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Mark Thompson
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Some theorists of modernization have influentially claimed that successful “late industrialization” led by developmental states creates economies too complex, social structures too differentiated, and (middle-class-dominated) civil societies too politically conscious to sustain nondemocratic rule. Nowhere is this argument—that economic growth drives democratic transitions—more evident than in Northeast and Southeast Asia (hereafter Pacific Asia).

South Korea and Taiwan, having democratized only after substantial industrialization, seem to fit this narrative well. But “late democratizers” have been the exception rather than the rule. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand democratized before high per capita incomes were achieved. Malaysia, and especially Singapore are more wealthy than they are democratic. The communist “converts” to developmentalism, China and Vietnam, are aiming for authoritarian versions of modernity. Table 1* shows that there is no clear pattern in Pacific Asia. Indeed, according to the nongovernmental organization Freedom House (and using the World Bank categories of low, lower middle, upper middle, or high income), poor and rich countries alike in Pacific Asia are rated “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.”

What key factors have influenced the different timing of democratization in Pacific Asia? Democratization has occurred early in the developmental process when authoritarian states have failed to create sustainable economic growth, which in turn has led to mounting debt. Many reasons explain this phenomenon, but a primary cause is the so-called failure to “deepen”—that is, certain countries’ inability to become major manufacturers of high-tech and heavy industrial goods. For example, when economic crises rocked the Philippines in the mid-1980s and Indonesia in the late 1990s, both nations lacked the economic maturity and breadth to rebound, prompting abrupt financial collapse. These nations’ political systems were too ossified to channel popular unrest, and mass mobilization resulted. Ideologically, the Marcos and Suharto regimes faced accusations of cronyism, as favored business leaders stepped in to rescue failing conglomerates, sidelining once-influential technocrats in the process. In the end, these countries’ limited economic development actually broke down their authoritarian systems.

 “Late industrializers,” by contrast, do succeed in industrial “deepening.” But they are often less successful in terms of “widening”—the perception that the benefits of development are being fairly shared in society. Statistics show that South Korea and Taiwan are relatively equal societies. Nevertheless, neither of these technocratically oriented authoritarian regimes was able to blunt criticisms that growth was unjustly distributed. South Korean workers and native Taiwanese felt particularly disadvantaged. In Malaysia, too, tensions are now mounting about distribution along ethnic lines. Electoral authoritarianism helped to defuse earlier crises in South Korea and Taiwan, but beginning in the mid-1980s, opposition forces in both nations launched successful challenges through the ballot box to bring about democratization. In Malaysia, the opposition scored major gains in the 2008 elections. Ideologically, all three authoritarian regimes were weakened by activist campaigns for social justice, which mobilized middle class professionals.

One can only speculate about whether Singapore will one day democratize. Its economy has continually deepened, most recently through a major drive to grow a biotech industry. At the same time, it has widened through a series of welfare-related measures focused on housing and pensions. The Singaporean government has also perfected a system of electoral authoritarianism, allowing some competition and participation without threatening the ruling party’s hold on power. Ideologically, the government has long determined the political agenda through its collectivist campaigns (including the once high-profile “Asian values” discourse). However, when Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, eventually passes away, the nation’s technocratic elite may be tempted to democratize. Democratization would give the government greater legitimacy to reform welfare provision, which many believe is currently limiting Singapore’s competitiveness. The main arguments are summarized in table two.*

It is evident that China and Vietnam are trying to imitate the Singaporean model. Though each faces many obstacles, both countries have already made great strides in industrial deepening and widening through an elaborate postcommunist welfare system. Ideologically, these countries will rely not just on growth—which will inevitably slow during the current economic crisis—but also on appeals to a collectivist identity that is simultaneously both nationalist and neo-Confucianist in character. Whether China and Vietnam eventually democratize or remain authoritarian despite modernization is one of the most important political questions in the world today.

* Please contact the Manager of Corporate Relations for a full PDF copy of this dispatch, including tables.

 

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A potential solution for weak or failing states is to enact a delegation agreement whereby a host relinquishes authority over some governance function to an external actor. Through case studies in Melanesia, I find that these arrangements can be implemented as treaties, rather than contracts, so that the external actor can in such cases remain somewhat exempt from the normal procedure or law of the host state. I also generate hypotheses about the conditions under which host states and external actors enact these self-enforcing equilibria: host states request these agreements either where a failure of law and order requires assistance to reestablish control over the use of force, or where a budgetary crisis necessitates funding to provide public goods. External actors agree to them where the host state poses a transnational security threat, and where the reputational and actual costs of the mission are low, as judged against alternative methods for resolving the threat. The next step in this project, then, is to test these hypotheses in other cases to see if similar agreements are enacted in different regions, and, if so, whether the same incentives also explain the decisions elsewhere.

Aila M. Matanock is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Stanford. Her current research is on effective governance for minimizing conflict, and on bringing violent groups into elections in conflicted states. Before coming to Stanford, she was employed by the RAND Corporation as a research assistant and summer associate on non-proliferation and counterterrorism projects. She received an undergraduate degree magna cum laude in Social Studies from Harvard University, while also working with the Belfer Center's Managing the Atom Project and with the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Seminar summary:

In her presentation, "Learning to Share: Under What Conditions do States Delegate Governance?" Aila Matanock seeks to define the concept of delegated governance and to identify the circumstances under which it arises. Drawing from field research with political elites in Australia and the Melanesian micro-states, she presents the variation in degrees of shared governance arrangements, from strict delegation to semi delegation, contracting and monitoring.

She defines delegated governance as an arrangement between a host state and an external actor that involves sharing in the decision function of the host state. She emphasizes the incentives of both host state and external actor as a framework for identifying the set of conditions under which we might expect to observe delegated governance. She argues and finds, in the Melanesian cases, that host states are more likely to seek delegation agreements if (1) they have lost their monopoly over the use of force (and there is no civil war or major ethnic cleavage); or (2) they are suffering from a severe budgetary crisis. External actors, for their part, enter into such agreements based on the costs they believe they will incur: reputational gains within the international community and domestic support for the delegation arrangement decrease an external actor's cost perception and increase its likelihood of entering into such an agreement. Matanock concludes that the Melanesian cases inform us that governance delegation is not an infrequent phenomenon. It is likely to emerge where lawlessness threatens both the host and external actor, but is constrained by the level of violence and the cleavages in society.

Matanock's presentation prompted questions about the scope and generalizability of the argument (To what extent do these findings reflect a special relationship between Australia and the Melanesian states? Would this apply in larger states such as Cambodia and Liberia, where the costs to an external actor might be greater?); the specific factors leading to the choice of delegated governance over other options (such as contracting, monitoring,...); and the power relationship between external actor and host state.

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Aila Matanock PhD candidate, Political Science Speaker Stanford
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In 2009, buffeted by the global economic slowdown, Malaysia’s economy is predicted to shrink.  Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak is expected to replace unpopular Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi as Malaysia’s top leader early in April.  On 23 March the government banned the two main opposition newspapers, Suara Keadilan and Harakah.  Earlier in March an opposition lawmaker was forced out of the national parliament after demanding that Najib answer allegations of involvement in the gruesome murder of a Mongolian model, Altantuya Shaaribuu, in 2006.  The killing has been linked to a 110-million-euro “commission” paid to a close confidante of Najib by a French firm for the sale of submarines to Malaysia.  In February Najib used local parliamentary defections to take over Perak, one of the five states won in March 2008 by the opposition in elections whose results embarrassed the government.  An independent poll shows that Najib is even less popular than Badawi.  Prof. Chin will address the implications of these and other aspects of current political turbulence in Malaysia.

James Chin has written widely on Malaysian politics and the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, among other topics.  Minority rights, ethnic politics, and good governance are among his current interests.  Before his Monash appointment he headed a business school.  Before that he worked as a financial journalist.  He has a doctorate from Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand.

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James Chin Head, School of Arts and Social Sciences Speaker Monash University's Malaysian Campus, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia
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Policymakers, funding agencies, and implementing organizations are increasingly focused on identifying the most effective strategies for promoting development. They have embraced the use of randomized trials as a strategy for assessing the impact of interventions in health, education, agriculture, and a range of other sectors. Donors and NGOs have forged close partnerships with academic institutions to bring the most rigorous methodologies to bear to uncover strategies that work in reducing poverty in the developing world.

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The presentation by Josephine T. Andrews and Kris Inman entitled, "Explaining Vote Choice in Africa's Emerging Democracies", offers new insight into voting strategies within Africa's seven most-free democracies, including Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, Botswana, Mali, and South Africa. Using data from the Afrobarometer in 2005, they found evidence of retrospective voting: individuals who view their president as more corrupt are less likely to support the president's party with their vote. They also found evidence of ethnic voting, but weaker support for clientelistic voting. In subsequent work, they look forward to exploring whether retrospective voting undermines the prospect of democratic reversal.

Josephine Andrews, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, UC Davis.  Primary research interest is on institutional design in emerging democracies, with recent work on established party systems of Western Europe (recent papers in Electoral Studies and British Journal of Political Science).  Current research involves political participation and corruption in Africa's emerging democracies as well as continuing work on party leaders and party systems of West and Eastern Europe.

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Josephine Andrews Associate Professor, Political Science Speaker UC Davis
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Homeland Security Watch's author since February 2007, Jonah Czerwinski, transitioned into a position in government and thus handed the blog over to new hands. Joining CISAC Senior Research Scholar Paul Stockton in writing for HLSWatch on a weekly basis will be Philip Palin, senior fellow with the National Institute for Strategic Preparedness.

Homeland Security Watch's author since February 2007, Jonah Czerwinski, transitioned into a position in government and thus handed the blog over to new hands. Joining CISAC Senior Research Scholar Paul Stockton in writing for HLSWatch on a weekly basis will be Philip Palin, senior fellow with the National Institute for Strategic Preparedness.

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Peter Ordeshook is Professor of Political Science at Caltech, member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, author or coauthor of An Introduction to Positive Political Theory; Game Theory and Political Theory; Lessons for Citizens of a New Democracy; Voters, Parties and Elections; A Political Theory Primer; Time Discounting in Social Networks; Designing Federalism; and (forthcoming) The Forensics of Election Fraud.

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Peter Ordeshook Professor of Political Science Speaker Caltech
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