How do military allies come
to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less
comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build
confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall
into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions? Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein
Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions
in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived
National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War
Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining
post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in
four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking
elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines
the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects
patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.
With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close
attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in
Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is
revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism
and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley
discussed his research and future plans.
What is one of the most interesting and timely case
studies that you examined?
Japan and China have had
a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The
reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of
Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of
disagreements between China and Japan.
Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations
in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's
largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully
unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not
apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese
nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the
post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being
revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's
war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in
anti-Japanese protests.
My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to
light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more
severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one
country see between their national identity and the national identity of the
other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these
historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between
Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard
security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security
architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is
very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a
decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some
unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands.
Based on your dissertation, what steps
would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?
A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms
like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to
establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend
to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive
headlines.
My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the
deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national
identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the
level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack
up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some
positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change
perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are
those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the
other.
For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where
its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine
that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very
objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change
perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister.
Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still
there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly
changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in
strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.
Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If
the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to
encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is
not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with
economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits
could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese
perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button
nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity
perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international
role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a
more stable, trusting relationship.
What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you
take to teaching?
The course will be about
nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage
these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students
with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast
Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity
frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will
ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their
choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own
suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are
going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different
fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I
think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the
environment here at Shorenstein APARC.
Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even
internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy
relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also
have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the
table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking
communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one
of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well.
Do you hope to work in academia or
government, or serve in both fields?
I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce
research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly
important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in
Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in
Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to
help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research
and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a
sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the
Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have
real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations.
Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of
research.
Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.
