Future historians will mark the first national election to be held in Malaysia since the retirement of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) as a watershed in the country's political history. Among key questions circulating in the run-up to the voting on 21 March 2004 were these: Would the ruling National Front gain or lose votes and seats? (Surprise: gained greatly.) Would the opposition Islamic Party, now in control of two states, improve or worsen its position? (Surprise: worsened sharply.) Would KeADILan, the political party which emerged after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim, gain or lose? (Surprise: lost badly.) Answers to other questions were still unknown: Would the election benefit Malaysia's current Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, at the congress of his political party later this year? What would the ruling coalition's landslide imply for Malaysian democracy, stability, and development? For Malaysia's role in the campaign against terrorism? For the country's relations with its neighbors and with the U.S.? (Surprise: Come hear Elizabeth Wong and find out.)

This is the ninth seminar of the 2003-2004 academic year Southeast Asia Forum.

As part of his visit to the West Coast of the United States, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Jan Petersen will speak at Stanford University. The Foreign Minister will speak about the role Norway is playing in facilitating peace and reconciliation processes in Sri Lanka, the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore the Foreign Minister will focus on security policy, including Norway's involvement in international operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Iraq.

Consider the paradox: Singapore's economy is well developed, yet civil society in the city-state has failed to generate significant pressure for greater openness and more democracy. Nor does Singapore appear to have been affected by the ?Third Wave? of democratization that has swept other parts of the world. Scholars have tried to account for the conundrum by noting the deterrent effect of extensive state power, including the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial. The state in Singapore has been likened to a large banyan tree whose omnipresent foliage casts shadows so wide and deep that no other organisms can take root or grow.

In her talk, Prof. Kadir will challenge this explanation as overdrawn. She will question the extent to which the Sinagpore state has remained immune from societal pressures, and explore the increasingly complex dynamics of society-state interaction. Based on a review of different civil-society actors and actions, she will highlight two modes in which social groups are proactive toward the state: by engaging it through interest advocacy, and by resisting it through efforts to protect their own autonomous space. The conventional wisdom is partly correct: Civil society does suffer the stunting shadows of the banyan tree. Yet social pressures are being felt. Ironically, some of these pressures, far from undermining the state, have helped it to remain strong.

Suzaina Kadir, currently a fellow at the Asia Research Institute in Singapore, is writing a book on state power and religious authority in Indonesia.

Drell Lecture Recording: NA

Drell Lecture Transcript: 

Speaker's Biography: Richard Garwin is IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York. After three years on the faculty of the University of Chicago, he joined IBM Corporation in 1952, and was until June 1993 IBM Fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York; Adjunct Research Fellow in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and Adjunct Professor of Physics at Columbia University. In addition, he is a consultant to the U.S. government on matters of military technology, arms control, etc. He has been Director of the IBM Watson Laboratory, Director of Applied Research at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, and a member of the IBM Corporate Technical Committee. He has also been Professor of Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. From 1994 to 2004 he was Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

He has made contributions in the design of nuclear weapons, in instruments and electronics for research in nuclear and low-temperature physics, in the establishment of the nonconservation of parity and the demonstration of some of its striking consequences, in computer elements and systems, including superconducting devices, in communication systems, in the behavior of solid helium, in the detection of gravitational radiation, and in military technology. He has published more than 500 papers and been granted 45 U.S. patents. He has testified to many Congressional committees on matters involving national security, transportation, energy policy and technology, and the like. He is coauthor of many books, among them Nuclear Weapons and World Politics (1977), Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (1977), Energy: The Next Twenty Years (1979), Science Advice to the President (1980), Managing the Plutonium Surplus: Applications and Technical Options (1994), Feux Follets et Champignons Nucleaires (1997) (in French with Georges Charpak), and Megawatts and Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? (2001) (with Georges Charpak).

He was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee 1962-65 and 1969-72, and of the Defense Science Board 1966-69. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society, of the IEEE, and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, the National Academy of Engineering, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the American Philosophical Society. In 2002 he was elected again to the Council of the National Academy of Sciences.

His work for the government has included studies on antisubmarine warfare, new technologies in health care, sensor systems, military and civil aircraft, and satellite and strategic systems, from the point of view of improving such systems as well as assessing existing capabilities. For example, he contributed to the first U.S. photographic reconnaissance satellite program, CORONA, that returned 3 million feet of film from almost 100 successful flights 1960-1972.

He has been a member of the Scientific Advisory Group to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and was in 1998 a Commissioner on the 9-person "Rumsfeld" Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. From 1993 to August 2001, he chaired the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board of the Department of State. On the 40th anniversary of the founding of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) he was recognized as one of the ten Founders of National Reconnaissance. In June, 2002, he was awarded la Grande Medaille de l'Academie des Sciences (France)-2002.

(Abstract from paper) Sociological theorizing and research on the relationship between inequality and corruption is surprisingly rare given the discipline’s long-standing focus on the correlations of inequality with democracy and development, as well as research that demonstrates the associations between corruption, democracy and development.  We propose that greater income inequality increases corruption and find that its explanatory power is significant relative to conventionally accepted correlates of corruption such as low levels of economic development and democracy.  We argue that the rich will employ corruption as one means to preserve and advance their own status, privileges and interests while the poor will be vulnerable to extortion at higher levels of inequality.

While countries with authoritarian regimes are likely to have greater levels of corruption on average, higher levels of inequality increase the likelihood of corruption in countries with democratic regimes because the wealthy cannot employ oppression to advance their interests in these political systems.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, smaller and not larger government is associated with higher levels of corruption because higher inequality through corruption is associated with both lower tax rates as well as lower government transfers and subsidies. We also corroborate the finding that the negative effect of inequality on economic growth can be explained at least in part by its impact on corruption.