Ten years ago, the United States and Russia signed the New START treaty—a nuclear arms control agreement that we, as the heads of our governments’ respective delegations, helped negotiate. Since then, New START has played a central role in keeping the peace and preventing a dangerous arms race between the two countries that together possess 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Now, however, New START is in trouble: without action to extend it, the treaty will expire in February 2021. Its demise would have worrying implications for the security of the United States, of Russia, and of the world. It could bring a return to nuclear competition and spark mutual suspicion that would push the world to a level of nuclear risk unseen for decades.

Read full article at Foreign Affairs

In my line of work, you have to have a long memory. Periods of success in negotiations are followed by droughts, because of politics, military upheaval, arms buildups—yes, sometimes the weapons have to be built before they can be reduced—or a sense of complacency: “We have arms control treaties in place; let’s just focus on implementing them.” In those cases, new thinking and new negotiations may slow or even stop. Yet, the national security interest of the United States continues to drive the necessity for nuclear arms control.

Read full article at The Foreign Service Journal 

[The following article originally appeared in French in Le Soir]

Over the past 20 years of exile, I returned to Morocco sporadically to visit family and friends. Now, I am here indefinitely until the coronavirus pandemic passes. I have observed its effects upon my homeland as not just a proud Moroccan, but also a trained social scientist assessing how the Moroccan state has responded – and how new social dynamics can emerge from it. 

Officially, Moroccan containment and mitigation measures have been described as a model of responsiveness. Notwithstanding testing shortages, and the failure to repatriate Moroccans abroad, new resources like personal protective equipment have been supplied to hospitals. Emergency funds are supporting the economy. The military and security forces have enforced strict quarantine and sheltering policies. Despite that infectious rates are among the highest in Africa, deaths from COVID-19 still remain comparatively low, a reality for which all Moroccans are grateful. 

However, the aggressiveness of these responses stems from a troubling reality. The state moved quickly to contain the pandemic because it could not afford to do otherwise. It already lagged behind in providing basic goods like education and jobs, due to the unbridled neoliberal economic model espoused by national planners for two decades at the expense of social development. The healthcare sector could not absorb even a modest surge in hospitalizations and deaths. In sum, Morocco’s response was optimal given its resources, but suboptimal given its potential. 

Why is this troubling? Not only do medical projections suggest a second wave of the pandemic looms this winter, but there will be more existential threats to come of this type. Climate change will further accentuate these dangers. Further, entire swathes of the Moroccan economy will remain in crisis for the foreseeable future. Vast numbers of the labor force work in the informal sector, the product of unfettered neoliberalism that did not produce any trickle-down effects due to weak rule of law. Grinding inequality means that successful treatments for COVID-19 will not reach most of the population. As Moroccans, we need only to consider the Rif to acknowledge the dangers that lie ahead. 

In the context of this crisis, many Moroccans have put aside standing grievances and put faith in their state. Politically, Moroccans do not labor under the extreme polarization often seen in other Arab countries. True, Morocco does not have the democratic system of Tunisia, where electoral institutions keep things in place. But, neither does it feature the deep schisms of Algeria, where the Hirak protest movement last year exposed the eroding legitimacy of the military and its civilian façade. If anything, Algerian politics will become even more fractured after the pandemic. 

Morocco stands in the middle. Unlike Tunisia, where democratic institutions absorb and mediate this crisis, here the state can only deflect and postpone it. However, neither has Moroccan politics splintered across irreconcilable rifts, partly due to the unifying presence of the monarchy. This gives Moroccans the chance to envision a future of improved governance that compensates for past deficiencies, and leaves us better prepared for future threats. This is not a substitute for genuine pluralism, but it can facilitate its onset. 

Recently, King Mohamed pronounced the prevailing paradigm of economic development to have floundered. As the Chinese proverb holds that with every crisis comes opportunity, we now have an opening to realign it, despite that more hardships will likely ensue as the pandemic continues to have long-lasting consequences. For instance, remittances, long a vital source of economic funding, will decline, as Moroccans abroad will more likely keep their cash close. The tourism sector will take many years to recover. But Morocco can also take advantage of global supply chain disruptions to secure new modes of production. Self-sufficiency and social spending must be priorities. 

Crucially, we cannot merely tweak the neoliberal model in favor of a master turn-key monarchical plan. The focus here falls upon not just the ideas behind national development, but the process through which those ideas come to fruition. Major ruptures that allow such soul- searching are rare in Morocco. One came after the passing of my uncle, King Hassan II, in 1999. A second came with the Arab Spring in 2011. Today marks another such inflection point, which allows all of society sharing common trauma and frustration to step back from the brink. 

That process will not be easy. Many Moroccans have lost faith in political engagement after too many failed reform promises. The Arab Spring’s impetus to demand voice and dignity will become more omnipresent. New social and economic initiatives must be formulated in close concertation with society, through inclusive dialogues that favor participation over top-down imposition. 

The state must avoid succumbing to the huge temptation of stoking false patriotism, or aggrandizing its authoritarian impulse by securitizing the pandemic. For instance, surveillance technologies utilized to ensure social distancing cannot be retooled to suppress political mobilization, as is happening in Russia and China. Indeed, many have wrongly assumed that autocracies are better equipped for the current crisis by comparing China with the US. However, this is a false dichotomy. For every China, there are successful democracies like South Korea and Taiwan where close state-society coordination is mediated not by the army or police, but rather by trust, transparency, and citizen engagement. 

In short, an historical opportunity now presents itself for Morocco; let us not squander it.

APARC's China Program recently hosted Center Fellow Thomas Fingar for the webinar "Was America’s China Policy a Foolish Failure? The Logic and Achievements of Engagement." In this talk, Fingar examines the longtime U.S. strategy of engagement with China as well as the potential shift toward a strategy of decoupling. "Much recent commentary on U.S. relations with China claims that the policy of 'Engagement' was a foolish and failed attempt to transform the People’s Republic into an American style democracy that instead created an authoritarian rival," he says. "This narrative mocks the policies of eight U.S. administrations to justify calls for 'Decoupling' and 'Containment 2.0.'” Fingar argues that the policy of Engagement has been fruitful and that Decoupling is not only inadvisable but also unattainable. Watch:

Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75^th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75^th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.