WASHINGTON - Take Jamey Bennett. When he first began selling his LightWedge personal reading lamp a few years ago, everything was made in China. Then the headaches began: Numerous conference calls in the middle of the night. Shipment delays because of a dockworker strike in California. And many problems related to language differences. The problems became so acute that Bennett transferred the manufacturing to Virginia two months ago.

"Managing a significant manufacturing effort in China remotely with a business of our size is very difficult," Bennett says.

"Firms that just believe that this is going to be simple ... very often get burned," says Martin Kenney, a University of California-Davis professor who recently completed a study of firms doing work in India. "This is a very, very complicated business activity, and there are a thousand ways it can go wrong."

Examples of the perils of moving work abroad keep cropping up. Last month, Indiana said it was halting a contract with an Indian company to upgrade its computer system for its unemployment benefits office after politicians and others started an uproar about the work leaving the state, not to mention the country.

Dell recently shifted some of its computer call center work from India. After moving some of its appliance call center work to India a few years ago, GE in May moved the work back to the Phoenix area. It found that workers in India, who don't own many appliances, couldn't relate to the customers' problems. U.S. workers can take more calls because they resolve issues faster, boosting productivity.

Highlighting how sensitive the topic of moving work outside the USA is, spokesmen for Dell and GE declined to comment. But Dell CEO Michael Dell recently told USA TODAY his company sticks with U.S. employees for many jobs for their skills.

"Most of our (employees) are in the U.S., and it's probably going to remain that way for a long time," Dell said. "The fear of jobs moving from one country to another, at least in our case, is probably greater than the reality."

That doesn't mean the trend will go away. Repetitive and low-skilled manufacturing and services work will likely continue to be sent abroad. But some firms' experiences suggest the hysteria about work going outside the USA may be overblown.

'Lost in the translation'

Several major issues confront businesses when they shift manufacturing outside the USA:

?Culture, language. U.S. firms are finding the do-it-now culture of the USA and some American tastes don't easily translate overseas.

Wells Fargo chief economist Sung Won Sohn says companies he has come in contact with have complained of productivity problems. A U.S. furniture importer has had a tough time persuading his overseas manufacturers to "distress" furniture, a popular style in some U.S. markets that evokes an antique feel. His workers don't see the point in taking a new product and making it look older.

And there are language issues. Although many people overseas speak English, phrasing and other issues can crop up when English is not the first language.

"Quite a bit was sort of lost in the translation," LightWedge's Bennett says.

A Dell spokesman told the Associated Press the company was shifting some corporate clients from Bangalore, India, to Texas, Idaho and Tennessee after receiving service complaints.

Gary Beach, publisher of CIO Magazine, recently was on the phone with a Dell agent in Bangalore for 11/2 hours after having problems with a notebook computer. "The guy was very polite, but he had to go to his supervisor after 65 minutes," Beach says. "It was a change in power options in your control panel. You had to switch to 'always on.' ... Duh!"

-Expertise. Many countries are churning out well-educated engineers, scientists and others while some foreigners are coming to the USA to be educated and then return home. But such education often does not replace experience.

Bethlehem, Pa.-based Air Products and Chemicals makes liquefied natural gas machinery in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. The firm has no plans to move the factory, even though none of the products is sold in the USA.

"We have spent a number of years building up this plant, making major investments and also building up a skilled workforce," spokeswoman Kassie Hilgert says. "Both the workforce and the technology are not transferable to anywhere else in the world."

Kenney notes that some of the businesses overseas are so new that there are few trained managers who know how to properly oversee both service and manufacturing operations.

-Shipping. Some manufacturers are finding the time, money and extra regulatory burdens associated with shipping products to the USA prohibitive. Those issues were compounded after the Sept. 11 attacks, because import regulations were strengthened.

Sanjay Chandra, co-founder of American Leather, a furniture producer in Dallas, does all manufacturing in-house. With hundreds of combinations of styles and fabrics and other attributes to choose from, the firm waits to produce the furniture until orders are received and prides itself on getting the products shipped out in a matter of weeks. Shipments from China are estimated to take about six weeks, after production, according to manufacturers.

"Special order, quick ship doesn't really lend itself to foreign manufacturing because of the time issues," Chandra says.

The shipping headaches may grow. Under rules starting this month, importers are required to electronically send lists to the government in advance of shipments, to help Customs and border protection agents identify high-risk cargo that deserves special attention because of terrorism fears. That is upsetting some importers who say the lists will cost them time and money if there are delays at the borders.

The challenges of importing were also highlighted a little more than a year ago when dockworkers in California were locked out during a labor dispute, stranding Asian imports at sea. The 10-day action that led to the closure of 29 docks was estimated to cost the U.S. economy up to $2 billion a day and forced some manufacturers who rely on foreign parts to shut down.

Keeping supplies flowing

The dockworker strike persuaded Alan Schulman, owner of Glentronics, to stick to his supply method. Schulman, who sells battery-operated, backup sump pumps, has suppliers both overseas and near his headquarters in Wheeling, Ill. When the dock strike started, he was able to switch to his local supplier and continued without any interruptions.

"I always want Plan B."

There are numerous other issues that U.S. firms are bumping into when it comes to working abroad. Many companies find themselves holding more inventory in case there is a supply disruption. That means added costs, because more inventory requires extra space, financing and, sometimes, employees.

"Supply Chain 101 says the most important thing is continuity of supply," says Norbert Ore, who organizes a regular survey of manufacturers for the Institute for Supply Management. "And when you establish a supply line that is 12,000 miles long ... you have to weigh the costs of additional inventory and logistics costs vs. what you can save in terms of lower costs per unit or labor costs."

Shipping business abroad also means relinquishing some control, which for some business owners is easier said than done. And, unless you own the facility and have an employee on-site, fixing any problems that require in-person work involves a lot of time and money. The contracts to set up facilities abroad can also be lengthy, involving months of negotiations and lawyer and consultant costs.

Regional conflicts, such as the periodic clashes between India and Pakistan, also must be considered.

Some move despite challenges

Despite all those issues, for some, moving work abroad is the way to go.

Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs estimates that of the 2.7 million U.S. factory jobs cut in the last three years, 1 million have been relocated abroad.

A wide range of service jobs, such as customer call centers, medical billing and architectural drafting, are also moving outside the USA. In the next 15 years, U.S. employers will move about 3.3 million white-collar jobs abroad, Forrester Research predicts.

The main motivation: money. UC-Davis' Kenney and co-author Rafiq Dossani of Stanford University estimate a call center worker who costs clients $12.47 an hour - including equipment and other costs - in Kansas City costs $4.12 an hour in Mumbai, the Indian city formerly known as Bombay. Indiana originally went with the Indian company after its bid for the computer work came in at $15 million, $8 million below the closest competitor.

After working in Asia and Europe for 15 years, Philip Ison, president of Ison International, bought an upholstery factory in Tennessee in 1999 and shut it down after two years.

"There was just no profit margin to be made," he says. "With all of the headaches between health insurance, workman's comp, OSHA, you can just keep on going down the list. It's not economically feasible to produce something here that takes a lot of labor."

Ison now produces furniture in Romania and ships the products to Norfolk, Va., before selling in the USA.

"With the Internet and the communication systems that are available at this point in time, it's no big deal to sit here and run the factory," he says.

But while some jobs may continue to be sent overseas, it's clear that others - especially those requiring special skills, quick turnaround times or customer contact - will stay in the USA.

"Most companies believe it's going to be easier (to shift work)," says Rudy Puryear of Bain and Co., who has consulted with clients on setting up operations abroad. He says he's seen some firms pull back two or three years after shifting to foreign workers or suppliers. "It is a buyer beware situation."

President Bush's week-long swing through six Asian nations is long overdue. Despite being home to half the world's population and the globe's most dynamic economies, Asia has received scant attention from this administration. Unfortunately the president has only one subject on his agenda -- the war on terrorism. The president is touching lightly, if at all, on the other issues that matter most to this region -- economic globalization, China's growing presence, and political instability fed by economic disparities. This is not surprising. The Bush administration doesn't seem to think much about global economic issues. And when it does speak, as it has recently on the issue of currency manipulation by China and Japan, the administration's policy is confusing and contradictory. In Asia, the single-minded focus on terrorism leaves an opening for others -- China first of all -- who are more in tune with the region's concerns. "I've never seen a time when the U.S. has been so distracted and China has been so focused,'' Ernest Bower, the head of the U.S. business council for Southeast Asia, told a business magazine.

Regional economic bloc

Faced with multiple challenges, the countries of Southeast Asia have accelerated plans to create a regional economic bloc like the European Union. The Chinese, followed closely by India and Japan, are embracing the idea, proposing the creation of a vast East Asian free trade area that would encompass nearly 2 billion people, but notably not include the United States. When national security adviser Condoleezza Rice briefed reporters on the president's trip, the focus was almost entirely on security issues. Bush's itinerary is designed to highlight the nations working closely with the United States to combat Al-Qaida-linked Islamist terror groups in Southeast Asia -- Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. Or to reward those who are backing the war in Iraq -- Japan and Australia. Even at the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok, Bush plans to `"stress the need to put security at the heart of APEC's mission because prosperity and security are inseparable,'' Rice said. No one can argue with that basic proposition. The example she cited was the terrorist bombing a year ago in Bali, Indonesia, which shut down tourism, a vital source of income for Indonesians. But let's not look at that link through the wrong end of the telescope. We need to grapple with the poverty and income inequality in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-populated nation, which feeds growing Islamic radicalism.

China drives growth

East Asia has largely emerged from the financial crisis that swept through this region in 1997-98 and sent countries such as Indonesia into economic collapse. Economic growth should pick up to almost 6 percent next year, the World Bank has predicted. But much of this is driven by China's rapid growth, which is in turn sparking a sharp rise in trade within the region, much of it between countries in the region and China. These countries look warily on this rising giant. China is sucking away foreign investment from places like Silicon Valley that used to flow to them, and with it, jobs. At the same time, progress toward a global free market that ensures fair competition has stalled. The world trade talks in Cancun last month collapsed in rancor, and the United States seems content now to pursue its own bilateral trade deals with favored countries such as Singapore and Australia.

10-nation association

This has encouraged the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations to accelerate plans to create a European Union-style economic community. The Chinese sent a huge, high-powered delegation led by their premier to their recent meeting, signed a friendship treaty with the group and pledged to negotiate a free-trade zone with the group. "The Chinese are moving in in a big way,'' says Stanford University expert Donald K. Emmerson. Where is the United States in all this? "We're outside, and our businesses are going to be outside,'' says Brookings Institution global economic expert Lael Brainard. "The Bush administration needs to get a handle on this.'' If it doesn't, the United States will wake up one day from its infatuation with unilateralism and return to Asia to find that the furniture has been rearranged and the locks have been changed.

Perhaps no other country has more to lose from North Korea's acquisition of a sizeable nuclear arsenal than China. The existence of such weapons would not only endanger the city of Beijing but also provoke a regional arms race in which Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan would eventually develop their own strategic deterrents. Given these facts, it is surprising that China has not acted more forcefully to persuade Pyongyang to terminate its nuclear program.

The explanation for this reluctance is the importance Beijing attaches to regional stability. If the North Korean regime were to collapse, a refugee crisis would ensue as starving people flooded across the border into northeastern China, and the way would be opened for South Korean and American troops to advance up the peninsula towards Beijing.

If the Bush administration wants to enlist Chinese help against Pyongyang, therefore, it must first assuage these very reasonable concerns.

China's importance to the United States stems from the absence of other sources of leverage over Pyongyang. Military action against North Korea is an unattractive option because Kim Jong Il and his generals could retaliate massively. Promises of long-term economic aid in exchange for Pyongyang's renouncing its nuclear aspirations also offers little hope. Kim has a long record of consenting to such deals and then surreptitiously reviving his armament efforts.

What is needed is an intermediate form of suasion. China is the only power that possesses this sort of leverage. According to South Korean analysts, in 2002 China supplied 31 percent of North Korea's imports and accounted for 37 percent of its exports. In addition, each year Beijing gives several hundred thousand tons of food aid to its troublesome neighbor, and, now that the United States and Japan have suspended their oil shipments, provides the preponderance of its fuel.

Beijing has occasionally used its influence to express discontent with North Korean behavior, and, by all accounts, the diplomatic dialogue between the two states has also become more acrimonious of late.

However, Beijing will presumably not press Pyongyang much further unless it is assured of the Bush administration's goodwill. In practice, this means that Washington must identify and alleviate China's specific geopolitical concerns. If Beijing fears a refugee crisis, then the United States and its allies must promise to help finance the care of the displaced and perhaps to absorb some significant number of North Korean emigrants. If Beijing fears the approach of American military forces, Washington should consider promising to limit U.S. activities north of the demilitarized zone.

While demonstrating that the United States is willing to accommodate China's needs, the Bush administration must also prove that Pyongyang's policies represent an immediate threat to East Asian stability. To do this, Washington needs to engage more frequently and more conciliatorily in diplomatic talks with Kim and his representatives. For with each abortive discussion, each rejection of reasonable American gestures, the North Koreans push Beijing closer to the conclusion that they pose an unacceptable danger to China's national security interests.

The effect of this policy of dual engagement with China and North Korea would almost certainly be positive. As Beijing's attitude towards Pyongyang hardened, the world might see a sharp reduction in its oil shipments, the deployment of more troops to the North Korean border, or overt discussions with the United States about the future of the peninsula. This would be the strongest possible signal to Pyongyang, short of war, that the world will not tolerate its emergence as a major nuclear power. If, on the other hand, he remained intransigent until the intensified pressure caused North Korea to collapse, Washington and Beijing would still be relatively well situated to deal with the ensuing challenges.

It is through the joint resolution of serious challenges that potential rivals like the United States and China learn to trust each other. If there is a silver lining to the North Korean cloud, it is this opportunity to improve bilateral communications in anticipation of future exigencies.

The writer is a fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford Institute for International Studies.

Stanford, December 1, 2003 -- Arthur Bienenstock, Vice Provost and Dean of Research and Graduate Policy, and Coit D. Blacker, Director, Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS), announced today that professor Stephen D. Krasner has been appointed deputy director of the Institute, effective January 1, 2004.

Krasner, the Graham H. Stuart professor of international relations, is also a senior fellow at the Institute and director of its Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

"I am enormously grateful to Steve for his willingness to do double-duty at the Institute, as he already directs our Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law," said SIIS director Blacker. Stanford is in the midst of an important transition -- evolving from a predominately national university to an institution with true global reach -- and I expect SIIS to be deeply involved in that process. Having Steve on board in a directing capacity will enhance our ability to think and act effectively at this important juncture in the development of the Institute."

Stephen D. Krasner came to Stanford University in 1981. He was the chair of the political science department from 1984 to 1991. Between 1986 and 1992, he was editor of International Organization. In 2002, he served as director of governance and development at the National Security Council. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (1987-88) and at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (2000-01). He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

His writings have dealt primarily with the political determinants of international economic relations, American foreign policy and sovereignty. His major publications include "Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and American Foreign Policy" (1978); "International Regimes," ed. 1983); "Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism" (1985); "Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics," co-editor (1999); "Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy" (1999), and "Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities," editor (2001).

Krasner received his B.A. from Cornell, M.A. from Columbia and Ph.D. from Harvard. Before coming to Stanford, he taught at Harvard and UCLA.

STANFORD, California Perhaps no other country has more to lose from North Korea's acquisition of a sizeable nuclear arsenal than China. The existence of such weapons would not only endanger the city of Beijing but also provoke a regional arms race in which Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan would eventually develop their own strategic deterrents. Given these facts, it is surprising that China has not acted more forcefully to persuade Pyongyang to terminate its nuclear program.

The explanation for this reluctance is the importance Beijing attaches to regional stability. If the North Korean regime were to collapse, a refugee crisis would ensue as starving people flooded across the border into northeastern China, and the way would be opened for South Korean and American troops to advance up the peninsula towards Beijing.

If the Bush administration wants to enlist Chinese help against Pyongyang, therefore, it must first assuage these very reasonable concerns.

China's importance to the United States stems from the absence of other sources of leverage over Pyongyang. Military action against North Korea is an unattractive option because Kim Jong Il and his generals could retaliate massively. Promises of long-term economic aid in exchange for Pyongyang's renouncing its nuclear aspirations also offers little hope. Kim has a long record of consenting to such deals and then surreptitiously reviving his armament efforts.

What is needed is an intermediate form of suasion. China is the only power that possesses this sort of leverage. According to South Korean analysts, in 2002 China supplied 31 percent of North Korea's imports and accounted for 37 percent of its exports. In addition, each year Beijing gives several hundred thousand tons of food aid to its troublesome neighbor, and, now that the United States and Japan have suspended their oil shipments, provides the preponderance of its fuel.

Beijing has occasionally used its influence to express discontent with North Korean behavior, and, by all accounts, the diplomatic dialogue between the two states has also become more acrimonious of late.

However, Beijing will presumably not press Pyongyang much further unless it is assured of the Bush administration's goodwill. In practice, this means that Washington must identify and alleviate China's specific geopolitical concerns. If Beijing fears a refugee crisis, then the United States and its allies must promise to help finance the care of the displaced and perhaps to absorb some significant number of North Korean emigrants. If Beijing fears the approach of American military forces, Washington should consider promising to limit U.S. activities north of the demilitarized zone.

While demonstrating that the United States is willing to accommodate China's needs, the Bush administration must also prove that Pyongyang's policies represent an immediate threat to East Asian stability. To do this, Washington needs to engage more frequently and more conciliatorily in diplomatic talks with Kim and his representatives. For with each abortive discussion, each rejection of reasonable American gestures, the North Koreans push Beijing closer to the conclusion that they pose an unacceptable danger to China's national security interests.

The effect of this policy of dual engagement with China and North Korea would almost certainly be positive. As Beijing's attitude towards Pyongyang hardened, the world might see a sharp reduction in its oil shipments, the deployment of more troops to the North Korean border, or overt discussions with the United States about the future of the peninsula. This would be the strongest possible signal to Pyongyang, short of war, that the world will not tolerate its emergence as a major nuclear power. If, on the other hand, he remained intransigent until the intensified pressure caused North Korea to collapse, Washington and Beijing would still be relatively well situated to deal with the ensuing challenges.

It is through the joint resolution of serious challenges that potential rivals like the United States and China learn to trust each other. If there is a silver lining to the North Korean cloud, it is this opportunity to improve bilateral communications in anticipation of future exigencies.

The writer is a fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford Institute for International Studies. Enlisting Beijing