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In his blog posting SORT vs. New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty, Steven Pifer continues with his previous posting Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate.  He points to the ratification experience between George W. Bush's 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and Burak Obama's 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as the basis for the Obama administration fear that the Republican majority Senate would not consider a treaty for further nuclear reductions on its merits.

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President Barack Obama desires to further reduce nuclear arsenals below the levels set in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and Republicans and former officials of the George W. Bush administration assert that this can only be done through a new treaty.  Steven Pifer, director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative, in his blog posting Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate, points out that nuclear reduction efforts have not always been accomplished through treaties requiring ratification by the senate.  History shows that past presidents, including Republicans, have used alternative methods that did not require a 2/3 majority vote by the Senate. 

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We examine whether and how political connections influence the use of courts in transitional and authoritarian settings using survey data of over 3,900 private firms in China. Although political connections are normally associated with “using the back door,” we find that politically connected firms are more inclined than unconnected firms to use courts over informal means of dispute resolution. Our finding raises a more challenging question: Are politically connected firms more likely to litigate because of their advantages in “know-how” (knowledge of navigating courts) or “know-who” (political influence over adjudication)? By manipulating regional institutional variance as moderators, we find evidence that political advantage dominates knowledge advantage in linking political connections to the use of courts, implying a relationship of perverse complementarity. This finding suggests that expansion of formal institutions may not necessarily erode informal networks; it is the latter that emboldens market actors to seize the advantage of the legal system.

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China’s remarkable development poses a problem for theories that have stressed the importance of institutions producing “good governance” and minimizing corruption.  As a possible solution to this problem, the following ten arguments are presented:  1) Current research presents us with two very different concepts of governance; 2) Only one of these can serve as the basis for an operationalization of “good governance”; 3) In this approach, labeled “Quality of Government” (QoG), it is argued that QoG should be distinguished from “quality of democracy”, implying that; 4) the definition of QoG should be confined to the execution and implementation of public policies; 5) Using a “public goods” approach to corruption, QoG can be defined and measured in a universal way using impartiality in the exercise of public power as the basic operational norm; 6) As with representative democracy, QoG can be institutionalized in very different ways; 7) Most western scholars have confused countries’ specific institutional configuration of “good governance” with the basic norm for QoG which; 7) has led to dysfunctional policy suggestions for developing countries;  8) Beginning in the 1990, the public administration in China has used performance-based management as its main operational tool; 9) This specific type of public administration can be conceptualized as a cadre organization – a non-Weberian model for increasing QoG, that has been neglected both in public administration research and in the institutional theory of development; 10) The cadre organization model, which is also found in the West, solves the perennial delegation problem in public administration, which can explain why China has thrived, despite not having a Weberian rule-of-law type of administration and scoring relatively high on standard measures of corruption.

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All the theories that explain post-Mao China’s economic success tend to attribute it to one or several “successful” policies or institutions of the Chinese government, or to account for the success from economic perspectives. This article argues that the success of the Chinese economy relies not just on the Chinese state’s economic policy but also on its social policies. Moreover, China’s economic success does not merely lie in the effectiveness of any single economic or social policy or institution, but also in the state’s capacity to make a policy shift when it faces the negative unintended consequences of its earlier policies. The Chinese state is compelled to make policy shifts quickly because performance constitutes the primary base of its legitimacy, and the Chinese state is able to make policy shifts because it enjoys a high level of autonomy inherited from China’s past. China’s economic development follows no fixed policies and relies on no stable institutions, and there is no Chinese model or “Beijing consensus” that can be constructed to explain its success.

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This paper draws on evidence from loosely structured interviews and data from original surveys of 5,130 delegates in township, county, and municipal congresses to argue that congressional representation unfolds as authoritarian parochialism in China. It makes three new arguments. First, popularly elected local congresses that once only mechanically stood in for the Chinese mass public, through demographically descriptive and politically symbolic representation, now work as substantively representative institutions. Chinese local congressmen and women view themselves and act as “delegates,” not Burkean trustees or Leninist party agents. Second, this congressional representation is not commonly expressed in the quintessentially legislative activities familiar in other regime types. Rather, it is an extra-legislative variant of pork barrel politics: parochial activity by delegates to deliver targeted public goods to the geographic constituency. Third, this authoritarian parochialism is due to institutional arrangements and regime priorities, some common to single-party dictatorships and some distinct to Chinese authoritarianism.

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Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Visiting Scholar

Jessie Jin-Jen Leu a government official from the Republic of China (Taiwan), was a visiting scholar at the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) in 2012-13. 

Ms. Leu is a senior economic officer who worked in various positions at the Ministry of Economic Affairs of R.O.C. She is experienced on the import management and multilateral trade related to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Currently she is working as an associate researcher to the National Security Advisor for economic affairs.

Ms. Leu graduated from Taiwan’s Tam-Kang University with a Bachelor's degree of International Trade in 1989. She continued her Master’s degree at University of Wyoming, United States in 1995. Ms. Leu also participated in the WTO negotiation and leadership Program at the Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in 2003.

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Fusion reactors have the potential to be used for military purposes. This talk provides quantitative estimates about weapon-relevant materials produced in future magnetic confinement commercial fusion reactors, discusses whether states will ever consider such a use and addresses possible implications for the current regulatory system.


About the speaker: Matthias Englert is group leader of the physics and disarmament section at the Interdisciplinary Research Group Science Technology and Security (IANUS) and holds a PhD in physics from Darmstadt University of Technology in Germany. Before joining IANUS he was a postdoctoral science fellow at CISAC, Stanford University from 2009-2011. His major research interests include nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, nuclear postures and warheads, fissile material and production technologies, the civil use of nuclear power and its role in future energy scenarios and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Although a substantial part of his professional work has been technical, he is equally interested in and actively studies the historical, social and political aspects of the use of nuclear technologies (nuclear philosophy). Matthias is the chairman of the board of the German Research Association Science, Disarmament and International Security (FONAS) and Vice Speaker of the Physics and Disarmament working group of the German Physical Society (DPG).

CISAC Conference Room

Matthias Englert Group Leader, Disarmament and Nuclear Security section, IANUS Darmstadt Speaker
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Grant Miller will discuss the results of his SAPARC-funded research in rural China, supplementing a large NIH-funded project about pay-for-performance to improve health. The research was designed to test the effect of offering school principals small incentives for anemia reduction on the health and academic performance of primary school students – potentially leading to substantially more cost-effective health policies.

Grant Miller, PHD, MPP, is an Associate Professor of Medicine at the Stanford School of Medicine, a Core Faculty Member at the Center for Health Policy/Primary Care and Outcomes Research, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). He is also a Faculty Fellow of the Stanford Center for International Development and a Faculty Affiliate of the Stanford Center for Latin American Studies. His primary areas of interest are health and development economics and economic demography.

Miller's current research focuses broadly on behavioral obstacles to health improvement in developing countries. One line of studies investigates household decision-making underlying puzzlingly low adoption rates of highly efficacious health technologies (like point-of-use drinking water disinfectants and improved cookstoves) in many poor countries. Another vein of research investigates misaligned macro- and micro-level incentives governing the supply of health technologies and services. He has conducted these and other research projects at institutions including the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Urban Institute, and the University of California-San Francisco's Institute for Health Policy Studies. He received a BA in psychology from Yale College, a master's degree in public policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and a PhD in health policy/economics also from Harvard.

Philippines Conference Room

Encina Commons Room 101,
615 Crothers Way,
Stanford, CA 94305-6006

(650) 723-2714 (650) 723-1919
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Henry J. Kaiser, Jr. Professor
Professor, Health Policy
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Professor, Economics (by courtesy)
grant_miller_vert.jpeg PhD, MPP

As a health and development economist based at the Stanford School of Medicine, Dr. Miller's overarching focus is research and teaching aimed at developing more effective health improvement strategies for developing countries.

His agenda addresses three major interrelated themes: First, what are the major causes of population health improvement around the world and over time? His projects addressing this question are retrospective observational studies that focus both on historical health improvement and the determinants of population health in developing countries today. Second, what are the behavioral underpinnings of the major determinants of population health improvement? Policy relevance and generalizability require knowing not only which factors have contributed most to population health gains, but also why. Third, how can programs and policies use these behavioral insights to improve population health more effectively? The ultimate test of policy relevance is the ability to help formulate new strategies using these insights that are effective.

Faculty Fellow, Stanford Center on Global Poverty and Development
Faculty Affiliate, Stanford Center for Latin American Studies
Faculty Affiliate, Woods Institute for the Environment
Faculty Affiliate, Interdisciplinary Program in Environment & Resources
Faculty Affiliate, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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Grant Miller Associate Professor of Medicine; Associate Professor, by courtesy, of Economics and of Health Research and Policy; Senior Fellow at FSI and CHP/PCOR Core Faculty Member Speaker Stanford University
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In our current societies, the media are backbone institutions of social life, a tool through which we can strength or deteriorate our democracy. Each society decides if it works exclusively for the market or if it conditions business goals to preserve collective responsibility. The media are nuclear tools to accomplish the right balance between the two.  Unfortunately, nowadays such balance is neither a priority of public media sector nor a private one. The speech of the media has shifted, with consent and complicity of all the stakeholders, and has diminished responsibility criteria and installed partisanship and special interest and business. Reversing this process is an emergency, but the absence of imminent danger, unlike what it happens with the economic crisis, has not forced us to assume our obligations. Consequently, without being aware of it, we are marginalizing media content that can contribute to public service. The dependence between politicians and journalists makes them forget that they must serve the public interest. They are too involved in their own fight to survive and as a result subject the law, subsidies and news to their own interests. This lecture will analyze the mechanisms and trends through which the mass media stabilize irresponsibility and encourage a sensationalist discourse that, in turn, distance the citizen from public affairs.


Mònica Terribas was born in Barcelona (1968). She is a journalist and has been teaching at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra since 1993. She obtained her degree of Journalism at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (1991) and a doctoral fellowship by the British Council and La Caixa to study the links between the concept of public sphere and national identity in the media (Ph.D,  University of Stirling, Scotland, 1994). She combined her studies with her professional career as a journalist in the radio news services in 1986 and continued in 1988 in TV3 - Televisió de Catalunya- as a screenwriter, coordinator, editor and presenter of several television programs, among which the late night news program, La Nit al Dia (2002-2008).  In May 2008 she was appointed General Manager of TV3, responsible for the six public channels of the Catalan media corporation up to April 2012.  Since August 2012, she is the editor and CEO of ARA, which includes a newspaper and the net news leader platform. Among other awards, she received the National Award of Journalism and National Award of Culture.

This event is part of The Europe Center's Iberian Studies Program lecture series and the Journalism and Literature series presented by the Division of Literatures, Cultures, and Languages, the Stanford Humanities Center and The Europe Center.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room


Mònica Terribas Journalist, Assistant Professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and editor and CEO, <em>Ara</em> Speaker
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