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Former Senator Gary Hart has served as chairman of the Council for a Livable World since 2006. Since retiring from the United States Senate, he has been extensively involved in international law and business, as a strategic advisor to major U.S. corporations, and as a teacher, author and lecturer. He is currently Wirth Chair Professor at the University of Colorado and Distinguished Fellow at the New America Foundation.

Hart was co-chair of the U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century. The Commission performed the most comprehensive review of national security since 1947, predicted the terrorist attacks on America, and proposed a sweeping overhaul of U.S. national security structures and policies for the post-Cold War new century and the age of terrorism. He was also co-chair of the Council task force that produced the report: "America Unprepared-America Still at Risk", in October, 2002.

Hart has been Visiting Fellow, Chatham Lecturer, and McCallum Memorial Lecturer at Oxford University, Global Fund Lecturer at Yale University, and Regents Lecturer at the University of California. He has earned a doctor of philosophy degree from Oxford University and graduate law and divinity degrees from Yale University. He was visiting lecturer at the Yale Law School.

Hart represented the State of Colorado in the United States Senate from 1975 to 1987. In 1984 and 1988, he was a candidate for his party's nomination for President.

Senator Hart has written numerous books including Under the Eagle's Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 2009 (Fulcrum Books, January 2008), The Courage of Our Convictions: A Manifesto for Democrats (Henry Holt/Time Books 2006), and The Shield and The Cloak: The Security of the Commons (Oxford University Press, 2006).

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Under the Eagles Wing Gary Hart
About Under the Eagle’s Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 2009:

Aimed at the new administration of 2009, Under the Eagle's Wing provides a sound national security strategy for the new century. Speaking from experience, former U.S. senator Gary Hart served on the United States Commission on National Security for the 21st century, which predicted the events of 9/11. Hart argues that threats such as terrorism, disease, and climate change are global challenges that should be addressed as such. He addresses a difficult question: How does a republic make itself secure in a revolutionary age without yielding to the temptations of empire? A thoughtful treatise, Under the Eagle's Wing makes a compelling plea for our leaders to embrace a new world order, one in which the U.S. and other nations draw strength from a united approach.

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Former Senator Gary Hart Chairman, Council for a Livable World; Wirth Chair Professor, University of Colorado; and Distinguished Fellow, New America Foundation Speaker

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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
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Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995 and served as FSI Director from 2015 to 2025. He is also an international affairs analyst for MSNOW.

McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

McFaul has authored ten books and edited several others, including, most recently, Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, as well as From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, (a New York Times bestseller) Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.

He is a recipient of numerous awards, including an honorary PhD from Montana State University; the Order for Merits to Lithuania from President Gitanas Nausėda of Lithuania; Order of Merit of Third Degree from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford University. In 2015, he was the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University.

McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. 

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Iain Johnston is the Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Harvard University's department of government. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. His research and teaching interests include socialization in international institutions, the analysis of identity in the social sciences, and ideational sources of strategic choice, mostly with reference to China and the Asia-Pacific region. He is the author of "Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History" (Princeton 1995) and "Social States: China in International Institutes, 1980-2000" (Princeton 2008), and co-editor of "Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power" (Routledge 1999), "New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy" (Stanford 2006), and "Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 2007).

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Professor Alastair Iain Johnston Speaker Department of Government, Harvard University
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This study was presented by PESD research fellows Jeremy Carl and Varun Rai and PESD Director David Victor at the conference “The Future of India's Foreign Policy,” hosted by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) at the University of Pennsylvania on April 22 and 23, 2008.

The study explores the role of energy in India’s foreign policy strategy and examines the wide gap between India’s need for a strategic energy policy and the government of India’s inability to put such a policy into practice. As a stark departure from the idealized vision, India’s energy supply chains that have grown increasingly creaky and unreliable. Only halting progress has been made towards reform and, without fundamental reform, it is likely that India’s global energy strategy will continue to be a failure.

In particular, the authors examine the relationship between India’s energy policy and its foreign policy by highlighting both themes and vignettes in three different areas of the energy system: oil & natural gas, coal, and electricity. They find that fickle domestic political coalitions dominate energy policymaking in India and that these unstable coalitions, when combined with the weak administrative capacity of the Indian state, leave India’s foreign policy apparatus incapable of making credible commitments in the energy sector.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #75
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Jeremy Carl
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David G. Victor
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On May 16-17 FSI will be co-sponsoring a conference with the Department of History and the Center for East Asian Studies on Same-Sex Desire and Union in China: Interdisciplinary and Historical Perspectives.

OVERVIEW

Same-sex desire and union are themes of basic importance to multiple fields of Chinese studies, notably Ming-Qing literature, but also history, anthropology, and contemporary cultural and political studies. After long occlusion by mainstream scholarship, these themes have recently become a central focus for a growing number of international scholars. In a complementary development, queer activism and cultural production are highly visible features of the increasingly robust civil societies that have emerged in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Hong Kong over the past decade or two. The following is a brief overview of just a few of the questions and challenges that scholars face today.

A rich body of homoerotic literature survives from Late Imperial China (especially the 17th-19th centuries), but much of this material has been neglected until very recently (in part because censorship by successive political regimes made once famous works obscure and hard to find). Indeed, a prominent part of elite male discourse and lifestyle was a homoerotic sensibility that focused in part on cross-dressing boy actors as objects of aesthetic idealization and sexual desire. By the eighteenth century, as commercial opera in Beijing achieved its mature form, to consort with boy actors had become a fashionable (if controversial) status symbol for elite men, and a high-class homosexual brothel/escort scene flourished in close connection with the theater. This world is richly documented in the drama, vernacular fiction, and literati jottings of the era, and it is now a rising priority for literary scholars and historians. But we have barely scratched the surface of this material, and mainstream scholarship has hardly begun to take account of its implications. A handful of scholars have also begun to explore drama and verse written by women, which contain many homoerotic themes; but this exciting body of texts remains largely unknown to the wider field of Chinese literature.

During the same era, a skewed sex ratio and shortage of wives among the poor meant that increasing numbers of marginalized males lived outside the normative family system. In that context, same-sex union (often framed by chosen kinship forms such as ganqin adoption or sworn brotherhood) was the dominant mode of alliance, although there is also evidence of widespread wife-sharing and other non-normative family forms. Although organized according to age hierarchy, such same-sex unions appear to have been far more symmetrical and consensual than anything found in the elite homoerotic scene. Judicial anxiety focused on the security threat supposedly posed by this growing underclass of marginal males, who were stereotyped as sexual predators threatening the women and adolescent boys of established families; legal prohibitions of male-male sodomy (fully developed in the eighteenth century) focused on suppressing this threat. As a result of these prohibitions, China’s vast legal archives from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contain masses of evidence about male same-sex relations that scholars have only just begun to investigate.

At the same time, there is considerable evidence in legal sources that male same-sex relations were also widespread within settled peasant communities. A common – if seldom openly acknowledged – pattern was for a young male, in the years leading up to marriage, to play the penetrated role in a sexual relationship with an older man. The penetrated role was stigmatized, but it was also understandable and largely tolerated as a stage of the maturation process on the path to full social adulthood, which came with marriage. This way of understanding and experiencing same-sex relations has much in common with practice in other premodern societies, but it seems radically different from the modern egalitarian template of sexual orientation.

The fall of the empire in 1912 ushered in a new era in which anxious elites promoted a Westernized vision of modernity in order to resist and catch up with the developed imperialist powers. A notable feature of this vision was a re-imagination of same-sex desire in terms of the newly imported concept of “homosexuality,” which implied pathology. This modernity involved the active suppression of longstanding forms of elite self-expression (for example, patronage of cross-dressing actors), but also the emergence of new images and self-conscious identities (for example, the concept of the lesbian as a social figure). Something similar happened in Japan and many other parts of the world during roughly the same era. This transformational process continues in China to this day; questions of identity and social role, in particular, remain open and fluid. A key issue now, in our era of accelerated globalization, is the ways in which imported concepts and vocabulary will articulate with locally emerging forms of identity, politics, and cultural expression.

The contemporary queer scene in “Greater China” (including the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) serves as a revealing barometer of wider political and social change. In Taiwan since the end of martial law (1987), queer politics and culture have become among the most striking and visible dimensions of a new democratic society. In a less open but no less dramatic way, the PRC in the post-Mao era (since 1978) has also witnessed an efflorescence of queer associations, social life, and cultural production. In cities like Beijing, such activity takes place within a broad, ambiguous grey area that enjoys no legal protection, but in practice is often tolerated by authorities. The underground film scene is especially lively. In both Taiwan and the PRC, queer life is a prominent feature of the fledgling civil societies that have emerged with the demise of more repressive political regimes.

The contemporary Chinese queer scene is characterized by a vital transnational cross-fertilization that takes in Western countries and overseas Chinese as well – for example, some of the key activists in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the PRC have spent long stints in North America, Australia, or Europe for education or work, and in that setting have been able to network with Western activists and scholars, and with other Chinese living abroad. By the same token, the study of homosexuality in Chinese history and culture (like the broader field of Chinese studies) has become an increasingly transnational enterprise, involving scholars in all parts of Greater China, together with North Americans, Australians, and Europeans, as well as Chinese expatriates who teach on foreign campuses.

The purpose of this two-day conference is to bring people together for a conversation across boundaries of discipline, period, and geography. Scholars in separate fields (and locations) have conducted enough work by now that we are reaching something like a critical mass. But so far, most of us have focused on our own narrow disciplines and topics of research – and at this point, we would all benefit from cross-fertilization and synthesis. What bigger picture emerges when we cast our separate findings in historical and interdisciplinary light? How do historical and comparative perspectives help to illuminate contemporary developments?

The conference will consist of five panels of speakers (three per panel), followed by a round table discussion among four prominent scholars (two historians and two literature specialists) from outside the field of Chinese studies, to highlight comparative and theoretical issues that have emerged from the conference papers. If, as I expect, the event is a success, I hope to edit a conference volume for publication.

The conference is free and open to the public.

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Venture capitalist, attorney and educator Michael Korver opened SPRIE's spring seminar series on new post-bubble patterns of entrepreneurship in Japan. Korver, a managing partner in Japan's Global Venture Capital, spoke on how he has seen venture capital evolve there in light of his own firm's experiences.

Korver argued that despite a number of problems surrounding the venture capital situation in Japan--a surplus of capital overwhelmingly from large entities in the financial services sector, low perceptions of entrepreneurial activity, and a lack of "high growth expectation" entrepreneurial activity--Tokyo offers a number of advantages to entrepreneurs, perhaps the most significant being Japan's early-adopter, high-consumption domestic market.

"Tokyo is... the perfect incubator for new businesses, ...but the Japanese leaders do not understand that the future of Japan... is absolutely dependent on creating entrepreneurial innovation."
-Michael Korver

He conceded that things have gotten worse since 2006: the backlash from the Livedoor/Takafumi Horie scandal and the resulting drop in the stock market, a 20% withholding tax on investment in Japan from foreign sources and the Ministry of Finance's regulation of industries that use limited partnerships like the venture capital industry have all added up to a drying-up of VC investments and a drop in IPOs in Japan.

Nonetheless, Korver will continue to have Tokyo as his base of operations. "Tokyo is... the perfect incubator for new businesses, ...but the Japanese leaders do not understand that the future of Japan... is absolutely dependent on creating entrepreneurial innovation."

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How might one think about Chinese power, its dimensions, its effects, and its implications for change in the United States and elsewhere? Dr. David M. Lampton will put China's current trajectory and its conceptions of power in their historical contexts, discuss how China's neighbors are responding to the PRC's growing strength, and explore the vulnerabilities and uncertainties that lie ahead not only for China but the outside world.  
 
Dr. Lampton's work is based on interviews in China, in countries along the PRC's long periphery, and in the United States, as well as extensive documentary research. His book, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds, was just published by the University of California Press. 

David M. Lampton, Dean of Faculty, is George and Sadie Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Senior International Advisor on China for the law firm of Akin Gump. Before assuming the post at SAIS in December 1997, he was president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations in New York City for a decade. Dr. Lampton is the author of numerous books and articles on Chinese domestic and foreign affairs. His most recent book is, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (University of California Press, 2008), and his articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, The China Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other venues academic and popular. Earlier books and edited volumes include: Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (University of California Press, 2001) and (editor) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford University Press, 2001).

Lampton received his PhD and undergraduate degrees from Stanford University and has lived in the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. He has an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Far Eastern Studies and is consultant to the Aspen Institute's Congressional Program, the Kettering Foundation, and various corporations and government agencies.

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David M. Lampton George and Sadie Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies Speaker the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
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David G. Victor is a professor at Stanford Law School and directs the Freeman Spogli Institute's Program on Energy & Sustainable Development; he is also adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What to do about Mexico's oil company, Pemex, may seem like a parochial issue of interest only to Mexicans and a few oil industry executives. But the matter should be of concern to anybody who is wondering when oil will come down off its near-record highs.

Pemex generates two fifth's of the Mexican government's income and is a lucrative employer, but it is ailing from neglect. For years the government has milked Pemex of cash without giving it the wherewithal to invest in and develop new sources of oil. When President Felipe Calderon proposed last week to reform Pemex and encourage more private investment in oil exploration and refining, his leftist opponents shut down the country's legislature in protest. Pemex, they claimed, is a cherished national treasure that must not be pushed into private hands.

Mexico is hardly the only country that treats its state oil companies as ATMs for governments, unions, cronies and others who siphon the rich benefits for themselves. A large fraction of the world's oil patch is struggling with the problem that bedevils Calderon: how to make state-owned oil companies (which control about three quarters of the world's oil reserves) more effective at finding and producing oil. Veneuzuela's oil output is flagging. Russia's state-owned gas company, Gazprom, is on the edge of a steep decline in production. And in different ways many of the world's state-owned oil companies are struggling to keep pace with rising demand. Simply privatizing them is politically difficult, and thus most of the world's oil-rich governments are struggling to find ways to make state enterprises perform better.

Even among state oil companies, Pemex's performance is notably poor. Used as a cash cow for the government, Pemex has never been able to keep enough of its profits to invest in exploration and better technology, the lifeblood of the best oil companies. Until a few years ago, Pemex invested essentially nothing in looking for new oil fields. It relied, instead, on the aging Cantarell field, which was discovered in the 1970s not by Pemex but by fisherman who were angry that the seeping oil was fouling their nets and assumed that Pemex was to blame. Pemex brought the massive field online with relatively simple technology. A scheme in the late 1990s extended the life of the field, but that effort has run out of steam. On the back of Cantarell's decline, total output from Pemex is sliding; some even worry that Mexico could become a net importer of oil in the next decade or two. They're probably wrong, but even the idea makes people nervous.

At times over the last few decades (including today) Pemex has been blessed with a dream team of smart managers, but even they have not been able to reverse the tide of red ink. That's because the company's troubles run so deep that even the best management can't fix them. Indeed, the most striking thing about Calderon's proposed reforms is that they don't go nearly far enough to make Pemex a responsive company, even though they are on the outer edge of what's probably politically feasible in Mexico.

For example, Calderon proposes a new system of "citizen bonds" that will help bring capital to the company (and because they would be owned by the public, these bonds would help blunt the legal block to any reform—Mexico's Constitution requires that its hydrocarbons be owned by the people). Money alone, though, won't reverse Pemex's fortunes. Part of the problem is that risk taking, which is essential to success in oil, is strongly discouraged. My colleagues at Stanford, in a study released last week, have shown that a system of tough laws that control procurement make managers wary of projects that could fail. Although such laws are designed to help stamp out corruption, a noble goal, they are administered by parts of the Mexican government that know little about the risky nature of the oil business.

Pemex's ability to control its own investment capital is probably more important to its success than anything else. The firm, though, has been hobbled because the government keeps all profits for use in the federal budget and the finance ministry has the final word on all Pemex investments. Solving that problem would require distancing government from the oil company. Given that the government is dependent on Pemex cash, that is politically risky. In fact, the real foundation for Calderon's reforms announced last week actually happened long ago when he first took office and spearheaded an effort to change Mexico's tax system. Much of the Mexican economy doesn't pay taxes to the government, which explains why its need for cash from Pemex is particularly desperate. Those tax reforms, however, are too modest to make a fundamental difference in the government's dependence on Pemex.

Calderon's reforms seem unlikely to solve the politically hardest task: reigning in the Pemex workers' union, which favors projects that generate jobs and benefits for its members. The union is well-connected to Mexico's left-leaning political parties, which helps explain why those same parties are so wary of "privatization." In fact, Calderon's proposals would not privatize the companies, but the union and the left know that cry will rally the people to prevent change.

Elsewhere in the world a thicket of similar, interlocking problems loom over the oil patch. Kuwait has a procurement system much like Mexico's, with a similarly perverse effect on the incentives for workers in that country's oil company to take risks and perform at world standard. Even in Brazil, whose state oil company is one of the best performing, has a hard time keeping the government at bay when it comes to taxing oil output. Two massive new oil finds over the last six months have kindled discussions in Brazil about raising the tax rate and channeling ever more of the oil output for government purposes. In Venezuela, where Chavez has taken a good oil company and run it into the ground, the burden of public projects is so great that the oil company can no longer focus on actually producing oil efficiently, and production is in decline.

The odds are that Calderon will make some reforms but won't transform Pemex. And that outcome, multiplied through state-owned oil companies around the world, suggests that oil output will increase only sluggishly. With demand still strong, oil prices are set to stay high for some time.

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