats and natural ecosystems, increasing imbalance and instability at the human-animal-vector interface, and more human population displacement all are likely to increase the chance of outbreaks like Ebola.

Megan Palmer
Photo Credit: Rod Searcey

The epicenter of this latest outbreak was Guéckédou, a village near the Guinean Forest Region. The forest there has been routinely exploited, logged, and neglected over the years, leading to an abysmal ecological status quo. This, in combination with the influx of refugees from conflicts in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire, has compounded the ecological issues in the area, potentially facilitating the spread of Ebola. There seems to be a strong relationship between ecological health and the spread of disease, and this latest outbreak is no exception.

While forensic analyses are ongoing, unregulated food and animal trade in general is also a key factor in the spread of infectious diseases across large geographic regions. Some studies suggest that trade of primates, including great apes, and other animals such as bats, may be responsible for transit of this Ebola strain from Central to Western Africa.

What are some of the other political and security implications of the outbreak and response?

Disease outbreaks can catalyze longer-term political and security issues in addition to more acute tensions.

There are complex international politics involved in emergency response and preparedness. Disease outbreaks often occur in poor regions, and demand help from more wealthy regions. The nature of the response reflects many factors - technical, social, political, legal and economic. Leaders often lack the expertise to take all these factors into account. It is an ongoing challenge to adapt our governance processes to be more reliable and move from damage control to planning. Organizations like the World Health Organization can provide guidance, but more resources and expertise are needed to get ahead of future disasters.

When help is provided, there is often mistrust of non-local workers, who can even be seen as sources of the disease. At a political level, distrust has been fueled by disguising political missions as health interventions, as was the case with the effort that led to the locating of Osama Bin Laden.

There are other security implications of this latest epidemic. This outbreak has led to a dramatic increase in the availability of Ebola virus in unsecured locations across West Africa, as well as to a growing number of labs across the world studying the disease. The immediate need to study the disease and develop beneficial interventions needs to be coupled to considerations of safety and security. From a safety standpoint, a rise in the handling of Ebola samples risks accidental transmission. From a security standpoint, those who wish to cause harm with this virus could acquire it from bodies, graves and other natural sources in the affected region. Both of these risks demand attention and efforts at mitigation.

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About the topic: Products developed using recombinant DNA methods account for over $300 billion in annual U.S. domestic revenues, underlying a so-called “bioeconomy” that has grown 10-15% annually since the invention of genetic engineering ~40 years ago. Yet most of biotechnology has not been imagined let alone made true.  I will review the last decade of work to make biology easier to engineer, from basic science to applied tools.  Particular attention will be given to two underlying trends that are having policy impacts beyond research labs: (i) interconversion of physical genetic material and digital sequence information via advancing DNA sequence and synthesis tools, (ii) coordination of labor across time and place via technical standards supporting composition, measurement, and data exchange.

About the speaker: Drew works on “synthetic biology.”  His group invented genome refactoring to both study and extend the utility of bacteriophage.  His team also realized non-volatile chromosomal digital data storage, amplifying genetic logic gates, and cell-cell communication via engineered DNA messaging.  He led the BIOFAB team that engineered a professional collection of reliably reusable standard biological parts and started the BioBricks Foundation (BBF) as a charity supporting development of a free-to-use language for programming life to benefit all people and the planet.  In 2013 Drew was recognized by the White House for the BBF’s contributions to “open science” and received the Seymour Benzer lectureship from the US NAS. 

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CISAC co-director David Relman, the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor and professor of microbiology and immunology and chief of infectious diseases at the VA-Palo Alto, and Susan Holmes, the John Henry Samter University Fellow in Undergraduate Education and professor of statistics, will share a $6.2 million federal grant to examine the effects of perturbations in humans' microbial ecology.

They are among eight Stanford scientists to receive the Transformative Research Awards from the National Institutes of Health.

Relman and Holmes will monitor the microbial ecosystems of healthy humans before, during and after several types of planned disturbance, such as changes in diet or antibiotic administration. They will apply novel mathematical methods to the data generated from these clinical experiments and identify features associated with future stability or recovery from these disturbances, with the goal of predicting disease and restoring health.

 

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More information TBA. 

 

Speaker bio:

David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University, and chief of infectious diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. He is also co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Dr. Relman’s primary research focus is the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome), and in particular, the nature and mechanisms of variation in patterns of microbial diversity and function within the human body, and the basis of microbial community resilience. His work was some of the first to employ modern molecular methods in the study of the microbiome, and provided the first in-depth sequence-based analyses of microbial community structure in humans. During the past few decades, his research has included pathogen discovery and the development of new strategies for identifying previously-unrecognized microbial agents of disease. A resulting publication was cited by the American Society for Microbiology as one of the 50 most important papers in microbiology of the twentieth century. He has also served as an advisor to a number of agencies and departments within the U.S. Government on matters pertaining to host-microbe interactions, emerging infectious diseases, and biosecurity. He co-chaired a widely-cited 2006 study by the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) on “Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences”, and served as vice-chair of a 2011 National Academies study of the science underlying the FBI investigation of the 2001 anthrax mailings. He currently serves as a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (2005-), a member of the Committee on Science, Technology, and Law at the National Academy of Science (2012-15), a member of the Science, Technology & Engineering Advisory Panel for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (2012-), as Chair of the Forum on Microbial Threats at the Institute of Medicine (NAS) (2007-), and as President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America (2012-2013).

Dr. Relman received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT (1977), M.D. (magna cum laude) from Harvard Medical School (1982), completed his clinical training in internal medicine and infectious diseases at Massachusetts General Hospital, served as a postdoctoral fellow in microbiology at Stanford University, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. He received an NIH Director’s Pioneer Award in 2006, was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology in 2003 and the American Association for Advancement of Science in 2010, and was elected a Member of the Institute of Medicine in 2011.

 

 

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David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. He is also Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford, and served as science co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford from 2013-2017. He is currently director of a new Biosecurity Initiative at FSI.

Relman was an early pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiota. Most recently, his work has focused on human microbial community assembly, and community stability and resilience in the face of disturbance. Ecological theory and predictions are tested in clinical studies with multiple approaches for characterizing the human microbiome. Previous work included the development of molecular methods for identifying novel microbial pathogens, and the subsequent identification of several historically important microbial disease agents. One of his papers was selected as “one of the 50 most important publications of the past century” by the American Society for Microbiology.

Dr. Relman received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT, M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. He served as vice-chair of the NAS Committee that reviewed the science performed as part of the FBI investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters, as a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, and as President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board and the Committee on Science, Technology and the Law, both at the National Academies of Science. He has received an NIH Pioneer Award, an NIH Transformative Research Award, and was elected a member of the National Academy of Medicine in 2011.

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David Relman Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor, Departments of Medicine and of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford School of Medicine; CISAC Co-Director; FSI Senior Fellow; Stanford Health Policy Affiliate Speaker
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From the 1950s through the 1970s, the success of antibiotics and vaccines in controlling or eradicating infectious diseases (ID) worldwide resulted in decreased emphasis on development of ID therapeutics. The emergence in the past three decades of HIV, SARS, West Nile, avian flu, swine flu, Ebola, and the potential for bioterrorist attacks has reversed this trend and renewed interest in treatment and prophylaxis of ID. Unfortunately, because many diseases are prevalent primarily in developing nations (e.g., malaria, TB, Chagas), potential sales of bioterrorist pathogens are limited mainly to orders for government stockpiles (e.g., anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin), and the cost of anti-infective clinical trials is high, traditional large pharmaceutical companies have cut back R&D resources in this arena. To combat this investment shortfall, a new paradigm has emerged where public-private partnerships between the NIH, World Health Organization, private foundations, academia, and non-profits, are beginning to function like pharmaceutical companies to advance the development of promising ID drugs, even when there is little opportunity for profit. This talk will discuss the growing need for ID therapeutics, present some new models for discovering and developing them, and provide examples of public-private partnerships that have advanced therapeutics for specific infectious diseases.


About the speaker: Dr. Jon C. Mirsalis is Managing Director of the Biosciences Division and Executive Director of Preclinical Development at SRI International in Menlo Park, CA. Dr. Mirsalis is an internationally recognized expert in the development of drugs for infectious diseases. He manages two large programs for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for the development of promising therapeutics for the prevention and treatment of a broad range of infectious diseases including TB, malaria, influenza, polio, anthrax, plague, and Ebola. He has personally been involved in the development of over 50 therapeutics that have entered clinical trials and several have already reached the market. Before joining SRI in 1981, Dr. Mirsalis was a postdoctoral fellow at the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology, where he developed the in vivo-in vitro hepatocyte DNA repair assay, which is now widely used as a screen for potential carcinogens by government and industry. He is the author of over 140 publications and abstracts. Dr. Mirsalis received his B.S. degree in zoology/molecular biology from Kent State University, his M.S. degree in genetics from North Carolina State University, and holds Ph.D. degrees in toxicology and genetics from North Carolina State University. Dr. Mirsalis has an adjunct faculty appointment with the University of California-Santa Cruz, where he lectures regularly on genetic toxicology and carcinogenesis. He has recently served on the Board of Scientific Councilors for the National Toxicology Program, the Advisory Board for the Critical Path Institute, and is a past member of the FDA’s Over-the-Country Product Review Committee. Dr. Mirsalis has been certified by the American Board of Toxicology since 1983.

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David Relman, a Stanford microbiologist and professor of infectious diseases, has taken up the mantle as CISAC co-director alongside Stanford law professor Tino Cuéllar, both of whom intend to broaden the center’s research in biosecurity and the life sciences.

Relman, the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor at Stanford’s School of Medicine and chief of infectious disease at the VA Palo Alto Healthcare System, has advised the U.S. government about pathogen diversity, dual-use technology and biosecurity. He also is the current president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

“The appointment of a life scientist who focuses on infectious diseases and biosecurity is an innovative step for our work in international security and cooperation,” said Gerhard Casper, president emeritus of Stanford University and director of CISAC’s umbrella organization, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Relman succeeds Siegfried S. Hecker, a nuclear scientist and director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, who was the CISAC co-director since 2007. One of the world’s foremost experts on plutonium, nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, Hecker is on sabbatical in New Mexico and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. He is working on a book about his historic efforts to foster collaboration between U.S. and Russian nuclear labs, as well as traveling to meet his nonproliferation counterparts in parts of Europe and Russia.

Hecker will return to CISAC this summer to resume his teaching in the Department of Management Science and Engineering, as well as his writing and research as a senior fellow at CISAC and FSI.

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Bangladesh is one of the highest risk settings for emergence of new strains of influenza. Some of these strains could infect humans and spread globally causing widespread human mortality. The government of Bangladesh has made genuine efforts to reduce this risk, but these efforts are constrained by the limited capacity of government institutions to affect the situations and behaviors that generate this ongoing risk.
 
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Dr. Luby comes to us from the International Center for Diarrheal Diseases and Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR, B) after serving as the research director there for the past eight years in a shared position with CDC.  Prior to this position, he taught at the Aga Khan University in Pakistan. He will be leading our research efforts within CIGH and we are looking forward to his start in September 2012.

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Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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Prof. Stephen Luby studied philosophy and earned a Bachelor of Arts summa cum laude from Creighton University. He then earned his medical degree from the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School at Dallas and completed his residency in internal medicine at the University of Rochester-Strong Memorial Hospital. He studied epidemiology and preventive medicine at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Prof. Luby's former positions include leading the Epidemiology Unit of the Community Health Sciences Department at the Aga Khan University in Karachi, Pakistan, for five years and working as a Medical Epidemiologist in the Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) exploring causes and prevention of diarrheal disease in settings where diarrhea is a leading cause of childhood death.  Immediately prior to joining the Stanford faculty, Prof. Luby served for eight years at the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), where he directed the Centre for Communicable Diseases. He was also the Country Director for CDC in Bangladesh.

During his over 25 years of public health work in low-income countries, Prof. Luby frequently encountered political and governance difficulties undermining efforts to improve public health. His work within the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) connects him with a community of scholars who provide ideas and approaches to understand and address these critical barriers.

 

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