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The 14th Informal APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting concluded on Nov. 19, 2006, and the participants had their photo taken in colorful Vietnamese traditional costumes called ao dai. Still in the shadow of the congressional election failure, President George W. Bush, realizing that a stable Asia is very important for the U.S. geostrategy, took advantage of the occasion to enhance the prestige of the United States. Just as American experts said, the Bush administration has probably become a lame duck now, but even a healthy duck needs to find a quiet pond.

"APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is an important political reason for U.S. to strengthen the group," Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum of Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University, explained. "While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence."

However, the U.S. effort to save the Doha Round of trade talks with the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement has yielded little. The Doha Round aimed to remove trade barriers in the world but was suspended due to some countries' agriculture protection policies. Washington had wanted to model the Doha Round upon the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement. But U.S. officials never expected that there would be so many differences among the Asia-Pacific leaders, and that the economic development of Pacific Rim countries differ in thousands of ways. Despite the fact that the Hanoi Statement reiterated that supporting the Doha Round was APEC's priority, no material progress has been made.

"The U.S. is urging a last ditch effort to restart the talks through APEC," Professor Charles Morrison, president of the East-West Center located in Hawaii, says. "Whether or not APEC can do more than make a rhetorical statement of support is unsure. I feel that the APEC economies should agree to prepare new offers within a short period of time -- three weeks, for example -- to challenge the Europeans, Brazilians, Indians and others."

United States Steps Out to "Please" ASEAN

Seventeen years after its establishment, APEC now plays a decisive role in the international political arena. It has 40 percent of the world's population, 48 percent of the world trade volume and 56 percent of the world GDP. Since 1989, the economy in this region has grown by 26 percent, compared to only 8 percent economic growth rate in the rest of the world. With the double advantage of economic strength and rapid growth, China, being one of APEC's main economies and its "engine," has fully taken the limelight. On the other hand, the United States has been weighed down with countering terrorism in the Middle East.

"China has done very well in enhancing its relations with Southeast Asia in recent years," Sheldon Simon, professor of the Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, points out. "China has not only established a free trade forum for China and ASEAN countries, but also helped and influenced the area with its economy and culture. But I think that the United States has realized the importance of this area and come back to fasten its friendly relationship with the region."

The United States coming back to Southeast Asia and repairing its relations with the ASEAN countries is partly activated by China's increasing influence in the area.

"The naissance and growth of some democratic countries in Southeast Asia has received sympathetic response of democratic values from Washington," said Simon. "With the traditional friendly relations between the area and the United States, these countries value their friendship with the United States sometimes more than the trust in their neighboring countries. Geopolitics is also very important factor. The Asia-Pacific area is a very important to the world economy and the U.S. power structure. Therefore, the United States will not easily give it up."

Another motive for the United States to foster closer relations in the area is the common interest of countering terrorism. There are still some terrorist groups in Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand.

"President Bush has a perfect attendance record at APEC meetings (Clinton missed two of them), which says that he does take APEC seriously and believes Asia is important to U.S. interests," Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview with the Washington Observer Weekly.

Besides attending the APEC summit meetings annually, Washington has recently activated several plans to "please" the ASEAN countries, including setting up a ministerial dialogue system with them and a platform for maintaining contact at the deputy finance minister level, even increased exchanges at the deputy defense secretary level.

The extent of U.S. efforts to foster cordial relations with Southeast Asian countries can also be seen in the increasingly friendly U.S.-Vietnamese economic and trade relations. The Bush administration is not only supporting Vietnam to enter the WTO, but has even proposed giving Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status.

"The reason that Bush failed to bring the gift of PNTR status to the APEC Hanoi summit is that the Congress dominated by the Republicans was lacking efficiency and could not pass the proposal in time," Simon explained. "But I think that it will be passed as soon as possible in the next month or by the Democrats who begin to dominate the Congress from next January."

Simon and Cossa both admit that Burma is an unharmonious element in U.S. relations with ASEAN. The Burmese dictatorial military government is really the most typical negative example of democracy for the United States. But ASEAN countries are reluctant to see Burma "punished" by the United States for ideological reasons. So Burma has become a sensitive issue in U.S.-ASEAN relations.

"This is a good way for him to interact with ASEAN since Myanmar is not there and this issue does not have to be addressed," said Cossa.

Simon, an expert of Southeast Asia affairs, points out ASEAN countries should be happy about the advantage they have with China and the United States vying for their attention. Being able to juggle the two big powers, Southeast Asia has gained many practical interests and financial aid for its economy, trade, security, culture and education.

"In a short period, there will not be any serious interest conflicts in the triangle balance of China, the United States and ASEAN," Simon told the Washington Observer Weekly. "ASEAN countries' only worry, if there is any, is an accidental spark in the U.S.-China military interaction in Southeast Asia such as the confrontation across the Taiwan Straits."

Turning the Asia-Pacific into a "Gigantic Enterprise?"

"The United States wants to demonstrate its continuing interest in the Asia-Pacific region. It is urging for a study of an Asia Pacific free trade area and support for an APEC business card, and both shifts of approach, illustrate its interest in and support for the APEC process," said Morrison.

An important subject for the APEC Hanoi summit is the "active discussion" of establishing an APEC free trade region. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed for the first time in 1993 the setting up of such an economic zone. Before Bush's visit, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia suggested that establishing an APEC free trade zone would be a subject worth serious discussion. But his proposal did not receive a warm response from the host. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung stressed that establishing a free trade zone is a long-term objective and will not affect progress of negotiations with the WTO or other bilateral trade agreements.

"Regarding the study of the Asia Pacific free trade area, a number of economies were skeptical because it would be such a large undertaking," said Morrison. A similar plan was once axed in an APEC ministerial statement and the leaders attending this summit do not seem to have much interest in it.

Simon explained Bush's thinking on the subject: "Washington reiterated its intention to establish an Asia-Pacific free trade zone in order to save the precarious WTO Doha Round. Breaking the tariff barriers in the Asia-Pacific region will help continue to press relevant countries to concede in granting agricultural tax subsidies and hopefully open the door to the Doha Round."

The five-year Doha Round was suspended in July this year because six major WTO members -- the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Brazil and India -- failed to reach agreement on market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products. Given the situation, the organizer said that the informal APEC economic leaders' meeting would provide a "good opportunity" to help restore the Doha Round talks. However, the Hanoi summit joint declaration just vaguely indicated that APEC will pursue further integration on issues such as energy in 2007. It would be extremely optimistic to expect that APEC will be able to remove all the tariff barriers in the region before 2010. Although the area produces 50 percent of the world's economic value, the styles and stages of economic development, the cultural backgrounds and political systems of the countries in the region vary a great deal, making it very difficult for these Asian countries to eliminate all these discrepancies and become fully integrated.

"Out of different worries, many Southeast Asian countries are actually not interested in the proposal though they do not speak out. Or we may say that it's not time yet now to change the Asia-Pacific region into a gigantic enterprise," Simon told Washington Observer Weekly.

Quite apart from who concedes what in return for what concession over the APEC free trade mechanism, the question arises: What geographical scope should a regional trade arrangement have? Who should be a party to the agreement and who should not?

There would appear to be three different ideas on the table: (a) the APEC-wide free trade area that the United States proposed at the recent summit in Hanoi; (b) the East Asia Summit-wide framework that Japan reportedly favors, which would include ASEAN + 6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand, Australia) but not the United States; and (c) the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) context that China seems to prefer, in which the exact positions of Tokyo and Beijing are not entirely clear.

"Without discussing the merits or demerits of each of these arrangements, suffice it to note that since ASEAN is common to all of them, the net effect of these alternative ideas is to strengthen the negotiating position of ASEAN," said Emmerson. "Then again, ASEAN will not necessarily be unified as to its preference for the three proposals. It will be interesting to look for the positions to be taken by individual ASEAN countries and for their collective effort to arrive at a single negotiating position, e.g., in the run-up to the ASEAN summit and the second the East Asia Summit in the Philippines next month."

Cossa has hope for 2007. "The U.S. in particular would like to see APEC moving faster, and will look ahead to next year, with Australia in the chair, for some real progress."

American Public Doesn't Share Washington's Interest in Southeast Asia

The prospect of economic and strategic cooperation brought about by APEC made for a lively week in Southeast Asia. But it stirred little response in the United States. According to the interviewed experts of Southeast affairs, the American public is still haunted by the situation in Iraq and the mid-term election. Even the U.S. media framed the event as Bush's first visit to a foreign country since the Republicans were defeated in the mid-term election.

"Because of the Congressional election, President Bush will want to show leadership rather than simply respond to the new Congress. Both Doha and the nuclear proliferation issue are examples," said Morrison.

Cossa holds a different view: "I don't think the elections will have any major impact on what Bush does or how he does it during this trip. Iraq is his legacy. What he does in Asia can make things better or worse at the margins but will likely be overshadowed by Iraq."

Simon echoed the sentiment. "On one hand, the Republican Party's defeat in the election cannot directly influence Bush's trip to Asia. On the other hand, Bush's economic achievements in the Southeast region will not add to his political record. In Asia, only the North Korea issue may sway the public opinion in the United States."

Yan Li, Washington Observer weekly - Issue No. 201, November 22, 2006

Reprinted by Permission February 12, 2007.

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About the talk:

Are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can rightholders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works? Using an experiment embedded in a survey of 1600 residents of conducted in Russia in October 2006, I find that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge, but that businesspeople can improve the legitimacy of property rights by doing good works, such as providing public goods.

About the speaker:

Timothy Frye is a Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. His research and teaching interests are in comparative politics and political economy with a focus on the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He is the author of Brokers and Bureaucrats: Building Markets in Russia, (Michigan Press 2000), which won the 2001 Hewett Prize from the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. He has published articles on property rights, the rule of law, protection rackets, economic reform, presidential power, and trade liberalization. Current projects include a book manuscript on the politics of economic reform in 25 postcommunist countries from 1990-2002 and articles on property rights and the rule of law drawing on surveys of business elites and the mass public in Russia.

Timothy Frye received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University in 1997. He has an MIA degree from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and a BA in Russian language and literature from Middlebury College.

This event is co-sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies (CREES), under Title VI of the Department of Education.

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Timothy Frye Professor of Political Science Speaker Columbia University
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Up-and-coming Stanford entrepreneurs must think and act globally. Critical resources, markets and opportunities are around the world, including the dynamic hotbed of China. Come meet trailblazers breaking ground in China. Hear how they got started, challenges they are wrestling with right now, their outlook for entrepreneurs in China, and their best advice. Then, take the opportunity to meet in break out groups with each leader for informal discussion, followed by a Chinese appetizers and networking.

This event, co-sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Student Entrepreneurship Society (ASES), is open to students, the Stanford community and the general public and is part of Entrepreneurship Week at Stanford University. Full details on panelists are below.

Throughout the week of February 24 - March 3, communities around the country will be celebrating EntrepreneurshipWeek USA, as designated by the U.S. House of Representatives, and Stanford will be no exception. In fact, the national organizers will be launching the national program from Stanford on February 24 during the opening ceremony. The theme of the week is "What is Your Big Idea?"

Stanford University has big plans for the week. Events hosted by entrepreneurship groups across campus will enable you to network with entrepreneurial students, venture capitalists (VCs), entrepreneurs and others; hear thought leaders, and share stimulating ideas. All events are free and most are open to the public.

You can see the entire Entrepreneurship Week agenda at eweek.stanford.edu, including information about the Innovation Challenge for student teams.

Featured panelists for "Global Entrepreneurship: Stanford Trailblazers in China":

  • Jack Hong: Principal and Founder of SN38, an incubation fund focusing on social-networking startups in China and the US. Prior to SN38, Hong was VP of Information Technologies at SINA Corporation (NASDAQ:SINA), heading SINA's enterprise IS infrastructure development in Beijing. Hong co-founded the Chinese-language portal SINANET.com in 1995 with fellow students while a PhD candidate at Stanford, and held the title of CTO until it merged with Beijing SRS International to form SINA in 1999.
  • Derek Ling: A serial entrepreneur with strong corporate background focused primarily in the IT and Internet industries. Ling is the founder and CEO of Tianji.com, the leading social networking service for professionals in China. Prior to starting up Tianji.com, Ling held senior management positions at Motorola, Apple Computer (Director of Business Development for Greater China) and SINA.com (Vice President); in 1999 he co-founded the Beijing-based startup Qzone.com, a youth entertainment community in China revolving around homepage and music.
  • Min Zhu: Co-Founder of WebEx Communications, Inc., a NASDAQ-listed company with 2006 revenues over $400 million; after co-founding the company in 1996 he served as President and CTO before being named "Chief WebEx" in 2004; Zhu is a Venture Partner in New Enterprise Associates (NEA), a leading venture capital firm. He serves on a number of Silicon Valley boards and is an advisor for the San Jose Municipal Government. In 2005 he founded Cybernaut, a Hangzhou-based company that aims to create a platform to support real-time multimedia communication applications and services.

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Jack Hong Principal and Founder Panelist SN38
Derek Ling Founder and CEO Panelist Tianji.com
Min Zhu Co-Founder Panelist WebEx Communications
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David Yang is a pre-doctoral fellow in CDDRL's Democracy in Taiwan program. He is finishing a cross-country comparative study entitled The Social Basis of the Third Wave: Class, Development, and the Making of the Democratic State in East Asia. He looks in particular at late authoritarian Taiwan and contemporary Singapore. Mr. Yang is interested in the social basis of pro-democratic opposition movements and the political implications of various developmental strategies - corporatist versus pluralist, for example. Before entering the doctoral program at Princeton, David Yang completed an MBA in Economics and International Business at NYU, and a B.Sc. in Computer Science at Brown.

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Visiting Scholar 2007-2008<br />CDDRL Pre-Doctoral Fellow 2006 - 2007
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David is our inaugural, and hopefully annual, fellow in CDDRL's new Democracy in Taiwan program. He is finishing a cross-country comparative study entitled The Social Basis of the Third Wave: Class, Development, and the Making of the Democratic State in East Asia. He looks in particular at late authoritarian Taiwan and contemporary Singapore. David is interested in the social basis of pro-democratic opposition movements and the political implications of various developmental strategies - corporatist versus pluralist, for example. David has been advised on his thesis by Lynne White, and Atul Kohli at Princeton, as well as Andy Nathan and Sheri Berman at Columbia and Barnard respectively. Before entering the doctoral program at Princeton, David completed an MBA in Economics and International Business at NYU, and a BSc in Computer Science at Brown.

David D. Yang Pre-doctoral Fellow Speaker CDDRL
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China once again is in the midst of a major reshuffling of leadership. The upcoming 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party will form a new Politburo and its Standing Committee. While the current top leaders, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, will most likely remain in power for the next term, a new generation of leaders, known as the "Fifth Generation," is poised to emerge in the national leadership.

Candidates to succeed Hu, Wen and other top leaders will become known within a year. Dr. Li will present his analysis of who the front-runners of the Fifth Generation are, how the selection of the possible successors reflects the changing nature of Chinese elite politics, in what aspects this rising generation of leaders differs from their predecessors, and how these differences will change the way in which China will be governed.

Cheng Li is the William R. Kenan Professor of Government at Hamilton College in New York and a visiting fellow at the newly-established John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution in Washington DC.

Dr. Li grew up in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution. In 1985, he came to the United States where he received an M.A. in Asian Studies from the University of California, Berkeley, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Princeton University. He is the author of Rediscovering China: Dynamics and Dilemmas of Reform, and Chinas Leaders: The New Generation, and the editor of the recent book, Bridging Minds Across the Pacific: The Sino-U.S. Educational Exchange 1978-2003. Dr. Li is also a columnist for the Stanford University journal, China Leadership Monitor.

Dr. Li has advised a wide range of U.S. government, education, research, business and not-for-profit organizations on work in China. Dr. Li is a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a trustee of the Institute of Current World Affairs, a member of the Academic Advisory Group of the Congressional U.S.-China Working Group, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. policy toward China, a member of Committee of 100, and a member of the U.S. National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

This talk is part of the "China's Year of Decision" colloquium series sponsored with the Center for East Asian Studies.

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Cheng Li William R. Kenan Professor of Government Speaker Hamilton College
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Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E301
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-0121 (650) 796-8078 (650) 723-6530
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SPRIE Visiting Scholar
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Dou Wenzhang started his professional carrier as an Assistant Professor/Lecturer at Shanxi University, teaching and conducting research in Urban Planning and Economic Geography from 1988-1995. He then joined the Institute of Economics, Peking University, as a visiting scholar specializing in regional economics research projects from 1996 to 1997. From 2001 to 2002, Dr. Dou was a postdoctoral fellow in Applied Economics at the Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, with a focus on telecommunications economics. At the same time, he joined China Mobile and conducted research on 3G strategy and business development & marketing strategies.

Since August 2002, Dr. Dou has been involved in the planning and fund raising for and formation of the Software & Microelectronics School at Peking University; he assumed the position of the Deputy Chairman of the Management of Technology department (MOT) in May, 2003. Dr. Dou is also a senior advisor to several provincial and municipal governments in the area of regional development, including the strategic planning of industrial parks. In 2001 Dr. Dou founded BOYA Strategy, a consulting business entity engaged in Regional Planning and Development for municipalities around China.

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Korea's "Chaebol" business groups built densely knitted equity crossholding ties during the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed the owner's family to exercise enormous control rights greatly exceeding their cash flow rights. This defining characteristic of "Chaebol" once made them look invincible, totally protected from outside attacks. However, the unprecedented takeover crises of Korea's best-known "Chaebol" such as Hyundai and SK force us to reconsider the traditional wisdom.

What explains the crises? In his talk, Dr. Chang will track the changes in the "Chaebol" equity network since 1997 and argue that the takeover crises are the result of constraints on the dynamics of hierarchically organized networks by the opening up of the financial market, changing state-business relations, and family circumstances.

Dukjin Chang is an assistant professor in the Sociology Department at Seoul National University. He is currently a visiting professor in the Department of Sociology at Harvard University. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1999. He has written extensively on Chaebol business groups and social networks in the cyberspace.

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Dukjin Chang Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology Speaker Seoul National University
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This paper evaluates the role of self-employment in China's rural economy, while paying attention to whether the rise of self-employment promotes entrepreneurship and is a sign of development, or whether it is a stopover for disadvantaged workers and a sign of distress. Using data on 20-year labor market histories of a nationally representative sample of individuals, we provide descriptive evidence that self-employment in rural China, unlike in some other places, is a sign of development. Econometric evidence from a random-effects probit model and a continuous-time Markov model shows also that self-employment in rural China shares many features of a productive small-business sector.

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World Development
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Scott Rozelle
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Daniel C. Sneider
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The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has been facing new pressures in recent months. Leaders in Washington and Seoul are visibly out of synch in their response to the escalatory actions of North Korea, beginning with the July 4 missile tests and leading to the October 9 nuclear explosion. South Korean leaders seem more concerned with the danger that Washington may instigate conflict than they are with North Korea's profoundly provocative acts. American officials increasingly see Seoul as irrelevant to any possible solution to the problem. Officials on both sides valiantly try to find areas of agreement and to paper over differences. If attempts to restart the six-party talks on North Korea falter again, it is likely this divide will resurface.

There is a tendency on both sides of the Pacific to overdraw a portrait of an alliance on the verge of collapse. Crises in the U.S.-ROK alliance are hardly new. As I have written elsewhere, there never was a "golden age" in our alliance that was free from tension. Korean discomfort with an alliance founded on dependency and American unease with Korean nationalism has been a constant since the early days of this relationship. Clashes over how to respond to North Korea have been a staple of the alliance since its earliest days.

Korean-American relations today are much deeper than at the inception of this alliance. Our interests are intertwined on many fronts, not least as major players in the global economic and trading system. We share fundamental values as democratic societies, built on the rule of law and the free flow of ideas. There is a large, and growing, contact between our two peoples, from trade and tourism to immigration.

The current situation is worrisome however because it threatens the security system that lies at the foundation of the alliance. Though our interests are now far broader, the U.S.-ROK alliance remains military in nature. The founding document of this alliance was the

Mutual Defense Treaty signed on October 1, 1953, following the conclusion of the armistice pact to halt the Korean War. That treaty has been significantly modified only once - 28 years ago in response to American plans to withdraw its ground forces from Korea - to create the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).

The two militaries have a vital legacy of decades of combined command, training and war planning. American military forces in significant numbers have remained in place to help defend South Korea from potential aggression from the North. South Korean troops have deployed abroad numerous times in support of American foreign policy goals, including currently in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This foundation of security is not only essential to this alliance but is the very definition of the nature of alliances in general, as distinct from other forms of cooperation and partnership in international relations.

"Alliances are binding, durable security commitments between two or more nations," Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, a Stanford scholar and former Clinton administration senior defense official, wrote recently. "The critical ingredients of a meaningful alliance are the shared recognition of common threats and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge agreement, an alliance requires ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior."

Alliances can survive a redefinition of the common threat that faces them but not the absence of a threat. Nor can alliances endure if there is not a clear sense of the mutual obligations the partners have to each other, from mutual defense to joint actions against a perceived danger. "At a minimum," Sherwood-Randall says, "allies are expected to take into consideration the perspectives and interests of their partners as they make foreign and defense policy choices."

By this definition, the U.S.-ROK alliance is in need of a profound re-examination.

The 'shared recognition' of a common threat from North Korea that was at the core of the alliance is badly tattered. As a consequence, there is no real agreement on what actions are needed to counter that threat.

There is a troubling lack of will on both sides to engage in policy consultations that involve an understanding of the interests and views of both sides, much less setting clear expectations for allied behavior. Major decisions such as the phasing out of the CFC have been made without adequate discussion.

Americans and Koreans need, in effect, to re-imagine our alliance. We should do so with the understanding that there is still substantial popular support for this alliance, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary. The problems of alliance support may lie more in policy-making elites in both countries than in the general public. That suggests that a concerted effort to reinvigorate the alliance will find public backing.

The results of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2006 multinational survey of public opinion show ongoing strong support for the American military presence in South Korea. Some 62 percent of Koreans believe U.S. troop levels are either about right or too few; some 52 percent of Americans share that view. A slightly larger percentage of Americans - 42 percent compared to 36 percent of Koreans - think there are too many U.S. troops. Along the same vein, 65 percent of Americans and 84 percent of Koreans favor the U.S. providing military forces, together with other countries, in a United Nations-sponsored effort to turn back a North Korean attack.

The crack in the alliance comes over the perception of threat from North Korea.

While some 79 percent of Koreans feel at least "a bit" threatened by the possibility of North Korea becoming a nuclear power, only 30 percent say they are "very" threatened. Fewer Koreans feel the peninsula will be a source of conflict than the number of Americans. More significantly, nuclear proliferation is viewed as a critical threat by 69 percent of Americans, compared to only half of Koreans (interestingly, Chinese are even less concerned about this danger).

The opinion poll was conducted before the nuclear test so it is difficult to judge the impact of that event. These survey results do clearly indicate however that while the security alliance still has support, there is an urgent need for deep discussion, at all levels, about the nature of the threat.

The crisis that faced the NATO alliance in the wake of the end of the Cold War has some instructive value for Koreans and Americans today. At the beginning of 1990, I was sent by my newspaper, the Christian Science Monitor, from Tokyo, where I had been covering Japan and Korea since the mid-1980s, to Moscow. The Berlin Wall had fallen a few months earlier and the prospect of the end of a half-century of Cold War in Europe was in the air. However, I dont believe anyone, certainly not myself, anticipated the astounding pace or scale of change that took place within just two years.

Within less than a year, in October of 1990, West and East Germany were reunited.

The once-mighty Soviet empire in Eastern Europe disintegrated almost overnight. By July of 1991, the Warsaw Pact had come to an end. Perhaps most astounding of all - not least to officials of the administration of George H.W. Bush - the Soviet Union fell abruptly apart in December 1991.

These tectonic events triggered a debate about the future of the NATO alliance that had provided security to Europe since it was founded in April of 1949. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev somewhat famously - and perhaps apocryphally - anticipated this debate. "We are going to do something terrible to you," he is said to have told Ronald Reagan. "We are going to deprive you of an enemy."

In those early days, the very continued existence of NATO was under active discussion. The Soviet leadership called for the creation of entirely new "pan-European" security structures that would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Some in Europe favored the European Union as a new vehicle for both economic integration of the former

Soviet empire into Europe, along with creating new European security forces that would supplant NATO's integrated command.

A more cautionary view argued for retaining NATO without change as a hedge against the revival of Russia as a military threat or the failure of democratic and market transformation in the former Soviet Union. American policymakers opted instead for the ambitious aim of expanding NATO membership to absorb, step by step, the former Soviet empire, including the newly freed western republics of the Soviet Union.

Along with expansion, the United States pushed NATO to redefine the "enemy." Americans argued that new threats to stability and security from ethnic conflict - and international terrorism - compelled NATO to "go out of area or out of business." NATO did so first in the Balkans, in Bosnia and Kosovo, though reluctantly. The alliance has moved even farther beyond Europe to Afghanistan, where NATO commands the international security forces. This draws upon the invaluable investment made in joint military command and operations that are the foundation of the alliance.

Certainly NATO's transformation is far from complete. As was evident at the most recent NATO summit in Riga, considerable differences of opinion remain between many European states and the United States over the mission of NATO. Europeans tend to still see NATO as an essentially defensive alliance, protecting the "euro-Atlantic" region against outside aggression, with an unspoken role as a hedge against uncertainties in Russia. They are resistant to continued American pressure for expansion - including a new U.S. proposal to move toward global partnership with countries such as Japan, South Korea and Australia.

But the reinvention of NATO after the Cold War provides some evidence that even when the nature of the threat has changed, security alliances can preserve a sense of common purpose.

A re-imagined U.S.-ROK alliance could draw from the NATO experience by including the following elements:

HEDGE - The alliance remains crucial as a 'hedge' against North Korean aggression, even if the dangers of an attack are considered significantly reduced. If North Korea retains its nuclear capability, that hedge will need to expand to include a shared doctrine of containment and deterrence, including making clear that the U.S. will retaliate against use of nuclear weapons, no matter where it takes place. Strategically the alliance is also a 'hedge' against Chinese ambitions to dominate East Asia and a guarantor of the existing balance of power;

EXPANSION - The alliance can reassert its vitality as the basis, along with the

U.S.-Japan security alliance, of an expanded multilateral security structure for

Northeast Asia;

NEW MISSIONS - The alliance should take on new missions, most importantly to participate in military and non-military counter-proliferation operations;

OUT OF AREA - A re-imagined alliance might formalize an "out of area" role, elevating the deployments of peacekeeping and other forces to Iraq and Afghanistan into more systematic joint global operations between the two militaries. In this regard, the participation of South Korea in a program of global partnership with NATO, most importantly in the area of joint training, merits serious discussion.

There is another alternative: South Korea and the United States can chose to bring their alliance to a close. If we cannot agree on the common threats that face us, this alliance cannot endure. What we should not do is to allow the alliance to drift from inattention into a deeper crisis that would only benefit our adversaries.

(This article is based on a presentation by the author to the 1st ROK-U.S. West Coast

Strategic Forum held in Seoul on Dec. 11-12, 2006).

This article appeared on the website of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.

Reprinted with permission from the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.

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This paper was discussed at the Global Justice workshop on December 15, 2006.

Excerpt from page four of Sebastiano Maffettone's "Universal Duty and Global Justice":

We could uphold that, as a rule, cosmopolitans subscribe to the global distributive justice model, reducing the socio-economic rights to a corollary of their theorems on justice. Statists, instead, always as a rule, fully reject the idea of a global distributive justice and, sometimes, even the possibility that the socio-economic human rights might have considerable soundness and effectiveness. In short, this third option of mine recognizes that, in this historical time, a comprehensive ideal of global distributive justice - founded on the domestic distributive justice model - is not yet theoretically justifiable, although it entails a lower degree of skepticism that the statist thesis about its progressive establishment. However, my thesis dwells above all on the fact that a broad and convinced interpretation of socio-economic rights may do much to lessen social injustice in today's globalized world, being sufficientist in the way above defined, starting from a reduction of extreme poverty and, over time, enabling peoples to decide their fate. It may be affirmed that this thesis, moving our attention from relative inequality to radical deprivations, is based on a more modest ideal than global equality, an ideal inspired to 'weak global distributive justice.'

In my opinion, this intermediate option meets another requirement of some significance, at least for a political theorist with a liberal background. Cosmopolitans have a propensity for a radical moralization of international politics, whose institutions are considered at the service of their favorite moral ideals. Statists, on the contrary, tend to cut to a minimum the space of morals in international politics. I believe that, for a liberal, both positions should prove scarcely convincing. This is the reason why I have called this third position of mine - based on a weak ideal of global justice and being neither moralistic nor skeptical - 'liberal conception.'

About the Author

Sebastiano Maffettone is professor of political philosophy at Luiss University, Rome. He specializes in political philosophy, ethics, bioethics, business ethics, philosophy of international relations, environmental ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, history of philosophy, and analytic and continental philosophy.

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