An Abstract

All too frequently, students of democracy and democratization view the politics they analyze exclusively through the prism of constitutions, elections, and political actors. In the case of the Middle East, this involves worn out questions of religious fundamentalism, neo-colonialism, entrenched autocracy, the politics of oil and Israel, etc. While all of these are indeed relevant to understanding the perseverance of authoritarian political structures, it is equally crucial to understand the dynamics of culture, and the ways in which forms of cultural expression are developing, and are channeled and managed. In his recent  analysis of the region, Hicham Ben Abdallah points out that, while legal and political authorities certainly define the contours of what is permissible or not, it is the shared system of collective beliefs which in turn shapes the law and politics, and it is in the realm of culture that these shared beliefs are produced and consumed.  The wearing of veil, for example, is not mandated by any legislation outside of Saudi Arabia and Iran, and yet it a growing practice throughout the region, part of an increasingly powerful salafist ideological norm that is at least as powerful as any law.

Contrary to the hastily-borrowed western-paradigm of an inexorable development of secularism leading to an inevitable development of democracy, Ben Abdallah demonstrates the proliferation of cultural practices in which result societies, and individuals, learn to live in a complex mix of parallel and conflicting ideological tendencies -- with the increasing Islamicization of everyday ideology developing alongside the proliferation of de-facto secular forms of cultural production, even as both negotiate for breathing room under the aegis of an authoritarian state. 

He finds any prospects for democratization complicated by parallel tacit alliances.  On the one hand, a modus vivendi between the state and fundamentalists, in which the latter is permitted to Islamicize society, and is sometimes allowed a carefully-delimited participation in state structures, under the condition they restrain from attempting radically to reform the state. On the other hand  intellectuals and artists refrain from frontal assaults on autocratic state structures, subtly limiting their militancy to non-controversial causes, while seeking the state's protection from extremism; their aim is to maintain some protected space of quasi-secular liberalism in the present, which they hope portends the promise of democracy to come.

For its part, the state is learning how to manage and take advantage of a segmented cultural scene by posing as the restraining force against extreme enforcement of the salafist norm, and by channeling forms of modernist cultural expression into established systems  of institutional and patronage rewards (for "high" culture) and into a commercialized process of "festivalization" (for popular culture) that ends up as a celebration of an abstract, de politicized "Arab" identity.

Ben Abdallah refers us to the deep history of Islam, which protected and developed divergent cultural and intellectual influences as the patrimony of mankind. He suggests a new paradigm of cultural and intellectual discourse, inspired by this history while also understanding the necessity for political democratization and cultural modernism. We must, he argues, be unafraid to face the challenges in the tension between the growing influence of a salafist norm and the widespread embrace of new, implicitly secular, cultural practices throughout the Arab world.

Version in English at Le Monde Diplomatique, "The Arab World's Cultural Challenge"

In 2009 the global coal market witnessed one of the most dramatic realignments it has ever seen - China, long a net exporter of coal, suddenly imported a record-smashing 126 Mt tons (103 Mt net). This inversion of China's role in global coal markets meant that Chinese imports accounted for nearly 15% of all globally traded coal, and China became the focal point of global demand as traditional import markets like Europe and Japan stagnated in the wake of the financial crisis.  The middle kingdom's appetite for imported coal seems insatiable, and the "China Factor" appears to have ushered in a new paradigm for the global coal market.

But China doesn't "need" the coal.  The world's largest coal producer cranked out 2.96 Bt of production in 2009, backed up by 114.5 Bt of reserves.  While the world's other fastest growing importer, India, is plagued by a growing gap between coal supply and power demand that it is unable to fill domestically, this is not the case in China.  The spike in Chinese demand for imported coal is therefore a more complex (and less easily predictable) phenomenon that requires careful examination if the world is to understand what impact China might have on global energy markets in the coming decade.

In this paper Richard Morse and Gang He devise a model that explains Chinese coal import patterns and that can allow the coal market to understand, and to some degree predict, China's coal import behavior.  They argue that the unique structure of the Chinese coal market creates a series of key arbitrage relationships between Chinese domestic coal markets and international coal markets that determine Chinese import patterns.

The implications of this argument are significant for the development of the global coal trade in the coming decade.  The arbitrage relationships that Morse and He describe directly link the domestic price of coal in China to the global price of coal. Developments in China's domestic coal market will be a dominant factor determining global coal prices and trade flows (and by implication power prices in many regions).  This makes understanding the domestic Chinese coal market, which operates according to a unique economic and political logic, crucial for any participant in the global markets.