Leading matters is an inspirational stanford tour that reveals how the university is changing and reinventing itself. Designed exclusively for Stanford alumni, family, and friends, Leading Matters is being held in 17 locations that stretch from London to Hong Kong. Speakers include Stanford President John Hennessy, distinguished deans, and faculty. Each event features thought-provoking faculty panels, stimulating seminars, and a state-of-the-art media presentation.

Several FSI faculty members presented their research findings at Leading Matters events in Seattle, San Diego, and Hong Kong, which were sponsored by The Stanford Challenge and the Stanford Alumni Association.

In Seattle, on January 26, FSI faculty led the panel, “Emerging Superpowers: Influence and Supremacy in the 21st Century,” which addressed how the landscape of world power has evolved since the end of the Cold War and what factors contribute to the making of current superpowers.

The panel, moderated by Dean Robert Joss of the Graduate School of Business, included William J. Perry, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor, FSI Senior Fellow, and the 19th secretary of defense; Michael A. McFaul, professor of political science, Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, and director of CDDRL; and Stephen J. Stedman, professor of political science (by courtesy) and senior fellow at CISAC and FSI. Said Perry, on efforts to reduce nuclear arms worldwide, “If we want to end the dangers that nuclear weapons pose to our civilization, we should not be waiting for divine intervention. We ourselves must take the necessary action.”

Rosamond L. Naylor, director of the Program on Food Security and the Environment and Julie Wrigley Senior Fellow, presented as part of the panel, “Big Plans for a Small Planet: Can We Feed the World Without Wrecking the Oceans?” moderated by Dean Pamela Matson of the School of Earth Sciences. Addressing some of the economic and environmental ramifications of the world’s growing dependence on the oceans for food, Naylor said, “Promoting environmentally sustainable fish farming operations requires knowledge of waste flows from open netpens, the ecological impacts of farming on wild fish populations, the economics of farming, and the regulatory Decisive Gifts Enable Summer Fellows Program to Continue with Bold Vision institutions governing the industry. Stanford is unique in integrating all of these factors into its analysis of the aquaculture sector.”

In San Diego, on March 8, Dean Richard Saller of the School of Humanities and Sciences moderated a panel on “Clash of Cultures,” featuring Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations and FSI Senior Fellow; Abbas Milani, Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies, research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution; and Martha Crenshaw, professor of political science (by courtesy) and senior fellow at CISAC and FSI. They explored how cultural differences influence power relations between nations in the post–Cold War world. Said Crenshaw, “Actually, the ‘new’ terrorism is not so different from the ‘old’ in terms of goals, methods, and organization. Terrorism in a variety of forms has occurred in all cultural contexts. What all expressions of the phenomenon have in common is political motivation. Terrorist violence is best understood as politics, not culture.”

In Hong Kong on April 19, President Hennessy and FSI Director Coit D. Blacker addressed the changing balance of power between the U.S., China, and India. Scott Rozelle, Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow, spoke on the panel, “Troubled Waters,” moderated by Dean Pamela Matson. Noting that more than 1.1 billion people have no access to safe or plentiful water, Rozelle addressed implications for global health and economic development.

Asked Rozelle, “Is China facing a water crisis? Some say yes. It could destablize China. It could even push China to ‘starve the world’ by reducing its ability to produce food and force it to turn to international markets, which would push up the cost of food globally. Can Stanford’s research help build ‘bridges’— sound policy bridges — over troubled waters? Should Freeman Spogli Institute researchers be involved in such work? We believe the answer is unequivocally yes. We are getting involved in the solutions to society’s most complicated problems. We are building partnerships with government officials, academics, and community leaders — and most of all the poorest of the poor, in trying to become builders of bridges.”

CISAC science fellow Undraa Agvaanluvsan faces no small task this summer: She has returned to her native Mongolia to help draft first-time legal and security protocols to ensure that the country’s uranium-based nuclear industry develops safely while also attracting international investment. “Our government needs to be prepared to move ahead,” the nuclear physicist said. “Mining needs to be regulated, there need to be laws specific to uranium so that extraction won’t cause a risk to security.”

Mongolia boasts rich uranium reserves and the mining industry contributes to about 25 percent of the country’s economy. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian partners exported Mongolian uranium ore for military purposes to a well-guarded enrichment facility in nearby Angarsk, Siberia, Undraa said. (Mongolians use only one name — Agvaanluvsan is Undraa’s late father’s name.) After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, mining in Mongolia almost stopped. “Today the security concern is completely different,” Undraa said. “It is said that some people even dig uranium, among other minerals, out of the ground with no legal right to do so. They’re called ‘ninjas.’ It’s worrisome and it’s completely unregulated.”

According to Undraa, foreign investors want to develop Mongolia’s uranium mines quickly. “Mining companies may be supportive of nuclear nonproliferation but their main objective is their business bottom-line,” she said. “There is not enough concern for security. The area we’re concerned with — nonproliferation and national security — seems very far from them.”

Since November, Undraa has split her time between CISAC and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where she has worked in the lab’s nuclear experimental group for three years. At CISAC, she has focused on the development of Mongolia’s civilian nuclear industry and how such changes are influencing the country’s fledgling democracy and market economy. Mongolia was a socialist state until a peaceful democratic revolution took place in 1990. The vast, landlocked country, squeezed between Russia and China with a population of 3 million, is now a multiparty capitalist democracy.

Undraa, 35, plans to return to Encina Hall this fall to continue this work with CISAC Co-Director Siegfried S. Hecker and consulting professor Chaim Braun. Under the auspices of the recently established Mongolian-American Scientific Research Center in Ulaanbaatar, the scientist is helping to organize two international conferences in the Mongolian capital this September on uranium mining and nuclear physics. Undraa hopes the conference findings will help her country, a non-nuclear weapons state, develop uranium mining profitably and responsibly.

“Mongolia plans to build a nuclear industry, starting from a zero baseline,” Undraa’s research plan states. “With a clean slate, how should Mongolia develop its uranium industry? What does Mongolia need to do to position itself as a trustworthy, global supplier of uranium?”

“With a clean slate, how should Mongolia develop its uranium industry? What does Mongolia need to do to position itself as a trustworthy, global supplier of uranium?”Undraa also wants to assess whether it makes economic sense for a developing Mongolia to turn to nuclear power or construct high-pressure coal-powered plants, which cost less and are faster to build and operate. She is acutely aware of the effects of climate change — in the late 1990s and early 2000s, millions of livestock across Mongolia’s steppes and deserts died due to harsh winters and summer droughts. “I have family members who lost their nomadic way of life — camels, sheep, goats, cattle died,” she said. “They had to move to the city because there was no point staying in the countryside.” As a result, the population of Ulaanbaatar has soared in recent years, with a parallel increase in pollution from coal fires burned by people living in traditional gers or yurts. “People say the pollution there is worse than Mexico City, worse than Beijing,” the scientist said.

Mining for Mongolia

On the uranium production front, Undraa wants to investigate whether her country should develop its own enrichment plant or collaborate with the Soviet-era facility in Angarsk. AREVA, the French multinational industrial nuclear power conglomerate, also is interested in building a power plant in Mongolia in exchange for raw uranium, she said.

An alterative proposal suggested by Sidney Drell, CISAC founding co-director, and Burton Richter, SLAC director emeritus, would establish a multinational uranium enrichment facility in Mongolia with possible collaboration from Japan, a country with a good track record for nuclear transparency. Such a facility could help meet the demands of growing energy markets in nearby China, India, and South Korea. Undraa said she supports exploring this option, which could bolster Mongolia’s position as a global producer of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. “Mongolia is a democracy with friendly relations with Russia, China, the European Union, Japan, North and South Korea, as well as the United States,” she said during a May 7 presentation at CISAC. “This is a long shot,” Hecker said. “But perhaps an enriched uranium fuel guarantee from Mongolia instead of the United States may be more successful in keeping some countries from building their own enrichment facilities.”

Science as a tool to effect policy

Undraa hopes that her hands-on research at CISAC will help her homeland. “Being from Stanford has given me a platform to talk to the uranium mining people,” she said. “It gives me a right to talk to them as a scientist who is concerned with these global issues.”

The work brings Undraa full circle — as a teenager she wanted to become a diplomat but her father, a coal miner, was pro-western and pro-democratic during the socialist period and he knew that his daughter would face difficulties if she tried to enter the field. He instilled in Undraa what she calls “an American way” of thinking. “I was a very American girl in communist Mongolia in the 1980s,” she said smiling. “What he said was, ‘You’re entitled to have a view, so have a view. You’re entitled to ask questions, so ask questions.’” He also stressed the importance of pursuing education. Undraa took that lesson to heart, excelling in mathematics, then earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees in physics from the National University of Mongolia and a doctorate from North Carolina State University.

In addition to helping Mongolia develop protocols for uranium mining and enrichment, Undraa and her husband, Dugersuren Dashdorj, also a nuclear physicist, and like-minded colleagues such as the country’s foreign minister, Sanjaasuren Oyen — the first Mongolian to earn a doctorate from Cambridge — are considering plans to establish their nation’s first major interdisciplinary research English-language university. The project is representative of Undraa’s drive to make a difference in Mongolia. “We don’t have to be bound by how it has been done in the past,” she said. “We can do it differently. We realize this is not a one-to-two-year project — it will take decades to establish. But one has to start somewhere.”

The recent run-up in global food prices is wreaking well-documented havoc throughout the developing world. As prices for major food staples have doubled or tripled over the past 12–18 months, food riots have broken out in more than a dozen countries, and the president of the World Bank has suggested that the rise in food prices will push 100 million people below the poverty line, undoing decades of economic growth almost overnight. FSE’s Peter Timmer calculates that high rice prices alone could cause the premature death of 10 million people in Asia. It is difficult to imagine an issue of more pressing global importance today.

Ongoing FSE research is focusing on which agricultural adaptations should be prioritized, for what crops, and in what locations.Getting prices down out of the stratosphere of course involves understanding what got them there in the first place. And while there is much disagreement over the primacy of different factors, most analysis seems to agree on three important contributors. The first is the recent expansion of biofuels production in the United States and the European Union, which has diverted corn and other grains from traditional feed and food markets into the production of fuel. Turning grain into fuel has been made increasingly profitable by the high and rising price of oil — the second factor in rising food prices — which, in addition to increasing demand for petroleum alternatives, has raised the production costs of farmers, raising transport costs and increasing the price of farm inputs like diesel and fertilizer. Finally, the agricultural and trade policies of various governments around the world have added to the problem, particularly as the nervous governments of a few key Asian rice exporters have attempted to stabilize domestic food supplies by restricting exports, helping send rice prices through the roof.

As these factors have come together in recent months, underwritten by longer-run trends of rising incomes and food demand in the developing world, many analysts have reached for the appealing metaphor of the “perfect storm,” invoking a situation in which everything that could have gone wrong did. But are things really as bad as they might have been?

Perhaps not. The recent spike in food prices saw only a half-hearted contribution from one of the main culprits in past short-run price swings: weather. A bad weather year that harms production in important producing regions often sends prices soaring. One of the best examples is an extreme el Nino event of the sort that occurs roughly once a decade, during which drought cripples rice production throughout much of Southeast Asia. Earlier work by FSE researchers showed that global rice prices can rise 50 percent or more as a result of extreme el Nino events.

The recent food price spikes were certainly not without influence from the weather. For instance, the much-cited long-run drought in Australia — traditionally a large wheat exporter — certainly has put upward pressure on global wheat prices, and there were modest weather-related declines in yield in other parts of the world (such as Russia and Ukraine). On the whole, however, supply disruptions over the past few years have been minor, and favorable weather is expected to result in record harvests for many large food- and feedproducing nations in coming months. But agricultural markets have hardly responded to this good news and prices remain at or near all time highs.

What then might a perfect storm actually look like? Add the effects of climate change to the current mix of biofuels, high oil prices, and trade restrictions, and the recent rise in food prices could be a small measure of things to come. Research is expanding rapidly in the field of climate change impacts, and researchers at FSE are at the forefront of understanding the implications of climate change for humanity’s ability to feed itself. The conventional wisdom has long been that a modest amount of climate change could actually be beneficial for global agriculture, with warming temperatures perhaps lengthening the growing season and expanding the areas in which we can grow crops. But recent work by researchers at FSE and others suggests that climate change could hurt agriculture immediately and, in some places, severely.

The rise in food prices will push 100 million people below the poverty line, undoing decades of economic growth almost overnight. High rice prices alone could cause the premature death of 10 million people in Asia.In a paper published in the January issue of the journal Science, an FSE research team led by David Lobell examined the likely effects of climate change on agriculture throughout the developing world. Combining data from a suite of climate models that simulate future changes in rainfall and precipitation with a host of historical data on climate and agricultural production, Lobell and colleagues found that by 2030 the production of staple crops in some of the poorest parts of sub- Saharan Africa could decline by 30 percent or more in the absence of adaptation, with somewhat smaller declines predicted for much of South and Southeast Asia. Production declines of this magnitude represent monumental declines in welfare for some of the poorest people on earth, the same populations currently being buffeted by high food prices.

Unfortunately, new evidence also questions the ability of higher latitude countries such as the United States to cover the production shortfalls in the developing world. Again contrary to perceived wisdom, this new work shows that climate change could immediately harm agriculture in this country and other large exporting regions, further constraining global supply. Such a climate-induced supply shock, in the context of the recent developments on the demand side for food, could give us a true perfect storm for high food prices. Recent price spikes might only pale in comparison.

Given the imminence and magnitude of the production decline possible and the attendant possibilities for rising food prices and hunger throughout the developing world, FSE researchers are turning from predicting impacts to assessing adaptation options. In particular, ongoing research is focusing on which agricultural adaptations should be prioritized, for what crops, and in what locations. To that end, FSE researchers recently received a $350,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation — one of the most important funders of agricultural research — to help the foundation prioritize agricultural investments in sub-Saharan Africa in the face of climate change. With the potentially severe impacts of climate change already on our doorstep, there is little time to lose.

By most measures, including Kuwait Petroleum Corporation’s ability to meet its own targets, the enterprise performs poorly.  Many of the problems are traceable to the profound dysfunction and fragmentation of the government, which translate into excessive interference and incoherent governance of the sector.  Government ministers are appointed by the Emir, but then these same ministers face withering scrutiny from the elected National Assembly, encouraging excessively cautious behavior.  Sector strategy reflects the whims of the oil minister, but five different people have held this post since 2000.  Unworkable governance structures inhibit effective strategy and execution: for example, the oil minister may approve a decision in his role as chair of the board of KPC and then overturn it with his ministerial hat on.  Bureaucratic requirements including extreme micromanagement of procurement and a tortuous budget process make it nearly impossible for KPC to run like a normal oil company.  On top of these problematic interactions with government, management and engineering talent within the company itself are generally weak, notwithstanding the presence of some excellent and knowledgeable senior managers.  People are given posts with insufficient experience and knowledge—a reflection of a governance system laden with political interference in the appointment and promotion of personnel and, increasingly, removed from the frontier of the industry.

In recent years these fundamental problems have been disguised by relatively high oil prices.  The small population and large accumulated reserve funds have helped paper over the cracks, and thus these severe problems in the oil sector could persist for a long time without creating a crisis in the country.  At the same time, increasing geological challenges in Kuwaiti fields, popular resistance to more deeply involving international oil companies, and political gridlock that makes it difficult to resolve problems quickly have created a dangerous situation for the sector.  If oil prices slip as the cost basis rises and KPC lags in performance, the problems could unfold quickly in a society where the population has become used to living in a rentier society with extensive and expensive benefits and pension rights.

Small scale power generation technologies (distributed generation) have the potential to significantly contribute to solving the rural electricity access problem in the developing world. This paper presents results from case studies in Brazil (part of a larger three country study) and shows that differences in business models and the influence of institutions are important factors for understanding success and failure in rural electrification and the contribution rural electrification can play in rural development. 

Much existing literature champions renewables implementation on India’s Sagar Island as an unqualified rural electrification success story.  Photovoltaic (PV) and wind systems put in place by the West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA) have clearly brought benefits to many of the island’s residents.

The highly-touted community management system governing the projects has been successful at instilling local pride and overcoming the traditionally thorny problem of tariff non-collection.  At the same time, an on-the-ground look at the Sagar Island experience identifies some deeper liabilities of the business model guiding the renewables projects.  Two of the ostensible strengths of the Sagar Island implementation – the harmonious tariff collection associated with community management and the resources, competence, and assertiveness of WBREDA itself – can at the same time be considered weaknesses limiting the scope, sustainability, and replicability of the projects. 

This working paper considers these questions through a case study of a typical Sagar Island facility, the Mritunjoynagar PV power plant.  It finds that Mritunjoynagar’s inability to recoup its full operating and maintenance costs by providing appropriate incentives for profit maximization limits the expansion of the project and threatens its long-term sustainability, or at least the relevance of its business model in the absence of a highly-visible champion like WBREDA to ensure continued support.  For WBREDA and other agencies to sustain and replicate similar projects—and their attendant benefits—throughout India, they must adjust their economic model, as WBREDA is beginning to implicitly acknowledge in exploring a franchise model for future efforts.

Just look at the number of construction cranes around you and you’ll immediately know that you have landed in a petrostate. What’s special about the Caspian oil giant Kazakhstan is the fact that there are two types of cranes—the idle ones and the busy ones. This becomes nowhere more apparent than in the country’s new capital Astana. The idle cranes stand on private construction sites and the busy ones on public construction sites.

Kazakhstan is probably one of the countries worst hit by the global credit crunch. After years of aggressive borrowing on international markets Kazakh banks have had to pull the plug on many domestic projects after their own cash stream evaporated and it became clear that they would need to settle most of the $14 billion in scheduled principal repayments on external debt this year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been warning about the unsustainability of the ever growing debt ratio for the past two years, but to little avail. Growth rates above 9 percent for the past seven years and great future prospects thanks to ever expanding oil production earned Kazakhstan a credit rating of “stable” from Standard & Poor's rating agency. Now, the bubble burst, the S&P rating turned “negative”, and the private cranes stopped.

The busy cranes—in contrast—run 24/7. No effort is spared to make sure that the fancy new government building, the pavement, the flower-adorned square will be finished in time for the highlight of the year: the birthday of both the President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the capital on July 6 (their 68^th and 10^th, respectively). This simultaneity is no coincident. Astana is largely Nazarbayev’s creation. It was him who anointed the city in the middle-of-nowhere the new capital of the young Republic, who chose its no-nonsense name (“Astana” literally means “capital”), and who caused its population to triple. The upcoming celebrations almost turned into a Nursultan & Nursultan party. If Mr. Sat Tokpakbaye and his fellow parliamentarians had gotten their way, the capital would yet again have undergone a name change—this time to honor its creator more explicitly by endowing it with the President’s first name (there is already an oil field named after him). But out in his modesty, the President declined. With his proposal Mr. Tokpakbayev, achieved the near-impossible: to distinguish himself by loyalty in a Parliament whose members all come from the same Nur-Otan party.

The idle and the busy cranes both stand for different answers to petrostates’ most burning policy question—how to best use the ballooning governmental revenues from the thriving oil and gas sector. Save or spend?—is the 500 billion dollar question (to take the value OPEC earned from net oil export in 2007). Kazakhstan, like 23 other oil and gas producing countries, followed the IMF’s advice and established an oil fund with the goal of sterilizing, stabilizing, and saving governmental oil revenues. The so-called National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK) has accumulated more than $26 billion in the eight years since inception, and the total value of all oil-related funds around the world is estimated to surpass the astronomical sum of $2.300 trillion. While the theoretical logic underlying the creation of oil funds is compelling, their actual track record in achieving macroeconomic stability and fair intergenerational income distribution is more mixed. As a number of recent studies demonstrate (e.g. Shabsigh and Ilahi 2007; Usui 2007), oil funds are no substitute for the strengthening of all institutions involved in the revenue management and budgeting process. Strong expenditure and deficit control mechanisms are indispensable because such richly endowed funds make it easier for the government to borrow money on international financial markets whereby the fund acts--explicitly or implicitly—as a collateral, which in turn undermines the fiscal prudence that the fund was meant to ensure in the first place. More indirectly, the accumulation of large sums of money creates a moral hazard problem also with respect to private sector spending. The temptation is huge for private (and state-owned) companies to take overly risky decisions in the hope that the oil fund will bail them out in case their speculations turn sour. When oil fund assets correspond to more than a quarter of the country’s GDP—as it is the case in Kazakhstan—this temptation is hard to resist. Recent demands by Kazakh banks to dip into the NFRK for alleviating their liquidity problems provide just one case in point, and the national oil company KazMunaiGas may soon follow suit.

However, spending, rather than saving, does not provide a panacea either and is fraught with its very own set of problems.

First, governments of oil rich countries faces a challenge similar to that of rich parents who want to raise their children to become productive members of society. As the US billionaire investor Warren Buffet was once quoted saying: “a very rich person should leave his kids enough to do anything but not enough to do nothing.” Political scientists refer to this concern as the risk of a growing “rentier mentality” (Beblawi 1990), i.e. the tendency of citizens in petrostates to expect the government to solve all their problems rather than relying on their own initiative. The resulting societal dependency may actually suit governments very well since who will bite the hand that feeds him/her? Innovation and entrepreneurship are undermined and undemocratic structures perpetuated. Second, pro-cyclical spending of highly volatile oil revenues results in a series of negative macroeconomic consequences ranging from soaring inflation, exchange rate appreciation, and a further accentuation of the crowding-out of private investments. Finally, a massive explosion in government revenues (e.g. the newly introduced oil export tariff alone is expected to add another $1.5 billion per year) makes it close to impossible for the governmental apparatus to identify and supervise a sufficient number of new spending projects with a satisfactory social return. The floodgates are wide open to white elephant projects, mismanagement, and corruption.

The Kazakh government is acutely aware of this dilemma. Like all other oil producing nations around the world, Kazakhstan is desperately trying to navigate safely between Scylla (saving) and Charybdis (saving). As a possible solution to this dilemma a number of scholars and activists are now proposing the direct distribution of oil revenues to all citizens (and thus the ultimate owners of a country’s natural resource endowment), thereby empowering them to decide for themselves how they want to spend the monetized share of their subsoil assets.

The only real world examples of direct distribution arrangements can be found in the US state Alaska and the Canadian province Alberta. This option has also been proposed for Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003), Iraq (Birdsall and Subramanian 2003; Palley 2003; Sandbu 2006), and Kazakhstan (Makmutova 2008).

While direct distribution arrangements may mitigate some of the problems highlighted above, they have to be greeted with some degree of caution. High levels of corruption and patronage-driven politics not only undermine the effectiveness of top-down development projects but can also jeopardize the fair distribution of oil revenues. Furthermore, even if every entitled citizen does receive his or her share of oil revenues, the long-term impact on a country’s economic development may be small or possibly even negative because of increased inflation and spending on unproductive goods and services imported from abroad. These considerations are not of particular relevance in the two existing examples of direct distribution of oil revenues. Alaska and Alberta both enjoy a relatively good record in fighting corruption and in observing the rule of law. They are both part of a larger, highly developed economy which helps to mitigate inflationary pressure and the risk that citizens will spend most of their additional income on goods imported from abroad. But the picture looks very different in most other oil dependent countries.

One possibility for addressing the risk that directly distributed oil revenues will be spent unproductively is to combine the direct distribution scheme with certain conditions that are intended to encourage citizens to invest in ways that boost their own productivity. This approach has so far not been discussed in academic or policy circles, but the conditional distribution of oil revenues (CDOR) offers the potentials of marrying the merits of two programs that are generally considered to be successful, namely the direct distribution of oil revenues and conditional cash transfer programs employed throughout the world to fight poverty in a more targeted and bottom-up fashion. A whole range of different design options are compatible with this overarching concept. CDOR schemes do not have to adopt the exclusive pro-poor focus of conditional cash transfer programs. In fact, both in Alaska and in Alberta oil revenues are deliberately distributed in an income-blind manner, staying true to the logic that citizens are entitled to a share of oil revenues in their capacity as the ultimate owners of these resources. Also in contrast to most existing conditional cash transfer programs (e.g. Oportunidades in Mexico), the conditions attached to the direct distribution of oil revenues would probably be primarily linked to the use of these revenues rather than some pre-qualifying behavior (e.g. taking infants to regular health check-ups). Eligible spending areas would be selected based on their potential to maximize productivity gains and could include education, health, energy efficiency, start-up capital for small enterprises. Additional design options worth examining include the saving and pooling of CDOR money, which would allow citizens to realize a medium to larger scale common project within the approved spending priorities. For instance, the most promising strategy for greater productivity in Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector lies in the creation of larger units (co-operatives, publicly traded agricultural complexes), and specific incentives may therefore be built into the CDOR scheme to promote such a move away from subsistence farming.

The conditional distribution of oil revenues under any of these design options presents a promising discussion platform for a new initiative the World Bank announced in April 2008—tentatively labeled EITI++. This initiative is meant to help resource rich countries to “manage and transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads the benefits more fairly among their people”, by focusing not only on the transfer of oil revenues from companies to governments (as does the “original” Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) of 2002) but also on the generation, management, and distribution of oil revenues. The transparency mechanism of double disclosure pioneered by EITI could thereby be used to ensure that all citizens receive the share of oil revenues they are entitled to. Transparency could be further enhanced by tools currently developed by the Google Foundation’s Inform & Empower program.

The implementation of the CDOR scheme could build directly upon the experience gained under conditional cash transfer schemes, including the scientific testing of its effectiveness in a randomized experiment setting. The bottom-up development philosophy underlying the conditional distribution of oil revenues ties nicely in with other approaches to strengthen the consumers of public goods and services that have gained currency over the past decade (e.g. vouchers for health and education services).

With this sketch of a conditional distribution of oil revenues scheme in my pocket (and and unconditional love for the kicking baby in my belly) I navigated my way through yet another construction site to see Mr. Kuandyk Bishimbayev, one of Kazakhstan’s young and rising stars (now the head of the so-called “Division of Socio-Economic Monitoring” within the Presidential Administration). During our meeting I got the impression that my enthusiasm for this novel approach to oil revenue management proved contagious, and since my return to Stanford I have rolled out my networking machinery to spread the virus among my academic colleagues. The time is certainly ripe. With oil prices set to remain high for the foreseeable future Kazakhstan and all other petrostates cannot afford to miss this historic opportunity to promote the diversification of their economies and to create the foundation for a future where oil may lose its dominant position to alternative sources of energy.