FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.
Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions.
The memory euphoria of the past half-century has, if anything, raised awareness of the constructed or invented nature of national memories and their complexity. Because the articulation between the normative rules of public memory and the at times politically incorrect claim to a right to private memory is representational and discursive, cultural artefacts, such as literary texts, films, photographs, videos or monuments have seismically materialized as go-betweens in the memory wars. The memories of empire in the Portuguese cultural tissue have been over the past 40 years after independence of the former colonies contentious sites, where a certain colonial melancholia clashes with a critical nostalgia that has been growing particularly amongst a generation of artists born after decolonization. Colonial melancholia is not simply a result of recent traumatic events, but spreads over two centuries in a pathological inheritance filled with resentment, humiliation, violence, denial, myth and mystification. This melancholic vision of the past has been mediated and disseminated by several media from texts to monuments, photos and films, which have either become accomplices in this regime of power, or have sought to subvert it and have finally created spaces of ambivalence and hybridity. A notorious example of the mediation of the colonial regime was of course photography. Visibility was pivotal to the image world of the imperial regime, that not only needed to dominate the reality portrayed in the new medium, but which also made use of it for the sake of its own assertive self-representation. The talk inquires into this regime of visibility and seeks by means of a practice of interference to unravel the colonial discourse that used the perceived essentializing of reality supported by visual ‘objectivity’ to create a structure of feeling based on melancholy and nostalgia that would become the dominant memory of empire in Portuguese culture. Arguably, in this practice of interference resonates a practice of cultural literacy that allows for the reinterpretation and re-contextualization not only of what the images showed, but what they meant. Then again, it is precisely a regained cultural literacy in the reading of the visual that lies at the root of the project of critical visual nostalgia enacted by contemporary video artists in the fragmented deconstruction of the imaginary wholeness of nostalgic thinking embedded in home movies.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Isabel Gil
Professor of Cultural Theory
Speaker
Catholic University of Portugal
On March 22, a military coup abruptly ended two decades of uninterrupted democracy in Mali, the well-reputed West African country and key counter-terrorism partner of the United States. The coup leader Army Captain Amadou Sanogo and his mutinous troops suspended the 1992 democratic constitution, took over the presidential palace, the state television and several institutions, arrested members of the government, and promised a more efficient fight against Tuareg rebels. Interruption of the Malian democracy by a belligerent military faction is a serious threat to stability, peace, and human rights given the domestic context.
Since the coup, the conflict with the Tuareg rebels has continued to worsen. The two main Tuareg groups — the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine — have gained ground and seized new territories in the north of the country, pushing for sharia law. If a domestic solution is not found quickly, African regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders - either diplomatically or coercively - to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too lateAfrican regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders — either diplomatically or coercively — to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too late.
The Coup in Mali: Who is Behind it and Why?
Plotters deposed the widely respected and democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, a little over a month before the scheduled presidential election on April 29. Coup leader Captain Sanogo justified the unconstitutional seizure of power under the guise of national security, accusing President Touré of inefficiently fighting the decades-old Tuareg rebellion, and not providing enough resources to the army.
However, given the electoral timing, reasons advanced by Captain Sanogo to justify the coup are illogical. President Touré was not a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and had just over a month left in his second and last term in office. As a visionary leader, he respected the unique Malian societal and political culture, improved governance, and put the country on a path to sustainable economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House has continued over the past two decades to classify Mali as a democratic regime — whether electoral or liberal — despite several challenges such as; weak public institutions and central government, poverty, aid dependency, the Tuareg separatist rebellion, and labor or social unrests. The coup leader’s argument is further weakened because the democratic Malian government was offering public space to potentially unsatisfied military personnel to negotiate within the constitutional framework, along with the option to openly discuss issues of concern with presidential candidates.
The Coup is Reinvigorating Fear of a Repressive Military Regime
The coup is reinvigorating fear of the resurgence of repressive rule that reigned for decades after successive military coups. Such repressive rule must be prevented. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré ousted the civilian government, eight years after Mali gained its independence from France. Because he was resistant to democratic changes, Traoré was ousted in 1991 by Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of widespread civil unrest and demands for greater political rights and democratic reforms.
In 1991, the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was formed by various groups representing civil society and under the supervision of Amadou Toumani Touré. The Committee organized successful political liberalization, which included; a national conference, a constitutional referendum, a founding election won by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002), and consequently a democratic transition in 1992. Many hope that twenty years of democratic developments are not eradicated by this coup. Captain Sanogo still has the window of opportunity to respect the Malian values and people, and end his rule, as requested by the people.
The Devastating Consequences of the Coup in Mali and Africa
The coup has significant implications on the political developments in Mali, West Africa and the African continent. It weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy.The coup weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy. In addition, it worsened the situation in the north of the country, with rebel militias controlling more towns than before the coup. The coup has consequently increased the risk of disproportionate use of force, potentially leading to more violent and deadly conflicts threatening minority groups in Mali, with negative consequences for the entire West African region.
The coup also gives reasons — not necessarily valid — to citizens and pessimistic observers to despair about the prospect of democracy in West Africa. The spirit of democracy has recently been challenged in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If most plotters manage to stay in power, Africa may face a resurgence of military coup plots, reviving the violent nightmare of the two last decades of the twentieth century.
Malian and International Reactions to the Coup
Malian domestic leadership and the international community have all taken serious steps towards returning the country to civilian rule and restoring the democratic system. Malian political and civil society leaders have clearly shown deep opposition to the rupture of the constitutional order, and they have requested return to the rule of law. They are peacefully demonstrating to avoid violence and to preserve national unity. On March 28, the ousted President Touré called for a consensual solution and told French Radio station RFI "what is important is democracy, institutions, and Mali." In the same vein, the international community has strongly condemned the coup, applied some diplomatic sanctions, and requested a return to an elected civilian government.
The U.N. Secretary General has called for immediate restoration of constitutional rule, and the U.N. Security Council echoed a similar sentiment by calling for "the restoration of constitutional order and the holding of elections as previously scheduled." The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reiterated its policy of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional seizures of power, organized high-level meetings with heads of state to persuade the junta to step-down, readied its stand-by forces, and placed an economic embargo on Mali.
The African Union immediately suspended the membership of Mali until constitutional rule is restored, and the U.S. paused military aid to Mali and urged rebels to end fighting. France has suspended its official cooperation with Mali, but maintained humanitarian aid and is pushing the U.N. Security Council to explore avenues to support ECOWAS in their efforts to restore order. Canada, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank have all suspended their aid. These diplomatic actions, especially from ECOWAS, have pressured the junta to announce (formally but not yet effectively) the restoration of the 1992 constitution on April 1, a few days after unconstitutionally promulgating a new one. Further actions should be made in a timely manner to pressure the junta to step-down, to ensure that power is transferred back to civilian rule and constitutional order restored.
Restoring democracy and peace in Mali — diplomatically or coercively — is imperative. It will send a strong warning to those who try to undermine democratic efforts that unconstitutional appropriation of power and threats to peace and security will not be tolerated. Citizens will also be shown that they are supported in their battle for democracy and peace.
The Arab Spring has unleashed powerful social forces across the region ignited by young people seeking to reclaim their countries from the hands of long-standing dictators. In the aftermath of the revolutions, this younger generation has expressed a greater interest and responsibility towards improving their communities. Faced with crumbling economies and rising unemployment, young people in the region are combining their activism and entrepreneurial ingenuity to launch new businesses and non-profit organizations.
A new research study entitled, Social Entrepreneurship: Why is It Important Post Arab Spring? released by the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law finds that economic conditions coupled with social changes unleashed by the Arab Spring have created an environment ripe for social entrepreneurship.
Operating where the public and private sector have failed, social entrepreneurs introduce new ideas and approaches to solve intractable development challenges in their local communities. Applying business principles towards a social cause, social entrepreneurs create new programs, reforms, and goods that benefit disadvantaged and marginalized segments of society. Leading innovations in the non-profit and business sectors, they have generated new employment opportunities for youth, worked towards building more inclusive societies, and advanced sustainable environmental practices.
As more aid dollars flow towards social entrepreneurship programs, little research has been conducted to examine the sector post Arab Spring. Researchers with the Stanford Program on Arab Reform and Democracy launched this study to assess general economic conditions, attitudes towards entrepreneurship, and the challenges social entrepreneurs currently face.
The Stanford research team used data from an online survey issued in Arabic and English to more than 12,000 residents in 18 Arab countries by Bayt.com, the leading online jobsite in the Arab region, and YouGov, a research and consulting organization. The survey targeted respondents who are on average younger, better educated, and more technologically connected than the general Arab public—previous research issued by the Brookings Institution suggested that this target group is predisposed towards the entrepreneurial sector.
Citizen-led uprisings have inspired a new generation of youth who are increasingly invested in the future development of their societies across the larger region.
Youth-led social and economic development: One of the most revealing findings in the study uncovered the changing perceptions and attitudes of young people towards the long-term development of their societies after the revolutions. Citizen-led uprisings have inspired a new generation of youth who are increasingly invested in the future development of their societies across the larger region. In Arab Spring countries 71% of respondents in Egypt and 75% in Tunisia expressed interest in improving their communities, revealing this upward trend.
According to Jacqueline Kameel, managing director of Nahdet el Mahrousa, the first social enterprise incubator in Egypt, "Youth are more vocal than ever now, they have a sense of responsibility towards Egypt, believing that if we don't do enough now, we might never have a similar chance to take the lead and impact the future of Egypt." In addition, the survey found that volunteerism is on the rise with nearly one-third of Egyptian and Tunisian youth currently volunteering their time at local NGOs, religious establishments, and schools. These trends represent promising pathways towards social entrepreneurship for the region's youth.
Rising unemployment leads to increased interest in self-employment: The results revealed deteriorating economic conditions across the larger region, impacting all age groups and economic levels. However, the effect on countries that experienced protracted revolutions is particularly stark with 58% of respondents in Tunisia, 68% in Egypt, and 71% in Syria indicating that their employment situation now is either worse or much worse than before the revolutions. Those working in the private sector have been disproportionately impacted by the Arab Spring than their counterparts in the public sector, suffering higher levels of unemployment.
Despite this fact, respondents across the region expressed a strong desire to work in the private sector, reflecting a move away from the government as a primary employer. The survey also revealed widespread interest in business ownership as respondents in every country said that if given the choice they would opt for self-employment. While many cited the independence it would offer, others indicated they were drawn to entrepreneurship out of economic necessity, not opportunity. Current economic conditions and a move towards the private sector and business ownership point to the growth of the entrepreneurship sector across the region.
Growing awareness of entrepreneurial sector: With increasing interest in social entrepreneurship, the study evaluated the level of familiarity with entrepreneurship—in both the business and social sense—as the term is often perceived as an import from the West. Survey results concluded that overall there was a general level of familiarity with the term, but more respondents identified with the business side of entrepreneurship, indicating that there is more work to do to build awareness around the social sector. More encouraging was the number of respondents—63% in Tunisia and 56% in Egypt—who expressed an interest in starting their own business and a general openness towards working in the field of social entrepreneurship.
Challenges facing the sector: While survey results revealed several opportunities, there remains a high rate of failure for new businesses and NGOs, preventing them from reaching maturity. In Egypt 44% of business owners stated that their current businesses were not performing well, and in Syria the figures were higher at 50%. Those operating NGOs did not fare much better, as 56% of respondents in Egypt said that they had hoped to start an organization but were unable to do so. Government interference, the inability to obtain finance, bureaucratic hurdles, fear of failure, and corruption were the major obstacles to starting a new enterprise.Government interference, the inability to obtain finance, bureaucratic hurdles, fear of failure, and corruption were the major obstacles to starting a new enterprise. With transitions underway in Arab Spring countries, Stanford researchers called for a number of policy recommendations to create an ecosystem conducive for entrepreneurship to thrive. Some of their suggestions include: legal and regulatory reform in the banking sector; introducing entrepreneurial education in schools; and increasing the number of high-tech incubators.
While the Arab Spring has had an immediate negative impact on the economic landscape in the Arab world, the positive effect on citizens’ interest in social and economic development remains strong. As Arab Spring countries attempt to rebuild economically, social entrepreneurship represents a promising pathway for the post-revolutionary generation to engage in positive social change in the region and beyond.
Rosamond L. Naylor, director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment, will join demographers, authors, activists, economists, and scientists for a daylong symposium on population at the Moving Mountains Symposium in Telluride May 25. During the daylong symposium speakers will touch on subjects like water tables, food security, women's education, immigration, and human longevity in the context of population growth.
FSE director Roz Naylor will address the challenges of feeding the growing world. According to Naylor, humans are already pushing against the limits of high yield agriculture, fisheries and habitat displacement for farming to feed a population that is trending toward a more carnivorous, and therefore higher impact, diet.
“Part of the focus is: How do we meet future demands of so many people on the planet? Another important question is, if we are successful, does it just promote and enable population growth?” she said, or does it set the stage for a population to level out.
Feeding the world goes back to agriculture and food production but also biofuels, and it will require new technologies and interdisciplinary collaboration, Naylor said.
Other participants include Stanford's Paul Ehrlich, author of “The Population Bomb” and long-time leading voice on the population issue, who will talk about what will happen when the population bomb explodes.
About the topic:This talk will provide a current affairs assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. It will present the trajectory of the counterinsurgency campaign highlighting the security and governance challenges--including the building up of the Afghan National Security Forces, the economic sustainability of the state and private sector, as well as issues pertaining to minority and women's rights. The talk will also offer a range of likely endgames in light of the 2014 withdrawal.
About the Speaker: Fotini Christia joined the MIT faculty in the fall of 2008. She received her PhD in Public Policy at Harvard University, and has been a recipient of research fellowships from the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs among others. Her research interests deal with issues of ethnicity, conflict and cooperation in the Muslim world. Fotini has written opinion pieces on her experiences from Afghanistan, Iran, the West Bank and Gaza and Uzbekistan for Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Boston Globe. She graduated magna cum laude with a joint BA in Economics-Operations Research from Columbia College and a Masters in International Affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.
CISAC Conference Room
Fotini Christia
Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT
Speaker
From the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street movement, young people have emerged at the helm of citizen-led change, opposing and challenging the status quo. Recognizing their local and global impact, youth are increasingly stepping up to fulfill Gandhi's famous maxim: "Be the change you want to see in the world." In turn, they are encouraging other members of their generation to answer this call to duty. In the aftermath of revolutions across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), youth have never been more engaged and active in the future development of their communities.
Inspired by these events, a group of young Stanford students launched a forum to unite leaders from the MENA region with their Western counterparts to build a bridge towards greater understanding, collaboration, and partnership. Nothing of this scale had ever been done on the Stanford campus, and there was a clear demand from the student body for deeper engagement with the region.
It was in this spirit that the American Middle Eastern Network for Dialogue at Stanford (AMENDS) was born, which will host its inaugural conference at Stanford University April 10 to 14, 2012 to convene exceptional young leaders together to share their ideas, seed potential collaborations and inspire the world. The AMENDS team represents a diverse group of students of various nationalities, faiths, and persuasions, but the common thread that connects them all is a desire to interact with the future generation of leaders who are writing a new chapter in the history of the Middle East.
AMENDS seeks to take a step forward towards greater partnership with a post-Arab Spring generation of leaders in the Middle East. -AMENDS co-founders Elliot Stoller and Khaled AlShawi
Co-founders Elliot Stoller (BA '13) and Khaled AlShawi (BA '13), hailing from Chicago and Bahrain respectively, were inspired to start a project devoted to U.S.-MENA relations largely in response to events surrounding the Arab Spring, “The problems addressed through the uprisings transcend a single country or region. They affect us all and require global collaboration to solve. AMENDS seeks to take a step forward towards greater partnership with a post-Arab Spring generation of leaders in the Middle East. ”
Within a year of launching the initiative, the AMENDS team received applications from over 300 promising delegates, organized a four-day summit, and launched an ambitious fundraising campaign to cover the costs of such an endeavor. Described by AMENDS senior leadership as a "full-time job" on top of their demanding academic schedules, this grassroots operation is fueled by the entrepreneurial energy of a band of passionate and dedicated student volunteers. AMENDS has benefited from the consultation of a board of advisors comprised of Stanford faculty and staff from the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Program in Iranian Studies.
According to Larry Diamond, CDDRL director and member of the AMENDS advisory board, "It has been a pleasure working with the AMENDS team on the design and implementation of this innovative project — the first of its kind — to convene a new generation of leaders in the U.S. and the Middle East at Stanford University."
AMENDS delegates hail from 17 countries and together represent students and young professionals leading projects driven by the ingenuity of the new Middle East.
AMENDS delegates hail from 17 countries and together represent students and young professionals leading projects driven by the ingenuity of the new Middle East. While many of their projects are still in their initial stages of development, the AMENDS conference and network is intended to provide leadership training and peer support to help scale-up these initiatives. A mentorship program pairs delegates with professionals, development practitioners, and industry leaders for tailored advice and support.
AMENDS delegates are as diverse as the issues they are confronting in the Middle East, North America, and the United Kingdom. Several AMENDS delegates are leveraging the use of new technology and social media to unite civil society, stimulate public debate, introduce alternative energy resources, and promote citizen-led journalism. In Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine, delegates are members of youth movements at the forefront of the Arab Spring revolutions and are championing new approaches for political change. Others are working in their local communities to defend the rights of HIV/AIDS patients in Egypt, support children with disabilities in Canada, and empower uninsured MENA immigrants in the U.S. Many projects share the common goal of getting more youth engaged and active in their local communities to achieve broader societal goals.
Over a five-day period, delegates will deliver ten-minute "AMENDS Talks" styled after TEDTalksTM, where they will introduce their initiatives to the larger Stanford community. The videos will be recorded and available through an online forum — in both Arabic and English — giving delegates’ a global platform to share their ideas, inspiring others to take action. Delegates will also participate in leadership development workshops at the Stanford Graduate School for Business and networking events sponsored by AMENDS strategic partner TechWadi, a Silicon Valley-based organization fostering high-tech entrepreneurial development in the Arab world.
Notable scholars and practitioners from the U.S. and the MENA region will provide unique insight and analysis to some of the timeliest topics emerging from the region. Speakers include Sami Ben Gharbia, Tunisian political activist and a Foreign Policy Top 100 Thinker; Thomas T. Riley, former U.S. ambassador to Morocco; and Rami Khouri, director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.
CDDRL faculty and staff will also be leading sessions and addressing the AMENDS delegates at the summit, including CDDRL Director Larry Diamond, CDDRL Consulting Professor and AMENDS Advisory Board Member Prince Hicham Ben Abdallah, Arab Reform and Democracy Program Manager Lina Khatib, and Moroccan journalist and CDDRL Visiting Scholar Ahmed Benchemsi.
Most AMENDS Talks and sessions are open to the Stanford community and general public. For more information on AMENDS, to read about the 2012 delegates, and to view the conference agenda, please visit: amends.stanford.edu.
Men are playing soccer in the street when soldiers from the Army’s 1st Infantry Division arrive in Shar-e-Tiefort. Vendors selling vegetables, teapots and toys shout to the troops who are here to speak with town leaders about building better roads and schools. The greetings in Pashto and Dari don’t sound like taunts – just a noisy welcome.
The place seems safe.
But chaos explodes when a roadside bomb detonates beneath a Humvee. Downed soldiers lie in the road. Survivors take cover behind the damaged vehicle – its side now stained by blood-red streaks.
A sniper shoots though a second-story window. The Americans return fire and the brat-a-tat-tat of machine guns is followed by the clinking of shell casings raining on the ground.
Then, silence. The sniper is hit. Or reloading. The troops flank the brick and concrete buildings, trying to secure their position and eliminate more threats in this small mountain town.
They’re not fast enough. A rocket-propelled grenade rips the air, striking close to the disabled Humvee and wiping out several more troops.
Overlooking from a nearby rooftop, Stanford scholars watch the action – a training session at Fort Irwin’s National Training Center, a sort of graduate school in California’s Mojave Desert for combat troops going to Afghanistan.
The bullets aren’t real. Neither are the bombs, the blood and the casualties. The soccer players, street vendors and sniper are either soldiers stationed at Fort Irwin or some of the hundreds of role players hired to populate Shar-e-Tiefort and the 10 other mock towns and villages built to replicate communities in Afghanistan.
But the tension and pressure of battle are genuine.
“You watch them train, and you become aware that the soldiers and the military supporting them are doing the best they can,” says Norman M. Naimark, a history professor and senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies who had the rooftop view.
“But you know some people are going to die.”
From the ivory tower to the trenches
Karl Eikenberry knows that tension better than any civilian. Now at FSI as the Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Eikenberry was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011. Before that, he was there as a lieutenant general overseeing the American-led coalition forces.
Eikenberry has delivered several formal talks and had countless conversations with scholars about the war in Afghanistan since arriving at Stanford this past summer. He’s proud of the Army he served for more than 35 years, and he speaks often of how adept it has become at meeting the needs of modern warfare.
Organizing the February trip to the National Training Center with the help of Viet Luong and Charlie Miller – Army colonels who are currently visiting scholars at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation – gave Eikenberry the chance to show a group of about 20 historians, doctors and political scientists exactly what he’s been talking about.
CISAC visiting scholars and Army colonels Viet Luong (left) and Charlie Miller (center) organized the trip to Fort Irwin with Karl Eikenberry, a distinguished lecturer at FSI and the former ambassador to Afghanistan. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick
“I wanted them to have the opportunity to see the technology and the networked approach to combat,” he said. “And I also wanted them to realize that – beyond all the technologies, beyond all the equipment – the most decisive force on any battlefield for the U.S. Army remains the individual soldier and the individual leader.”
Trips like this inform a scholar’s work. And the papers produced, the lectures delivered, and interactions with other academics and policymakers can help shape the way politicians, government officials and military leaders think about wars.
“It’s always very helpful to get out of the ivory tower and into the trenches,” says Amy Zegart, a CISAC affiliate and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution who focuses on the effectiveness of the country’s national security organization.
“Even for someone like me who’s been studying the military for more than 15 years, I learned things I didn’t know before,” she says. “I hadn’t appreciated how hard it is to coordinate the human element when you’re going in and doing counterinsurgency operations. You can think about it abstractly, but to see it makes it more tangible.”
Before 9/11, the Army’s training program was shaped by Cold War perspective. Tanks ruled the battlefield, soldiers were easily identified by their uniforms, and nobody thought about the tactics that have come to define the war in Afghanistan.
“The Army wasn’t planning to fight counterinsurgency in a remote country in Central and South Asia,” Eikenberry says of the organization in which he rose through the ranks. “But today, if you look at the effectiveness of our forces on the ground, it’s extraordinary.”
In The Box
Roughly the size of Rhode Island, Fort Irwin is home to the largest and most expansive of the three combat training facilities designed for each branch of the military. About 4,500 soldiers and their families are permanently stationed here, and another 50,000 troops rotate through three weeks of combat training each year.
The base is a community unto itself, with the shopping centers, schools, gyms and restaurants you’d expect to find almost anywhere in America.
But all familiarity vanishes in “The Box”– the National Training Center’s 1,250-square-mile operations area that sprawls across an otherwise empty high desert with infinite views of mountains, dirt and sky.
Activated in 1980, the NTC was filled with tanks and troops expecting to take on the Soviets. Trainers blasted this no-man’s land with every live weapon in the defense department’s arsenal with the exception of nuclear bombs.
Just before 9/11, the Army began rethinking the command structure of war. Rather than having generals make top-down decisions for thousands of troops, military leaders figured it was wiser to have smaller units do what made the most sense given their individual combat situations.
The move toward decentralization was complete soon after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began.
“By that time, we were well-structured to be able to fight smaller guerilla and insurgent networks,” Eikenberry says. “We changed how we were going to fight, and that meant we needed to change how we trained.”
Tanks rolled out of The Box, replaced by a new land of make-believe. Apartments. Courthouses. Government buildings. Mosques. A construction boom of facades ushered in a new way of training for the next generation of warriors.
Replicating the worst
The Army’s 1st Infantry Division arrives in Shar-e-Tiefort, a mock Afghan town at the National Training Center. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick
As the 1st Infantry Division moves through a makeshift market in Shar-e-Tiefort, crowds of men bicker and barter over vegetables while women shrouded in burqas hover in doorways.
They scuttle and take cover when the roadside bomb explodes and the gunfight begins, but they don’t break character.
While the skirmish looks and sounds like the real thing, what’s happening is essentially an elaborate game of laser tag. The vehicles, soldiers and actors posing as insurgents and civilians wear targets that detect safe lasers being fired at them from otherwise authentic weapons.
When they’re hit, they hear a beep. Game over.
The terrain of the Mojave Desert may not be similar to the high peaks and lush valleys of northern Afghanistan, but there’s enough here to disorient – and ultimately familiarize – the soldiers with what awaits them when they deploy.
Pyrotechnics create bursts of flames and leave clouds of smoke. Speakers wired through some of the town’s 480 buildings play the soundtrack of urban warfare: Shouts, shrieks and cries replace the brief quiet that comes when rounds are no longer being fired.
Even the stench of battle is copied. Hidden sensors emit the stink of burning flesh and rotting garbage.
Scripts and mock weapons used for the combat scenarios are constantly changed and updated in response to new battlefield threats. When troops in Iraq saw a surge in casualties caused by a newly developed grenade, they were able to describe the device in enough detail so artillery experts at the NTC could replicate it.
Within 96 hours of initial reports of the new explosive, soldiers at Fort Irwin were being trained how to outsmart it.
“We try to replicate the worst possible day they’ll ever see and make sure they learn from it,” Capt. Richard Floer tells the Stanford group while escorting them through The Box.
“In Afghanistan, there’s no rewind,” he says. “There’s no stop or pause or do it again.”
Bad guys and best practices
The training isn’t all about offensive and defensive tactical maneuvers. The NTC has designed dozens of scenarios meant to replicate actual missions carried out in Afghanistan. Some involve nothing but fighting. Others rely heavily on role-playing, where soldiers have face-to-face meetings with actors posing as town leaders who are eager – or sometimes resistant – to negotiate local stability for the American promise of improved infrastructure.
Occasionally there’s a combination of force and diplomacy. An operation meant to engage local officials can be derailed by insurgents bent on driving the Americans away, like the members of the 1st Infantry Division experienced in their training.
Soldiers plan their next move after a simulated IED attack "kills" a comrade and disables their vehicle. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick
And once the insurgents are killed and the casualties are tended to, the meetings sometimes go on.
“You need to dust yourself off and continue with your mission,” says Luong, the Army colonel and visiting scholar at CISAC who fought in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011 and in Iraq four years earlier.
“You have to show the bad guys that they can’t just scare you away,” he says. “You need to show them that the Army can stay on mission.”
As the United States draws down its military presence in Afghanistan, the NTC is preparing new training programs for future wars. Based on newly imagined conflicts, the so-called decisive action training will pull together the motivations of military forces, freewheeling criminal organizations, guerillas and insurgents to create a host of worst-case scenarios.
Tanks, bombs, weapons of mass destruction and political, religious and cultural grudges will all come into play.
“We’re looking at the world’s worst actors and using all of their best practices,” says Brig. Gen Terry Ferrell, Fort Irwin’s commanding officer. “This will serve as our new baseline training. Once we get specific orders, we will refine that skill set and respond accordingly.”
Learning from mistakes
After about an hour of simulated combat in Shar-e-Tiefort, the troops of the 1st Infantry Division are sitting in a room watching a rerun of the mission they just carried out. Dozens of video cameras rigged around the town captured their maneuvers and create a powerful teaching tool used during what’s called an AAR – an after action review that gives the soldiers and their combat trainer a chance to critique the operation.
They’ve run through the same battle scenario twice today and will have another crack at it after the AAR. In just a few weeks, they’ll be in Afghanistan.
“What are the things that worked better this time or need to be modified or fixed?”
Maj. Peter Moon, the combat trainer, wants to know.
First, they report the good: Vehicles were positioned to provide good cover from enemy fire. The unit did a better job responding to casualties. Overall, the soldiers tell Moon, they worked better together.
Moon agrees. “You looked a lot more controlled,” he tells them. “Things went much smoother than this morning.”
Then, the problems: Too much chatter over the radios. A lag in communications that could have been deadly – four rounds of sniper fire went off before it was reported over the radio.
Despite the errors, one soldier describes how quickly he spotted the sniper from the second-story window. And how he waited for his shot.
“Next time he poked his head out, I zeroed the .50-cal in,” the soldier says. “And that was that.”
Moon keeps at it, asking the same questions over and over again to go over every detail. What went wrong? What needs to be tweaked? What must be duplicated?
Facades of apartments, government buildings and mosques were built in the Mojave Desert to replicate Afghan villages. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick
Here, they can learn from their mistakes. In Afghanistan they won’t have that luxury.
“That’s your goal,” Moon says. “To keep getting better and better and better.”
Drawing insight and saving lives
For many in the Stanford group, the AAR provided some of the best insight into how the military trains for combat.
Beyond the technological gadgets and computerized network systems they saw, beyond the off-the-record briefings they received from Fort Irwin’s leaders, and beyond the simulated combat they watched, many say the most impressive aspect of the NTC is the student-teacher relationship where questions are asked, lessons are learned and lifesaving knowledge is the goal.
“As a teacher, that’s what really sticks out,” says Katherine Jolluck, a senior lecturer in history and FSI affiliate. “You see the leaders trying to draw real insight from the soldiers. They’re not just being told what to do. They’re being encouraged to think for themselves and come up with solutions.”
And the most important solutions often lie in what can seem like the smallest of details: Marking a building properly so everyone knows it’s clear. Stationing vehicles in just the right place. Determining how much chatter should fill the radio. Figuring out who should be carrying the radio in the first place.
“It isn’t about grand strategy,” says Stephen D. Krasner, FSI’s deputy director and the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations.
“The goal of the training is to make sure you do all the small things right,” he says. “That’s what saves lives.”
Timed between the election's first and second rounds, this discussion brings together noted scholars and authors with unique and deep insight into contemporary French political culture.
Co-sponsored by the Europe Center and the French Culture Workshop
Arthur Goldhammer opens the panel by arguing that the first round of the French presidential elections, not the second, are "the real story." For the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, divisions between left and right were less pronounced than between the top two tiers of candidates (Hollande/Sarkozy, and Melénchon/Le Pen) especially regarding their attitudes toward European integration, globalization, and the Euro. Goldhammer points out that given France's role as a top global investor as well as a leading destination for foreign investment, the anti-globalization stance of the second tier candidates is unrealistic, although it enjoyed broad support at the polls. Sarkozy responded to this show of support by attacking the Shengen agreement and other aspects of the EU in a bid to win votes, while Hollande kept a low profile on the same issues. If Hollande wins, Goldhammer predicts, he will be tested by the markets and the global financial industry. He also points out that the Socialist and UNP parties are both internally divided on important issues. If Sarkozy loses and decides to leave politics, Goldhammer predicts a power struggle for leadership of the party.
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi predicts that if Hollande wins, the outcome will be a statement against Sarkozy more than one in favor of Hollande. He echoes Arthur Goldhammer's concern about a strong market reaction to a victory by Hollande, who has positioned himself as pro-growth and has sanctioned Sarkozy for his strict austerity measures. Cohen-Tanugi adds that Hollande's focus is on domestic politics, and that he lacks significant international experience. Whoever wins, he cautions, France is in for difficult times.
Jimia Boutouba describes the rise of the extreme right – which has invoked nostalgia for a pre-globalization era - leading up to the elections. This rise has been dominated by Marine Le Pen and the Front National, which vows to defend the "French way of life" and (like Sarkozy as the election neared) has made anti-immigration rhetoric a key component of its platform. Le Pen, however, has attracted many first time, rural, and female voters, and has been successful in setting the tone and the agenda of national politics. Boutouba sees several problems with this trend toward defining the nation by what it opposes (Islam, globalization, international finance, etc), and warns it can be very disruptive to the political system, pointing to the recent fall of the Dutch government. More significantly, the anti-immigrant tone of the discourse discourages second and third generation descendants of immigrants from voting or participating in the political process.
A question and answer session following the roundtable addressed such questions as: Have both Hollande and Sarkozy radicalized their rhetoric and proposals to win support from far right and far left voters? Will the taxes and government spending (which is already very high in France, at 57%) promised by some politicians choke private sector growth? Which candidate will be most attractive to this new generation of French college graduates? What are the main differences between the three potential leaders currently jockeying for control of Sarkozy's party? To what extent would a Hollande presidency be beholden to Communists, Greens, and other extreme left parties? How will a Hollande presidency affect France's involvement with NATO, and relations with the United States? What are the prospects for the future of the Euro?
CISAC Conference Room
Arthur Goldhammer
Translator, writer, and Senior Affiliate at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University; member of the editorial boards at "French Politics, Culture, and Society", and "La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review"
Speaker
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi
Visiting Lecturer at the Stanford Law School, international lawyer, policy adviser and public intellectual
Speaker
Jimia Boutouba
Assistant Professor of Modern Languages and Literatures
Speaker
Santa Clara University
The Stuxnet computer worm is perhaps the most complicated piece of malicious software ever built - roughly 50 times the size of the typical computer virus. This threat leveraged a huge array of new techniques to spread itself, conceal itself and to attack Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. This talk will provide a detailed dissection of the Stuxnet worm, answering such questions as how it spread, how it evaded detection, what it did once it found its target, and ultimately, how successful it was.
About the speaker: Carey Nachenberg is a Fellow and Chief Architect at Symantec corporation, the world's largest computer security provider. As Chief Architect, Mr. Nachenberg drives the technical strategy for all of Symantec’s core security technologies and security content, which in total protect hundreds of millions of customers around the world. During his time at Symantec, Mr. Nachenberg has led the design and development of Symantec’s core antivirus, intrusion prevention and reputation-based security technologies; his work in these areas have garnered over fifty United States patents.
He holds BS and MS degrees in Computer Science and Engineering from University of California at Los Angeles, where he continues to serve as an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Computer Science and a member of UCLA’s Computer Science Alumni Advisory Board.
CISAC Conference Room
Carey Nachenberg
Vice President and Symantec Fellow
Speaker
Symantec Corporation