Stanford University

Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

The Rippling Effects of the U.S.-China Competition: Where Does South Korea Stand?

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Portraits of Myung Hwan Yu and Gi-Wook Shin with text about Oct 18 webinar on the implications of US-China competition for South Korea

This event is part of APARC’s 2022 Fall webinar series, Asian Perspectives on the US-China Competition.

With rising Sino-U.S. tensions, South Korea has increasingly been in a difficult position to choose policy decisions that may tilt it towards one hegemon or the other. The new Yoon Administration signaled its strengthened alliance with the U.S. by attending the NATO summit and joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), but there are concerns that such actions run the risks of potential economic backlash from China. With increasing tensions between the U.S. and China, what diplomatic and economic options are left for South Korea? How does the domestic political environment such as the rise of anti-China sentiments and the return of pro-alliance conservatives back to power influence South Korea’s outlook on international affairs? Former South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan, in conversation with Professor Gi-Wook Shin, will discuss the South Korean perspective on the rising U.S.-China rivalry.

Myung Hwan Yu, former foreign minister of South Korea

 Myung Hwan Yu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea, also served as Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines, and as Minister of the Permanent Mission to UN. His experience extends across a broad range of issues in international relations including trade, security and nuclear negotiations with North Korea. After his retirement from the foreign ministry, Ambassador Yu was board chairman of the Sejong University in Seoul, visiting scholar in the Korea Program at APARC; and he is currently a senior advisor at Kim & Chang Law Office.

This event is made possible by generous support from the Korea Foundation and other friends of the Korea Program.

Gi-Wook Shin

Via Zoom: Register at https://bit.ly/3LjfeMW

Myung Hwan Yu <i>former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea</i>
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Asian Perspectives on the US-China Competition: Implications for South Asia

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Portraits of Sinderpal Singh and Arzan Tarapore with text about a webinar on the implications of the US-China competition for South Asia.

How is India posturing to manage strategic competition in the Indian Ocean? Thus far US-China security competition has been most acute in the western Pacific, but Chinese capability growth and strategic policies suggest that it also seeks a leading role in the northern Indian Ocean, in the not-too-distant future. India has traditionally considered itself the natural dominant power in the Indian Ocean region, but it has never faced the scale and types of competition that China will present. Does India have the wherewithal to maintain its leadership in the region? How will India work with the United States, bilaterally and through groupings such as the Quad, as they seek to maintain the status quo in the face of Chinese challenges? Is the Indian Ocean bound for militarized competition, or can India, the US, and China find a pathway to strategic coexistence?

Panelist

Headshot photograph of Dr. Sinderpal Singh
Dr. Sinderpal Singh is Senior Fellow and Assistant Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, and concurrently Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. In the fall of 2022, he has been appointed as the McCain Fulbright Scholar in Residence at the United States Naval Academy. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia with a special focus on Indian foreign policy, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region, and India-Southeast Asia relations. He is currently writing a book on India’s role in the Indian Ocean since 1992 and is the author of India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP (Routledge 2013). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, his MA from the Australian National University, and his BA from the National University of Singapore.

Moderator

Square headshot photograph of Arzan Tarapore
Dr. Arzan Tarapore is the South Asia research scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he leads the newly-restarted South Asia Initiative. His research focuses on military strategy, Indian defense policy, and contemporary Indo-Pacific security issues. Prior to his scholarly career, he served as an analyst in the Australian Defence Department. Arzan holds a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London.

This webinar is co-sponsored by the Center for South Asia

Questions?

Contact Kana Igarashi Limpanukorn
Arzan Tarapore
Arzan Tarapore

Virtual via Zoom Webinar

Sinderpal Singh Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, and South Asia Programme Senior Fellow, Assistant Director S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Honors Students to Meet with Top-Level Policy Makers in Washington, D.C.

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Nora Sulots
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Every September, rising seniors in the Fisher Family Honors Program travel to the nation's capitol for CDRRL's Honors College. During this week-long program, students visit a wide variety of policy-related institutions in Washington, D.C., and gain firsthand exposure to how these organizations, the federal government, and think tanks work to advance democracy and development around the world.

Throughout the week, students will have the opportunity to learn about the government's vision for democracy at the National Security Council, explore an academic view of development from scholars at the World Bank, and dive into the challenges and advantages of empowering local democratic activists — particularly in countries hostile to democracy — with speakers at the National Endowment for Democracy, among other exciting site visits. They are also encouraged to use this time to connect with experts related to their thesis question. The culminating event of the trip will bring current honors students together with alumni from across the greater D.C. area for a networking happy hour.

CDDRL’s Fisher Family Honors Program brings together undergraduates from diverse fields and methodologies who are united by their passion for understanding democracy, development, and rule of law (DDRL). The aim of the program is for students to carry out original, policy-relevant research on DDRL and produce a coherent, eloquently argued, well-written honors thesis.

This year's Honors College begins on Sunday, September 18, and will be led by Didi Kuo and Stephen Stedman, who jointly direct the honors program, alongside Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy Larry Diamond.

Check back throughout the week for photos and updates from our students.

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CDDRL honors class of 2022 with Steve Stedman, Sako Fisher, and Didi Kuo
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Graduating CDDRL Honors Students Recognized for Outstanding Theses

Adrian Scheibler ('22) is a recipient of the 2022 Firestone Medal and Michal Skreta ('22) has won the CDDRL Outstanding Thesis Award.
Graduating CDDRL Honors Students Recognized for Outstanding Theses
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CDDRL Congratulates Newly Elected Phi Beta Kappa Members

Sylvie Ashford (honors class of 2021) and Carolyn Chun (honors class of 2022) are among the newest members of this prestigious academic honors society.
CDDRL Congratulates Newly Elected Phi Beta Kappa Members
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From September 18 through 24, the Fisher Family Honors Program class of 2023 will attend CDDRL's annual Honors College, gaining firsthand exposure to how the federal government, policy organizations, and think tanks work to advance democracy and development around the world.

Kyuri Park

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Postdoctoral Fellow, 2022-23
Kyuri_Park.jpg Ph.D.

Kyuri Park joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as a postdoctoral fellow during the 2022-2023 academic year. Kyuri was also a non-resident fellow of the US-Korea NextGen Scholars Program (2022-2024), an initiative by CSIS Korea Chair and USC Korean Studies Institute. 

Her research lies primarily in international security and cooperation, with a regional focus on the Asia-Pacific. Kyuri is particularly interested in examining the variations in the pattern of security cooperation between great powers and secondary states in the Asia-Pacific (1970-present) and drawing out the implications for regional order, stability, and the US grand strategy. By shedding light on joint military exercises in the region, during her time at Shorenstein APARC, Kyuri worked on her book project which explores how East Asian secondary states are responding to the rise of China, and why they are responding the way they are.  

Kyuri’s work on South Korea’s middle power diplomacy has appeared in International Politics. Previously, Kyuri was a US-Asia Grand Strategy predoctoral fellow at the USC Korean Studies Institute. She also served as a co-contributing author of ‘Korea-Japan relations’ in Comparative Connections published by Pacific Forum.  

Kyuri received her Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC), M.A. in Asian Studies at Georgetown University, and B.A. in International Studies at Ewha Womans University. 

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Lt. Col. Faith Posey

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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2022-23
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Lieutenant Colonel Faith Posey joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as Visiting Scholar for the 2022-2023 academic year. Lt. Col. Posey currently serves in the United States Air Force. While at APARC, she conducted research regarding security and international relations issues in the Asia-Pacific.

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Or (Ori) Rabinowitz

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Senior Research Scholar, FSI
Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies, 2022-2026
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Or (Ori) Rabinowitz  joined Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in summer 2026 as a Senior Research Scholar, with appointments at both CDDRL’s Jan Koum Israel Studies Program and CISAC. She arrives at Stanford following her time as a tenured Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

A recipient of the British Foreign Office’s Chevening Scholarship, Rabinowitz completed her PhD in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London in 2011. Her first book, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, was published by Oxford University Press in 2014. Her second book, Protecting the Nuclear Monopoly, forthcoming with Cambridge University Press, examines the evolution of U.S.–Israeli collaboration in countering nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Rabinowitz has published widely in leading academic journals as well as in prominent policy and public-facing outlets. She is the recipient of multiple grants and distinctions, including two competitive personal grants from the Israel Science Foundation.

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APARC Invites Fall 2023 Asia Studies Fellowship Applications

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Noa Ronkin
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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2023.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on contemporary Japan and contemporary Asia broadly defined, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2023. The application deadline is December 1, 2022.
 

Apply for the Japan Postdoctoral Fellowship
 

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2023. The application deadline is December 1, 2022.
 

Apply for the Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia
 

Next Asia Postdoctoral and Visiting Fellowships

The Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) is a new innovative policy lab housed at Shorenstein APARC under the directorship of Professor Gi-Wook Shin. The lab is committed to addressing Asia's emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges. The Lab's initial research focuses on two themes. The Talent Flows and Development research theme will examine how various forms of talent mobility and strategy have contributed to the developmental success of different nations in the Asia-Pacific region. The Nationalism and Racism theme will explore how nationalism and racism are intertwined to create various forms of exclusion and intolerance across the region.

SNAPL is offering two inaugural postdoctoral fellowships (two years in length) to begin fall quarter 2023. One fellowship will focus on “Talent Flows and Development,” and the other will focus on “Nationalism and Racism” in Asia. The deadline to apply for fall quarter admission is December 1, 2022. SNAPL is also offering two visiting fellow positions to researchers and professionals from Asia with a PhD or a substantial record of achievement related to the Lab's two research themes. These visiting scholar appointments are for one year, and the deadline to apply for fall quarter 2023 admission is March 1, 2023.

 

Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellowship on Southeast Asia

The Lee Kong Chian National University of Singapore-Stanford (LKC NUS-Stanford) Fellowship on Southeast Asia provides an expert on Southeast Asia the opportunity to conduct research on or related to contemporary Southeast Asia. Fellows spend three to four months at Stanford and two to four months at NUS. At Stanford, APARC's Southeast Asia Program hosts the fellowship. Appointments will begin and end within the period from September 1, 2023 to May 31, 2024. The application deadline is January 27, 2023.
 

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Protesters in Myanmar stand on a picture of General Min Aung Hlaing
Commentary

It’s Time to Help Myanmar’s Resistance Prevail

The country’s brutal coup regime is no candidate for political compromise.
It’s Time to Help Myanmar’s Resistance Prevail
Chinese soldier
Commentary

China Hasn’t Reached the Peak of Its Power

Why Beijing can afford to bide Its time
China Hasn’t Reached the Peak of Its Power
Members of K-pop band BTS speak at a press briefing at the White House.
Commentary

Will Hallyu Swell to a Tidal Wave? Korea's Future as a Cultural Superpower

The Korean Wave, which has unique characteristics and continues to evolve in intriguing directions, could become a first mover on the global cultural scene.
Will Hallyu Swell to a Tidal Wave? Korea's Future as a Cultural Superpower
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The Center offers a suite of fellowships for Asia researchers to begin fall quarter 2023. These include postdoctoral fellowships on contemporary Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.

Is China a Challenge to U.S. National Security?

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Cover of the book 'The China Questions 2'
The belief that China presents a challenge, if not an outright threat, to U.S. national security is increasingly prevalent in elite and public discourse. The main points of contention lie in the degree to which China threatens U.S. national security, how exactly China may challenge U.S. national security, and uncertainty about how the answers to these questions may change over time (which is fundamentally a debate about the drivers of Chinese strategy).

In this chapter, included in the volume The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations​ Harvard University Press, 2022), Oriana Sklayar Mastro focuses on the direct and indirect ways the People's Republic of China poses a threat to U.S. national security today.

Two caveats are in order. First, this focused discussion on challenges and threats may distort the degree to which China threatens the United States. On aggregate, the discussion presents a malign influence from the Perspective of U.S. national security. But it could be much worse. China has resolved many of its territorial disputes peacefully. Beijing has relied mainly on economic and political tools to blunt U.S. influence beyond its immediate region. China is an active member of the vast majority of international institutions. Even though faced with a conventionally superior U.S. military, China has yet to change its minimal no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

Second, while Mastro presents information on trends and trajectories, her focus is on today's challenges. These are likely to expand in scope and increase in intensity over the next five to ten years.

Related Research

Learn more about Dr. Mastro's research on the U.S.-China great power competition.
View project page

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Defense, Deterrence, and the Role of Guam

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Defense, Deterrence, and the Role of Guam
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July 2022
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A chapter in The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations, edited by Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Harvard University Press
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China’s Huge Exercises Around Taiwan Were a Rehearsal, Not a Signal, Says Oriana Skylar Mastro

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This commentary originally appeared in The Economist.

In the afternoon of August 4th, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) kicked off the largest and most sophisticated military exercises it has ever conducted. Over the course of a week, the Chinese launched dozens of missiles and conducted drills near Taiwan with 100 aircraft, ten destroyers and support vessels. Submarines and aircraft carriers also played a role. The display has made the third Taiwan Strait crisis, which occurred between 1995-96, when China conducted four rounds of tests over the course of several months, with barrages of no more than six missiles, look like child’s play.

Part of the rationale for the latest exercise was to signal Beijing’s anger over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Ms Pelosi, the speaker of the House of Representatives, was the highest-ranking American government official to visit the island since 1997. Back then Newt Gingrich, who was also the House speaker, made the trip. China warned that if Ms Pelosi added Taipei to her itinerary, there would be hell to pay.

The exercise is also a bit of a “coming-out party” for Beijing. In 1996 the third crisis ended when America sent two aircraft-carrier strike groups within 200 miles (322km) of Taiwan. America saw this as a great strategic success, and Chinese leaders were unhappy with its interference in what China considers a domestic affair. The resentment helped to drive China to build the PLA into one of the greatest armed forces in the world.

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Compared with 1996, China’s forces today are barely recognizable. Back then it had a large army, with roughly 4m people, but that was a sign of its backwardness more than anything else. With obsolete equipment and poor training, China barely had what could be considered an air force and a navy. Its pilots could not fly over water, at night or in rough weather. In 1999 less than 2% of its fighters were fourth generation, just 4% of its attack submarines were classed as modern (nuclear powered, for example) and none of its surface ships was. Its navy was a glorified coastguard with ships that, lacking air-defense systems, had to hug the coastline on any patrol. Its nuclear weapons, solid-fuelled and housed mainly in fixed silos, could have been taken out in one fell swoop by America.

Now China’s armed forces are comparable to America’s in quality and quantity. Most of its platforms are modern (of the latest technology for the relevant domain) and it boasts the largest navy in the world. In some areas, Chinese military capabilities already surpass America’s—in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air-defense systems. China possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, one that is currently undergoing major modernization.

Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. China has not fought a war since 1979, when it made heavy weather of a “punitive” invasion of Vietnam. An amphibious attack, and to a lesser degree a blockade of the type the exercises off Taiwan were simulating, would demand complex joint operations (involving army, air force and navy), which in turn require impeccable logistics and command and control. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, launched a massive organizational reform to improve in these areas, and the PLA undoubtedly has. But the war in Ukraine may have given him heightened anxiety, given that the Russians struggled precisely with logistics and command.

For this reason, we should see the massive exercises off Taiwan less as a signal, and more as a rehearsal for combat. Mr Xi wants progress on the Taiwan issue, and domestically talk in the press is shifting from peaceful reunification to armed reunification. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

China will seize the opportunity to practice as much as possible. It has announced already that this round of exercises will continue and that another round in the Bohai Gulf/Yellow Sea is next. And it won’t just be large-scale exercises. It is unlikely that Beijing will return to its previous level of operations. Instead, China might attempt to normalize greater Chinese activity around Taiwan. That makes war more probable. Through a series of exercises the PLA, and the party leadership, might gain confidence that China’s forces are ready to take Taiwan sooner than they would otherwise have thought.

Of course, this all depends on how the exercises and operations go. From the outside, this is hard to assess. The missiles landed where they should have in recent days, and there were no accidents. But we don’t know how much and how well different groups are communicating with each other. To prepare for joint operations, air-force units need to operate in close proximity and coordinate with ground troops and amphibious elements. The PLA needs to practice providing supplies, such as prepositioned fuel stocks, and bringing munitions and medical supplies to forward locations such as Fujian, the province directly across the Taiwan Strait.

This is where the real trouble lies. If activities in the vicinity of Taiwan become more routine, not only does this heighten anxiety in Taipei (and probably other regional capitals as well) but it helps to disguise any preparations for a real military campaign. China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island. If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing. Ms Pelosi’s visit has allowed Beijing to move to a new level of military activity unchallenged, which will make it harder for America to defend Taiwan. No signal of America’s commitment to the island can fix that.

Related research by Mastro

Explore Mastro's research project, "Deterrence and Defense Across the Taiwan Strait"
View project page

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Honor guards prepare to raise the Taiwan flag in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall square.
Commentary

Biden Says We’ve Got Taiwan’s Back. But Do We?

Many will applaud Mr. Biden for standing up for democratic Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats. But he could be putting the island in greater danger, and the United States may not be able to come to the rescue.
Biden Says We’ve Got Taiwan’s Back. But Do We?
An Island that lies inside Taiwan's territory is seen with the Chinese city of Xiamen in the background.
Commentary

The Taiwan Temptation

Why Beijing Might Resort to Force
The Taiwan Temptation
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A Taiwanese F-5 fighter jet is seen after taking off from Chihhang Air Base on August 06, 2022 in Taitung, Taiwan.
A Taiwanese F-5 fighter jet is seen after taking off from Chihhang Air Base on August 06, 2022 in Taitung, Taiwan. Taiwan remained tense after U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to the island as part of a tour of Asia aimed at reassuring allies in the region. China has been conducting live-fire drills in waters close to those claimed by Taiwan in response. | Annabelle Chih/ Getty Images
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Nancy Pelosi’s visit was more pretext than provocation.

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Rhiannon Neilsen

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rhiannon.jpg Ph.D

Dr. Neilsen is an Assistant Professor in International Security at Baruch College, City University of New York (CUNY). She was the Cyber Security Fellow at CISAC from 2022-2024. Her research focuses on new technologies in conflict (specifically cyber, social media, and AI), mass atrocities, dis/misinformation, and the ethics of war. Her published work has appeared in International Affairs, Terrorism & Political Violence, Ethics & International Affairs, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Genocide Studies & Prevention, Lawfare, Just Security, and War on the Rocks. 

Previously, Rhiannon was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Australian National University, a Research Consultant for the Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (ELAC) at the University of Oxford, and a Visiting Fellow at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

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