China’s remarkable aggregation of national power over the past 35 years has been a source of wonderment: to economists, who have been surprised by that country’s consistently high rate of growth; to political scientists, who are at a loss to explain the persistence of authoritarian Communist Party rule despite its more open market order; and to historians, who describe China’s meteoric rise as unprecedented. But to the U.S. national security community, China’s swift climb up the international power ladder has been a source less of wonderment than of increasing concern.

How should America evaluate the risks that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to its current and future interests? It is a crucial question, since sound strategy depends on an accurate assessment of the capabilities and intentions of potential rivals. Significantly underestimating China’s ambitions and its future means to advance them could render the United States strategically vulnerable. Exaggerating those same factors risks an inefficient use of America’s diplomatic, military, and economic resources, while counterproductively stimulating more vigorous PRC investments in hard power than would otherwise be the case.

Much literature has appeared in recent years speculating on future Sino-American cooperation, competition, or conflict. While there is no shortage of theories of international relations to inform conjecture on likely future scenarios, two in particular highlight the sharp contrasts in approach and perspectives that characterize this debate. The first is realism, which assumes an evolving international environment in which fierce competition between leaders and challengers is the norm. The realist dynamic is sometimes called the “Thucydides Trap”, a term inspired by Thucydides’ famous account of the seemingly inevitable conflict between the rising city-state of Athens and the status quo power Sparta as they struggled for dominance of Ancient Greece in the fifth century BCE. Realists who embrace the Thucydides Trap metaphor argue that the risks of hegemonic wars between rising states (such as China) and status quo states (such as the United States) are high. A second and contrasting theory framing this discussion is neoliberalism, which assumes that open-access political systems (which China is not) and market-based economic exchange create opportunities for the realization of positive sum gains between competing powers. Deepening socio-economic interdependence, encouraged and sustained by skillfully designed international institutions, can ensure stability and growing prosperity.

These two perspectives promote very distinct U.S. approaches for dealing with the challenges posed by a rising China. Realists, who believe that states operate in an unsentimental and unforgiving environment, would advise current U.S. leaders to keep ample powder dry, to leverage existing and acquire new allies, and to occasionally accommodate when relevant U.S. interests are much less than those of China. Persuaded that the China locomotive will keep speeding down the tracks in the years ahead, a realist would point to growing U.S.-China friction in the East and South China Seas as the shape of things to come.

Neoliberals would advise the status quo power to maintain the vibrancy and appeal of liberal political-economic norms and institutions in the belief that the contender will find it more advantageous to be a member of a successful club than to start one of its own. More importantly, neoliberals argue that long-term club membership leads to co-option and to an evolutionary change in the contender’s values. Of course, the neoliberal predictions of co-option and an evolutionary change in values are sharply at odds with those of China’s Communist Party, whose leaders envision no evolution concerning its monopoly on political power.

Both Thucydidean realists and neoliberals warn against the adoption of the other’s viewpoint. Realists point out that overly-optimistic predictions of China’s power trajectory could result in a less robust U.S. foreign policy that might encourage PRC aggression, undermine America’s reputation, discourage the commitment of allies, and set conditions for the possibility of a significant strategic setback. Neoliberals counter that too muscular a policy could undercut cooperative efforts at securing optimal agreements between the United States and China that might help improve long-term relations. Moreover, while either side could be correct, both could prove irrelevant if China’s growth slows significantly, seriously weakening its prospects to become a truly formidable challenger.

No matter what the perspectives or underlying assumptions, any useful analysis of this vexing and serious policy dilemma requires a deep understanding of China’s current standing in both regional and global affairs, as well as comprehensive knowledge of the internal and external constraints it faces in trying to realize its long-term ambitions. An effective China policy for the United States is best built on a foundation that is grounded in sober, thorough assessments of the context in which Sino-American relations exist and operate. [...]

The first paragraphs of the article "China's Place in U.S. Foreign Policy" (The American Interest, vol. 10, no. 6) have been reproduced here with permission; access to the full article is available on The American Interest website. 

Karl Eikenberry is a distinguished fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, announced earlier this month.

Writing for NK News, Rob York reviewed Crossing Heaven’s Border (Shorenstein APARC, 2015), a book written by Hark Joon Lee, a South Korean journalist and filmmaker.

A project that began in 2007, the book is a firsthand account of the challenges facing North Korean defectors. Lee, reporting for the Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo, initially published the stories as articles, and later as a documentary on the Public Broadcasting Service in 2009.

“Lee has written a gripping account of his time among the escapees, seeing sights few people will and seeing through a lengthy stint (from 2007 to 2011) in which the possibility of arrest – and even death – were distinctly possible," York writes.

The book, now available in English, details the experiences of North Korean defectors in China as illegal immigrants seeking news lives and in South Korea as new citizens navigating unfamiliar territory, and would-be defectors who remain in North Korea finding ways to survive.

“Lee’s lengthy account…presents a full range of humanity among these refugees,” York writes.

The review is available on the NK News website.

Bioengineering researchers have recently constructed the final steps required to engineer yeast to manufacture opiates, including morphine and other medical drugs, from glucose, drawing significant interest, and concern, from the media and academics in the science and policy fields, including at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).  

“Researchers are getting better at building biology based platforms to create a wide variety of compounds that are difficult, inefficient, or sometimes impossible to create by other means,” Dr. Megan J. Palmer told National Public Radio in the weekly Science Friday segment.

She highlighted how these platforms can enable production of potentially safer, cheaper and more effective drugs. “But one significant concern is if we create the full pathway to go from glucose to this intermediate and then all the way to things like morphine, this could feed into illicit markets and bolster new illicit markets.”

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The media this week has focused on comments by researchers who pointed out that the modified yeast could be used to manufacture heroin, a synthesized version of morphine. The prospect of “home-brewed heroin” has been prominently featured in news coverage.

There are significant concerns, says Palmer, but she cautioned that focusing solely on that possibility could lead to bad policy outcomes.

“There is a big opportunity for researchers, policy makers, and industry to work together to figure out what controls they can put in,” she said in a separate interview. “We have time to get ahead of this problem. We now have choices in how we build and regulate the technology. The challenge for regulatory and technical communities will be to avoid reactive quick fixes. It’s encouraging to see researchers engaging in these issues early on.”

The challenge will be to find ways for researchers, law enforcers, and policy experts to work together to build safeguards into the biology itself as well as into organizations and institutions. 

“We really need to think about security as a design principle,” Palmer said. She hopes to foster thoughtful and rigorous analysis of how the design of biotechnology impacts future governance options.

“This issue highlights beautifully the nexus between public policy and science and technology, which is where CISAC has already, and will continue to make important contributions,” said CISAC Co-Director David Relman. Dr. Relman is also the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University. 

CISAC recently hosted a seminar led by Stanford’s Dr. Christina Smolke that discussed technology advances that are resulting in alternative supply chains for drugs, with particular attention to opiates.

Dr. Smolke is also troubled by the over-emphasis of the risks associated with the potential technology. “I believe it’s inflammatory, biased, and not grounded in an accurate representation of the technology. However, the commentary focuses on the risks of the supply chain and proposes regulations/governance for such a technology, without implementing a process to engage various parties in discussions to thoughtfully assess risks, opportunities, and regulatory needs in this context.”

“I think we need to frame this issue in the context of the larger systemic challenges involving the rearrangements of supply chains enabled through bio-manufacturing and how we spread responsible norms and practices,” Palmer said. “We need to think about governance options in terms of human capacities and technical capacities. What safeguards can we engineer into our technologies, and in turn what safeguards can we build into our organizations and institutions?”