Environment

FSI scholars approach their research on the environment from regulatory, economic and societal angles. The Center on Food Security and the Environment weighs the connection between climate change and agriculture; the impact of biofuel expansion on land and food supply; how to increase crop yields without expanding agricultural lands; and the trends in aquaculture. FSE’s research spans the globe – from the potential of smallholder irrigation to reduce hunger and improve development in sub-Saharan Africa to the devastation of drought on Iowa farms. David Lobell, a senior fellow at FSI and a recipient of a MacArthur “genius” grant, has looked at the impacts of increasing wheat and corn crops in Africa, South Asia, Mexico and the United States; and has studied the effects of extreme heat on the world’s staple crops.

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Walter Falcon, the Helen Farnsworth Professor of International Agricultural Policy in Economics (emeritus), writes from an unusual perspective. During the academic year he serves as a senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. He spends the summers on his family farm near Marion, Iowa. He returns to campus each year with reflections on the challenges and rewards of faming life in his "Almanac Report." Falcon is former deputy director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment. 

September means that it is time again for my annual Iowa farm report, the sixth edition in this series. As readers of prior postings will remember, my day job is Professor of International Agricultural Policy at Stanford University. However, my wife and I also own a 200-acre farm near Marion, Iowa, where we spend summers watching over corn, soybean, and alfalfa fields, and gazing out at a growing cow-calf herd.

After all these years, it is still difficult for me to describe the differences in pace, politics, and age structure in Iowa relative to California. I am now 81, and at Stanford I feel ancient; in Iowa, I am just one of the boys, since 41 percent of farm owners are 75 or older. 

This summer’s weather, especially rainfall, has been almost perfect for crops in our area. Although western Iowa and the northern Great Plains experienced drought, we are expecting record yields of both corn and soybeans, possibly reaching 225 and 55 bushels per acre, respectively. Unfortunately, December corn prices are only about $3.50 per bushel. This level is just half of what it was five years ago. The old adage that farmers should raise more hell and less corn has taken on new meaning. Average prices of Iowa farmland have slipped from about $9,000 to $7,000 per acre during the past five years (though still remarkably high relative to the $2,000 that prevailed in 2000). Renters of land are also feeling price pressures. Average cash rents have fallen about 10 percent over the past two years and now average about $230 per acre in our part of the state.

The difference between the “almost perfect” weather described above and an absolute disaster measured about three miles this year. During much of June, our area was hit with very unstable air. The worst episode was on June 28 when an EF-2 tornado came barreling right at our farm. The picture below was taken out of the west window before we scampered down to the safe room in our basement. At the last minute, the tornado veered slightly, going just between our farm and the bustling county fair (also shown) four miles to the north. The tornado then touched down a few miles to our east, crushed the historic Brown farm, and mostly destroyed the small town of Prairieburg. Amazingly, both our farm and the fair were completely spared except for a few broken tree limbs.

There is an interesting footnote on risk to this story. When I show the tornado picture to my California friends they cannot understand why I would live in such a risky place; however, my Iowa friends frequently remark that they cannot comprehend how I can live in the risky state of California with its earthquakes. Risk, like beauty, is sometimes in the eyes of the beholder.

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Photo: Karla Hogan (just to the west of our house)

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Photo: David Roll (fair)

Not everything from the sky was bad this year, although one other episode also turned out to be a non-event. Our region was to have had 90 percent coverage during the eclipse. We were completely socked in by clouds, however, and could see absolutely nothing on this historic occasion. On the other hand, airplane applications of fungicides and pesticides were greater than I can ever remember. A combination of new weeds to the region (water hemp and Palmer amaranth) and growing weed resistance in Roundup-ready soybeans are causing increased problems for farmers. As for the applicators, I never cease to be impressed by the skill (craziness?) of those pilots who fly at 50 feet or less, dodging power lines, while managing controls of the spray equipment as well as the plane.

Describing another “sky” event at the farm requires that I first remove considerable amounts of egg from my face. Stanford sits in the middle of Silicon Valley, and over the past decade perhaps a dozen firms have visited my office regarding agricultural applications. Particularly in the earlier years, I assured them that precision agriculture was overrated and that drones would never have a place in agriculture. Those were not among my better forecasts!

My conjecture is that more than 90 percent of the fields in Iowa have now been laid out with GPS grid maps that permit automatic steering of tractors and harvesters. Famers rarely steer or look ahead; rather they mostly look backward at planters and other equipment. From gauge-filled cabs that resemble cockpits, farmers monitor yields, seed-planting rates, and fertilizer applications in ways that produce field maps for each 10x10 meter sub-plot. In some sense, producers already have more data than they can assimilate, so one could reasonably ask, can drones really help? It turns out that they can, and they can do so for only a small investment.

The high quality drone shown below, complete with two 30-minute batteries, costs about $2,000, with quality determined mostly by the precision of its camera. (That sum may not be petty cash, but it is not in the same league as a $600,000 combine-harvester either.) For mapping work, drones are connected to an off-site service center that costs about $100 per month. They produce video in real-time, snap images as well, and are proving useful in determining if the number of emergent plants (really the lack of plants) on areas that may require replanting; in checking fields for “wet spots” after rains for indicators of future tiling needs; and watching the cow herd from the back porch, as is also shown below. Applications are ever underway that can take the temperatures of animals via intricate heat-sensing devices.

Once corn grows to chest high, it is impossible to walk or drive through fields to isolate areas with particular weed problems or to view pest damage. These drones are also tied in with GPS systems, so that entire fields can be mapped “automatically” at very high resolution. A 100-acre field can be mapped within the 25 minutes of a single battery-powered flight. (The further good news is that the machines are smart enough to return to their takeoff point before losing power.) Drones seem to be here to stay because they save labor, generate useful data, and help improve farm-management practices

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Photo: Margaret Meythaler (drone demo)

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Photo: Mitch Meythaler (field map by drone—August 5th corn plant health (potential yield); red is low, green is high; dark red areas are waterways and fence rows; sandy soils show red to the north, and red streaks indicate water erosion.)

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Photo: Mitch Meythaler (part of cow herd by drone)

Drones, however, have not affected my image of the old limestone “restaurant” where neighborhood farmers gather about 8 a.m. Most of the “action” is around the big table where truly terrible coffee is self-served. Payment is on the honor system, since there is rarely a waitress around. Maybe it was just my imagination, but farmer discussions seemed more somber and narrower this year, despite the good weather. Perhaps it is the third successive year of low prices, or the uncertainty about corn exports to Mexico and China, or the general chaos in Washington, D.C. Perhaps it also reflects the ethnic and religious homogeneity of the local population. Stanford’s undergraduate student body, for example, is only 45 percent white. However, during the course of all of my personal interactions during four months in Iowa, I encountered only three minority persons – two medical doctors at the local hospital whose families came from India, and one African-American. Homogeneity and diversity make for different worldviews and different conversations – neither being necessarily better or worse, but certainly different.

The most animated discussion I participated in concerned technology gone astray. Large chemical companies, such as Monsanto and DuPont, have purchased many seed companies, thereby assuring markets for their particular brand of chemicals. In the case of corn, for example, a particular GMO variety has been bred such that, when sprayed by a particular brand, all plants are killed except for the corn. Spraying these herbicides requires training and specialized equipment, and herbicide applications are frequently hired – typically for about $8 per acre, plus the cost of chemicals. As part of the new technology, the specific corn variety and the particular brand of spray are entered into the software that then uses GPS maps to control the actual spraying. But what happens when the hired vendor, in this case a local co-operative, enters the wrong variety into the computer, as happened to two of our neighbors? The spray killed the weeds, but it also killed the corn. At that point, it was too late in the season to replant. These fields were sorry looking messes, and the debate still continues as to who is liable and for how much.

Another hot button item this year centered on the purchase of farmland for housing developments. Farmers almost universally regard such investments as unwarranted intrusions into their space. (The proposed relocation of the county landfill generated even more vehement responses.) The housing argument typically took two forms: more houses mean more children and therefore higher property taxes for schools; and theses houses take “all of the good Iowa farmland”, which is needed to feed the world. There is some correctness to the former argument, but as to the latter assertion – not so much. I argued that for the last five years, total acres of corn and soybeans in Iowa had trended upward rather than downward, and that furthermore, both current and future problems of hunger were driven primarily by poverty, not the lack of corn and soybean supplies. This comment was not regarded as being helpful to the coffee-crowd discussion!

Politics are rarely discussed in these conversations – at least in my presence. However, I sense several things. Although Iowans voted for Donald Trump, I think it was because they generally disliked him less than they disliked Hilary Clinton. Most of my neighbors now simply seem embarrassed by what is happening. My California friends continue to ask me about what Iowans think and what they believe in. There is not much open discussion about these matters either, which made a July poll of the Des Moines Register all the more interesting. When given a choice of 17 options of whom they believed, the top six in order were: the armed forces, God, the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, local schools, the Farm Bureau, and the FBI. The three options they believed in least, also in order from the bottom, were the U.S. Congress, the media, and the President. I do not know what a comparable survey in California would look like, but I believe that it would be considerably different.

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Photo: Daryl Hamey (2016 calves — the red heifer is now bred, and the black baldy steer is now in the freezer!)

At the end of last year’s report, I left readers hanging with the question of whether our seemingly disinterested yearling bull would produce a crop of calves. It turns out that my fears were misplaced, and that he was indeed working the night shift. Our problems were in fact on the female side—our best cow did not conceive, and another of our good cows produced a sickly calf that ended up being bottle-fed by my wife. To compete the story, we again rented a red Angus bull – the same one in fact that we had last year – and he is now a much larger two-year old. But he is still no competition for “Upward”, the strangely named Angus super-bull winner at the Iowa State Fair that weighed 2,798 pounds.

I leave in a week for yet another year of teaching and research at Stanford. I have only a limited number of lectures scheduled, and most of my time will be directed toward research on the growing importance of tropical vegetable oils, particularly from oil palm in Indonesia. Palm oil has recently replaced soybean oil as the most important in world commerce, so even when I am in California, there remain important and unusual Iowa connections.

My neighbor says that I must leave Iowa soon – because of the upcoming weather. In true Almanac fashion, he confidently predicts an early and harsh winter ahead. His evidence – the deer are weaning their young at an early date, and are busy consuming great quantities of corn from our fields, so as to layer on fat for the winter. We might even be able to see the extent of their gluttony on our autumn yield maps!

 

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The Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) on August 26 hosted a forum, “Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization,” which included the launch of a book of the same name and a panel discussion. 

The book explores the key institutional and governance challenges China will face in reaching its ambitious targets for sustainable, human-centered, and environmentally friendly urbanization as part of the next phase of the country’s National New Urbanization Plan (2014-20). Book authors Karen Eggleston, Director of the Asia Health Policy Program at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and Senior Fellow in Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Jean C. Oi, Stanford’s William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics, Founding Director of Shorenstein APARC’s China Program and SCPKU Director, and Wang Yiming, Vice President and Senior Research Fellow at the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), attended the launch and participated in the panel discussion.  In her welcoming remarks, Professor Oi briefly introduced the book, the result of a close, 5-year collaboration between Shorenstein APARC and the NDRC. In addition to qualitative data and fieldwork, the book covers comparative analyses among countries, such as the spatial distribution of urbanization in China, India and the United States.

Other panel speakers included Canfei He, Dean of Peking University’s College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Yulong Shi, Director of NDRC’s Institute of Spatial Planning and Regional Economy, Yongzhi Hou, Director-General and Research Fellow of the Department of Development Strategy and Regional Economy at the Development Research Center of the State Council, and Sangay Penjor, Director of the Asian Development Bank’s Urban and Social Sectors Division, East Asia Department. 

During the panel discussion, Dr. Hou pointed out that the publication gave an accurate and objective description of China’s urbanization that could help deepen the understanding of problems in China’s urbanization efforts.

Wang Yiming summarized the book’s content in the context of the household registration system, land system, public service, housing system, finance, financial policy, and administration policy. He suggested that in past forty years, a large number of the rural population has moved to form enormous urban hubs in various cities in China. The Chinese government is targeting 100 million of the 260 million people who are residing in cities to complete their citizenization by 2020. Prof. Wang introduced current urbanization reform plans to close this gap, policies that relate to the household registration system, urban “zero threshold” access, and policies on public services such as education and health care, and intergenerational inheritance.

 

 

 

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China urbanization experts participate in the forum's panel discussion at SCPKU on August 26, 2017.
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The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford is now accepting applications for the Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship in Contemporary Asia, an opportunity made available to two junior scholars for research and writing on Asia.

Fellows conduct research on contemporary political, economic or social change in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to Shorenstein APARC’s publications, conferences and related activities. To read about this year’s fellows, please click here.

The fellowship is a 10-mo. appointment during the 2018-19 academic year, and carries a salary rate of $52,000 plus $2,000 for research expenses.

For further information and to apply, please click here. The application deadline is Dec. 20, 2017.

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Abstract: We live in a world where the risks from a changing climate are clear. New research highlights the magnitude of the risks and the benefits of rapid, ambitious action. We also live in a world where the technologies for addressing climate change, for limiting the amount of climate change that occurs and for dealing as effectively as possible with the changes that cannot be avoided, are increasingly mature, affordable, and rich with co-benefits. In many ways and in many places, progress in deploying solutions is dramatic. But worldwide, progress is much slower than it needs to be, if we are to avoid the worst impacts. We need to find a global accelerator pedal for climate solutions. Key enablers include steps to level the economic playing field, government investments to drive down the costs and risks of technology solutions, and novel mechanisms to spur international collaboration.

Speaker Bio: Chris Field is the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and Melvin and Joan Lane Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies. His research focuses on climate change, ranging from work on improving climate models, to prospects for renewable energy systems, to community organizations that can minimize the risk of a tragedy of the commons. Field was the founding director of the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology, a position he held from 2002 to 2016. He was co-chair of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from 2008-2015, where he led the effort on the IPCC Special Report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation”  (2012) and the Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. His widely cited work has earned many recognitions, including election to the US National Academy of Sciences, the Max Planck Research Award, and the Roger Revelle Medal.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

Chris Field Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University
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Associate Professor, Health Policy
Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Associate Professor, Economics (by courtesy)
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Maya Rossin-Slater is an Associate Professor of Health Policy at Stanford University School of Medicine. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic and Policy Research (SIEPR), a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and a Research Fellow at the Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). She received her PhD in Economics from Columbia University in 2013, and was an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara from 2013 to 2017, prior to coming to Stanford. Rossin-Slater’s research includes work in health, public, and labor economics. She focuses on issues in maternal and child well-being, family structure and behavior, and policies targeting disadvantaged populations in the United States and other developed countries.

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In a Q&A with Elisabeth Eaves at The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, CISAC's Siegfried Hecker explains how the latest North Korean nuclear test is different, what North Korea's capabilities are now and how the U.S. could respond.

With North Korea testing missiles at a steady pace, the Bulletin has been checking in regularly with Siegfried S. Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory who has visited North Korean nuclear facilities multiple times. We talked to him again after last Sunday, when, as many Americans enjoyed the Labor Day long weekend, Pyongyang conducted a powerful underground nuclear test, its sixth ever and first in a year. The device detonated may or may not have been a hydrogen bomb, but we do know it was significantly more powerful than any nuclear weapon North Korea has tested before. In this interview, Hecker weighs in on what this means, what the North is capable of, and how to get out of the dangerous game of nuclear brinksmanship now embroiling Northeast Asia and the United States.

BAS: To the general public, there has been so much nuclear news out of North Korea lately that this one might sound like “just another test.” So please put it in context for us: What was different about North Korea’s September 3rd nuclear test? How did it differ in magnitude from previous tests, and what does that tell us?

SH: The destructive power of North Korea’s previous five nuclear tests had progressed to about 25 kilotons, roughly the same as the bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. This test was greater than 100 kilotons; that’s a big deal. It indicates they have progressed considerably beyond primitive fission-bomb technologies.

BAS: Was this one really a hydrogen bomb, and how would we know?

SH: The size of the blast was consistent with a hydrogen bomb—that is, a fusion-based bomb. However, it could also have been a large “boosted” fission bomb, in which the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium were used to enhance the fission yield. If any telltale radioactive debris leaked from the underground test site, that could help us differentiate, but so far none has been found. So we can’t be certain.

BAS: What would it mean if it was a hydrogen bomb? Would that be a game changer?

SH: No, I don’t see a hydrogen bomb as a game changer. The North has been steadily enhancing its nuclear weapons in that direction. It was only a matter of time before it got there—although, if this one was a small, modern, two-stage hydrogen bomb, then I am surprised it got there so quickly. For years, I have followed the country’s steady progress on producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the fuels for fission bombs. And I concluded some time ago that it also has the ability to produce tritium, which is necessary for a boosted fission bomb or a hydrogen bomb.

BAS: But hydrogen bombs are a thousand times more powerful than fission bombs. Doesn’t that change the military threat?

SH: True, hydrogen bombs can be a thousand times more powerful. In fact, there is no theoretical limit to their destructive power. However, what is much more important is whether any nuclear bomb—fission or a fusion—can be made sufficiently small and light to mount on a missile, as well as robust enough to survive the missile’s launch, flight and atmospheric re-entry. Even a fission bomb of 25 kilotons delivered to Seoul or Los Angeles would cause horrific damage. So sure, a hydrogen bomb with very high destructive power would be worse, and have the advantage of being deliverable on a much-less-accurate missile, but the damage from a fission bomb would already be unacceptable.

BAS: Does the latest test change the political dynamics?

SH: Yes, it does. Washington was already suffering from its preoccupation with keeping North Korea from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) instead of dealing with the nuclear crisis that already threatened Northeast Asia. President Trump seemed to have made ICBMs his red line, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un blasted right past that in July and August. If you add the specter of a hydrogen bomb, that creates an enormous dilemma for the Trump administration in terms of how to assure the American public it will be protected. In Pyongyang, meanwhile, they surely must see being able to field hydrogen bombs as leveling the playing field. A hydrogen bomb would put them in the elite company of the so-called P-5 states, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France. It would increase Pyongyang’s leverage should it ever come back to the negotiating table.

BAS: When we spoke in August, you said that Pyongyang’s ability to reach the continental United States with a nuclear-tipped missile was still some years away. Has last Sunday’s nuclear test changed your view?

SH: Well, they got closer with this test, as they do with each missile and nuclear test. They may still be a few years away, but they are very competent at climbing a learning curve and making rapid progress. Besides, they are determined. Continued progress with either boosted fission bombs or hydrogen bombs—through more nuclear testing—will make it possible to fit the bombs on an ICBM. However, they still need to do a lot of work to get their weapons to survive the extreme launch, flight, and re-entry conditions.

BAS: Have North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests done any actual physical harm to the United States or other countries?

SH: It certainly is confusing for the general public to hear about all these missile tests—flying toward Guam or over Japan. It is important to stress that these are tests of rocket technologies in which the rockets carry surrogates, not explosives or nuclear bombs, so there is no damage.

The nuclear tests, such as the sixth one last weekend, are enormously powerful, but the destruction is contained underground in a mountain. We must keep in mind that the United States conducted 1,054 nuclear tests between 1945 and 1992, when we stopped. Until 1963, more than 200 of them were detonated in the atmosphere, causing radioactive fallout. The Soviets, by the way, conducted 715 tests over roughly the same time frame, and the Chinese 45. All six North Korean nuclear tests have been underground and well-contained. The possibility of radioactive leakage from these tests, however, is one of China’s greatest concerns since the test site is close to the border.

BAS: Several hours before the test, the North Korean official news agency KCNA posted photos of Kim Jong-un inspecting what it called a two-stage thermonuclear bomb. Do you believe that is what was tested?

SH: The images undoubtedly showed a model rather than the real device, but it had features generally consistent with a two-stage thermonuclear device, that is, a modern hydrogen bomb. The photos showed Kim inspecting the model in front of a schematic of the Hwasong-14 ICBM re-entry vehicle, and next to a mockup of its nose cone. The model appeared to have dimensions that would allow it to be mounted inside the ICBM. Clearly, that’s what the North Koreans would like us to believe, that they have mastered the ability to deliver a thermonuclear-tipped missile to the US mainland. However, we have no way of knowing if the device tested was of this design. The model could quite easily be constructed based on drawings of two-stage thermonuclear bombs available on the Internet. Nevertheless, I have learned not to underestimate the North Korean nuclear specialists.

BAS: Does the time interval between this nuclear test and North Korea’s last nuclear test tell us anything about technological progress they may be making?

SH: North Korea has been very methodical and deliberate about nuclear testing. The fact that it conducted six tests over such an extended period, beginning in October 2006, gave its nuclear scientists a chance to learn a lot between tests. I believe North Korea learned much more from its tests than did India or Pakistan, which conducted almost all of their six respective tests over a short time period with little chance to learn from one to the next. However, there was another reason for the slow, deliberate pace: North Korea lacked sufficient fissile materials, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium, until quite recently. The regime must also have weighed the likelihood of adverse actions from China, but as this last test shows, it was determined to proceed regardless of Chinese and international reaction.

BAS: The news coverage sometimes implies that Kim Jong-un, who took power in 2011 after his father and grandfather before him, is especially impatient and determined to develop a threatening nuclear arsenal. Do you see it that way?

SH: Not necessarily. North Korea has been making deliberate, steady progress on nuclear and missile advances since at least 2009, when all serious dialogue with Pyongyang ended. Progress, particularly on the missile front, has accelerated since Kim Jong-un took the reins at the end of 2011, but the foundations for the nuclear and missile programs were already built. It does appear that Kim Jong-un has brought a more effective, hands-on management style to move the programs forward.

BAS: In photos the KCNA released last weekend, one of the men alongside Kim Jong-un appears to be Ri Hong-sop, head of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute. A Reuters news report, which identifies Ri in an earlier photo, says you met with him during your visits to Yongbyon. Is that so, and what can you tell us about him?

SH: Dr. Ri Hong-sop was director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center during my first visit in January 2004. I was impressed with his technical competency as well as his honest and direct answers to my technical questions during the tour, in which he gave our Stanford team remarkable access to the Yongbyon plutonium facilities. In a fascinating exchange about the intricacies of plutonium metallurgy, he even allowed me to hold a sample of recently produced plutonium—in a sealed glass jar—to convince me it really was plutonium.

BAS: Was that the only time you met with Ri?

SH: No, we met during several of my seven visits to North Korea, although by the fourth visit in 2007, he was no longer director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Center. I was told he had moved to Pyongyang to advise the General Department of Atomic Energy. When I asked about him during my last visit in November 2010, my host told me somewhat sarcastically that my government wouldn’t let me meet him because the latest UN sanctions had put him on a blacklist. Much of what we know about the North Korean nuclear complex comes from discussions we had with technical professionals in Yongbyon. So much for the benefits of sanctions: They didn’t slow down the North’s progress on its nuclear program, but eliminated one of the few windows we had into it.

BAS: An official KCNA statement quoted Kim Jong-un as saying, “all components of the H-bomb were homemade … thus enabling the country to produce powerful nuclear weapons as many as it wants.” You have previously said that North Korea has only limited inventories of fissile materials, the fuel required for bomb making. Do you still consider that to be the case? How many bombs could it make now?

SH: North Korea cannot produce “as many as it wants,” although it is making progress on both fusion and fission fuels. It appears to have produced lithium deuteride, which can be used to produce the tritium fuel for hydrogen bombs, but likely has only small inventories of tritium for boosted fission devices. And it still has relatively small inventories of fissile materials for the fission bombs that are required to trigger the fusion device.

Although they do involve great uncertainty, I believe my previous estimates still hold: By the end of 2016, North Korea had enough bomb fuel—roughly 20 to 40 kilograms of plutonium and 200 to 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—to make 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, with an annual production capacity of six to seven bombs’ worth. If they continue to test and develop more sophisticated hydrogen bombs that could use less fissile material, we’ll have to revise that upwards. However, I don’t concur with the leaked intelligence estimate that they have up to 60 nuclear weapons now.

BAS: The KCNA statement also touted North Korea’s ability to launch a “super-powerful EMP attack” against the United States. EMP is short for electromagnetic pulse. Could you explain what an EMP attack is, and whether this is a credible threat?

SH: The idea of an EMP attack would be to detonate a nuclear weapon tens of miles above Earth’s surface with the goal of knocking out the US power grid and causing other electrical disruptions.

I don’t see this as something the United States needs to worry about now. First, North Korea has a lot of work to do to develop the right nuclear device for an intense EMP weapon. Second, how would an EMP attack help Pyongyang achieve its objective of deterring the United States? If Pyongyang used such a weapon against the United States, Washington would consider that an act of war, which would likely lead to the end of the Kim Jong-un regime.

What the EMP comment does show, however, is how closely the North Koreans follow the American press, which has published reports by some American alarmists wringing their hands about this threat. The North Koreans were even clever enough to have researchers from Pyongyang’s Kim Chaek University of Technology write a short brief about EMP, with the conclusion that it represents an important “strike” method.

BAS: Could the comment by American UN Ambassador Nikki Haley that North Korea is “begging for war” hold any truth—that is, might Kim Jong-un see some benefit in getting to the point of actual military conflict? I know he’s probably a pretty rational actor, but leaders have been known to think they might benefit from war.

SH: I don’t think so. Kim Jong-un’s only hope of survival is to avoid war. He apparently believes that in order to survive, he has to be able to threaten the United States not only with ICBMs, but with ICBMs tipped with hydrogen bombs.

BAS: You’ve previously argued that the Trump administration must talk directly to North Korea as the next step in resolving the nuclear crisis. But both Haley and Trump have said the “time for talking is over.” So now what?

SH: I’m afraid the Trump administration is compounding the mistakes of past US administrations with such comments, along with threats of “fire and fury.” This rhetoric will make it all the more difficult for Washington to take the necessary steps to avoid a nuclear confrontation with North Korea. We need to face reality—the way we got into this situation is that we haven’t talked seriously since 2009.

BAS: “Talks” can mean different things to different people. Should the US negotiate? Or accept a nuclear-armed North Korea? Does talking constitute “appeasement,” as Trump accused South Korean President Moon Jae-in of pursuing?

SH: The US administration should dispatch a small team to talk to Kim Jong-un to establish mechanisms to avoid misunderstandings, miscalculations, or misinterpretations that could quickly send us over the cliff into nuclear war. The talks would not be a reward or a concession to Pyongyang, nor should they be construed as signaling acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Such talks are not meant to appease Pyongyang as they would not offer any rewards. They could, however, deliver the message that while Washington fully intends to defend itself and its allies from any attack with a devastating retaliatory response, it does not otherwise intend to attack the North or pursue regime change. I realize that talking so soon after North Korea made such a major nuclear weapons advance may make it look like the US administration blinked first. But I consider that much less dangerous than stumbling into a nuclear war, which could happen if we pursue other actions being considered by the administration.

These talks would not be negotiations—not yet. Rather, they are a necessary step toward re-establishing critical lines of communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. Negotiations on denuclearization might follow, but that would require a much longer time frame and coordination with China, Russia, and US allies

 

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Hurricane Harvey and Irma have brought home to everyone the impact of climate change on our economy, our society, and our daily lives. Curtailing climate change is an urgent issue, one that requires international cooperation. In this session experts from Japan and the United States discuss some of the lessons that have been learned from Asia’s experiences. In the case of Japan, following the period of high growth (1960s-1980) which made Japan an economic power house, the government took strong steps to clean up polluted air and water. The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in 2011 forced Japan to take even more aggressive action to reduce energy consumption and lessen its impact on the global environment. In contrast, the United States, the world’s largest economy, is one of the world’s largest polluters and recently made headlines when it withdrew from the Paris Agreement negotiated at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP2). California, and other state and municipal governments, are now taking the lead in US efforts to deal with climate change. Speakers will address questions on strategies for limiting carbon emissions and possibilities for future international cooperation on climate change.

Shorenstein APARC is pleased to host the Abe Fellows Global Forum (Abe Global) inaugural season’s flagship event. A new initiative of the Abe Fellowship Program, Abe Global brings the research and expertise of Abe Fellows on issues of global concern to broader audiences. The event is co-organized with the Social Science Research Council, in collaboration with the Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation, which funds the Abe Fellowship Program

 

Abe Fellows Global Forum
Confronting Climate Change:
What Can the U.S. and Japan Contribute to Creating Sustainable Societies?

 

Conference Program

13:30-14:00     Registration

14:00-14:20     Welcome remarks

       Takeo Hoshi, Director, Japan Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University

       Junichi Chano, Executive Director, CGP

       Opening Remarks

       George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution,

        Stanford University

14:20-14:45     Keynote Speech

                             Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC Fellow, APARC, Stanford University

14:45-15:00     Break

15:00-17:00     Panel Discussion “What Can the US and Japan Contribute to Creating Sustainable Societies?”

                  Moderator:      Takeo Hoshi

       Presenters:      Toshi H. Arimura,  Waseda Univeristy

                              Janelle Knox-Hayes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

                               Phillip Lipscy, Stanford University

                               Dana Buntrock, University of California, Berkeley

                               Michael Armacost, Stanford University

16:55                 Closing Remarks

                               Linda Grove, Consulting Director, SSRC 

17:00-18:00     Cocktail Reception

Conferences
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Abstract: As a potential measure of mitigating the contribution of fossil fuel emissions to global warming, carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) entails capturing CO2 from from large industrial sources, compressing it to a dense supercritical form (scCO2), injecting it deep into suitable reservoirs, and storing it permanently. After 20+ years of research on CCS, including various applied studies involving pilot and demonstration projects, many stakeholders believe that the world is now ready to move from demonstration to industrial-scale implementation. Yet many hurdles remain, ranging from mostly technical nature to economic and public perception issues. This talk provides a broad overview of the decades of research on CO2 and discusses what has been learned versus what challenges remain. The presentation also elaborates on California as an interesting example for the complicated road to deployment at scale, as ambitious climate goals and generous carbon credits should provide for project economics to work, yet no California CCS project has materialized to date.

Speaker Bio: Jens Birkholzer is an internationally recognized expert in subsurface energy applications and environmental impact assessment. He is a Senior Scientist at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL, Berkeley Lab) in Berkeley, California, and currently serves as the Director for the Energy Geosciences Division (EGD) at LBNL. He received his Ph.D. in water resources, hydrology, and soil science from Aachen University of Technology in Germany in 1994. Jens joined LBNL in 1994, left for a management position in his native Germany in 1999, and eventually returned to LBNL in 2001. He has over 400 scientific publications, about 125 of which are in peer-reviewed journals, in addition to numerous research reports. He serves as the Associate Editor of the International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control (IJGGC) and is also on the Board of Editorial Policy Advisors for the Journal of Geomechanics for Energy and Environment (GETE). Jens leads the international DECOVALEX Project as its Chairman, is a Fellow of the Geological Society of America, and serves as a Senior Fellow of the California Council on Science and Technology.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

Jens Birkholzer Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
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A new biosecurity initiative at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) aims to identify and mitigate biological risks, both natural and man-made, and safeguard the future of the life sciences and associated technologies.

The initiative will be led by David A. Relman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and FSI. Relman, the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and Microbiology & Immunology, has served as the science co-director at CISAC for the past four years. He will leave this position on Aug. 31 to lead the new initiative.

Michael McFaul, director and senior fellow at FSI, said, “With exceptional leadership skills, valuable experience and abundant energy, David Relman is ideally positioned to work with scholars from across campus who offer critical expertise in biosecurity. This is an exciting, challenging and important new initiative for FSI that is designed to protect public health from the many new risks now accelerating.”

Relman said the biosecurity initiative will seek to advance the beneficial applications of the life sciences while reducing the risks of misuse by promoting research, education and policy outreach in biological security. His CISAC leadership gives him the know-how to lead such a wide-ranging effort across diverse disciplines and communities.

Relman said, “The opportunity to serve as co-director at CISAC has been a wonderful experience, one that has afforded me the chance to get to know outstanding faculty and staff, their scholarship, and critical policy-relevant work, all of which I had not fully appreciated sitting across campus. This experience has made clear the unusual qualities of Stanford University, and the great people that work here. I am now greatly looking forward to this new opportunity at FSI.”

Biosecurity collaborations

During Relman’s term as CISAC’s science co-director from 2013-2017, he led an expansion of the transdisciplinary work in science and security to include biology, biological and other areas of engineering, medicine, and earth and environmental sciences.

The foundations for work in biological science, technology and security were established at CISAC, especially in the hiring of Megan Palmer, a senior research scholar at CISAC and FSI. Both Relman and Palmer worked together on engagements and discussions with a growing network of more than 20 faculty involved in biosecurity across Stanford.

Palmer said, “Stanford has an opportunity and imperative to advance security strategies for biological science and technology in a global age. Our faculty bring together expertise in areas including technology, policy, and ethics, and are deeply engaged in shaping future of biotechnology policy and practices.”

New insights, new risks

In his new post, Relman said he intends to build on this foundation by creating an initiative that consolidates and focuses activity in biosecurity, develops research and educational programs, attracts new resources, and looks outward at opportunities for policy impact and changing practices across the globe.

Relman said that “new capabilities and insights are reshaping important aspects of the life sciences and associated technologies, and are accompanied by a host of new risks.” If misused, whether by malice or accident, “they pose the potential for large-scale harm,” he noted.

Relman added that the initiative will bring together interest and expertise across the centers and programs of FSI in partnership with Schools and Departments across the university.

At FSI, CISAC will co-sponsor the biological security initiative, which will leverage Stanford expertise in the life sciences, engineering, law and policy.  Key partners will include Tim Stearns (biology), Drew Endy (bioengineering), Mildred Cho (bioethics), and Hank Greely (law), according to Relman. The biosecurity group will also partner with another new program at FSI in global health and conflict, which is led by Paul Wise, Frank Fukuyama, Steve Stedman, Steve Krasner, and others, he added.

Stanford’s School of Medicine and Department of Medicine will also co-sponsor the initiative, thanks to leadership from Lloyd Minor, Michele Barry and Robert Harrington. Relman looks forward to establishing similar relationships with other schools and departments, he said.

 “These partnerships are critical. I’m excited to work with a growing community both within and beyond Stanford towards the goal of a peaceful and prosperous world in the century of biology,” he said.

MEDIA CONTACTS:

David Relman, Center for International Security and Cooperation: relman@stanford.edu

Megan Palmer, Center for International Security and Cooperation:  mjpalmer@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

 

 

 

 

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The Stanford Biosecurity Initiative will be led by David A. Relman, senior fellow at CISAC and FSI.
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Siegfried S. Hecker wrote the following essay for Politico Magazine on the subject of the Trump administration's approach to North Korea:

Now that the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula has been at least temporarily defused thanks to Kim Jong Un’s announcement that he would wait and see before launching missiles toward Guam—despite ominous North Korean propaganda as the U.S. and South Korea launch their latest joint military exercises—it’s time to step back and ask ourselves the big questions about just how useful our approach to North Korea’s nuclear program has been so far. 

My answer: Not very useful at all. During the past 15 years, North Korea first built the bomb and then expanded it to a nuclear arsenal that threatens the region, while Washington has continued to deny reality with its call for complete denuclearization. Which is why it’s time to take a long and serious look at the next option: talking with North Korea.

Although a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Secretaries Jim Mattis and Rex Tillerson earlier this month served to lower tensions by stating that the United States was still pursuing peaceful denuclearization, it does not introduce any new elements that could bring the two sides closer to ending the nuclear crisis. The op-ed, which reassured Kim that “the U.S. has no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea,” is a welcome relief from Mr. Trump’s “fire and fury” warning to Kim. But this approach is likely to fare no better in compelling Pyongyang give up its nuclear weapons than the Obama administration’s “strategic patience.”

So—how can we make real progress?

Washington should drop its preoccupation with North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat. It is misplaced and dangerous. Instead, Trump administration officials should talk with Pyongyang, face to face, without any preconditions, to avert what I consider the greatest North Korean nuclear threat—that of stumbling into an inadvertent nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, which may lead to hundreds of thousands deaths including thousands of American citizens.

It’s important to understand why Kim is so obsessed with these weapons: to deter the United States from attacking North Korea and what Pyongyang calls “hostile policies.” Striking the U.S. with a nuclear-tipped missile would be suicide, and there’s no evidence that Kim is suicidal.

What’s more, there’s a lot to indicate that North Korea isn’t close enough to developing ICBM-capable missiles to strike the United States even if it wanted to. The panic over North Korea’s missiles was elevated recently when leaked classified U.S. intelligence estimates were reported to indicate that Pyongyang has already achieved such capabilities, in addition to possessing as many as 60 nuclear weapons in its arsenal. But I don’t concur with those estimates.

Based on my 50 years of experience with nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons, combined with what I saw and learned during my seven visits to North Korea beginning in 2004, I don’t believe Pyongyang has yet mastered the key elements of delivering a nuclear-tipped ICBM to the continental United States. Although North Korea demonstrated significant progress in the missile field with two launches in July, experts have raised serious questions about whether it has demonstrated all the missile and re-entry vehicle technologies that will protect the nuclear warheads during the fiery plunge into the Earth’s atmosphere.

Moreover, the nuclear warhead that must be mounted on the missile is the least developed and least tested part of North Korea’s nuclear ICBM ambitions. It must survive the extreme temperatures and mechanical stresses involved during launch, flight and re-entry into the atmosphere. It must detonate above the target by design, not accidentally explode on launch or burn up during reentry. More missile tests are needed that mirror real ICBM conditions to permit measurements that more accurately define the extreme conditions that the delicate materials such as plutonium, highly enriched uranium and chemical high explosives experience inside the warheads. It is much simpler to detonate a nuclear device in an underground tunnel under controlled conditions than to simulate all of the conditions a warhead experiences on the way to its target. 

What makes matters even more challenging for Pyongyang is that it has very little plutonium and highly enriched uranium. I have estimated that North Korea has 20 to 40 kilograms plutonium and 200 to 450 kilograms highly enriched uranium. My analysis is based on what I saw during my visits to the Yongbyon nuclear complex and on extensive discussions with their nuclear experts. These stocks have to serve multiple uses: They must be shared between experiments required to understand the world’s most complex elements, nuclear tests to certify the design of the weapons and stock for the arsenal. My best estimate, albeit with considerable uncertainty, is that the North’s combined inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium suffice for perhaps 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, not the 60 reported in the leaked intelligence estimate.

North Korea will need a few more nuclear tests because its experience with either material, plutonium or highly enriched uranium, for warheads is too limited for ICBM use. Nuclear test site preparations appear complete, but Pyongyang is most likely weighing the technical benefits against the political risks of conducting such tests. Whereas I believe North Korea has insufficient test data for ICBM warheads, we must assume it has already learned enough to mount a warhead on its shorter-range missiles that can reach all of South Korea and Japan because these missiles are able to accommodate bigger nuclear warheads and these would experience less stringent operational conditions.

In other words, the North still has a ways to go to pose a serious ICBM threat, but it is clearly working in that direction. The danger is that in his drive to achieve a greater balance with the United States by perfecting a missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the continental U.S., Kim could miscalculate where Trump’s red line actually is, triggering a retaliatory action by Trump that could escalate to a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. Our problem is that we know nothing about Kim and the military leaders who control his nuclear arsenal and drive the missile and nuclear development programs. It’s time to talk and find out.

And we have to talk now, without demanding that North Korea agree to any preconditions, such as those suggested by Mattis and Tillerson – namely, an immediate cessation of its provocative threats, nuclear tests, missile launches and other weapons tests. Pyongyang is not about to make unilateral concessions before talks. One should read Kim’s announcement that he will wait with the missile launches as a positive signal, although he added that the U.S. must stop its “arrogant provocations.”

The diplomatic opening created last week on both sides makes such talks possible. President Trump should send a small team of senior military and diplomatic leaders to talk to Pyongyang. These talks would not be negotiations—not yet. Importantly, these talks would not be a reward or a concession to Pyongyang and should not be construed as signaling acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Talking would, however, be a necessary step toward re-establishing critical links of communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. The dialogue should stress the need for mechanisms to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation or misinterpretation of actions that could quickly bring us over the cliff into a nuclear war.

The talks would provide an opportunity to convey Secretary Tillerson’s message that Washington does not seek regime change face to face in Pyongyang. In simplest terms, the team could underline the message that Washington is deterred from attacking the North, but not from defending the United States and its allies. It should reiterate that any attack on South Korea or Japan, be it with conventional, chemical or nuclear weapons, would bring a devastating retaliatory response upon North Korea.

The team can also impress upon Pyongyang that ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons is an awesome responsibility. These two issues are becoming more challenging as North Korea strives to make its nuclear arsenal more combat-ready. A nuclear-weapon accident in the North would be disastrous, as would a struggle to control the North’s nuclear weapons in the case of attempted regime change from within or without. All indications are that such talks would be strongly supported by the North’s two most important neighbors, South Korea and China, particularly if Washington consults them before.

For too long, America’s policy toward North Korea has been based on impractical goals. Complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization was a hallmark of the George W. Bush administration’s approach to North Korea and was also pursued by the Obama administration. Whereas complete and verifiable denuclearization might be realistic long-term goals, irreversible is impossible short of the total loss of human memory. The U.S. Manhattan Project produced the bomb in 27 months more than 70 years ago, and that was without knowing with certainty at the outset that it was even possible.

It was under Bush that North Korea first built the bomb and under Obama that it expanded to a threatening nuclear arsenal. Both presidents failed to address the root cause of Pyongyang’s determined effort to build a nuclear weapons arsenal—assuring the Kim regime’s security. Now, Trump faces a North Korea with the ability to inflict unacceptable damage to U.S. allies and U.S. assets in the region, while it also continues its drive to threaten the continental U.S. Perhaps, much as Dwight Eisenhower talked to Nikita Khrushchev, Richard Nixon to China’s Mao Zedong, and Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev, Trump can take the next step with North Korea, and talk now to avert a nuclear catastrophe.

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Siegfried Hecker writes in a new Politico Magazine essay that if Nixon went to China, then the Trump administration can talk to North Korea.
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