Environment

FSI scholars approach their research on the environment from regulatory, economic and societal angles. The Center on Food Security and the Environment weighs the connection between climate change and agriculture; the impact of biofuel expansion on land and food supply; how to increase crop yields without expanding agricultural lands; and the trends in aquaculture. FSE’s research spans the globe – from the potential of smallholder irrigation to reduce hunger and improve development in sub-Saharan Africa to the devastation of drought on Iowa farms. David Lobell, a senior fellow at FSI and a recipient of a MacArthur “genius” grant, has looked at the impacts of increasing wheat and corn crops in Africa, South Asia, Mexico and the United States; and has studied the effects of extreme heat on the world’s staple crops.

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David M. Lampton gave a talk titled “Chinese Power and Rail Connectivity in Southeast Asia” before the Stanford China Program audience on February 6th. He addressed three issues in particular: the scope of his research project, conducted in partnership with two co-authors based in Singapore and Malaysia; the long genesis of this railroad construction idea from Southeast Asia to China; and, third, the overarching question of whether China can effectively implement the gargantuan feat – technologically, financially, and politically. The high-and conventional-speed rail project will span seven Southeast Asian countries, plus China, Lampton highlighted.  This project is not only geographically forbidding, but the political terrain, and its socio-economic variety, is an even greater challenge.  Lampton’s talk comprised part of Stanford China Program’s 2019 Colloquia Series, “A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations.”

Lampton began by clarifying that the vision of rail connectivity through Southeast Asia into China is not the brainchild of either China’s leadership or Xi Jinping. This idea has a long history, he stated, beginning with the British and the French in the 19th century when they were occupying Burma and Indochina, respectively; and even during World War II when Japan further entertained building railroads from the Korean Peninsula to Singapore to advance their military ambitions. In contemporary times, ASEAN had articulated a plan in 1995 to develop a rail line from Singapore to Kunming city, P.R.C. In 2010, ASEAN again put forth a master connectivity plan for 2025 where railroad development comprised a prominent part. Only in the aftermath of these many plans and proposals did Xi Jinping, in 2013, officially announce China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an infrastructure initiative with a scope far greater than simply Southeast Asia. The idea of infrastructural connectivity in the region, in other words, has a long history that predates China entering the picture as a major actor. Only recently has China amassed the technological capacity and financial wherewithal to realize this enormous project, with economic, diplomatic, and strategic military implications.

Next he described the key role that Beijing’s industrial policy has played in the rapid development of China’s high-speed rail. From a nonexistent industry in 2001, China has built a sector that is now an international powerhouse in high-speed rail technology. As of 2014, China boasted four trunk lines, North and South; and four trunk lines, East and West, crisscrossing the P.R.C. China’s industrial policy has clearly delivered striking results (as well as some setbacks) not only with respect to high-speed rail but also in other industries.  In light of this, Lampton opined that China is not likely to yield to U.S. demands for major structural reforms in onoing trade talks with China. 

Lampton described the progress in high-speed and conventional-speed rail construction with partners in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) that the Chinese have made, with Laos and Thailand furthest along in implementation. Nonetheless, Beijing also has met with significant resistance due to the complicated political situation in various regions. Lampton described, for example, the drawn-out financial negotiations between Singapore and Malaysia with respect to the rail line connecting Singapore to Kuala Lumpur; and the jockeying among various heads of Malaysia’s federation of local states. The election of Mr. Mahathir in 2018 also put an at least temporary halt to the construction and planning of two rail projects for many reasons, including the corruption of the preceding regime of Najib in Kuala Lumpur. Although Lampton expressed overall confidence that the rail lines will get built to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, for example, in the not-too-distant future, the political complexities of the region and China’s ability to successfully navigate them are still open questions.

He also described the competing world views regarding infrastructure construction and economic development. There are powerful constituents in China – now backed by Xi Jinping himself – who believe that infrastructure development drives growth: i.e., “if you want to get rich, build a road.” By contrast, the U.S. and entities such as the World Bank are more cautious, seeing all the negative social and environment extenalities such massive projects create. They also want to see greater assurances of projected returns from these infrastructure projects before devoting resources. Having said this, both multilateral financial and development institutions, and the United States Government, are gradually adopting a more supportive posture on large infrastructure projects, in part not wishing to abandon the commercial and strategic battlegrounds of the future to the PRC.

Lastly, Lampton debunked the notion that the BRI is a unified, top-down “plan.” Rather, he described it as Beijing’s “umbrella policy” that “creates a predisposition [among Chinese entities] to build infrastructure.” It incentivizes “entrepreneurial SOEs, provinces, localities, overseas Chinese . . . to push their pet projects . . . onto . . . the national largesse.” This being the case, Lampton described the BRI as a dynamic, chaotic and, sometimes, even a rapacious process for the transit countries. Yunnan Province, for example, started a rail line even before the central government had approved it; and Guangdong Province began developing its own special economic zone and port construction in Malacca all without central approval. As Lampton stated, the “BRI isn’t just about Xi Jinping and Beijing . . . . [I]t’s about local initative, and how Beijing can or cannot control or . . . under what circumstances, it chooses to control [its local actors].”

The recording and transcript are available below.  

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David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow and Research Scholar at APARC, speaks at Stanford's China Program on February 6th, 2019.
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Abstract: Russia is a major energy exporter and has used those exports to advance its geopolitical goals. Based on her book "The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas” (Harvard UP, 2017), Dr. Agnia Grigas will discuss the recent transformation in global energy markets and the resulting shift in the geopolitics of energy, specifically relations between key producing and competing states such as Russia and the United States, and key consuming regions such as Europe and developing Asia. Focusing on natural gas, Dr. Grigas will address Russia’s energy challenge to European security and steps the United States can and should take to mitigate this challenge.
 
Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/EImxZfGJN9o
 
Speaker Biography: 
 
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Dr. Agnia Grigas is a strategic advisor on energy and geopolitical economy for US government institutions and multinational corporations. She is the author of three acclaimed books: "The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas,"​  "​Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire,"​ and "The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia."  She serves as nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Associate at Argonne National Laboratory and advisory board member for the McKinnon Center for Global Affairs at Occidental College, the Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis and LITGAS.  She holds a Master’s and Doctorate in International Relations from the University of Oxford and a BA in Economics and Political Science from Columbia University. Follow via: @AgniaGrigas & grigas.net

 

Agnia Grigas Strategic Advisor
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EMERGING ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIA

A Special Seminar Series


RSVP required by Tuesday, May 7, 2019

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ABSTRACT: Why have the three most salient minority groups in Japan - the politically dormant Ainu, the active but unsuccessful Koreans, and the former outcaste group of Burakumin - all expanded their activism since the late 1970s despite the unfavorable domestic political environment? My investigation into the history of the three groups finds an answer in the galvanizing effects of global human rights on local social movements. Drawing on interviews and archival data, I document the transformative impact of global human rights ideas and institutions on minority activists, which changed the prevalent understanding about their standing in Japanese society and propelled them to new international venues for political claim making. The global forces also changed the public perception and political calculus in Japan over time, catalyzing substantial gains for the minority movements. Having benefited from global human rights, all three groups repaid their debt by contributing to the consolidation and expansion of international human rights principles and instruments. The in-depth historical comparative analysis offers rare windows into local, micro-level impact of global human rights - complementing my other projects on the relationship between international human rights and local politics, which employ cross-national quantitative analyses - and contributes to our understanding of international norms and institutions, social movements, human rights, ethnoracial politics, and Japanese society. 
 
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Kiyoteru Tsutsui
PROFILE:
  Kiyoteru Tsutsui is Professor of Sociology, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies, and Director of the Donia Human Rights Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His research on globalization of human rights and its impact on local politics has appeared in American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Problems, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and other social science journals. His book publications include Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press 2018), and a co-edited volume (with Alwyn Lim) Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Cambridge University Press 2015). He has been a recipient of National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, National Science Foundation grants, the SSRC/CGP Abe Fellowship, Stanford Japan Studies Postdoctoral Fellowship, and other grants as well as awards from American Sociological Association sections on Global and Transnational Sociology (2010, 2013), Human Rights (2017), Asia and Asian America (2018), and Collective Behavior and Social Movements (2018).
 

 

McClatchy Hall, Building 120, Studio 40
450 Serra Mall
Stanford University

Kiyoteru Tsutsui Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan
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Massive changes in the global food sector over the next few decades – driven by climate change and other environmental stresses, growing population and income, advances in technology, and shifts in policies and trade patterns – will have profound implications for the oceans. Roz Naylor, Senior Fellow and Founding Director of Stanford’s Center on Food Security and the Environment,  will discuss the interplay between terrestrial and marine food systems, highlighting the rising role of aquaculture in helping to meet the nutritional demands of 9-10 billion people by 2050. As a platform for her talk, she will introduce a new research initiative at Stanford on “Oceans and the Future of Food”, co-led by the Center for Oceans Solutions (COS) and the Center on Food Security and the Environment (FSE).

Free Admission is by reservation only. Please call 831-655-6200 between 8:30AM – 5:00PM, Mon-Fri, or RSVP at the Friends of Hopkins web page.

Contact:
Amanda Whitmire
831-655-6200
thalassa@stanford.edu

Boat Works Lecture Hall, Hopkins Marine Station

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Abstract: In efforts to halt the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons (CW) in that country’s civil war the United States and other outside powers applied coercive strategies, in both a deterrent and compellent mode. Outcomes varied: compellence achieved a partial success in getting Syria to give up much of its chemical stockpile, but there were multiple deterrence failures. This paper examines this record to draw lessons about factors associated with the effectiveness of coercion. Its analysis points to the interplay of three factors: credibility, motivation, and assurance. Regarding credibility, the case demonstrates that threats fulfilling many of the traditional criteria for establishing credibility can still fail. In Syria, this is partly because there were ambiguities in the scope of what was covered by deterrent warnings and partly because other factors also affect coercive outcomes. In the Syria case two additional factors were especially important. First, the domestic political motivations of the target affect whether external threats provide coercive leverage. In this case Syrian President Assad’s concern with regime survival led him to perceive the value of CW use as outweighing the likely costs even if outside powers followed through on retaliatory threats. Second, where regime survival is a concern, it is vital to pair coercive threats with appropriate assurances. Here, the case suggests that it is possible not only to provide too little assurance, but also too much. Whereas the Obama administration found it hard to offer credible assurances to Assad, the Trump administration initially conveyed assurances that were too robust, creating a sense that Syria could use CW with impunity. This analysis suggests there may have been a potentially viable path to effective coercion of the Assad regime, but the path would have involved intense tradeoffs that largely prevented decision makers from embracing it. Decision makers and outside commentators alike turned instead to a familiar schema that implies credibility is established by demonstrating a willingness to impose costs using airpower – a script that can be labeled the “resolve plus bombs” formula. Despite the frequent tendency to equate coercion with the threat or limited use of air strikes, this approach was not sufficient to change Syria’s calculations regarding chemical arms.

 

Speaker's Biography: Jeff Knopf is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California, where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies and a senior research associate with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). He is on sabbatical for the 2018-19 academic year and is spending the year as a visiting scholar at CISAC. This is his second stint at CISAC. Dr. Knopf received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford and was previously a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC in the days when it was still located in the old Galvez House. His most recently completed project is a forthcoming book volume he co-edited on Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons. While at CISAC, Dr. Knopf will primarily be working on a project titled “Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons.” This project examines efforts by the United States and other countries to apply deterrent and compellent strategies in attempts to stop the Syrian government from using chemical weapons and to dismantle its chemical arsenal. Dr. Knopf will also be working on a paper that explores cognitive aspects of the nuclear taboo.

Jeffrey Knopf Professor Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS)
Seminars
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Abstract:

The recent surge in nationalism and tribalism brings renewed salience to questions of identity within and across borders. Notably, it exposes the tension between bounded social identities, on the one hand, and universalist yearnings and commitments, on the other. Liberal democracy—and the ostensible universalism on which it is based—is struggling to resolve this tension. I turn instead to the cosmopolitan tradition. I argue that cosmopolitanism—and a genuinely cosmopolitan (i.e., unbounded) social identity, in particular—represents not just an extension of scope from the national to the global, but a qualitative shift that permeates all identities, and serves to fundamentally protect and liberate particularist attachments from their otherwise inherent instabilities and contradictions. On this view, the promise of cosmopolitanism does not rest exclusively in what it can deliver beyond our borders, but also in its potential to fundamentally recast social identities within boundaries, resolving crises of identity at all levels of society.

 

Speaker Bio:

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Shahrzad Sabet's research spans politics, economics, psychology, and philosophy. She is a Fellow at the University of Maryland’s Bahá’í Chair for World Peace Program. Previously, she was a Senior Research Fellow at Princeton University’s Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance and a Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard, where she recently received her PhD in Government. Her work has been featured in outlets such as The Washington Post and The New York Times.

Shahrzad Sabet Fellow at the University of Maryland’s Bahá’í Chair for World Peace Program
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We assess scientific evidence that has emerged since the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 2009 Endangerment Finding for six well-mixed greenhouse gases and find that this new evidence lends increased support to the conclusion that these gases pose a danger to public health and welfare. Newly available evidence about a wide range of observed and projected impacts strengthens the association between the risk of some of these impacts and anthropogenic climate change, indicates that some impacts or combinations of impacts have the potential to be more severe than previously understood, and identifies substantial risk of additional impacts through processes and pathways not considered in the Endangerment Finding.

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Christopher B. Field
Noah Diffenbaugh
David Lobell
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The event is jointly sponsored by the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.

The Heisei era started in 1989, with high hopes for Japan to contribute to the international order. As the Heisei era draws to an end, Japan is once again expected to “step up” with increased urgency, given the current US administration’s withdrawal from, and challenge to the international order.  In this talk, I will first look back at the thirty years of Heisei, and discuss why Japan did not take the “internationalist” path in a way that some had expected. Looking forward, I discuss how the domestic institutional changes, together with the geopolitical challenges in Asia, have prompted Japan to seek active leadership in the region and beyond. I will elaborate on the evolution of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision,” with focus on how exactly Japan seeks to achieve “free and open” in the region, and challenges and limitations going forward.

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Takako Hikotani is Gerald L. Curtis Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy. She previously taught at the National Defense Academy of Japan, where she was Associate Professor, and lectured at the Ground Self Defense Force and Air Self Defense Force Staff Colleges, and the National Institute for Defense Studies. Her research focus on civil-military relations and Japanese domestic politics, Japanese foreign policy, and comparative civil-military relations. Her publications (in English) include, “The Japanese Diet and defense policy-making.” International Affairs, 94:1, July, 2018; “Trump’s Gift to Japan: Time for Tokyo to Invest in the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2017; and “Japan’s New Executive Leadership: How Electoral Rules "Japan’s New Executive Leadership: How Electoral Rules Make Japanese Security Policy" (with Margarita Estevez-Abe and Toshio Nagahisa), in Frances Rosenbluth and Masaru Kohno eds, Japan in the World (Yale University Press, 2009). She was a Visiting Professional Specialist at Princeton University as Social Science Research Council/Abe Fellow (2010-2011) and Fellow of the US-Japan Leadership Program, US-Japan Foundation (2000- ). Professor Hikotani received her BA from Keio University, MAs from Keio University and Stanford University, and PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, where she was a President’s Fellow.

Takako Hikotani Associate Professor, Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Columbia University
Seminars
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The event is sponsored by the Japan Society for Promotion of Science and
the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.

 

abe 6364 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaks at Stanford about innovation in Japan and Silicon Valley. He was also joined on stage by Stanford President John Hennessy and George Shultz, the former U.S. Secretary of State and a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution (below).
When the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan regained the power led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012, Japan’s government embarked on a set of economic policies dubbed “Abenomics.” Abenomics aimed at bringing Japan back from stagnation and restoring its growth potential.  The Abe administration entered its 7th year and Prime Minister Abe looks most likely to become the prime minister with the longest reign in the post war era.  Abenomics looks seemingly successful as well.  Japan’s economy has been in the longest expansion phase in the post war era.  The unemployment rate is so low that many employers claim they cannot find workers.  Yet, the major goals of Abenomics set at the beginning, such as 2% inflation rate and 2% real economic growth, have not been achieved.  Has Abenomics really succeeded?

This panel features four experts who have been closely watching Abenomics’s impacts on the Japanese economy.  They evaluate what Abenomics has accomplished so far in various areas.

 

Panelists:

Joshua Hausman, Assistant Professor of Public Policy; Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Michigan

Takatoshi Ito, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

Nobuko Nagase, Professor of Labor Economics and Social Policy, Ochanomizu University, Japan

Steven Vogel, Professor of Asian Studies; Professor of Political Science; Chair of the Political Economy Program, University of California, Berkeley

Takeo Hoshi (moderator), Director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

 

Koret-Taube Conference Center
Gunn-SIEPR Building
366 Galvez Street, Stanford University

Panel Discussions
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