Over the last several decades, there has been a strenuous debate about policies for economic development between the Washington Consensus promoted by the major international financial institutions and the revisionist political economists . Followers of the former view advocate free and unfettered markets buttressed by institutions to protect property rights. The revisionists argue that development involves social and political processes not adequately captured by the narrow prescriptive focus of the Washington Consensus.

In confronting globalization, there is also a new split among the revisionists themselves. Whereas the Washington Consensus welcomes globalization as a boon to developing countries through expanding the scope of market forces, the revisionists divide over the prospects for developing countries under globalization. The optimists, such as Ernst and Saxenian, see transnational networks as providing opportunities for developing countries to continue to learn the skills and competencies necessary to further their progress. The pessimists of the revisionist camp, such as Stiglitz and Strange, see globalization eroding the capabilities of the state or state-societal alliances necessary for development.

Using the case of technological upgrading (one aspect of economic development) in China's information technology (IT) industry, I demonstrate that opportunities for development exist under globalization. These paths to development are not simply the result of picking the right international networks to join nor are they due to the continued efficacy of state action. They also do not arise from well-developed market institutions within China. China's development success in spite of low levels of state industrial policymaking capacity and very incomplete market institutions tells us that other developing countries similarly unequipped can develop even in this globalized world.

In China's IT industry, two local institutional variables, firm operational strategies and state-firm relations, have interacted with the technology flows present in global networks to create opportunities for certain types of firms to upgrade. A firm's operational strategy (OS) determines its motivation to upgrade in China as opposed to doing so elsewhere. The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance i.e. whether or not they can access functioning financial institutions.

The relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance and these sources of finance in turn impact their ability to upgrade. Sources of finance that provide credit with hard budget constraints give firms incentives to upgrade. Firms have hard budget constraints when they do not receive free help in covering their own financial obligations. With hard budget constraints forcing firms to meet their financial obligations, firms have to remain competitive to survive. For technology firms, a critical part of their competitiveness is their technology so they have every incentive to improve their technologies to keep pace with competitors. Finance that provides credit with soft budget constraints deprives firms of the incentives and even the capabilities to upgrade. Firms have soft budget constraints when they do not have to pay for some or all of their financial obligations themselves. These firms can rationally expect to survive even if not competitive because others are willing to bail them out. A third possibility is no source of finance. Firms without financing will not be able to invest in technological development.

There are four types of firms in China: the favored domestic firms, the neglected domestic firms, the hybrid foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and the regular FIEs. Financing and motivation have varied across firm categories. Due to different state-firm relations, FIEs rely on foreign finance and domestic firms do not. Hybrid FIEs differ from regular FIEs because the hybrids have a China-based operational strategy. This operational strategy (OS) is a mix of interests and ideational factors that causes these firms to perceive China either as the vital center of their operations (the China-based OS) or as just another location among many (the non-China-based OS). Thus, variation in firm-state relations (finance) and operational strategy (motivation) determine the variation in technological upgrading.

This thesis finds that the two types of FIEs are more likely to contribute to upgrading in China than the two types of domestic firms. Among the FIEs, the hybrid FIEs are more likely to contribute than the regular FIEs though the discrepancy is not as large as it is between the FIEs and domestic firms.

The hybrids are the most successful upgraders because they have both disciplined finance (i.e. credit with relatively hard budget constraints) from foreign financial institutions and the motivation to upgrade in China due to their China-based OS. The unsuccessful domestic upgraders lack finance (neglected domestic firms) or financial discipline (the favored domestic firms) due to their particular relationships to the state. The regular FIEs have the capabilities to upgrade due to their financial discipline and access to transnational technology networks, but undertake less upgrading in China than the hybrids because they lack the China-based operational strategy.

The 2005-06 Academic Year got off to an exciting start for the European Forum. Following the recent terror attacks in Madrid and London, the Forum plans to be organizing a variety of events on the manners in which European countries and institutions are facing the threat of terrorism. In the first weeks of the Fall Quarter the European Forum hosted several European politicians, academics and authors. On October 12 John Bruton, European Union Ambassador to the United States and former Prime Minister of Ireland (1994-97), presented his views on Europe and the United States as global partners in a fascinating lecture for a crowd of about 100 faculty and researchers.

Earlier during the Fall term the European Forum was honored to welcome Latvian Foreign Affairs Minister Artis Pabriks. On September 21 he gave a lecture on Latvia's current challenges in foreign policy and homeland security, and answered questions on Latvia's relations with the United States and its position within the European Union.

During a visit to Stanford on October 4 German sociologist Heinz Bude, from the University of Kassel, presented his views on the most recent German elections from a broad, societal and historical perspective, paying attention to the 1968 student uprisings and their long-term impact on German society. Later on in October Christian Deubner, from the CEPII research center in Paris, shared his opinions on current developments in French politics, with a focus on the French rejection of the EU Constitution earlier this year and its impact on France's position in the EU.

On October 26 German author Peter Schneider offered his reflections on the cultural differences between Europe and the United States. He compared the relationship between the two continents to a marriage that has its ups and downs, but endures. In a seminar on November 3 Josef Joffe, Editor of the German newspaper Die Zeit, pointed at cultural, demographic, political and economic reasons to argue that the European Union is not about to become a new superpower. Both events drew much attention and a large audience from the Stanford community.

Later on in November there will be talks on the effects of the Europeanization of the holocaust on the attitudes toward Jews (November 16), by Werner Bergmann from the Technische Universität Berlin; and on Poland's current economic dilemma's (November 17), by Wojciech Bienkowski, from the Warsaw School of Economics.