Hanna Folsz then took a closer, domestic look at the Tisza Party and how they triumphed over Orbán. As Kelemen discussed, Orbán's new electoral rules strongly favored large parties with rural bases, the characteristics of the Fidesz party. The Fidesz Party also controlled the media and enjoyed advantages in party financing. However, the Tisza Party, led by Peter Magyar, dominated the 2026 election, despite the electoral system being stacked against opposition parties. 

Economic woes, corruption, and scandals surrounding Fidesz created broad voter discontent and set the stage for the Tisza Party’s victory. Tisza worked to create a broad coalition through extensive group-level campaigning, messaging that focused on competent economic governance and anti-corruption, and the idea of reclaiming patriotism. Magyar also extensively campaigned, holding rallies all over Hungary in localities of all sizes. The district candidates within the Tisza Party campaigned in a similar manner. 

The Tisza Party focused its policy proposals on extensive welfare, public services improvement, the elimination of corruption, strengthening relationships with the EU and neighbors, and largely avoided divisive topics. The Party also distanced itself from the discredited and divisive established opposition parties, and they did not coordinate with past opposition parties. 

Folsz outlined the lessons Hungary’s electoral outcome shows for democratic resistance against autocratization. The Hungarian case demonstrated the importance of connecting with voters and building credibility by campaigning a lot and across the country, including in rural constituencies. The Tisza Party also smartly presented a vision for a better future with concrete proposals, rooted in citizens’ core concerns– in this case, the economy and corruption, and distanced themselves from divisive opposition politicians and parties. The Tisza Party focused its messaging on unity and reclaiming patriotism from the far right.

The 2026 Hungarian election offered a rare example of democratic recovery in a system widely considered entrenched, raising important lessons for opposition movements confronting democratic erosion.

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How should we understand the role of fragmentation versus centralization in state formation?

Prof. Blaydes argued that fragmentation plays a foundational role in the development of strong institutions. Specifically, fragmentation and decentralization reduce the power of centralized rulers, fostering a political culture of executive constraint. This culture is critical for the later emergence of durable institutions, including democracy.

However, Prof. Blaydes clarified that fragmentation alone is not sufficient. Strong states are still necessary for effective governance and capacity. The key lies in sequencing: societies benefit from an initial phase of fragmentation that establishes executive constraint, followed by the development of centralized state capacity. In Prof. Blaydes’s view, both elements are necessary, but fragmentation must come first to produce stable and accountable institutions.

How can political culture arguments avoid becoming essentialist?

Prof. Blaydes defined political culture not as something rooted in geography or religion, but as a set of incentive structures that enable elites to constrain rulers. In this framework, political culture emerges from institutional conditions rather than inherent societal traits.

Prof. Blaydes emphasized that such cultures can arise in diverse contexts, provided that power differentials between rulers and elites are sufficiently reduced. However, in historically entrenched centralized states, this process is more difficult because rulers tend to remain far above other elites, limiting opportunities for constraint.

Is geography deterministic in shaping political outcomes?

Prof. Blaydes rejected deterministic interpretations of geography. Instead, geography was described as having probabilistic effects — it increases the likelihood of certain political outcomes without making them inevitable. Terrain and resource distribution can shape whether states tend toward centralization or fragmentation, but institutional and historical contingencies remain critical.

Is there a trade-off between state capacity and institutional durability?

Prof. Blaydes suggested that the relationship is not necessarily a direct trade-off but can be understood in terms of differences in political structures and ruler–elite dynamics. Systems with strong central authority may achieve high capacity but lack mechanisms for constraint, whereas more decentralized systems may develop more durable institutions over time.

Why would rulers adopt systems of alien rule (e.g., Mamluks)?

Prof. Blaydes explained that rulers often adopt such strategies to secure loyalty. Foreign elites are less tied to local populations and therefore more dependent on the ruler, making them appear more reliable.

However, Prof. Blaydes noted that this creates long-term instability. While individual rulers may perceive these arrangements as beneficial, over time, such elites can coordinate and overthrow rulers. Individual rulers may not recognize this pattern due to short time horizons and limited information, meaning the instability only becomes visible in aggregate historical data.

Does leadership quality decline over time within dynasties?

Prof. Blaydes argued that leadership quality often declines across generations within dynasties. Founders tend to possess exceptional capabilities, but these traits are not consistently transmitted to successors. Drawing on Ibn Khaldun, Prof. Blaydes noted that ruling groups often lose their initial cohesion and strength over time, becoming vulnerable to replacement by new elites.

Prof. Blaydes also suggested that assimilation into society may contribute to this decline by enabling coordination among subjects against rulers.

Do religious institutions independently shape political outcomes?

Prof. Blaydes took an endogenous view, arguing that religion does not independently determine political outcomes. Instead, religious institutions reflect broader social and political dynamics. Religious elites may either constrain or reinforce the state depending on their relationship with political authority, particularly whether they possess independent sources of power or revenue.

Introduction and Contribution:

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has been one of the most devastating conflicts of the 21st century. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine has experienced not only mass casualties but immense cultural destruction, as well as the forcible deportation and adoption of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russian families. Ending the war requires understanding its causes, particularly from the point of view of Vladimir Putin and other key Russian decision-makers. 

Some observers of Russian and global politics — as well as Putin and his allies — have claimed that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO caused the war. The argument here is that as a superpower, Russia could not tolerate the security implications of a country on its border joining a rival alliance. Russia’s war, then, was a preventive one — less a choice than a strategic necessity. Any superpower in such a situation would do the same.

In “NATO Did Not Cause Putin’s Imperial War,” James Goldgeier and Brian D. Taylor convincingly challenge the NATO hypothesis, showing it to be more a piece of Kremlin propaganda than a plausible account of Putin’s decision-making process. Instead, the authors draw our attention to Putin’s most deeply held and longstanding beliefs: that Ukraine is not a legitimate nation state, that Ukrainians would not freely associate with the West and its alliances (unless they were being manipulated), and that dominating Ukraine is essential to Russia reclaiming its status as a global superpower, one that is constantly disrespected by the West. 

As many social scientists focus on improving the causal power of their statistical inferences, Goldgeier and Taylor helpfully focus our attention on the beliefs and reasons of political actors who cause political outcomes such as wars and revolutions. More importantly, the authors provide a starting point for thinking about ending the Russo-Ukrainian war, one focused not on the distraction that is NATO arguments but on Putin’s imperial ambitions.

Pitfalls of the NATO Explanation:

The authors begin by noting that NATO enlargement clearly played a role in the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West over the past 25 years. In part, this is because many Russian elites — owing to their imperialistic beliefs, more on this below — never accepted that former Soviet Republics were free to join the alliance. However, NATO enlargement was but one item in a long list of Russian grievances, some based in reality and others fictional. These include the 2003-04 Color Revolutions — mainly reflecting widespread domestic sentiment, not Western machinations — and alleged American support for the 2011-13 Russian protests in the aftermath of Putin’s rigged elections, which were similarly homegrown.

There is good evidence that Putin and his inner circle neither feared NATO aggression nor believed that Ukraine could realistically join the alliance. After George W. Bush’s failed bid for Ukrainian membership in 2008, no American president has seriously entertained or pushed for Ukraine’s admission. NATO took minimal action after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, before which time Ukrainians themselves didn’t support joining the alliance (likely because they anticipated the negative consequences for Russia-Ukraine relations). NATO itself has worked against admitting Ukraine; indeed, much of its security assistance has been designed to make it possible for Ukraine to defend itself without formal admission. What’s more, no country bordering Russia joined NATO after 2004 until Finland did so in 2023.

When Putin decided on war in 2021, his invasion plan was based on the assumption that victory would be quick and easy, evidencing his lack of concern for NATO intervention. Further, he knew that NATO lacked the troops and would be extremely wary of confronting nuclear Russia. 

Putin’s Imperial Beliefs and Goals:

For several decades, Putin has expressed the belief that Ukraine is not a genuine nation-state and that Russia both gave away and was “robbed” of much of its territory. One of Putin’s key goals is arguably to rebuild Russian greatness via imperial conquest. The West is not merely intervening in Eastern European politics but, according to Putin, actively working to downgrade Russia to a second-class country and undermine its sovereignty. Putin views the war as key to reversing Russia’s declining status.

Because Putin and his inner circle view Ukraine to be a natural part of Russia, the possibility that Ukrainians would freely tie their fortunes to the West is inconceivable — Ukrainian elites must have been tricked, co-opted, or bribed. Some Russian propagandists have even described the war as one of “Russians killing Russians.”

Putin’s imperialism is not only confined to privately held beliefs. During COVID-19, he spent a great deal of time reading historical texts to prepare a 5000-word article on the alleged historic inseparability of Russia and Ukraine. What could such an undertaking have to do with NATO expansion?

Russia’s wartime conduct also provides strong evidence for the imperialism explanation. As mentioned above, Russia has gone to great lengths to destroy Ukrainian culture. It has rejected multiple peace deals that would have prevented Ukraine from joining NATO. Putin saw these as failing to address the conflict’s “root causes,” arguably a euphemism for Ukrainian sovereignty. Instead, Russian conditions for peace include making Russian an official language, disbanding “nationalist” political parties, and ensuring the influence of Moscow’s Orthodox Church. These conditions smack of Russian chauvinism.

Of course, elites’ imperial beliefs do not necessarily lead to war. And indeed, Putin initially sought to control Ukraine through political measures, such as election interference. However, the authors argue that when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seized the assets of a key Putin ally, Putin realized his position was weakening. Russian security officials then assured Putin — likely out of fear — that overthrowing Ukraine’s government would be easy. This flawed decision-making process led to war. Readers will come away struck by how many lives have been lost while policy and scholarly debates remained focused on the NATO hypothesis.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.