Africa owns 60% of the world’s uncultivated land suited for crop production, but accounts for 30% of the world’s malnourished and only 3% of global agricultural exports. If there is one thing global agricultural policy experts Paul Collier and Derek Byerlee can agree on, it’s that Africa’s food system is struggling.Their different views on the causes and investment solutions to put Africa on a more prosperous and food secure path made for a provocative discussion at a symposium hosted last week by Stanford University’s Center on Food Security and the Environment.

Collier, a distinguished economist and author of the award-winning book “The Bottom Billion”, was direct in his opening remarks.

“Smallholder agriculture has been a persistent productivity disaster for Africa,” said Collier. “Despite a huge land area to population ratio and higher proportion of its labor force engaged in food production, Africa is still not able to feed itself. The smallholder business model of the last 50 years is fundamentally flawed…maybe it is time for a Plan B.”

African agricultural productivity remains astoundingly low and stagnant at about $500 per person per year. His solution: debunk the ‘myth of the efficient peasant’ and rural romanticism and support commercial agriculture and urban growth.

Commercial agriculture reaps economies of scale that provide advantages often beyond reach for smallholder farmers yet are critical to agricultural production in Africa—risk finance, liquidity, technology, logistics, and knowledge of markets. Collier points to the success of Brazil and Thailand—two emerging economies that differ in scale of commercial organization, but have become major agricultural exporting countries.

Byerlee, a renowned economist and director of the 2008 World Development Report, agreed with Collier that commercial agriculture is likely Africa’s future, but that market-oriented smallholder farmers will play the lead role.

“We have much to learn from emerging business models,” said Byerlee. “Smallholders and agribusiness have complementary assets that can contribute to commercial agriculture, and states and investors must help facilitate smallholder inclusion in these models.”

Byerlee noted that the choice between small-scale or large-scale production models depend on transaction costs and type of commodity, and are context specific. Small- to medium scale production is best suited to most types of products in Africa especially food staples and many labor intensive products (e.g, diary). This follows the example of Thailand that not only has succeeded in food production but alone exports more than the value of all sub-Saharan Africa. Value chains that require stronger coordination with processing and shipping (e.g., sugar and palm oil), demand market standards (e.g, export horticulture) or are taking pioneering risks (e.g., new crops in new areas) may be better suited for large-scale production. Benefits may still be large if they create good jobs—a major challenge for Africa’s future.

Where to invest in Africa’s future?

"Young Africans are voting with their feet in droves to leave smallholder agriculture because it is impoverishing and boring, “ said Collier. “The economic tragedy for Africa is that cities haven’t been the engines of economic opportunity and wage employment.”

Collier argued investments in cities over agriculture are needed to prepare for an urban future and must be done quickly due to one dangerous fact—climate change.

“Climate change is the train coming down the tracks and it is already happening in Africa,” warned Collier. “The continuing deterioration of African agriculture is already set in stone. The last 50 years of carbon emissions are going to continue to devastate Africa’s climate over the next 50 years.”

Collier fears climate change will shift Africa’s competitive advantage in agriculture to Northern Eurasia and North America. Therefore, limited investment dollars must shift to cities which are more climate resilient. Byerlee disagrees.

“There is overwhelming and convincing evidence that agricultural growth is important for poverty reduction and food security,” said Byerlee. “Look at the Green Revolution in Asia and the institutional reforms in China in the early 1980s.”

The 2008 World Development Report also found GDP growth from agriculture benefits the income of the poor two to four times more than GDP growth from non-agriculture. So why isn’t this working for sub-Saharan Africa?

Byerlee points to Africa’s history of poor macroeconomic policies that have disadvantaged African farmers. Smallholder farmers have traditionally been taxed at high levels (as much as 50 percent 20 years ago before liberalization programs started kicking in). Rates have come down dramatically to 15-20 percent, but are still significantly higher than other countries.

“African states must level the playing field,” said Byerlee.

Many of these macropolicies are slowing changing, and that makes Collier and Byerlee hopeful.

“After four decades in sub-Saharan Africa I feel optimistic about Africa’s food systems and future,” said Byerlee. “I see exciting opportunities in terms of market growth, private interest, and improved policies.”

Yields in Africa are low, but there is room for significant improvement. The continent is home to potentially 240 million hectares of uncultivated land and less then 20 percent of irrigation potential has been tapped.

African agricultural systems are transforming rapidly in response to rising rates of income growth, urbanization, and shifts in demand for high value and processed food, and feed for livestock. Higher food prices are incentivizing farmers to enter the market and increasing farmer income. Regional markets now accounting for only 5-10% of trade have much potential to expand, and Byerlee projects the value of African urban food markets to quadruple over the next 20 years.

Renewed investment in Africa is another reason for optimism. After decades of declining support donor agencies are refocusing their efforts on supporting agricultural development in Africa. Private sector investment, ranging from local to foreign investors, is also increasing. Collier spoke of the value pioneer commercial investors are bringing to unused and underutilized, but arable lands in Africa. These larger investors are better able to internalize the benefits of infrastructure supply while creating jobs and opening new markets.

The spur in foreign investment has drawn some fire from opponents worried about ‘land grabbing’. Collier and Byerlee both pointed out the need to differentiate between commercial investors and land speculators. The latter are being scrutinized, and for good reason.

Land speculators are leasing huge tracts of land over long time horizons and banking on the land’s option value if there is a big spike in food prices. This takes potentially arable land out of near-term production and out of the hands of local communities. Byerlee suggests governments impose controls on how rapidly the land is developed as one way of managing this problem.

What will a successful African food system look like in 2050?

"African peasantry as we know it today will not be preserved," projects Collier.

For several decades, Southeast Asia’s tracts of dense, old-growth rainforest have served as fertile ground for lumber, and much land has been converted to agriculture. Now, palm oil plantations are being planted where forests once stood.

In 2011, Indonesia, one of the region’s most prosperous countries, instituted a two-year moratorium on clearing new areas of forest, which is set to expire this May and has been criticized as having several loopholes. Other countries, including Cambodia and Myanmar, are losing forests rapidly.

Out of concern for climate change, international initiatives such as Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) have aimed to promote conservation and sustainable development in countries with significant forest cover. But these efforts do not always support local needs, and can inadvertently have negative impacts.

Tim Forsyth, a Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow, speaks about the gap between conservation efforts and economic and social development in Southeast Asia. He is visiting Stanford this quarter from the London School of Economics and Political Science where he is a reader in environment and development at the Department of International Development.

What major types of forest management do we see across Southeast Asia today?

A number of countries have put laws in place to restrict illegal logging, and have established national park areas. These are usually old-growth rainforests that restrict logging and agriculture. The problem with national parks is that they put so many restrictions on land use that the vulnerable populations living around them either suffer or are forced to cut other trees. I have spent some years working in poorer villages in Indonesia and Thailand on the edge of protected forests, and usually conservation policies avoid the fact that people need to get livelihoods somehow. Government policy should acknowledge how these people are vulnerable to changes in crop prices and the availability of land, or else these people might be forced into breaking the rules of national parks.

There is also production forest, which usually includes forest plantations. These can include softwoods such as pine, or hardwoods such as teak — and increasingly oil palm for food and biofuels. Forest plantations are attractive to governments and businesses because they earn money and can provide timber for construction and exports. Sometimes, plantations also gain carbon credits, although this is not a lot of money so far. In terms of conservation, destroying old-growth forest and replacing it with a monoculture plantation is not good for biodiversity. It also does not benefit those local people who want to harvest forest products or use part of the land for agriculture.

Finally, there are community forests that are supposed to be places where people can grow food, live, and have forest cover. The definition of “community forest,” however, varies from place to place. In Thailand, for example, the way the government defines it is not very different from a conservation area, and consequently there is not much space for agriculture. The Philippines, on the other hand, is more decentralized and local people can shape the nature of the forest landscape more. Corruption, however, is a problem.

Is there an ideal model that successfully supports sustainable development? How does your research approach this issue?

There has been much progress in collaborations that involve willing governments, international advisors, and local actors — often in accordance with an international agreement such as the Convention on Biological Diversity. These collaborations are more useful than a single actor working alone, and they acknowledge a wider range of objectives.

A new initiative is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). This is meant to encourage governments to slow down deforestation by rewarding them financially through carbon credits. But REDD+ has a number of challenges. The main problem is that the value of the credits is so low at the moment. REDD+ also overemphasizes forest cover, rather than forest quality. This means that if a satellite image of a country shows a lot of forest cover, that is good according to REDD+. But this gives no indication as to the biodiversity or the diversity of livelihoods inside a forest. It is a green light to all of the people who want fast-growing tree plantations, which makes them money and supplies them with wood for construction. In addition, it keeps a government happy because it supplies their country with timber and tax revenue, but this is not necessarily what you would call sustainable development.

There are elements of good models in different places, and it really depends on one’s viewpoint. Nepal offers a good example of community forestry because, in principle, it aims to engage local people more effectively and equally, and so can combine local development with the protection of national forests. From a development perspective, some forms of conservation can hurt poorer people and actually undermine conservation efforts. Therefore, in my work, I try to promote policy that acknowledges the needs of the more vulnerable populations. My research tries to make climate change policy more relevant to development processes in Southeast Asia. In my current project, I am seeing how policy recommendations about forests can be reshaped and reinterpreted locally in developing countries in order to address local interests. My goal is to understand how expert knowledge about climate change can be governed more effectively in order to enhance both development and conservation in Asia with better outcomes for everybody.

What can people do in their everyday lives to help combat climate change?

The practical problem of dealing with forest destruction and climate change in Southeast Asia is also a function of social and economic trends. As countries become more prosperous, more and more people live in megacities, drive cars, live in air-conditioned apartments, and frequent shopping malls.

A couple of years ago in Bangkok, I took lots of photographs of t-shirts printed with global warming messages and of people carrying reusable bags. When I was there recently, all of these things had disappeared. In other words, there is a tendency for people to think of conservation efforts as a fashion trend.

I do not think that any city in Asia is doing enough. We have to start planning cities in ways that use fewer greenhouse gases, and also to encourage people to realize that they can be real agents of change. At the moment, many urban citizens believe they can implement climate change policy by managing rural and forested landscapes. Instead, they need to realize the problems of these approaches, and to see what they can do themselves.

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