Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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Ten years ago, in the summer of 1995, it was fashionable in Washington and Seoul to predict the imminent collapse of North Korea's political and economic systems, and even the state itself. While clearly an errant forecast, it is easy to see why pundits and analysts thought as they did. Kim Il-Sung had died. Kim's son and successor, Kim Jong-Il, was failing to lead just as the country suffered a massive agricultural failure. A nuclear-weapons dispute with the United States had forced a costly full-scale mobilization of the country's million-man army. It was likewise clear that North Korea's industry had shut down; night imagery of the peninsula showed, quite literally, that the lights were out in North Korea.

Ten years on, this volume aims to rectify misconceptions and increase collective understanding about North Korea. It is intended to present a snapshot of what is happening in North Korea now -- economically, politically, and socially. To be sure, much of the country remains in shadow, and there is much we still do not know. Moreover, issues of North Korean nonproliferation are so often binary that compromise becomes difficult, if not impossible.

The distinguished contributors -- specialists in politics, economics, human rights, and security -- advocate a subtler, more multidimensional approach to the North Korea problem. Offering cautionary perspective on this poorly understood place, they highlight recent positive developments and suggest solutions to seemingly intractable problems. Most attest that economics, commerce, and integration -- all arenas in which slow progress is being made -- may be the most powerful forces for change on the Korean peninsula. This timely book encourages thoughtful, pragmatic discussion about North Korea and seeks to light the road ahead, for the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

(This book is now out of print. You may download the full text here.)

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Philip Yun
Gi-Wook Shin
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Shorenstein APARc
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In this Article, we describe an emerging arena of global administration. We claim that this arena, not bounded by a state, raises accountability problems of a kind different from those addressed by conventional administrative law. And we argue that measures designed to address these problems will have potentially large implications for democratic theory and practice. Our argument starts from the premise—stated here without nuance—that something new is happening politically beyond the borders of individual states and irreducible to their voluntary interactions. To distinguish these developments from what is commonly called “international law and politics,” we use the term “global politics.” The emergence of global politics is marked by a proliferation of political settings beyond domestic boundaries. This proliferation expands the range of relevant political actors, while shifting our understanding of political units and of relations among them: the emergence of human rights as limits on Westphalian sovereignty was a first step in this shift, but not the last.

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NYU Journal of International Law and Politics
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Joshua Cohen
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One of the few ways to get a taste of North Korea, short of leaping through numerous hoops to get a visa to visit the country, is to eat cold noodles (naengmyen). Most South Korean cities and even a few American ones offer several types of North Korean-style noodle restaurants. The version often prepared in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, is mul naengmyen, or cold noodles in broth. It is served in a large metal bowl and looks like a flowering mountain rising up from the sea. Artfully balanced atop the mound of noodles made from buckwheat flour are julienned cucumbers, several slices of beef, half a hardboiled egg, and a few pieces of crisp Korean pear. When prepared Hamhung-style -- named after the industrial city on North Korea's east coast -- noodles are made from sweet potato flour and often topped with raw skate, which has a slightly ammoniac flavor.

The signs in the South advertising Northern-style cold noodles are a reminder of the Korean War and the division of the peninsula. After the Korean War, refugees from the conflict set up stalls in the markets of Seoul to sell the "taste of the north" to those who could no longer travel there. The recipes they brought with them to the south were sometimes the only valuables they carried. In the 1990s, a new wave of North Koreans came to the South and established naengmyen restaurants. Hailing from the North lends a certain authenticity to the preparation of the dish. Whether prepared by the refugees of the 1950s and their descendents, the defectors of the 1990s, or North Koreans themselves in Pyongyang or Hamhung, cold noodles are something that North Koreans are widely credited with doing better than South Koreans.

But the way naengmyen is "consumed" in the South reveals the great disparity between the two countries. There are many jokes in South Korea about the number of North Korean defectors who have only this one marketable skill. Since cooking in Korea is largely a woman's job, the close association of North Koreans with the production and sale of cold noodles subtly feminizes and, according to patriarchal Korean values, devalues them. North Koreans are thus second-class citizens, both those who are unemployed (the majority) and those who are employed only to provide service to the real "breadwinners" of the country. Anthropologist Roy Richard Grinker relates how South Korean textbooks and popular culture often depict North Korea as the younger brother of the more advanced South Korean older brother. Given the cultural associations of naengmyen, wife to husband might be the more appropriate analogy. A recent Joongang Ilbo Photoshop cartoon reinforces this sexist gloss on inter-Korean relations by depicting South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun dressed as a Choson-era husband with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as his bride.

In a divided country, cold noodles serve as an important reminder of a common culture. They also represent a unique contribution that the economically weaker North Korea can bring to the reunification process. But however tasty Pyongyang-style mul naengmyen may be, cold noodles ensure neither a sustainable livelihood for every North Korean defector nor an equal place at the reunification table for North Korea.

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This paper concerns the paradox of democratization in South Korea, whose progression has been entwined with neoliberal capitalism beginning in the 1990s. A particular form of democratization addressed in this paper is the broad-reaching initiatives to transform the relationship between the state and society. Specifically, the initiative to rewrite colonial and cold-war history was examined. This particular initiative is part of an effort to correct a longstanding tendency of previous military regimes that suppressed the resolution of colonial legacies and framed Korean national history within an ideological confrontation of capitalist South Korea and communist North Korea.

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Global meat production is becoming increasingly industrialized, spatially concentrated, and geographically detached from the agricultural land base. This Policy Forum reviews the process of livestock industrialization and globalization, and its consequences for water, nitrogen, and species-rich habitats in meat- and feed-producing regions often vastly separated in space. It argues that pricing and other policy mechanisms which reflect social costs of resource use and ecological change are needed to re-couple livestock and land in producer countries, drawing on examples from Europe and the United States. It also argues that consumers can play an important role in setting a sustainable course.

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Science
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Rosamond L. Naylor
Henning Steinfeld
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This presentation is based on a paper written by Anne Platt Barrows, Paul Kucik, William Skimmyhorn and John Straigis.

Paul Kucik is a Major in the U.S. Army. He served in Aviation units in a series of assignments, including Company Command. He then served as Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. He later served as analyst and as deputy director of the U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Business Administration from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Anne Platt Barrows is a Member of the Technical Staff in the Advanced System Deployments department at Sandia National Laboratories in Livermore, California. She focuses on facility protection, primarily on defending facilities against attacks with chemical agents. She holds a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering and a B.A. in Ethics, Politics, and Economics from Yale University.

William Skimmyhorn is a Captain in the U.S. Army. He has served in Aviation units in a variety of assignments including Bosnia, Kosovo and two tours in Korea. His jobs have ranged from Platoon Leader to Liaison Officer to Troop Commander. He is currently a dual Master's Student at Stanford University studying International Policy and Management Science and Engineering. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Economics from the United States Military Academy.

John Straigis is currently working as a Systems Engineer at Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Sunnyvale, California. He just celebrated his second anniversary with the company, and is presently in Special Programs. Concurrently, he is completing his second Master's degree from Stanford University, in Management Science and Engineering, with a focus on Decision and Risk Analysis. His first Master's, before beginning his career at Lockheed Martin, was in Aero/Astro Engineering, also from Stanford. For undergraduate, he attended Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, in Terre Haute, Indiana, receiving double degrees in Chemical Engineering and Mechanical Engineering. Outside of work and school, he enjoys several sports, particularly ice hockey, in which he is the starting goaltender for the Stanford ice hockey team.

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Paul Kucik PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford
Seminars

Affective experience, as defined by independent dimensions of valence and arousal, can change rapidly.  Yet empirical measures rarely capture the dynamics of subjective experience on a second-to-second timescale.  Investigators examined whether “affect dynamics” could be reliably probed in real time during a task in which participants anticipated and received monetary incentives.  The results implied that older adults do not show neural or affective reactions during anticipation of monetary losses.  Findings from this basic research program may have implications for judg

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A lasting legacy of the Cold War is the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction--uniquely, nuclear arms. The context in which they exist has been drastically changed in the realm of international politics. Father Hehir will probe the changed context of proliferation, as he addresses the continuing ethical and strategic challenges inherited from the past and now reshaped in this century.

 

Drell Lecture Recording: NA

 

Drell Lecture Transcript: 

 

Speaker's Biography: J. Bryan Hehir is the Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life at Harvard University and the Secretary for Social Services and the President of Catholic Charities for the Archdiocese of Boston. Father Hehir's research focuses on ethics and foreign policy, and the role of religion on world politics and in American society. His writings include The Moral Measurement of War: A Tradition of Continuity and Change and Military Intervention and National Sovereignty.

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J. Bryan Hehir Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life, Kennedy School of Government Speaker Harvard University
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What should we expect from the trial of Saddam Hussein? Full justice will likely elude the court, since Hussein faces only a partial list of possible charges. The trial probably won't quell ethnic and sectarian conflicts, either. But the trial could teach a valuable lesson about the place of law in a democratic state, writes CISAC's Allen S. Weiner in this Los Angeles Times op-ed.

The prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants is off to a rocky start. As of last week, the trial has been adjourned twice after only a day and a half of proceedings; two of the defense lawyers have been murdered, perhaps by Iraqi security agents; and Hussein has showered the judges with contempt and challenged the legitimacy of the tribunal.

Can the trial in fact succeed? That depends on what we think are its goals.

The principal rationale for criminal justice is retribution--to punish those who have harmed others and violated society's norms. But retribution--or revenge--could be achieved without courts and due process. Trials also ordinarily produce reliable determinations of guilt or innocence, but few people, either inside or outside Iraq, have genuine doubts about Hussein's guilt.

The success of the Hussein trial, then, should be judged by whether it can also accomplish any of the broader goals that criminal prosecutions can serve in societies that have experienced widespread atrocities:

1) Providing justice for victims and documenting history. Trials enable victims to confront their abusers, a psychologically important step in the social re-integration of victimized groups. Trials also generate an authoritative record of the crimes committed by a previous regime. This can compel other groups in society--including perpetrators--to acknowledge that abuses occurred and can refute subsequent attempts at historical revisionism. This is today viewed as one of the important legacies of the Nuremberg trials.

The Hussein trial could provide a forum for victims, but only if the tribunal is allowed to address the full range of atrocities perpetrated by his regime. At this point, Hussein is being tried only for crimes committed in connection with a single episode--the killing and torture of residents of the village of Dujail after an assassination attempt on Hussein in 1982. Iraqi prosecutors have said that, after the Dujail case, they will pursue other cases involving the killings of tens of thousands of Shiites and Kurds.

A full airing of the vast tableau of Hussein's crimes, however, could take years; the trial of former Balkan strongman Slobodan Milosevic on crimes of comparable scope before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has been underway for almost four years. Such a timeline is unlikely to satisfy Iraqi street protesters demanding a swift trial and hanging of Hussein. Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari's declaration that the Hussein trial "is not a research project" suggests the Iraqi government may feel pressure to sacrifice the goal of giving Hussein's victims a chance to record the atrocities they suffered in the interests of swift retribution.

2) Contributing to peace and reconciliation. Particularly in societies emerging from ethnic or sectarian conflicts, criminal trials individualize responsibility for abuses. They thus allow victims of atrocities to move beyond collective condemnation of the ethnic or religious groups from which their abusers came, enabling once-divided groups to begin to reconcile.

But the Hussein trial seems more likely to inflame sectarian tensions than to soothe them, at least in the short term. It gives Hussein a platform from which to challenge the Shiite-dominated government and to rally Sunni insurgents. Shiites and Kurds, frustrated by delays in having Hussein face the justice they believe he deserves, may escalate attacks against Sunni or Baathist targets. The net result may be a spiraling pattern of vigilantism and counter-vigilantism.

3) Promoting the rule of law. Subjecting a former dictator to a court of law, rather than a firing squad, can commit a transitional regime to due process and the rule of law. But early indications do not give hope that the Hussein trial will promote this goal. Last-minute legal changes--such as the elimination of the right of defendants to represent themselves--have been made for political, rather than legal, reasons. Tribunal officials have been selectively targeted for dismissal by the de-Baathification Commission headed by Ahmad Chalabi.

Moreover, Iraq's president announced in September that he had learned from one of the tribunal's investigating judges that Hussein had confessed to ordering executions during the notorious Anfal campaign, raising further questions about the judicial independence of the tribunal. Even the decision to try Hussein for the Dujail killings before the completion of investigations of more serious atrocities appears to be politically motivated. The government hopes to demoralize Hussein loyalists by securing a swift conviction on the easiest charges to prove.

Even under the best of circumstances, the Hussein trial could not possibly accomplish all three of these goals simultaneously. Hussein's crimes are so numerous that no trial can produce both a full historical accounting and swift justice. Iraq may be better served by establishing a truth commission to write a comprehensive history of the abuses of the Hussein era. Efforts to manage the trial to promote political stability in Iraq are unlikely to succeed and will only reflect a continuation of the Hussein-era tradition of executive branch manipulation of the courts. Addressing Sunni grievances, protecting minority rights and sharing Iraq's wealth is the way to promote reconciliation.

The best hope for the Hussein trial to be meaningful is for the Iraqi government to accord him full due-process rights and to refrain from further interference and manipulation. If the Iraqi government accepts the constraints of the rule of law, the Hussein trial can teach Iraq the valuable lesson that the state may punish citizens, even one as detested as Hussein, solely on the basis of laws impartially applied, not on the whims or caprice of the ruler.

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