Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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The Energy Security Initiative (ESI) is a proposal to increase the benefits offered to countries in good standing with their NPT Obligations, to compensate for all the new supply restrictions and intrusive safeguards requirements imposed on them. The NPT Balance between benefits to signatories and impositions made on them has eroded through more restrictive interpretations of the NPT. The recently implemented Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the proposals to deny nuclear fuel cycle facilities to countries not yet operating them on the one hand, and the limited supply of low cost nuclear energy available to developing countries on the other hand, demonstrate the need to re-constitute the balance implied in the NPT. It is, in fact, in the self interest of the developed countries, to be able to offer an expanded menu of additional energy benefits to countries whose current scope of available benefits has shrank, while the costs of complying with all new restrictions imposed and proposed has increased. This is the purpose of the ESI, which represents a reinterpretation and expansion of a part of Article IV of the NPT.

This presentation includes a detailed description of what ESI could offer under a new reading of article IV; which countries could qualify as beneficiaries of such program, how much might the total program cost, and how to fund it. A special case dealing with small national enrichment plants in countries such as Iran or Brazil is also considered.

Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others. Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, he was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings. His research project this year is entitled "The Energy Security Initiative and a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center: Two Enhancement Options for the Current Non-Proliferation Regime."

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Chaim Braun
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We describe VEGA, a system for analyzing the vulnerability of an electric power grid to physical attacks by terrorists, and for planning mitigation efforts. VEGA (Vulnerability of Electric Grids Analyzer) consists of a bilevel optimization model and solution algorithm, a graphical user interface and a database. The optimization model implements a Stackelberg game in which (a) a group of terrorists attacks components of a power grid ("the system") so as to maximize the amount of load that must be shed (demand for power that goes unmet), and (b) the system operator minimizes that maximum by controlling the degraded system as best possible. We illustrate the basic model using realistic data and show how it can guide a system-upgrade plan to reduce vulnerability.

Actually, we at NPS are using similar techniques to study the vulnerability to attack of a variety of infrastructure systems. This talk will discuss the common approach, and provide two examples: (a) Finding "weak spots" in the Saudi Arabian crude-oil pipeline system and (b) protecting the Washington, DC subway system from a chemical or biological attack.

Dr. Kevin Wood is professor of operations research at the Naval Postgraduate School. At NPS since 1982, he has taught courses in networks and optimization and has published research on network reliability, mathematical programming and its applications, and on interdiction. His 1993 paper "Deterministic Network Interdiction" spurred renewed interest in applying analytical techniques to network and system interdiction, and has led to a series of papers on these topics, by him and by others. He is currently applying the methodology to critical infrastructure protection in general, and electric power grids in particular: Professor Wood has long-term research support from the Office of Naval Research as well as the Air Force of Scientific Research, and has been a visiting professor at Stanford University, the National Security Agency and the University of Auckland.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Kevin Wood Professor of Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School
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The nine nations that possess nuclear weapons have enough plutonium and high-enriched uranium collectively to build more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons, according to a new report aimed at controlling the spread of such weapons and the materials to make them.

This considerable surplus of nuclear-explosive, or fissile, materials threatens global security, as other nations or terrorists seek the means to build nuclear weapons. "Despite a compelling security requirement to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and additional countries," the report warns, "not nearly enough is being done today to achieve this objective."

A group of 23 nuclear experts, convened by Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security (PS&GS), issued the report, "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism: Essential Steps to Reduce the Availability of Nuclear-Explosive Materials."

The report details which nations currently have the means to produce nuclear weapons and how much fissile material they possess. "This distribution of fissile material defines the critical tasks facing the international community," the report states. It calls for nations to cooperate on seven steps.

At the top of the report's "to-do list for the international community" is closing what some see as a gaping loophole in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)--the ability of a nation to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities and then withdraw from the NPT without penalty. So the report first proposes that the U.N. Security Council establish sanctions to impose against any country that withdraws from the NPT and attempts to build weapons using fissile materials and facilities obtained under the treaty for ostensibly peaceful purposes.

The NPT, in effect since 1970, will undergo its seventh 5-year review by more than 180 member states May 2-27 in New York. The report, issued in time for this review, recommends six additional steps for consideration by the conference delegates and other nuclear nonproliferation specialists:

-- "strengthen international physical security standards;

-- "stop the uncontrolled spread of uranium enrichment plants," and "subject all enrichment plants to an extra layer of multinational monitoring;"

-- declare a moratorium on building new plants to reprocess spent nuclear fuel that could be diverted to weapons production;

-- "conclude a verified global treaty ending all further production of fissile materials for weapons;

-- "dispose of much more of the excess fissile materials recovered from dismantled Cold War weapons; and

-- "phase out the use of high-enriched uranium (HEU) as a reactor fuel," in favor of low-enriched uranium, which cannot be made into nuclear weapons without further enrichment.

Some of the study group's recommendations "have been on the international agenda for decades," the report points out, but "most are barely moving forward, if not completely stalled. These measures urgently need high-level attention."

"All of the report's proposals focus on weapons-usable fissile materials--highly enriched uranium and plutonium--because they are the essential materials for nuclear weapons," said CISAC Co-Director Christopher F. Chyba, who led the study with PS&GS Co-Directors Harold Feiveson and Frank von Hippel. "They and the technologies to produce them must be much more strictly controlled if further nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are to be prevented. The report lays out a series of steps to do so," Chyba added.

The researchers intended to strengthen similar proposals under discussion. The report "gives technical details and support to policy ideas on the control of nuclear explosive materials and their means of production that Mohamed ElBaradei (director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency) and others have been forwarding," explained Feiveson.

While the report emphasizes physical security measures geared toward reducing the supply of nuclear weapons materials, its authors acknowledge that "demand-side measures" are "equally important." A comprehensive strategy to halt nuclear proliferation must also "address the reasons that certain states choose to pursue nuclear weapons," the report states.

The research group of scientists, political scientists, and international legal experts from leading research and regulatory institutions met at Stanford University in August 2003 to begin their assessment of the global stock of nuclear weapons and the nuclear-explosive materials needed to make them and to outline a plan for limiting the spread of these materials. They continued to refine their recommendations, to produce their report in time for this year's NPT review.

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Many critiques have been made of the U.S. Intelligence Community's performance in thwarting terrorist attacks (i.e. 9/11) and understanding the proliferation of WMD (i.e. Iraq). Given the reports from the 9/11 and WMD commissions as well as last year's legislation establishing the position of National Intelligence Director, what in fact are the deficiencies of the Intelligence Community and what changes have the best chance of correcting them and preventing future intelligence failures?

This seminar will feature a panel discussion by three experts on intelligence issues. They will focus their comments on the issues, challenges, and potential solutions for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community capabilities to provide timely warning and accurate assessments of future threats. They will then invite comments, questions, and discussion.

Sidney Drell is a professor of theoretical physics (Emeritus) at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. As a physicist and arms control specialist, he has been a leader in providing essential technical advice to the U.S. Government on national security issues. He is an active member of JASON, a group of distinguished scientists, and has served on a number of boards, including the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Non-Proliferation Advisory Panel.

Keith Hansen is a consulting professor of international relations teaching courses on U.S. intelligence and arms control/proliferation. His 35-year government career included seven years on the National Intelligence Council, where he managed numerous national intelligence estimates and other interagency studies on strategic and nuclear issues, and where he served as the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation.

Henry Rowen is Director Emeritus of the Asia/Pacific Research Center, professor of public policy and management (emeritus) at Stanford's Graduate School of Business, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (1989-1991), Chairman of the DCI's National Intelligence Council (1981-1983), President of RAND Corporation (1968-1972), and Assistant Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget (1965-1966). Most recently, he was a Member of the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

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FSI Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director-Emeritus, Shorenstein APARC
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Henry S. Rowen was a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of public policy and management emeritus at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, and a senior fellow emeritus of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). Rowen was an expert on international security, economic development, and high tech industries in the United States and Asia. His most current research focused on the rise of Asia in high technologies.

In 2004 and 2005, Rowen served on the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. From 2001 to 2004, he served on the Secretary of Defense Policy Advisory Board. Rowen was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense from 1989 to 1991. He was also chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983. Rowen served as president of the RAND Corporation from 1967 to 1972, and was assistant director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget from 1965 to 1966.

Rowen most recently co-edited Greater China's Quest for Innovation (Shorenstein APARC, 2008). He also co-edited Making IT: The Rise of Asia in High Tech (Stanford University Press, 2006) and The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (2000). Rowen's other books include Prospects for Peace in South Asia (edited with Rafiq Dossani) and Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity (1998). Among his articles are "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," in National Interest (1996); "Inchon in the Desert: My Rejected Plan," in National Interest (1995); and "The Tide underneath the 'Third Wave,'" in Journal of Democracy (1995).

Born in Boston in 1925, Rowen earned a bachelors degree in industrial management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1949 and a masters in economics from Oxford University in 1955.

Faculty Co-director Emeritus, SPRIE
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Henry S. Rowen Speaker
Keith Hansen Visiting professor of international relations Speaker
Sidney D. Drell Professor of theoretical physics (Emeritus) Speaker Stanford University
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When the Soviet Union dissolved on Dec. 25, 1991, the nuclear threat changed from the Cold War concern of ending civilization as we know it to one of securing "loose nukes" in chaotic Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. I had the opportunity to visit the secret cities of the Russian nuclear complex six weeks after the collapse and to initiate a program of scientific collaboration between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists. Together, we made remarkable progress in reducing the threat in the early and mid-1990's because of the trust we were able to build based on mutual respect, similar objectives, and a common heritage in the great early-20th century school of European physics.

Although the number of joint U.S. - Russian cooperative threat reduction programs increased and the U.S. funding rose dramatically at the turn of the millennium, real progress slowed as U.S. and Russian objectives began to diverge, and the programs became politicized and bureaucratized. Major opportunities to reduce the long-term threat were lost. Cooperation was re-energized by the tragic events of 9/11 and the emerging threat of nuclear terrorism. Today, both Presidents Bush and Putin agree that keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists is their highest security priority. Yet, strategy and commitment on both sides appear incommensurate with the threat. I will discuss critical barriers to and opportunities for renewed cooperation to meet the threat.

Siegfried S. Hecker is currently a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker was Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986-1997. He joined the Laboratory as technical staff member of the Physical Metallurgy Group in 1973, following a postdoctoral assignment there in 1968-1970 and a summer graduate student assignment in 1965. He served as Chairman of the Center for Materials Science and Division Leader of the Materials Science and Technology Division before becoming Director. From 1970 to 1973 he was a senior research metallurgist with the General Motors Research Laboratories.

Dr. Hecker received his B.S. in metallurgy in 1965 and M.S. in metallurgy in 1967 from Case Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in metallurgy in 1968 from Case Western Reserve University.

Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, Foreign Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Fellow of the TMS (Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society), Fellow of the American Society for Metals, Honorary Member of the American Ceramics Society, and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Among other awards, Dr. Hecker received the American Nuclear Society Seaborg Medal (2004), the Acta Materialia J. Herbert Hollomon Award (2004), the Case Western Reserve University Alumni Association Gold Medal (2004) and Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award (2001), the New Mexico Distinguished Public Service Award, (1998); was named Laboratory Director of the Year by the Federal Laboratory Consortium, (1998); received an honorary Doctor of Science degree (Honoris Causa) from Case Western Reserve University (1998); received the Department of Energy's Distinguished Associate Award, (1997); the University of California's President's Medal, (1997); the ASM Distinguished Life Membership Award, (1997); an Honorary Degree of Scientiae Doctoris, Ripon College (1997); the Navy League New York Council Roosevelt Gold Medal for Science (1996); the Aviation Week Group Laurels Award for National Security (1995); the James O. Douglas Gold Medal Award (1990); the ASM International's Distinguished Lectureship in Materials and Society, (1989); the Kent Van Horn Distinguished Alumnus Award, Case Western Reserve University (1989); an Honorary Degree of Scientiae Doctoris, College of Santa Fe, (1988); the Year's Top 100 Innovations Award from Science Digest (1985); the Department of Energy's E. O. Lawrence Award, (1984); the American Society for Metals, Marcus A. Grossman Young Author Award (1976); and the Wesley P. Sykes Outstanding Metallurgist Award, Case Institute of Technology (1965). He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Council on Foreign Relations, Tau Beta Pi Honorary Engineering Fraternity, Alpha Sigma Mu Honorary Metallurgical Fraternity, and the Society of Sigma Xi.

In addition to his current research activities in plutonium science and stockpile stewardship, he works closely with the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy on a variety of cooperative threat reduction programs. Dr. Hecker is also actively involved with the U.S. National Academies, serving on the Council of the National Academy of Engineering, serving as chair of the newly established Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States, and as a member of the National Academies Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation. He is a member of ASM International and TMS, the Minerals/Metals/Materials Society, having served both in numerous local and national positions, and a member of the Materials Research Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council. He serves on the Corporate Advisory Panel of the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, is a member of the Advisory Group to the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), and previously served on the Board of Regents for the University of New Mexico.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-6468 (650) 723-0089
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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Research Professor, Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus
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Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.

Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

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Siegfried S. Hecker Senior Fellow Speaker Los Alamos National Laboratory
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Donald K. Emmerson
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When the 9.0-magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami struck Asia and East Africa on December 26, Indonesia took a devastating hit. More than 100,000 people died and another 500,000 were left homeless, with some experts predicting that the final death toll may rise above 250,000. Aceh province on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, where the Free Aceh Movement rebel forces have been fighting against the Indonesian Defense Forces for almost 30 years, was at the center of the destruction. Donald Emmerson, a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for International Studies and director of its Southeast Asia Forum, is an Indonesia specialist who has been traveling to Aceh since the late 1960s. He's finishing a book entitled What is Indonesia? Identity, Calamity, Democracy.

STANFORD: What do we need to know about Aceh province?

That it's a wonderful place, that the people have a tradition of hospitality, and that they share with you what they have. It's very sad that it has been subject to so much violence and conflict for so many years.

What's been happening in recent times?

Since May 2003, Aceh has been virtually off-limits to foreigners. The [military] reasoning is that it's for security reasons, but there's always been a suspicion that it's also because bad things -- horrible things, killings and so forth -- are done in the dark, and they don't want people to watch. Certainly the human rights community has had great difficulty getting access to Aceh.

What could happen as a result of some 1,000 representatives of aid organizations being on the ground there?

The opening of Aceh to foreign and domestic humanitarian aid workers has the potential to introduce elements that can serve as a check on human rights abuses. Obviously, the time for mourning is not over. But if we can insert a silver lining in this very dark cloud, it might be that the devastation of the tsunami opens up an opportunity to rebuild much of Aceh, and that it will require cooperation among all Acehnese. I am cautiously optimistic about the opening that this catastrophe represents for trying to lessen the man-made pain of the Acehnese people.

What might a rebuilt Aceh look like?

The plan is to take villages that were destroyed, and maybe even the town of Meulaboh on the west coast, which was the worst hit, and move them inland a certain number of kilometers. Then, construct mangrove swamps as barriers against a repetition of the tsunami, and also to protect the soil from erosion and generate the possibility of brackish-water fishing for the livelihoods of the people. This is a massive effort that is going to last for years and years. Authorities have estimated that the rebuilding costs in Aceh could run to $2.2 billion.

Fishing villages would no longer exist on the coast?

I spent nine months in fishing villages in East Java, and I found that the relationship of the populations on the coast to the ocean is not necessarily what one would expect. They are not happy bathers on the beach, fishing is an extremely dangerous operation, and the ocean is considered a wild place.

Many fishing communities are overfishing the source. I wrote a long report for the Ministry of Agriculture's fisheries office, arguing that what Indonesia ought to do was take the money the government was spending to supply nylon fishing nets and higher horsepower outboard motors, and spend it on wives who were involved in craft commodities. The women have commercial skills, and getting microcredit programs for women to set up shops and expand is the future.

How will religion figure in that future?

Aceh is known in Indonesia as "the front porch of Mecca." The Acehnese are almost entirely Muslim. While there's a tendency among Americans to presume that [a Muslim nation] must be fanatic, Indonesia remains an overwhelmingly moderate society. There is a poignant photo, which hasn't been circulated in the U.S. press, of a sign at a depot for humanitarian relief supplies. It reads, "If you try to steal this material, you will be responsible to Allah."

The following is supplemental material that did not appear in the print edition of STANFORD.

What was the overall impact of the tsunami in Indonesia?

I think it's important to keep in mind that each of the affected countries was affected in a somewhat different way. In Sri Lanka, an estimated 70 percent of the coastline of the entire island was affected, so the economic consequences there are going to be more severe than the damage that was done to Indonesia. If you go down the west coast of Sumatra, you will see damage, but the main damage was overwhelmingly concentrated in a single province, Aceh, which represents less than 2 percent of the total population of Indonesia. Aceh got a double-barrel assault -- from the earthquake and the tsunami. The death toll was horrid, with a huge loss of life, but it was concentrated on the coasts.

How does Aceh's history set it apart from the rest of Indonesia?

The first record we have of an Islamic sultanate in what is now Indonesia is a stone carving dated 1297, on the north coast of Aceh. Aceh was closest to the Middle East, and there were Muslim traders who would go short distances, pause, sell, buy and reload. Long-distance Arab-Malay trade finally got to Indonesia, and the logical landfall was Ache.

Then there were tremendous and unequal casualties in the war against the Dutch, who recruited Ambonese troops to fight a colonial war in Aceh in the 19th century. There's a photograph of Dutch troops standing on the dead bodies of Acehese rebels. The Acehnese war lasted a long time, and it was one of the last parts of the archipelago to be fully brought into the colonial orbit.

Aceh has been for some time under a state of military emergency, and an estimated 13,000 have died as a result of the [rebel] war since 1976. But the tsunami has changed all that. Looking at it from a political science point of view, if we don't begin trying to analyze the situation, I'm not sure we can make it better down the road.

What needs to happen?

In a time of crisis what you need is efficiency and effectiveness, and you need somebody to stand up and say, "This is the way things are going to be." But the governor of Aceh is, by all accounts, exceedingly corrupt. He is in Jakarta now, in detention, awaiting trial on corruption charges. So you don't even have an active, sitting provincial government leader to take charge.

The number of members of the provincial administration who died in the tsunami is quite high, and the central government has had to send up 300 replacements from Jakarta. The administration of Aceh has essentially been completely taken over by the central government. This is potentially unhelpful, depending on how sensitive and effective the central government is and how corrupt the atmosphere is within which masses of foreign aid are moving.

The somewhat optimistic scenario is that now Aceh is even more dependent on the central government than it was before, with the need to rebuild substantial portions of its coastline. So a leader of the [freedom] movement [might] look down the road and say, "It's unrealistic for us at this point, with this incredible body blow to our economy, to expect that we can now somehow take over Aceh. We are more dependent than we were before on the central government."

And, conversely, in Jakarta there might be the thinking that since Aceh now so obviously needs support within the republic, "We are in a stronger position, and therefore we can afford to be generous, and to extend concessions, short of independence, that will take advantage of this." The bottom line is that two enemies who were at each other's throats now face a third enemy -- nature.

Are there other voices that should be heard in Aceh?

One of the difficulties of having negotiations between the Acehnese Freedom Movement and the central government is that it tends to exclude other Acehnese views, which is one reason why negotiations that took place previously were not successful. Acehnese society is pretty diverse, and the Acehnese Freedom Movement does not represent all Acehnese, not to mention the Javanese and Indonesians who have migrated into the province, who are university students and [members of] religious communities.

The conflict has lasted for 30 years in its present form, and it has created such enmities that there is no particular mood to compromise. The government has no incentive to reach out, and the Acehnese Freedom Movement remains intransigent. In the long run, those who disagree with a so-called freedom movement are in the shadows and their views tend not to be reported. My hope is that as these voices are allowed to take part in determining the future of Aceh and its political leadership, the polarization will decrease and there will emerge a kind of more moderate center, in favor of autonomy and full rights.

In the 1990s, the United States cut military assistance programs to Indonesia. Is the relationship between the two countries improving?

SBY -- Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -- is a former military man, but he's identified as relatively clean, and associated with a somewhat more reform-minded element within the military. More than any previous president of Indonesia, he has had exposure to the United States. Certainly this is an opportunity for an improved relationship between Indonesia and the U.S.

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Soyoung Kwon
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APARC's 2004-2005 Shorenstein Fellow, Soyoung Kwon, discusses Europe's new perspective on Pyongyang.

PALO ALTO, Calif. -- The European Union is increasingly showing a new independent stance on foreign-policy issues as the logic of its industrial and economic integration plays out in the international arena.

Already the EU has taken a distinct and independent approach to both the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the nuclear crisis in Iran. Now it has broken ranks over the Korean Peninsula, fed up and concerned with the failure to resolve the ongoing crisis over North Korea's development of nuclear arms.

Reflecting this new stance, the European Parliament this week passed a comprehensive resolution on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran:

  • It urges the resumption of the supply of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to North Korea in exchange for a verified freeze of the Yongbyong heavy-water reactor, which is capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, to avoid a further deterioration in the situation. At the same time it is calling for the European Council and Commission to offer to pay for these HFO supplies.
  • It urges the Council of Ministers to reconsider paying 4 million Euros of the suspension costs for KEDO (the Korea Energy Development Organization) to South Korea to ensure the continued existence of an organization that could play a key role in delivering energy supplies during a settlement process.
  • It demands that the Commission and Council request EU participation in future six-party talks, making it clear that the EU will in the future adopt a "no say, no pay" principle in respect to the Korean Peninsula. Having already placed more than $650 million worth of humanitarian and development aid into the North, it is no longer willing to be seen merely as a cash cow. This view was backed in the debate by the Luxembourg presidency and follows a line initially enunciated by Javier Solana's representatives last month in the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee.
  • It urges North Korea to rejoin the NPT, return to the six-party talks and allow the resumption of negotiations.

The EP cannot substantiate U.S. allegations that North Korea has an HEU (highly enriched uranium) program or that North Korea provided HEU to Libya. It has called for its Foreign Affairs Committee to hold a public hearing to evaluate the evidence. "Once bitten, twice shy" is the consequence of U.S. claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

The world order is changing; the EU -- like China -- is emerging as a significant global power economically with the euro challenging the dollar as the global currency (even prior to the latest enlargement from 15 to 25 member states, the EU's economy was bigger than that of the United States). Speaking at Stanford University earlier this month, former U.S. foreign policy adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out that the EU, U.S., China, Japan and India will be the major powers in the new emerging global order. Since the new Asia will have three out of the five major players, he stressed the importance of engaging with it.

How will those already in play respond? Some may claim that statements by North Korea welcoming the EU's involvement and participation are merely polite, inoffensive small talk that cannot be taken seriously. Yet there have been a spate of pro-EU articles appearing in Rodong Sinmun, the daily newspaper of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, since 2001.

Of 128 EU-related articles between 2001 and 2004, a majority praised Europe's independent counter-U.S. stance, emphasized its increasing economic power and influence, and heralded its autonomous regional integration. Rodong Sinmun portrays the EU as the only superpower that can check and balance U.S. hegemony and America's unilateral exercise of military power.

North Korea's perception of the EU is well reflected in articles such as: "EU becomes new challenge to U.S. unilateralism"; "Escalating frictions (disagreements) between Europe and U.S."; "European economy (euro) dominating that of the U.S."; "Europe strongly opposing unilateral power play of U.S.," and so forth.

Concurrently, North Korea has pursued active engagement with the EU by establishing diplomatic relations with 24 of the 25 EU member states (the exception being France). It is not necessary to read between the lines to recognize North Korea's genuine commitment to engagement with the EU based on its perception of the EU's emerging role on the world stage.

The Republic of Korea has publicly welcomed the prospect of EU involvement, while China wishes to go further and engage in bilateral discussions with the EU on its new policy toward the North. Russia will follow the majority. The problem is with Japan and the U.S.

In Japan, opinion is split by hardliners in the Liberal Democratic Party who view problems with North Korea as a convenient excuse to justify the abandonment of the Peace Constitution. They don't want a quick solution until crisis has catalyzed the transformation of Japan into what advocates call a "normal" country.

The U.S. expects an EU financial commitment, but not EU participation. The neocons believe that EU participation would change the balance of forces within the talks inexorably toward critical engagement rather than confrontation.

The question is whether the EU's offer will point the U.S. into a corner or trigger a breakthrough. Will U.S. fundamentalists outmaneuver the realists who favor a diplomatic rather than military solution? Only time will tell.

Glyn Ford, a Labour Party member of the European Parliament (representing South West England), belongs to the EP's Korean Peninsula Delegation. Soyoung Kwon is a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center.

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Dr. Sarah Mendelson is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Before joining CSIS in 2001, she taught international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Mendelson received her B.A. in history from Yale University, and her Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. She also earned a certificate from the Harriman Institute.

At CSIS, she manages several projects that explore the links between security and human rights. Her current research includes collaborative work on public opinion surveys of Russian attitudes on democracy, human rights, Chechnya and the military. She directed a collaborative study evaluating the impact of Western democracy assistance to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. In addition, she has served on the staff of the National Democratic Institute's Moscow office, and was a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She has also been a fellow at CISAC and at Princeton University's Center of International Studies.

Dr. Mendelson serves on the steering committee of Human Rights Watch, the editorial board of International Security, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security.

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Sarah Mendelson Senior Fellow Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Tonya Putnam has a J.D. from Harvard Law School and received her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University in March 2005. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, but will be moving to the Center on Globalization and Governance at Princeton University for a postdoctoral fellowship next academic year. Her dissertation, Courts Without Borders? The Politics and Law of Extraterritorial Regulation, explores the extraterritorial reach of U.S. federal courts and regulatory institutions, and implications for the development of de facto international regulatory frameworks. Other research areas have included human rights in peace implementation missions, comparative legal responses to the threat of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, risk communication in the context of radiological terrorism (dirty bombs), and obstacles to military reform in Russia.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

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Tonya Lee Putnam

Tonya L. Putnam (J.D./Ph.D) is a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. From 2007 to 2020 she was a member of the Political Science at Columbia University. Tonya’s work engages a variety of topics related to international relations and international law with emphasis on issues related to jurisdiction and jurisdictional overlaps in international regulatory and security matters. She is the author of Courts Without Borders: Law, Politics, and U.S. Extraterritoriality along with several articles in International Organization, International Security, and the Human Rights Review. She is also a member (inactive) of the California State Bar.

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Tonya L. Putnam
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Linda Kirschke is a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. She is a PhD candidate at Princeton University, in the Department of Politics, and her research focuses on state politics and ethnic violence. She published "Informal repression, zero sum politics and late third wave transitions" in the Journal of Modern African Studies in 2000. Drawing on the cases of Cameroon, Rwanda and Kenya, this article shows that transitions to multiparty politics place Sub-Saharan South Africa at high risk for civil violence. Kirschke was a Eurasia Title VIII Fellow at the Social Science Research Council in 2002-03, working on Russian language training. In 2003-04, she was awarded an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Pre-Dissertation Fellowship at Columbia Universityís Council for European Studies. Kirschke has a BA in French and African studies and has worked for human rights organizations in France, London and Africa.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Linda Kirschke Predoctoral Fellow
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