Strategies for Release

Lilian Tintori, an internationally recognized human rights advocate and the wife of former political prisoner Leopoldo López (the 2022 Robert G. Wesson Lecturer in International Relations Theory and Practice at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies), spoke candidly about her seven-year struggle to secure her husband’s release. “It is not easy,” she stated, “You become the voice of the political prisoner. You can’t talk, you have to scream in every crevice, every place, every moment you get.” 

Tintori argues that the most important aspect for release is a community of resilience, which is to provide mental health and emotional support to political prisoners’ families, as they cannot act as the voice if they feel broken themselves. At the heart of this strength, she argued, is love. In her efforts, she now distributes the Pathway to Freedom handbook, produced through her organization, the World Liberty Congress, to help families navigate the grueling road to release.

“Torture only occurs because the Maduro regime knows we are the majority,” Tintori clarified. Since the beginning of 2025, five political prisoners in Venezuela have died in custody. Tintori emphasized the importance of protecting the life of the person being detained — the human being behind the titles of activist, mayor, or opposition leader, beyond a simple number. To raise awareness about political prisoners alike, Tintori often employs the strategy of always mentioning “other political prisoners” after their loved ones’ names. This keeps the broader community of victims in public consciousness.

With international and local channels to plead for help closing, such as the EU or historically, the U.S., all three panelists stressed that silence is not an option for all communities — including academic spheres — and the broader public. Tintori testified that after public pressure, the regimes do pay attention and often send proof of life to suppress further outrage, hence helping to protect prisoners until their release.

Ways to Support A Political Prisoner 

Having been a political prisoner himself after co-founding the April 6th Youth Movement in Egypt, Waleed Shawky recounted what he believed carried him through his time behind bars — the cause he fought for. Upholding the values and vision that led to their arrest, he argued, can provide hope and dignity in the most inhumane conditions. “Being a victim is a choice as a prisoner, because you can choose to be a survivor,” Shawky asserted, “It is important to remind them of the bigger picture.” 

Echoing Tintori’s previous statements, Shawky praised the courage of the families, particularly women, who visit and support prisoners, often at great personal risk. He also warned against idolizing or victimizing political prisoners. “They’re human,” he emphasized. “Don’t cry in front of them. Be strong; they need your strength.”

Authoritarian Crackdowns and Resistance

Gulika Reddy highlighted the challenges advocates operating in authoritarian contexts face and how they navigate these challenges. She broke it down into three different categories: movements, organizations, and individuals.

• Movements are often delegitimized and co-opted. Reddy stressed the importance of engaging in grounded movement building, offering counter-narratives to sustain public trust, and fostering solidarity and collective action.

• At the organizational level, regimes may block formal registration, restrict funding, and launch physical or digital attacks — including office raids and data seizures. To survive these assaults, organizations can diversify financial models, invest in digital security, and cultivate collective care to mitigate burnout and trauma. Additionally, there is a need to adopt diverse theories of change in contexts where traditional human rights tactics prove ineffective.

• For individuals, threats include intimidation and retaliation, which can also extend to their loved ones. Reddy recommended conducting risk assessments and creating mitigation and response plans, including access to free legal aid and safe housing.

What we learned from our speakers is clear: authoritarianism thrives on silence, but freedom depends on our voices. For political prisoners around the world, solidarity, resilience, and an unwavering defense of human dignity are not just ideals; they are lifelines that can bring them home.

Argument & Key Findings

The system of reentry institutions — including halfway houses, parole agencies, and housing assistance programs — can be extremely complicated for formerly incarcerated persons (FIPs) to navigate. These complications are not merely logistical, but also social and emotional: the ways in which FIPs interact with reentry institutions can affect their sense of belonging, dignity, and prosperity. When the rules and practices of reentry institutions undermine these needs, it becomes more likely that participants will violate rules, withdraw from the institutions altogether, or find themselves reincarcerated. 

In “Home But Not Free,” Gillian Slee offers a rich analysis of these socioemotional dynamics. The paper both increases our knowledge of reentry processes and deepens our understanding of FIPs and reentry staff. Previous scholars have focused more on how adverse outcomes stem from reentry institutions prioritizing surveillance or control. Slee pushes forward this conversation by highlighting how adverse outcomes also stem from failures to acknowledge and support the dignity of FIPs.

Slee’s paper is informed by over two years of ethnographic fieldwork with FIPs in Philadelphia. This includes observing over 200 appointments at a housing assistance program, analyzing more than 130 files of program participants, and both observing and assisting with programming at a women’s halfway house. 
 

Three Mechanisms:

The core of the paper centers on Slee’s elaboration of three mechanisms that link socioemotional concepts, such as indignity, to outcomes like withdrawal or reincarceration. Each mechanism is clarified through a range of examples and case studies.

1. Unrecognized vulnerability:

Reentry institutions and their staff often fail to recognize or respond to the constraints and vulnerabilities faced by FIPs. These failures can undermine the dignity of FIPs and provoke their withdrawal from such institutions. In the realm of housing assistance, the Philadelphia program requires that rent falls between 30% and 45% of participants’ income. However, this is often unrealistic given the difficulties of finding fairly priced units or securing gainful employment with a felony conviction. Accordingly, FIPs must seek low-quality units or roommates. Yet most participants do not want roommates because it reminds them of being incarcerated. Participants are thus presented with an undignified set of choices. The program restrictions mean that many FIPs cannot or will not utilize housing assistance programs, deepening their sense of instability.

Another source of vulnerability concerns the mismatch between FIPs’ expectations and the realities of frontline bureaucracy. For example, many housing assistance programs have too few staff, some of whom struggle to juggle appointments or return phone calls. Because reentry staff are overburdened, they may ask participants to pick up the slack by searching for housing units. Yet many FIPs lack the requisite know-how, for example, calling about units too frequently or too early in the morning. Others may show up hours early for their appointments, in the process annoying reentry staff. Yet participants are not coached on how to improve these behaviors, leading to neglect. Other FIPs must learn that the majority of units are listed online as opposed to in newspapers, incurring the mockery from reentry staff in the process. 

A final source of vulnerability concerns participants’ lack of efficacy — the sense that their efforts make little difference or are inadequate. Reentry staff may have high expectations of people who feel “cryogenically frozen in time” (p. 32) because of years of incarceration. Some are unable to use modern cell phones or have no rental history.
 

2. Discretion’s Benefits and Drawbacks:

The discretion exercised by reentry staff introduces difficult choices for participants, forcing them to choose between (a) following the rules and becoming socially isolated or (b) breaking the rules and developing social connections. For example, some halfway houses are restrictive about time spent outside of the house. Participants who abide by the rules may miss out on socially important events, like a child’s basketball game. Some FIPs may lie about or conceal where they live in order to deal with less intrusive parole agents. Others may cross state lines to pursue important career opportunities. One participant parked their mobile home outside of the parole district lines because it was less expensive and easier than seeking alternative units, but these kinds of ‘rational’ behaviors cannot be accommodated. Discretion is a highly variable attribute: some reentry staff cancel meetings and inconvenience participants, while others remember individuals’ needs and accommodate them. Those who expect more discretion than they receive may break the rules out of frustration. Ultimately, discretion and its absence can provoke a host of socioemotional problems.
 

3. Risk-Escalating Rules:

Instead of preventing noncompliance, program rules may serve to encourage it when they undermine participants’ sense of dignity. For example, 29 states prohibit associating with other FIPs, yet many participants have friends or family supervised by the system; as such, people violate the rules in order to preserve meaningful relationships. Some FIPs are faced with painful dilemmas, for example, choosing between living in halfway houses where drug use is common or breaking the rules by leaving. Others report using cocaine instead of marijuana because the latter can be detected in their bloodstream for much longer. Some halfway houses mandate spending a certain number of hours inside the house, but this leads to participants being unable to work multiple jobs to support themselves, a clear violation of their dignity.

For many FIPs in uncomfortable halfway houses, they cannot be placed in another house unless they break the rules of their existing house; some consider breaking the rules for the sake of their well-being, even though doing so might land them under even more restrictive supervision. One participant was refused permission to live in a camper that he could afford because the camper’s mobility posed a flight risk. Another participant broke the rules by traveling out of state because her son’s father had cancer, and a reentry professional later told her to return in a rather threatening way. The rules of reentry institutions thus incentivized FIPs to make very risky choices.
 

By highlighting socioemotional concepts — especially (in)dignity — as central to the experiences of formerly incarcerated persons, Slee shows how the rules and practices of reentry institutions can undermine reintegration. Addressing sources of vulnerability and counterproductive rules may help reform reentry institutions in more humane and effective ways.

The escalation between India and Pakistan over the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir is revealing important insights into India's evolving defense posture and military capabilities. Arzan Tarapore joins Michael McFaul to discuss what happened between April 22 and May 10, what the clash says about the security landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, and why it matters in global politics.

Arzan Tarapore is a research scholar at the Center in International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. His work focuses on Indian military strategy and regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific. Prior to his scholarly career, he served for 13 years in the Australian Defence Department in various analytic, management, and liaison positions, including operational deployments and a diplomatic posting to the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other major podcast platforms. 

TRANSCRIPT:

McFaul: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of FSI.

Today I'm talking to Arzan Tarapore, a research scholar at the Center on International Security and Cooperation, which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute here at Stanford. His work focuses on India's military strategy and regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific, which is why he is the perfect person to talk with us today about the escalation earlier this year between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region. And India's evolving military strategy more generally, as it relates to players like the United States, China, and Russia.

Arzan, welcome to World Class.

Tarapore: Thanks very much, Mike. It's good to be on.

McFaul: So, I want to start with a chat group I was on several weeks ago with a bunch of former U.S. government officials. And at one point, somebody interjected, “We are about to see the biggest military war in the world since Russia invaded Ukraine.”

And I have to tell you, I was taken aback. I don't follow issues between Pakistan and India as closely as I should, and I look forward to learning more about that now that my book is done and I have more time.

But that really startled me. Take us back to that moment. Help us understand what occurred that made people so alarmist, and then why that didn't turn out to be the case.

Tarapore: Yeah, okay, that's a very big question. Let me see if I can hit all the high spots. Look, the trigger for that comment, probably, was a terrorist attack that happened in India at a place called Pahalgam on the 22nd of April. And it was an attack that was conducted, as far as we can judge, by a Pakistan-based terrorist group that attacked innocent civilians.

And in particular, it was designed, it seems, to be as inflammatory, as provocative as possible, right? Because the terrorists were at a tourist spot, and they rounded up people and got those people to identify themselves — whether they were Hindu or Muslim — and they executed the Hindu men.

McFaul: Wow. Oh my God.

Tarapore: So it was designed to be as communal and as provocative as possible. And in that sense, it worked because the Indian government almost immediately was assumed to be poised to retaliate.

And this is interesting. This is notable, because about as recently as a decade ago, it was always an open question whether India would retaliate militarily against these types of terrorist attacks. And the situation has changed so much in the past decade that this time around it was almost assumed from the get-go that India would retaliate. And indeed they did retaliate.

McFaul: And they did.

Tarapore: And they did. And probably the reason that that member of your group chat said what they said is because India and Pakistan have, for decades, been poised with their militaries pointed at each other. These are very large militaries, very capable militaries. And nuclear armed militaries.

McFaul: Yes. Let's not leave out that small fact.

Tarapore: Exactly, right? Which is always overriding concern in Washington. So, it was President Clinton who, back in the 90s, called South Asia the most dangerous place in the world. He identified India Pakistan as the sort of scenario that if any scenario in the world was going to lead to a nuclear exchange, since the 90s there's been a strong case to be made that it would be India Pakistan. And that's always colored American thinking whenever there's a crisis between India and Pakistan and this time around was no different.

McFaul: And tell us how it played out, and how it ended.

Tarapore: So, the inevitable—that is, an Indian military attack—happened on the night of 6-7 May. So, in the very early hours of the 7th of May, local time. At about 1 a.m., India launched standoff attacks, meaning attacks launched by aircraft that did not cross into Pakistani airspace.

So the Indian aircraft stayed on the Indian side of the border and launched long-range munitions plus probably some loitering munitions, so sort of what some people call suicide drones. So, drones that are designed to go to the target and destroy the target and themselves.

S,o India launched these standoff attacks against nine terrorist targets, terrorist sites.

McFaul: And they were terrorist sites, right?

Tarapore: Yes. So there's a line of Pakistani information operations that suggests that civilians were killed. That may or may not be true. But certainly the Indian position is that they were terrorist targets and that the Indian claim is that the strike was designed to minimize civilian casualties as far as possible. Hence they attacked, for example, at 1 a.m., right, when places were probably not occupied.

McFaul: Got it.

Tarapore: So, a bunch of these sites were sort of in the countryside. And we know that because they showed the full motion video of the sites being destroyed by the missiles and they are just for some of them were just a building in the middle of the countryside or a couple of others that were terrorist headquarter complexes in the middle of cities and these are big sort of campuses that include living quarters and operation centers and mosques all on the same campus. And a couple of those sites were struck as well.

But again, at 1am and in a very targeted fashion to minimize civilian casualties. And by and large, they did a pretty good job of minimizing civilian casualties.

McFaul: So they could have done more and they chose this kind of response, right?

Tarapore: Exactly. And not only that, but they also in the subsequent press briefings, they were very clear in saying, “Listen, our quarrel is with the terrorists. We do not intend to start a war with Pakistan. We will respond if Pakistan responds to us. But we very deliberately have not struck Pakistan military targets or targets of the Pakistan state. We've only struck terrorists. And so as far as we are concerned, we have done what we needed to do. Now it's up to Pakistan to stand down and not retaliate.”

Of course, there was no chance of that happening. Pakistan did retaliate. And so then we entered a period of about three or three and a half days of tit for tat attacks between India and Pakistan. Again, all of them largely targeting each other's particular military sites; everything from sort of air defence sites to air bases on each side.

McFaul: On each side, right?

Tarapore: On each side.

McFaul: And did planes cross the line, or was it was the same kind of thing that you just described?

Tarapore: Planes never crossed the line, as far as we know. So, even though there were claims that some aircraft were shot down on the Indian side, and the Indian military leadership has subsequently conceded that, admitted that.

McFaul: So there were? That has been confirmed? I didn’t know that.

Tarapore: They have confirmed that they suffered some losses. They have not confirmed how many or what type. But it seems to be somewhere in the order of two to five Indian aircraft were shot down.

A bunch of Pakistani air bases were struck by Indian Air Force strikes. And this time around, unlike in the last crisis in 2019, the Indians were very assiduous in releasing battle damage assessment—photography and video—to prove they did actually hit these targets.

And through this whole process of about three and half days of tit for tat strikes, where the Indians scored a few big strikes against the Pakistan military and the Pakistan military did not really score any big hits against the Indian military. There were a few rounds that went astray and did sort of hit civilian targets, but by all accounts unintentionally. Through this all, the two militaries tried to keep things relatively proportionate. Neither one took big steps. They did not cross big thresholds to escalate.

But then on the last day, there were some concerns that Pakistan was in fact preparing for a bigger escalation. That's when the U.S., which had hitherto sort of tried to stay hands off, that's when the U.S. started making some phone calls to both capitals.

And then as probably prompted by that, prodded by U.S. pressure, Pakistan made a phone call to India—the Director General of Military Operations made a phone call to his opposite number in India—suggesting a ceasefire, which India agreed to. And that was the end.

So it was about a three and a half day stoush, little conflict, mostly run by missiles and loitering munitions. So no one crossed into the other country’s territory. It was a very sort of modern conflict in that sense.

McFaul: So, I want to get back to the Americans in a minute, but before that: what did you learn about Pakistani military capabilities and Indian military capabilities as a result of this?

Tarapore: So it was pretty interesting. It was very interesting, actually. Because for decades, basically throughout the 21st century, we have been worried about the prospect of a conventional war between India and Pakistan as a result of a terrorist attack.

And the mental model that we've always had is a large, combined arms, ground-centric invasion by India against Pakistan, right? Basically a war.

And for years, India has been trying to find options short of that in a way that would not prompt a Pakistan nuclear escalation. And it seems, after a couple of crises, that India has found a way to hit back at Pakistan militarily using these standoff capabilities that are relatively new in the Indian arsenal.

So, India has recently acquired a lot of these capabilities that have given it the strategic option to hit Pakistan without starting a war, So, when you ask, what did we learn about their capabilities, we learned that India has the capability to conduct these standoff attacks. And interestingly, from my point of view, the real star for the Indian military was air defense.

Whereas India managed to score a few good hits against the Pakistan Air Force and the terrorist infrastructure on day one, the really interesting thing was that despite Pakistan launching a bunch of mostly drone attacks against India, they did not score any significant hits. And this was a result of a layered air defense system that India has built up, which I was surprised by. The effectiveness was surprising.

McFaul: And where do their missile defenses come from? Are they Russian? Are they mixed?

Tarapore: I'm glad you asked Mike. They come from all over. A lot of it is indigenous.

McFaul: Indigenous! Okay, I didn't know that.

Tarapore: Some of it is indigenous, the shorter range. There's a surface-to-air missile called Akash, which is an indigenous system. There are some old legacy guns that the army operates that prove very effective.

But the really interesting thing that think that you would find in particular interesting is that the most sophisticated—which is to say, the most recently acquired and longest range system that provides the biggest bubble—was the S-400, which India acquired from Russia, much to the chagrin of the United States.

McFaul: Yes, the United States. It was a huge fight, right?

Tarapore: Yup! The U.S. threatened CAATSA sanctions against India for it.

McFaul: Tell everybody what CAATSA sanctions are. It’s a specific category of sanctions passed in the Trump administration, wasn’t it?

Tarapore: Yep, which is designed to deter countries from acquiring Russian equipment. So, the Indian deal to acquire S-400s was happening contemporaneously and the U.S. was always on the horns of a dilemma whether they should enforce CAATSA sanctions against India or issue a waiver.

As far as I recall, the U.S. decided to not make a decision. They never imposed the CAATSA sanctions, but nor did they issue an indefinite waiver. So it was always something that years ago was sort of hanging over the head of the relationship that the U.S. did not go through with sanctioning India. And the Indians now, after Op Sindoor, after this clash, now feel vindicated that in fact they acquired S-400s and you know what? They they proved to be extremely effective in protecting India.

McFaul: Super interesting. So they were right. I remember when we were trying to prevent the Russians from selling the S-400s to the Iranians during our negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal long ago. On paper, this was a significant capability. It sounds like in reality it is as well.

Tarapore: It absolutely is.

McFaul: Let's talk about the geopolitics. Let's just talk about the reaction. Walk us through U.S., China, Russia. How did they react to this conflict? And what are your takeaways in terms of the geopolitics of a very complicated set of bilateral relationships, especially with India, it seems to me, but with Pakistan as well.

How did the great powers react? And what do we learn about great power competition from this conflict?

Tarapore: So as you would know, as listeners would know, China is Pakistan's primary patron, great power patron. It provides Pakistan the bulk of its military capability. And in fact, this India-Pakistan clash was seen by some in some quarters as a test of Chinese military capability . . .

McFaul: Yes.

Tarapore: . . .  because the Pakistanis operate so much Chinese equipment.

Well, I think it's not a very good test of Chinese capability for many reasons. One, because the equipment itself that Pakistan operates is lower grade export variants of what China’s is. It's not integrated into a system in Pakistan in the same way as it is in China. And it's not used with the same what we would call “multi-domain doctrine” as the Chinese use.

So it's not a very good test of the Chinese equipment.

McFaul: Okay, well that's an important point, a very important point. They don't have the best stuff.

Tarapore: Yeah, that's right. They don't have the best stuff and they don't use it “properly,” quote unquote, in the same way that the Chinese do.

So, from the Indian point of view, this is a country, India, that has always been concerned about what they call the collusive two front threat: Pakistan and China ganging up on India, where if there was a crisis or a conflict with one, then India was always concerned that the other rival would opportunistically take advantage of it and open a second front.

I've always been skeptical of that. And I think what this conflict showed was what India considers to be no longer a two front dilemma, but one reinforced front. Because in this view, Pakistan was essentially, if not an appendage of China, it was nevertheless underwritten by China.

It may, according to some accounts, have benefited from real-time Chinese support during the conflict. For example, intelligence support, electronic warfare support by China, perhaps even Chinese personnel helping to advise Pakistan on how to use its weapons and how to plan and operate them. We don't know if that's true, but that's a possibility.

McFaul: Speculation, interesting That's a big step.

Tarapore: It is a big step. And so if you ask about China's approach to this, then clearly China is not neutral in this, right? China is underwriting Pakistan in this. But openly, diplomatically, it's not going to take a position and it's not going to take advantage of this sort of conflict to cause trouble on the India-China border. It's not that sort of exploitation.

Similarly, as with the U..S, there were Russian comments throughout this conflict that either proponents of an India-Russia relationship or critics of an India-Russia relationship could use instrumentally.

Some people, sometimes some Russian officials said something about India and Pakistan sort of creating this sense of equivalence that in fact they're not on our side, that they're being ambivalent. Others would say that no, in fact, Russia was more solidly behind us than any other country was.

And the same occurred with the U.S. There were U.S. officials who commented that either India is a victim of terrorism and that Pakistan is a perpetrator of terrorism, which pleased Indians, or that this conflict is none of our business, that it's something for India to handle, which they could live with.

Or, when President Trump started talking about India and Pakistan having been at war for a thousand years or whatever he said . . .

McFaul: Thousand years, he said. Yes.

Tarapore: . . . Indians rolled their eyes and were frustrated because for decades Indian officials have been trying to get Americans to internalize this idea that India is an important partner of the U.S. and that this hyphenation between India and Pakistan is an outdated idea that no longer applies.

And now here we have a President of the United States, again talking about India and Pakistan in the same breath, talking about having mediated between them, talking about having coerced both sides using the cudgel of trade deals, and promising to get the two sides to sit down and talk about Kashmir.

All of these things to anyone who doesn't follow South Asia, prima facie sound reasonable. To anyone who follows South Asia, these are all red lines and big alarm bells, especially in India, because they go against decades of American policy.

And so it was a sense of, in the extreme, a sense of betrayal. Or at a minimum, was a sense of rolling your eyes at a president who has not been well briefed.

McFaul: Who doesn't know the details. So what do you think? Was it was he just winging it, or was this really a policy change that was scripted?

Tarapore: No. So the interesting thing is, I mean, if you look at what the United States, quote unquote, deep state did—that is, the State Department, the U.S. State Department and the Secretary of State Marco Rubio—their comments were very consistent with U.S. policy over the last couple of decades. The concern is strategic stability, that these are two nuclear armed countries, we don't want conflict escalating carelessly, and that India is in fact a victim of terrorism and that, you know, there's no role for the United States to mediate a Kashmir issue.

There was none of that sort of sense, right? The State Department and the Secretary of State played a very straight bat and were consistent. It was President Trump who spoke extemporaneously about a conflict he seems to be not well-versed in, which has raised heckles.

But also, on the one hand, we can say that this is just a president speaking extemporaneously. On the other hand, he is the commander in chief of the United States.

McFaul: Exactly, yeah, right, exactly.

Tarapore: So you can't quite ignore what he says.

McFaul: Right. And just two seconds on the Russians. You gave us a little bit of it, but did they seem pleased? Obviously, they seem pleased with how their S-400s performed. Is this another – because obviously Modi has a pretty special relationship with Putin, I would say, compared to other leaders of democracies. Is this seen as a sign of closer relations between India and Russia, or is that too far?

Tarapore: I think that's going too far. I think the broader trend of India trying to wean itself off Russia remains, but it may have been set back a little bit by this. And what I mean by that is, for example, even if you take just the S-400s themselves, India bought five regiments of them and only has taken delivery of three of them.

COVID interrupted the deal, right? COVID interrupted the deliveries and then the Ukraine war interrupted the deliveries.

McFaul: Okay, I didn't know that.

Tarapore: And so the Indians are still waiting to take delivery of two regiments. And now, again, as we've said, this conflict seems to have vindicated the Indian decision to acquire S-400s. And that in fact, you know, there may be niche military capabilities that the Russians can offer India that proved to be operationally useful. So this relationship is far from a relic, right? This relationship is very much a live relationship that yields dividends for India.

McFaul: Great point. And tragically, the Russians have learned a lot about how to use drones in Ukraine. I just talking to some officials who work on European security, and they are way far ahead of where we expected them to be in terms of that. That could be an exportable technology in the future for other countries, for sure.

Tarapore: Absolutely.

McFaul: So to close out: give us your sense of what's next. What do you think happens here? Is this just a one-off or are you worried about other escalatory events?

Tarapore: An India-Pakistan crisis is never a one-off.

McFaul: That's a good point! I shouldn't laugh, but it's been there for a long long time.

Tarapore: It's been there for a long, long time. So, the sub-conventional campaign of terrorism based in Pakistan against India will continue. And as I said at the outset, what used to be hard to think of and then became a question of uncertainty has now become a certainty that India will retaliate.

Modi, after this conflict, gave a speech where he basically pledged that any future attack against India will be met with retaliation, Indian military retaliation. So it is now a matter of policy that India will retaliate against Pakistan.

McFaul: Before go on: we have not—the United States and obviously not China—we do not have enough influence vis-a-vis Pakistan to shut those terrorist camps down, right?

Tarapore: No way. This is foundational to the Pakistan army, foundational to the most powerful political actors in Pakistan.

McFaul: Got it.

Tarapore: And I think what this latest conflict shows is that India also recognizes that it is futile to try and dissuade the Pakistani military-jihadi complex from attacking India.

That used to be what they tried to do: to dissuade them, to deter them. What we've seen in 2025 is India recognizing it cannot dissuade Pakistan. It must instead impose costs upon these terrorists, and now the Pakistan army as well, so that it just makes it harder for them to attack India, so that attacks become less frequent and less provocative.

That seems to be where India is leaning. It is expecting future attacks from Pakistan And it's correct. And it will retaliate next time. That is a highly probable eventuality.

The question for me is, okay, so we now expect this sort of conflict to recur. The question is, what does it mean for India's overall defense posture, including what lessons does India learn for deterring conflict with China on the land border. And what does it mean for India's ability to project power into the Indian Ocean region? This is a country that faces challenges, security challenges on all sides.

And every time one of these fronts becomes active and it seizes the attention of decision makers in Delhi, the concern is that India will react to it and it will over learn the lessons of the last crisis and it will come at the expense of other priorities elsewhere.

So that'll be the thing that I watch. To what extent does this cast a shadow over Indian security planning for the months and years ahead?

McFaul: Wow, it sounds super scary. It sounds like Clinton was right, what he said back then. And when you add, as you did, we're talking about two nuclear powers. Obviously, China is a nuclear power.

Tarapore: Three!

McFaul: Three. This is frightening part of the world. That's why we're grateful, Arzan, to have you on World Class! We're grateful to have you at FSI and at Stanford, because we’ve got to be following this issue. So thanks for joining World Class today.

Tarapore: Absolutely my pleasure. Thanks Mike, for bringing some attention to this issue.

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

Evolving negotiations over the war in Ukraine; uncertainty about the unity of NATO; increased transatlantic mistrust. There is a seeming divide growing between the United States and Europe, and that could have major impacts on future security on both sides of the Atlantic.

James Goldgeier, a scholar of European security, NATO, Russia, and Ukraine and a research affiliate at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, joins the institute's director, Michael McFaul, on the World Class podcast to discuss what's happening, and why. 

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or other major podcast platforms. 

TRANSCRIPT:

McFaul: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of FSI. Today I'm joined by Jim Goldgeier, research affiliate both at the Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law and the Center on International Security and Cooperation here at FSI.

Jim is also a professor at American University, but most importantly, he's a co-author with Michael McFaul on many things, including a book about U.S. policy towards Russia after the Cold War. He also has written extensively on European security, NATO, Russia, and Ukraine. And given what's going on in the news, Jim, I didn't think there could be a better person to chat about all those things. From when we planned this a couple of weeks ago till today, there's actually been a lot of news. 

So why don't we just start with the latest in terms of the negotiations. And then I want to pull back to this broader picture. Really, by the end of our conversation today, I want to know, is there a future for transatlantic security partnerships and the future of NATO? But let's go micro first and then we'll end with that macro. So tell us what's going on as to the best of you can figure it out in terms of these alleged peace negotiations to try to end the war in Ukraine. Tell us what you think is going on and how well you think it's going.

Goldgeier: Well, first of all, thanks for having me on. It's great to be with you and lots of tough issues to talk about, including this one. And I think it's just worth people remembering that, you know, a real negotiation process would be one in which, especially if the United States was really playing a central role in negotiations, in which the US negotiator was going back and forth between the Russian president and the Ukrainian president and trying to figure out how to really resolve some super tough issues, particularly regarding how Russian occupied territory is going to be treated. Even if Ukraine has to accept that for now it can't control that territory, it shouldn't be asked to have to recognize that territory as Russian. And Russia wants, of course, that that territory be recognized as Russian. So a negotiator would be going back and forth. That's not happening.

There isn't a real negotiation. Also in a real negotiation, both sides would be asked to make concessions. Vladimir Putin isn't being asked to make concessions. And he still has the same maximalist goals he had at the beginning of this war. He wants a Ukraine that's basically a subsidiary to Russia. Even if he doesn't conquer the whole thing, he doesn't want it to be independent and sovereign. He doesn't want it to be Western oriented. He wants it under his thumb.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: He wants a new government, a government that he would control. And it would really be incumbent on the United States to explain to him why that's not going to happen. But so far, he hasn't been asked to make concessions, and he also wants Ukraine not to have any military capability to defend itself in the future.

McFaul: So lots of things I want to pull on there if we have time. What do you think the Trump strategy is? Why is he not being asked to make any concessions?

Goldgeier: I think the basic problem comes down to the fact that it just appears that Donald Trump views Ukraine as a nuisance. And he views President Zelensky as a real nuisance. We saw that in the Oval Office meeting. Zelensky's like, you know, we need some security guarantees, otherwise how can we agree to anything? And you know, to Trump, this is all just a nuisance. He wants it to go away. He wants to be able to have a quick victory. I achieved a ceasefire.

Goldgeier: I said I would, I did, and then he can move on to something else. He doesn't care whether Ukraine has peace or not. He doesn't care whether Ukraine's government survives or not. And he has this weird affinity for Putin. We've seen it since 2017 and before. He admires the guy. He wants to hang out with the guy. He wants to do deals with the guy.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: He clearly doesn't want to press him. And so that's not a good recipe for a solution to what is a very serious situation that Russia created.

McFaul: That doesn't sound like a good strategy to me either, I agree. But help Americans understand why it matters. Maybe there are other people that think, well, why do we care about Ukraine? Maybe it is a nuisance, right? What are the bigger interests for America at stake in this negotiation?

Goldgeier: Well, I think we do have to go back to what this country has decided to believe in and support since the end of the Second World War. I mean, we fought a second world war. We fought a war against countries that had used their militaries to go into neighboring countries, take territory that wasn't theirs, and created conflict. That was a big war, a world war.

McFaul: Yeah.

Goldgeier: And we decided at the end of that that we were going to try to create a system internationally that would either prevent those things from happening or impose real costs on countries that try to break that order. And we did that, for example, in 1991 when we went to war against Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait in 1990, and George H.W. Bush put together an international coalition to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.

And that was something we stood for. We saw it as in our security. And I would argue it is in our security to live in that kind of world. Who wants to live in a world where countries can just go in and take territory from their neighbors, because you don't know whether they're going to keep going. And we have an interest in security and stability in Europe. So when Putin invaded, we supported the government of Ukraine, along with our European allies and other allies as well.

South Korea, for example, which has played a big role in supporting the Ukrainians. And I would say, you know, this is one of the things that's, I would use the word problematic, but it's so far beyond that, about the Trump administration is his own discussion about taking the territory of Greenland, which he said in front of a joint session of Congress, we're gonna take one way or the other. Well, you know.

That's the same thing. You're threatening to use military force to take something that doesn't belong to you. In that case, it belongs to an ally, I mean, a NATO ally. So it's even worse. So, you know, is that the world Americans want to live in? Where powers use military force that way and create the kind of conflicts that led us into a world war previously that was pretty significant for the United States. I don't think Americans want to go through that again.

McFaul: Great explanation. We should study that history so we don't have to repeat it, right? Tell us a little bit about how this is playing in European capitals, these negotiations, right? It was striking to me, for instance, when there was the first meeting with the Russians, Lavrov and Ushakov in Saudi Arabia, and on our side of the table, Secretary Rubio was there, National Security Waltz was there.

But at the other end of the table, there were no Ukrainians, of course. To your point, there's no shuttle diplomacy nor is there direct negotiations. But there were two Saudi officials sitting there. There weren't two Europeans sitting there. How is this playing out as the Europeans observe what is going on, but also are now starting to take actions on their own towards what they might do separately and apart from us vis-à-vis Ukraine?

Goldgeier: It's tough for the Europeans because they are dependent on the United States for their security. They're going to be trying to get out of that situation as best they can because they now, and we can get into that, see that the United States is now an unreliable ally for them. So that puts them in a very different situation than they've been in since the end of the Second World War.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: They don't really have a choice but to stay engaged and to support Ukraine because Putin's Russia remains a threat to them. As long as Vladimir Putin keeps talking about territory that's not his as being subject to potential Russian aggression, they have to worry about what his ambitions might be. They don't really know. They know he has these grand visions of himself as a world historical figure in Russia like Catherine the Great and Peter the Great. And so he's a threat to them. They would love to be able to do this as they had been doing prior to January 20th. They would love to be supporting Ukraine militarily and trying to help it achieve peace that enables Ukraine to remain a sovereign and independent country.

But if they can't do it with the United States, they're going to do everything they can to do it themselves. And so they're going to stand, they're going to help send Ukraine what they can and potentially put troops in Ukraine, although that's a very complicated issue. But they want Ukraine to know that Europe is there for it. And I think they now recognize that they can't count on the United States on this or really much anything else. And so they have to adjust accordingly.

McFaul: And are you impressed by what they're doing collectively or does it seem kind of slow and difficult because you don't have NATO doing this all together? Is the glass half empty or half full, I guess is what I'm asking.

Goldgeier: I think it's half full because I think we just have to accept that they don't have the same capabilities that the United States does. I mean, it's just a fact. They know it. Now they're very aware of it. For example, intelligence capabilities. I mean, this is something the United States has been able to provide to Ukraine. They just don't have the same intelligence capabilities, and that would take them a long time to develop.

They have some defense production capabilities and they're trying to ramp that up as quickly as possible and they're trying to provide what they can. It's not enough, but I am impressed with the urgency that they do feel and the ways in which they're thinking, okay, we can't count on the US anymore. How are we going to take care of our own security in Europe as Europeans? And in that regard, how can we best support Ukraine so that we can stop Putin there so that he doesn't get tempted to do it elsewhere.

McFaul: Let's open the aperture a little bit wider, just talk more generally about transatlantic relations, not just Ukraine. It seems like there's been some pretty big shocks to this relationship. I'm thinking first and foremost about the speech that Vice President Vance gave at the Munich Security Conference, where he lectured all the Europeans about how badly they're doing with their practice of democracy. There's then been the tariffs, of course, and there's been hints that we might be pulling our troops back. You can update us as to whether that's real or not, but give us your update on transatlantic relations in the first hundred days of the Trump administration.

Goldgeier: So JD Vance, his speech in Europe at the Munich Security Conference, also his efforts on behalf of the far right AFD party in Germany interfering in the German elections to support an extremist party, was definitely a wake up call for the Europeans. I think even more than what we're seeing with respect to Ukraine, this was a sign that the United States is not an ally anymore. Donald Trump treats the European Union as an adversary. He talks about how it was created to screw over the United States. By the way, the United States was strongly supportive of building a more united Europe. That was true for post-war presidents who thought it would be great for Europe to be more united as a partner with the United States.

McFaul: And that turned out to be true, right? I mean, that was a pretty good investment. 

Goldgeier: It was true. It's been true. Great trading partners, great military partners. They're great partners. And now we're telling them, you know what, we don't see you as a partner anymore.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: First Trump term, the Europeans sort of tried to just tell themselves they would just get through those four years, hoping things didn't go hugely terribly and that they could get through it. And they did.

And I think a lot of them with Trump winning this second time in 2024 thought initially, okay, maybe we could just get through these four years again. And I think now they're recognizing that this is just a different situation, the kinds of people that Trump had around him as advisors, as national security advisors, as secretaries of defense, they don't have that, you know, what were termed adults in the room in the first Trump administration. He's unleashed. He clearly hates Europe. I mean, I just think this is just a longstanding belief he has that they've taken advantage of the US. He's treating them as an adversary. 

The tariff situation is, I think, the most serious because it's basically telling the Europeans, we're going to make it harder for you to trade with the US. And what that's going to do is cause the Europeans, as they're currently doing, to look elsewhere. I mean, this is the general problem for US foreign policy right now is, you know, nobody likes a bully. He is a bully. But other countries have to pursue their interests. So if they can't do that in concert with the United States, they're going to figure out other ways to do it. 

The trade agreement that was the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Trump walked away from in his first term, well, the other countries in that TPP reformed it as a different entity. And Europe now is interested in figuring out how to get in. Europe's interested in figuring out with Australia how to form a free trade agreement.

Goldgeier: They're actively looking elsewhere… 

McFaul: Without us involved, right? 

Goldgeier: …without us, because they can't count on us and they don't know. You know, he put 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminum. He's got 10 % tariffs worldwide. There's a possibility he's going to go up to 20% with Europe. They don't know. He's unreliable, he's unpredictable, and they have got to start making other calculations. And so they're going to do that.

McFaul: That's sobering. And on the military side too, tell us a little bit about what you see happening within NATO and other conversations of European security architecture outside of or next to NATO.

Goldgeier: I think the two really big issues for us to watch and think about, one is Europe's own defense production. In the world we've lived in, Europe could buy military equipment from the United States. You want F-16s, you want F-35s, you can buy from the US. Europeans now are thinking, all right, we don't want to do that anymore. American defense companies are going to lose through this because the Europeans don't want to put themselves into that dependence situation anymore. So they are developing their own systems. And while that will take time, these are rich economies. They've got technological capabilities. A lot of it's going to be whether or not countries can work together in terms of developing new fighter aircraft, which they've already started doing and they're starting to...

McFaul: The Europeans have?

Goldgeier: The Europeans are doing this. They're finding markets in the Middle East, for example. I think this is going to be bad for the United States. And I would think Lockheed Martin and Boeing and others are going to the Trump administration and saying, this isn't going to be good for us. So that's one thing to watch, just that defense production. And then the other, as you were just mentioning, is institutionally, how does Europe do this?

McFaul: Yeah.

Goldgeier: You know, NATO has existed all this time since 1949 with the United States as its undisputed leader. The United States has been the major power in Europe. There's always been an American who's been the supreme allied commander in Europe, the SACUR. This is the military official who oversees the military operations for NATO and that person has always been an American. With the Trump administration, there's been grumblings about maybe not wanting to do that anymore. 

We don't know whether Trump really would fully withdraw from NATO or whether the United States would just have less of a presence and I think the real question and I don't know the answer to it is, can NATO function without that US leadership? Can the other countries of NATO, there are 32 countries in NATO, can they work together within that organization that's been set up without the United States having much of a presence? I mean, we haven't been in that situation before, so we just don't know.

I mean, the European Union isn't really set up to do what NATO does. So I think it's still a hugely open question. And I believe we will see lots of sessions at think tanks in America and in Europe on the future of European security and re-imagining European security and trying to understand this. It's just uncharted waters.

McFaul: Right. Say a little bit, again, in the same question I had about Ukraine. So why should Americans care, right? Europeans haven't been spending much on defense, as you alluded to. I think we agree they probably should have been doing more. And maybe had we started that conversation earlier, we wouldn't be here. I'm not convinced of that, but some people make that argument. 

There's a more extreme argument that you hear from Trump administration officials and Trump himself is like, let the Europeans take care of Europe. We got to take care of Asia. Putin, that's their problem. What's the downside of the breakdown or weakening of NATO from America's national interests?

Goldgeier: I'd say two things to that. One is just that… Of course, Europeans have been spending more and of course they should have been spending even more. And I do think Joe Biden was wrong. The first thing he said when he came back in was, to the Europeans, America is back. Which basically led many of them to think, okay, phew, we don't actually have to do a lot more. When we should have taken those four years to really put this on a better path because I think the United States should have less of a presence in Europe. 

They are rich countries. We don't have to do everything for them as we have in the past. They know, they should know that by now, but we should do it in partnership with them. We could still be partners with them, even if we're doing less.

McFaul: And why is that important from your perspective in terms of America's national interests? That partnership versus just go at it alone. We'll be in charge of North America. They'll be in charge of Europe. What's wrong with that kind of thinking?

Goldgeier: You never know when you're going to need your friends. So I think it's good to have friends. I mean, one of things that's been an advantage for the United States in the world compared to countries like Russia and China is we have lots of friends. We have allies. They're there for us. When we asked them to join us in Afghanistan, they were there. They came. A lot of them lost lives, had troops that were killed.

And the other thing is, actions in one part of the world have implications in others. There's a reason in the last three summits that the countries, the so-called Indo-Pacific Four, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, the heads of state and government from those four have come to the NATO summits the last three years and presumably are coming to the one this summer. They see these linkages. They see the importance of Ukraine. South Korea has been providing artillery to Ukraine because they don't want Putin to succeed in Ukraine because they don't want to see the signal that will send to Xi Jinping regarding Taiwan and regarding potential Chinese aggression more broadly in the Western Pacific. 

So, countries are definitely watching. And I just think from a U.S. perspective — and I do think most Americans understand this — it is good to have friends. We have good, strong friends who've been with us and we can explain why they're gonna need to do more and I think the Europeans have gotten the message and are gonna try to do more, but it should be with us and not against us. Why do we need them as an adversary? We already have other adversaries. 

McFaul: Yeah. We have serious adversaries. 

Goldgeier: We don't need to make our best friends adversaries.

McFaul: And wasn't it Churchill who said, or I'm paraphrasing the word, the only thing worse than going to war is going to war alone? I think he's said something along those lines. 

Goldgeier: Right. Yeah.

McFaul: So Jim, last question. Tell us about the future. Speculate a little bit about, is this the end or, and just maybe focus on NATO, because we don't have time to talk about all the institutions, or if they survive and muddle along for the next four years, is there a possibility of renewal of these transatlantic security relationships, a renewal of the NATO alliance?

Goldgeier: Well, I hope we could renew a transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. The problem is the Europeans now know that the United States is not reliable. We had Trump one, we had Joe Biden, we had Trump two. They can't keep bouncing back and forth. If we have another president like Joe Biden after Donald Trump, who wants to rebuild things with Europe, they still have to be thinking, okay, we don't know what's gonna happen four years later. Is J.D. Vance going to come and start yelling at us, talking about how pathetic we are as he did in the signal chat? I mean, in my view, NATO as a collective defense organization that at its core has the United States there to help defend the member states. I don't believe the Europeans can count on the United States in the future to defend them.

And I think that given that that is the core of NATO, I think NATO as we've known it is finished. What NATO can be, the different thing it can be, more European organization, less US, we don't know how that's gonna play out. But as an organization where the United States was fundamentally there and saying, we are with you in collective defense, I think they know Donald Trump's not going to defend any country in Europe. And they don't know whether a future president would or wouldn't. And so I think they have to adjust accordingly.

McFaul: Well, we can't end on that sobering note. Give us one piece of hope for the future of transatlantic relations, US-European relations, long term, even if you have to go way into the future.

Goldgeier: Well, I think long term Americans and Europeans will still want to, I mean, as peoples, I think the peoples will still want to be partners with each other. So it's just getting the governments back to reflect what the populations would like to see.

McFaul: Okay, we can’t end on that horrible end note that the feature is over. I think the thing you had is really true. I think that our societies are connected and we have shared values. We're part of a democratic world and you and I travel to Europe all the time and they want that connection. I think that's a thing that the Trump world sometimes wants us to convince the world that nobody wants America. That's definitely not my feeling when I travel. And in Asia too, by the way. I would say they want an American presence. So that gives us something to chew on and work on in the future. 

Jim, thanks for being on World Class. Great to have you. 

Goldgeier: Thanks for having me.

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.