International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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On February 26, the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) was pleased to host Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat for a talk on his new book, The Art of Diplomacy. Eizenstat’s distinguished career in Washington, spanning five decades, included his work as a former ambassador to the European Union and as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. He spoke with Stanford faculty and students about the importance of diplomacy and the dangers of isolationism. Drawing from personal experience and examples from close colleagues such as Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, Eizenstat identified the attributes and strategies necessary for diplomacy. Leaders engaged in diplomacy require “unsympathetic empathy,” courage, and intellect. They must know the other side’s history and culture, come to negotiations prepared, and possess stamina — both mental and physical — for months-long or years-long negotiations.

Eizenstat shared how his connection to Israel has inspired some of his teaching. He described how Jimmy Carter’s incremental progress and knowledge of his fellow negotiators allowed him to drive the Camp David Accords. In his stories about the Oslo Accords, he also highlighted the utility of back channels in negotiations.

Outlining the role of leverage in diplomacy, Eizenstat noted that whereas positive leverage involves giving the other side what they want, negative leverage includes actions such as sanctions and military support. He argued that sanctions are ineffective in the current era and that military force should come as a last resort. Offering analyses of the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the war in Gaza, Eizenstat described successful and unsuccessful uses of war in diplomacy. If resorting to war, leaders must prioritize national interests, stay equipped to change their plans, have good intelligence, understand local alliances and advantages, and establish post-war strategies.

During the question and answers portion of the seminar, Eizenstat spoke about deterrence, credibility, and strategic decision-making in international conflicts, referencing Obama's red line in Syria, Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis strategy, and the current situation in Ukraine. He also emphasized the roles public opinion and public pressure play in diplomacy, noting that they are far more powerful in democracies.

You can listen to the audio of Ambassador Eizenstat's presentation below:

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Eugene Kandel on Tackling Israel’s Internal Existential Risks

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Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat discusses diplomacy during a seminar hosted by the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program.
Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat discusses diplomacy during a seminar hosted by the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program.
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In a seminar hosted by the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program, Eizenstat explored why diplomats succeed or fail, drawing from his firsthand experience with world leaders.

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China is rapidly gaining influence and power on the global stage, and if the United States wants to stay ahead, Oriana Skylar Mastro believes Washington need to fundamentally rethink its understanding of Beijing's geopolitical strategy. She joined host Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast to discuss how America can counter an "upstart" great power.

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other major podcast platforms. A full transcript of the episode is also available.

Oriana Skylar Mastro's latest book is Upstart: How China Became a Great Power, published by Oxford University Press.



TRANSCRIPT:


McFaul: You’re listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. We bring you in-depth expertise on international affairs from Stanford's campus straight to you. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of the Freeman Spogli Institute.

Today I'm joined by Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Center Fellow here at FSI, an active member of the United States Air Force Reserve, in fact, a recently promoted officer of the Air Force Reserve, and Deputy Director of Reserve Global China Strategy at the Pentagon. Oriana combines all that expertise in her latest book called Upstart, How China Became a Great Power.

I strongly advise you to buy this book. I don't care if you read it, but I want you to buy it now. In all seriousness, I've read lots of books on China in recent years. This is one of the best. It's one-stop shopping for all you need to know about China. It examines China's climb to great power status through a careful mix of strategic emulation, exploitation, and entrepreneurship on the international stage.

So Oriana, let's get right to it. Let's talk about Upstart. So, Upstart sounds like a Silicon Valley topic. Tell us about the title and tell us why you decided to write this book.

Mastro: Maybe I'll start with why I decided to write the book because it leads into the title. In my academic work and in my policy work, looking at how China was building power, the conventional wisdom was the same. Academics called it something a little fancier, but it was basically mirror imaging. There were a lot of arguments being made.

McFaul: What was the academic words? I'm curious.

Mastro: Oh, Kenneth Waltz, like, “emulation,” diffusion” . . .

McFaul: Got it, got it, got it, okay.

Mastro: Kenneth Waltz argued that success breeds the same type of competitive tendencies. Meaning, if you want to be a great power, if you're China in the 1990s, the way to do it is to act like the United States.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: You go into the policy world and you see the same exact things. Constant arguments about, Is China going to build overseas bases? Is China going to, you know, have a military the same as ours? that were all basically predicated on the understanding that they wanted to mirror image the United States.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: As a China specialist, I'm a political scientist, I'm also doing this policy work, but I'm also a China specialist. And I speak Chinese, I spend a lot of time in China. And on the surface, it just didn't really make any sense. Like, why would China do exactly what we do? How would that make them competitive?

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: And it really was an introduction in my life to literature on competition from business and management. Partially being in Silicon Valley inspired that, and partially it's because the rise and fall of great powers is very rare, but the introduction and destruction of companies is actually very frequent.

McFaul: Good point.

Mastro: So I discovered this whole other literature on, how are you competitive in trade and in commerce? And a lot of the arguments about competitive advantage, about being entrepreneurial, innovative, trying to find a different way of doing things, really resonated with how I saw China. And so that's what sparked the original idea. It takes writing a whole book to try to convince people that there is very strong evidence and a logical argument for why we have to look at this situation differently than past historic cases of rising powers.

McFaul: Dig into it a little bit. Give us some examples, especially about military power, which is your strong suit. And then if we have time, we'll talk about economic power. So, give us some examples of the “upstart strategy.”

Mastro: So the upstart strategy has three components: emulation, entrepreneurship, and exploitation. Now the first one is based on the conventional wisdom, right?

China does emulate some aspects of U.S. power, but the book tries to evaluate the conditions under which they do so. When are we most likely to see them take the old strategies, whatever the United States is doing, and apply it in the exact same area? That's my definition of emulation.

McFaul: Okay.

Mastro: And they tend to do this when it's reassuring to the United States. So think of examples like engaging in free trade, joining international institutions. In the military realm, they started to participate in humanitarian aid and disaster relief campaigns. They started to participate in peacekeeping operations, right? They're the number one contributor to PKOs on the Security Council of the United Nations.

And so they did decide to do certain things that they thought, Listen, this will help us build power — mediation diplomacy is a great example, helping to mediate between different countries when they're engaged in conflicts —it helps us build power and it makes us look good and it makes the United States calmer about our rise. Because one of the main reasons why you don't want to act exactly like the United States, is that actually could seem very threatening, right?

If you're trying to build the exact power the United States has, it would be very easy for people in the United States to say, Hey, wait a minute, what's going on here?

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: Right? And the example I give, if China built overseas bases, like our network of 120 bases, we would have seen that a lot differently than what they ended up doing, which was the Belt and Road Initiative, like economic policies. So those are in the emulation category.

For military power, most of them are about reassurance. And then there's a few times where they have such a competitive advantage and this area of power is so important that even though there's a downside in terms of how the U.S. will perceive it, they go for it anyway.

So, an example in the military realm is building what we call C4ISR network, or Command Control Computers Communication Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance, which in the most simple way...

McFaul: That's what — ISR, you just spelled out the acronym, right?

Mastro: Yeah, right.

McFaul: Thank you.

Mastro: So in the most simple sense, it's building a space architecture.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: Having their own navigation systems, having their own precision timing, you know. So, they realized that was really important for the nature of warfare. They needed it. The United States might not like it, but it was just so necessary. And because their engineers are cheaper, because they're actually really advanced in certain missile technologies, they knew they would have an advantage there.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So that's emulation. Exploitation is when they use the U.S. strategy, but in an area where the United States isn't competing. There's disincentives to do it directly. And this largely could be because of competitive advantages. So one area is like arms sales, Chinese arms sales around the world. China really only sells arms to countries that cannot buy them from the United States. Either because they're under some sort of human rights arms embargo, they’re poor countries that are not strategically relevant enough to be gifted arms by the United States, so the Bangladeshes of the world get a lot of their military equipment from China.

McFaul: Because they're too poor? I did not know that.

Mastro: Yeah, well, Chinese stuff is a lot cheaper. Now, there's some countries who are poor that still have U.S. stuff, but that's because we've decided, like . . .

McFaul: They're important.

Mastro: They're important for strategic reasons, so we have gifts and loans and things. And then there's certain technologies that because of treaty obligations, the United States wasn't exporting. And this is how China got sort of a stronghold in the market on unmanned systems, for example. On the diplomatic side, elite visits, right? A Chinese leader like Xi Jinping makes as many overseas visits as a U.S. president, but they go to fundamentally different places, right?

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: The U.S. president is mainly going to the UK, Germany, Japan, Australia. Chinese president is visiting Africa.

McFaul: A lot.

Mastro: A lot! So Xi Jinping has visited three times more countries than President Obama did, and President Obama visited more African countries than any previous U.S. president. He also goes to the poorest countries in the world, the 70% of the poorest African countries Xi Jinping has been to, that no U.S. president has ever been to. So it's kind of filling in those gaps.

And then the military realm, for those of you out there with military background, the example that's just perfect for this is something we refer to as A2/AD, or the Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy.

What is that? Very simply put, China deliberately evaluated the types of things the United States needs to project power, and then they developed specific capabilities to target those. So things like the aircraft carrier. So China developed a missile designed to hit and sink an aircraft carrier, right? Or a need to refuel because our bases are far away, you know, or blinding satellites because we need satellites more because we don't have the home-court advantage.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So in the military realm, this exploitation strategy is very strong.

And the last category, entrepreneurship, is when they do something completely different. And this, I would say, is the most controversial aspect of the book. I briefed it to a lot of military audiences. Just on Friday I got a note that a four-star wanted my address to send me a letter about the book. And I'm like, Is this– I don't know if it's going to be like I loved your book or it's gonna be like I hate everything you say about the following chapters, because it is a Navy admiral.

So I imagine that they're sensitive about, one, my argument that China is not seeking an overseas basing network despite all the concerns over the past 20 years that they're, you know, they're on the cusp and they're going to build when they're going to build one. One of the reasons China sometimes does things differently from the United States is that they think U.S. strategy is stupid. So, one of the parts of the argument is trying to look at how China might change in the future. And it's important, the rationale.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So the book looks at thousands of Chinese . . .

McFaul: Startups are not always startups, right? They get old, and…

Mastro: . . . They evolve. This book relies on thousands of Chinese sources to also evaluate the rationale of why they chose certain strategies. So you could imagine if they chose a strategy because they were weaker or didn't have an advantage, as they get more powerful, they might start emulating.

But this is an aspect when they're like, you know, the war in Afghanistan cost the equivalent of ten Belt and Road Initiatives. Why would we be engaged in sort of foreign military intervention, which tends to go hand in hand with these overseas basing networks, when we can achieve our goals better with economic and political means of power? And that's outside of Asia. China does clearly want to dominate Asia militarily, but they don't need bases for that because they have China.

So, that's one of those arguments that says this is not for lack of ambition. Of course, they will have certain military roles in some places. We'll probably see some more intelligence gathering, you know, sensors being put places, but not offensive combat operations.

And the second very controversial one is about China's nuclear forces. And I had a follow-up piece in The Economist last month by invitation to talk about China's nuclear arsenal. China has, basically, since 1964, every aspect of their approach to nuclear weapons has been different than the United States: posture, doctrine, readiness, delivery systems, number of nuclear weapons, structure of the organization for nuclear weapons.

I mean, besides the initial decision to build them for the sake of nuclear deterrence, nothing has been the same. And part of that, again, is about inefficiency arguments, that China never understood why the United States needs thousands and thousands and thousands of them. And from a competitive point of view, up until the mid 2000s, the United States spent more on its nuclear weapons than China spent on its whole military.

McFaul: Wow.

Mastro: So, one of the reasons they've been able to get this conventional power that people like me write very openly about being concerned of, right? I'm not as concerned about their nuclear weapons. But, I'm absolutely concerned about the tipping of conventional power in China's favor. They've been able to do that by not overspending on nuclear weapons.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So there's a lot of debate right now because they're increasing their numbers. They used to just have like 200 and 320. There's a debate right now about whether or not they're going to push up to 1,000 or 1,500 in the next 10 years. But even so, I sort of argue that there's other reasons for that, dealing with advancements in technology and changes in U.S. doctrine that has made them concerned that their deterrent has weakened.

McFaul: Their nuclear deterrent has weakened.

Mastro: Their nuclear deterrent has weakened. And so they still have the same sort of minimal deterrent posture that they've had before. So that hasn't changed. But those are kind of the two most controversial entrepreneurial areas that I discuss in the book on the military side.

McFaul: So, if you had the chance to . . . in fact, I learned this term from military folks when I worked in the government: the BLUF, right? “Bottom line up front”. Really great phrase for all people having to do briefings.

But if you got, say, 45 seconds with President Trump, and he asked you, Lieutenant Colonel - can I call you that now?

Mastro: Yeah, sure. Yeah.

McFaul: Lieutenant Colonel Mastro. He probably wouldn't call you Dr. Mastro, but Lieutenant Colonel Mastro.

Mastro: He'd probably be like, “Hey lady!”  But, yeah. Yeah.

McFaul: Congratulations on being Lieutenant Colonel, by the way. That's a fantastic achievement. But if he just asked, What's the balance of military power between the United States and China today? How could you answer that in 45 to 60 seconds?

Mastro: I would say that we're outgunned in Asia. We have the advantage everywhere else. We're deterring China from a large-scale protracted war.

But the problem is in conflicts close to China, in particular over Taiwan, the United States is outgunned. And we need to put more bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles closer into China, which means we have to be nicer to countries in the region because they have to agree to let us put that stuff there. And we have to reform the defense industrial complex so that we can innovate in those areas, in particular land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles, and be able to produce them in mass in a cost-effective way.

McFaul: Fantastic answer. You know how to do this. I can tell.

Mastro: You usually get more than 45 seconds, but sometimes they get right to it.

McFaul: You hit it, I saw it. Now we have a little more time to dig into that. Because that was a very profound thing you just said. Take us through the pieces that you think are inadequate. And then let's talk about whether the Trump administration will begin to realize those solutions. But first, just articulate the threat posture that — you had three big buckets there — maybe more, but I heard three. Tell us a little more in detail about what is alarming about that balance of power in Asia to you?

Mastro: So, if you can humor me, right before I do that, I just want to really hammer home a point that I said in that answer, that I feel is clouding some of the debates among policy experts and academics, okay?

McFaul: Please.

Mastro: Which is, we are adequately deterring China from engaging in a large-scale war with the United States. So people are always like, China doesn't want to fight a war with the United States and all of our allies and partners. And, the economic costs will be huge. And it's like, yes, but that is not what people in the defense department are worried about. We're not worried that tomorrow China attacks the United States and we're fighting World War III.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: What we're worried about is that there are certain aspects of contingencies like Taiwan that they can move and gain, in this case, control over Taiwan before the U.S. military can come in mass. Okay? And the coming in mass is just a more diplomatic way of saying, Before we can really start blowing things up. So, let me just start with that because what people say . . .

McFaul: That's very important. I'm glad you did that. Yeah.

Mastro: It's very important because it's not the case that I think, like, China's like, gunning for whatever. Or, I do a lot of media interviews when I'm walking my kids to and from school and once my four year old was like, “Does the United States lose all the wars that we fight?” after they hear me on the phone, I'm like, “Mom did not say that!”

What I'm saying is that there's this particular scenario, and if China initiates conflict, they're going to initiate it when it's most favorable to them.

So the problem is, the United States, we have forces close to Taiwan, right? In Japan, for example. But there are so few of them that if we actually mobilized them after the immediate attack on Taiwan, for example, they're not survivable. Which, again, is the military diplomatic speech of saying everyone is going to die.

And if that were credible, if China thought we were going to do that, then they're in the major war with the United States, right? They’ve just killed thousands of Americans. So, that doesn't become appealing. But the logic is, most U.S. presidents are not going to send in those forces — in this case, it's mainly air power — when they're all going to die. And then we also lose in this sort of exchange about 70% of our most advanced aircraft? Which means then, now we're transitioning to that major war with China. It's like, we're not in a great position.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So we have stuff there, but we don't have enough. The question is like, what does enough mean? Very simply, you gotta keep the ships that are carrying the people across the strait from landing on Taiwan. And so, I'm kind of a broken record on this with the military when people are always like, “Well I'm contributing to deterrence. You know, I'm doing this dance, I'm doing this messaging.” Or even certain weapon systems like, well, you know, “I got this tank . . .”

I'm like, if it does not sink ships, I do not care. Right? Because then you're in this realm of cost in which people say they're trying to deny China the objective of Taiwan, but really it's like, well, I could sink a ship or two. And I'm like, well, when you got thousands of them, you know, one or two is not going to do it.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So the thing I laid out, basically, are designed to sink a lot of ships quickly. Submarines, the United States has the advantage undersea still. There's an apocryphal story that I talk about in my book that when they devised that strategy to target the key platforms of the United States in the 1990s, the Navy, for some odd reason, was changing their patrolling schedule. So the submarines just weren't patrolling them.

And so when China was like, we got to get the aircraft carriers, we got to get the satellites. We got to hit the fixed bases where the aircraft are taking off. They just didn't think of the submarines, you know? So that's the story. I don't know how true it is, but that's the apocryphal story.

So we have, full reign with submarines. The problem is we just don't have a lot of them.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: And then the munitions they carry, they can only sink a few ships. And then we have no capability to replenish them in the region. So they have to go all the way back to Guam or Hawaii. So I talk about tenders, submarine tenders, a lot of military personnel being like, I need that stuff and I need it in the Philippines and Japan. Like, that's where we need it.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: And then the bombers are very controversial because those are an offensive capability that are designed to penetrate into China and bomb mainland targets. Mike, we're just throwing it out there. That's what they do.

McFaul: That’s what they do.

Mastro: That's important because the biggest threat are all the missiles that China is going to be shooting at us.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: Missile defense on the back end is hard, like missiles coming towards you. It's a lot easier if you just took out the launcher where it's coming from.

And so that's really what that is about. Like, okay, if we're going to stop all these missiles from being shot at Taiwan, from being shot at our carriers, from being shot at our bases that we need to operate, we're going to have to get in there, we're going to have to take care of it, and that's where the strategic bombers come from.

And then the last component was the land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: Missiles are a lot cheaper than everything else. Because they're land-based, they tend to be more powerful, more precise. There is a deterrent against China, just a little bit more, because they have to attack the country where the missiles are based.

McFaul: Right. Good point.

Mastro: That's an additional thing that imposes caution on them. So yeah, those are the things that I would want more than anything else. And I really believe that if we put those things in place and so China couldn't do this quickly, the two-and-a-half to three weeks that they might consider, that they'll never do it.

And then this problem will just persist forever, but at least we won't fight a hot war over it. So that's why I really focus on some of those issues and focus on just understanding that China sees a lot of things differently than we do. So, that's what really the book… the heart of the book is about convincing people to keep an open mind about how they're understanding and interpreting Chinese actions so that we can be more entrepreneurial ourselves about how to deal with great power competition.

McFaul: That's a great point. Your recommendations are crystal clear. Who is listening in the Trump administration? And I mean that as our last question.

Don't talk about the specifics, but at the end of the Trump administration, as you know better than I, they focused pretty heavily on diagnosing the China threat. And they put out all sorts of speeches. And Secretary Pompeo did this big long paper about the threat.

It's a little curious to me, and it's only a few weeks, of course, so let's give them time, but it's a little curious to me how we're focused on a lot of other things besides what you just described so far.

Is that unfair or is it too early? And what do you expect in the coming weeks and months in terms of the Trump administration doing some of the things that you just outlined?

Mastro: Well, I think the fact that it's been quiet, I'm very hopeful.

McFaul: Mmm. Explain that, that's good!

Mastro: Because generally speaking, you want the experts to have the space to do the things they need to do. And I see a lot of those policies being driven by some of the domestic political stuff. Like we know tariffs is not going to help anyone get their jobs back, but the people who voted for President Trump believe that.

And so when you say, Who is listening? I mean, this is one of the main reasons that 15 years ago I enlisted in the military, when I was doing my PhD at Princeton, is because people explained to me the pathways that academics could be influential.

And I thought, Okay, so I could write an op-ed and hope someone read it and hope they did this. Or I could go into government, which is a great pathway, but as a woman who, I knew I wanted to have children, the in and out of government thing could be disruptive to the move, and I didn't want to wait 10 to 15 years before I got to do anything interesting.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: So, for me, there are people listening. I feel like I do have the ear of some pretty important people. And then, as someone who works in the system, I make changes directly.

So I get to see, here's the national defense strategy. It's done. Here's our war plan. It's done. Here's our force posture, our force modernization. I get to physically just go in there and change it and then hope no one notices and changes it back.

But that's how I tend to focus on my influence. And as long as the Trump administration, the more they stay out of that space, the easier it will be, I think, for us to devise good effective strategies.

So if you have that top level of support, and respect for the expertise of the people in the building, which I think we've seen some signs that maybe that's going to be a problem, you know, we'll give them the benefit of the doubt. They respect their military advisors and that expertise. Then we can really make some advancements.

My biggest concern is that we're going to upset a lot of other countries in the region. And Biden made a lot of improvements in our force posture by getting countries to agree to certain things, in particular, Japan and the Philippines and Australia and some second island, you know, Pacific Islands, that if that's reversed, it's going to make it harder for us to deter China.

So I just hope that . . . the way I articulate it to people who have some of those more isolationist views, or unilateralist views, is like, this isn't about your love for this other country or even about multilateralism or legitimacy. If you want the United States to be powerful and that you want to do whatever you want, you need to have these countries willing to host you.

Hopefully they won't disrupt those relationships too much. But on the other hand, they're not as worried about provoking China, which a lot of my recommendations, like with the bombers or something, previous administrations might be like, Oh, I don't know, that might be a little touchy.

McFaul: Right.

Mastro: But maybe with the Trump administration, they're like, yeah, get in there, what you need to get in there. So there could be some pros and there could be some cons, but I think it takes this type of academic research is important because then we can really stand from a position of knowledge and authority and confidence, when you're making arguments that are controversial that people might push back on, that, at least I believe they better inform policy.

So, I stick to them even when people try to push back in more emotional ways about stuff. I think that is really the role of the academic practitioner, and I hope this book serves that purpose.

McFaul: Well, that's one of the most optimistic things I've heard in the first weeks of the Trump administration. As long as they're not talking about the issue, that's a good sign, not a bad sign.

And we can't see what you write for the Pentagon and inside the Pentagon and who you brief, but we can read your book, and everybody should. It's called Upstart: How China Became a Great Power. Thanks for talking with us about some of the ideas here. And I encourage everybody to go out and get this book.

Mastro: Thank you, Mike.

McFaul: Thanks for being here.

You’ve been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a review. And be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts, to stay up to date on what’s happening in the world and why.

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At the Nikkei Forum, Freeman Spogli Institute scholars Oriana Skylar Mastro, Michael McFaul, Gi-Wook Shin, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui considered the impacts of the war in Ukraine, strategies of deterrence in Taiwan, and the growing tension between liberal democracy and authoritarian populism.
Stanford Experts Assess the Future of the Liberal International Order in the Indo-Pacific Amid the Rise of Autocracy, Sharp Power
Steven Pifer on World Class podcast
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Assessing Europe's Security After Three Years of War in Ukraine

Steven Pifer joins Michael McFaul on World Class to discuss how America's relationship with Ukraine and Europe is shifting, and what that means for the future of international security.
Assessing Europe's Security After Three Years of War in Ukraine
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Drawing from her book "Upstart," Oriana Skylar Mastro joins Michael McFaul on World Class to discuss what the United States is getting wrong about its strategy toward China, and what America should do differently to retain its competitive advantage.

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Three years into Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine remains a sovereign democracy. But changes in the U.S. and shifts in the international security landscape could drastically impact the trajectory of the war and Ukraine's future. Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center on Security and International Cooperation and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, joins Michael McFaul to discuss what's been happening and how it may affect Kyiv, Europe, and the world order more broadly.

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other major podcast platforms. A full transcript of the episode is also available.



TRANSCRIPT:


McFaul: You’re listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. We bring you in-depth expertise on international affairs from Stanford's campus straight to you.

February 24th marks the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It's a horrific, tragic day. There's a lot of uncertainty right now in Ukraine and among its friends and allies about what the future is going to bring.

There's a lot of pressure right now on President Zelenskyy to negotiate. There’ a lot of concern in Europe over what might happen over the negotiations between the United States and Russia, something that has not happened in three years, and a lot of unanswered questions more generally about America's future leadership in the world and especially in Europe.

And so we could not be luckier than to have Steve Pifer, an affiliate with the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Europe Center here at FSI to be with us today.

Steve not only is a former ambassador to Ukraine, but has spent three decades of his career in diplomacy working on European issues. And is one of the most prolific commentators. I have to say, Steve, it's hard to keep up with you and all your writing. Most people after they retire from the Foreign Service slow down. It seems like you are speeding up. But maybe that has to do with the events that are happening in Europe that require that.

So thanks for coming on our program today, Steve.

Pifer: Thanks for having me, Mike.

McFaul: So originally we were going to have a conversation to start with takeaways from the Munich Security Conference. But so much has happened since that event, which is literally only six days ago, by the way. The negotiations in Saudi Arabia, the trolling between President Trump and response to President Zelenskyy.

Steve, just start at some kind of basic assessment: where do we stand right now in terms of the alleged peace negotiations that have been started? And I'll let you characterize it in any way you want to. Take stock of where we are at right now.

Pifer: Well, Mike, let me just actually step back first and make a couple of observations.

One is: on February 24, 2022, I would not predict we would be having any kind of conversation like this.

McFaul: Great point.

Pifer: Nobody, virtually, expected the Ukrainians to last militarily. Had you asked me, I thought that the Russians would win the force-on-force fight. And then in 2025, what we would be seeing would be a very bloody insurgency by Ukrainians against Russian occupying forces.

McFaul: Right, right.

Pifer: So I think it's a real testament to the Ukrainian military, Ukrainian resilience, that the Ukrainian military is still very active in the field. Even last year in 2024, I have to say the Russians had the momentum. But in that period, over the entire year, they captured maybe 1,500 square miles of Ukrainian territory. That's less than 1% of Ukraine's land.

And they did that at enormous cost. At some points, they were losing 2,000 troops a day, dead and wounded. The British Ministry of Defense now estimates that more than 800,000 casualties on the Russian side. And I'm not saying that Ukraine is winning, but the idea that Russia is on the verge of a great victory, I think, is overblown.

McFaul: Great point to start with. I'm glad we started with that. And I share your assessment. I remember three years ago, I remember talking to you three years ago and the assessments we all had and here we are three years later and it hasn't happened.

Pifer: Yeah. And again, that's a credit to the Ukrainians.

You know, a lot's happened in the last two weeks. I have to say I am thoroughly disappointed in the efforts by the Trump administration to try to broker a solution and this unseemly rush to try to re-engage Vladimir Putin, which I think is a mistake.

I mean, if you look back, there have been, think, three or four wins for Putin in the last 10 days. One is you had Secretary Hegseth in Europe and then the president saying, “Well, Ukraine can't expect to hold onto its territory and Ukraine get into NATO.”

Now, whether or not that's realistic, why are senior officials and the American president saying that when we're going to try to broker a solution? We've already at the beginning made a big lean towards the Russian position.

Then you have President Trump calls Putin and announces he's going to have not one, but several meetings with Putin, breaking with a policy with the Western leaders for the last three years that you do not engage Putin.

The next day he says, let's bring Russia back into the G7 to make it the G8 again.

McFaul: Oh my goodness, I even forgot about that one!

Pifer: If you had a vote right now, I think Trump would lose six to one on that.

McFaul: But he did offer it, yes.

Pifer: And then Secretary Rubio goes to meet with Lavrov. So that looks like that's four pretty big wins for Russia. And I can't see a single thing that the United States has received in return.

And then I would just add, I mean, this unseemly haste to engage Putin, I think Putin looks at this and says, I'm dealing with somebody — Trump — who is very weak. I'm just going to sit back and wait for more concessions. I think they've gotten off to a very bad start that's going to make it much harder to achieve their goal if their goal is to try to broker a just and durable settlement between Russia and Ukraine.

McFaul: Steve, why do you think this is happening the way it is? Let's talk about Trump and then we'll talk about Putin and Zelenskyy separately, but how do you explain it?

Pifer: Trump going back for 10 years has this inexplicable affinity for Putin. You're very hard pressed in the last 10 years to find examples where Trump has criticized Putin or Putin's actions. That's hard to understand because Putin's committed a lot of actions in the last 10 years which deserve to be criticized.

Someone suggested maybe there's a grand chess strategy here. And the idea is perhaps to throw Ukraine under the bus and back away from Europe to peel or to basically cultivate Putin so you could somehow peel Russia away from China, given the administration's focus on China.

But I think that grossly misunderstands the depth of the relationship between Xi and Putin and how dependent Russia is on China now.

McFaul: Yeah.

Pifer: So if that's the objective, I think it's going to fail. But otherwise, if it's not by design, then it simply is incompetence or, as one Republican senator said — he's a bit more diplomatic saying — “rookie mistakes.”

McFaul: Let's just pull on this thread a little bit because first of all, he's not a rookie. He was president for four years. And second, it seems more by design, right?

It seems like he just wants to make a go at a peace treaty. He doesn't really care about the contours of it. Most certainly doesn't care about Ukraine. And then just walk away or is there a bigger deal that he's trying to get?

So one, as you pointed out, might be this China play. And I completely agree with your assessment; that is going to be a loser. If you're Vladimir Putin, you're going to break up the most important relationship you have in the world to take a gamble on President Trump, who then might not be in power in four years time?

Pifer: Exactly.

McFaul: So that makes no sense to me at all. But what about like, maybe there's some kind of economic deal that somehow Trump thinks getting closer to Putin might be good for the United States?

Pifer: Well, reportedly that when Secretary Rubio was in Saudi on the Russian delegation was this Russian oligarch who talked about, I think he said hundreds of billions of dollars that American businesses had lost by not being in Russia over the past three years.

McFaul: Yeah. By the way, his name is Kirill Dmitriev. I used to know him. Has a degree from Stanford and Harvard, by the way. Very savvy guy who runs their investment fund.

But that's a good point. He did say that, and the fact that he was on the delegation is kind of strange too, isn't it?

Pifer: It's very strange. But his numbers . . . I think he said $380 billion. He's talking about American companies lost the equivalent of 5% of Russia's gross domestic product over the last three years? That's a wildly inflated number. And I think he was also talking about oil and gas concessions.

Well, before the Trump administration gets too excited about oil and gas concessions in Russia, they ought to go back and talk to President George W. Bush and his energy people, because there was all this excitement back in 2002 and 2003 about energy cooperation and huge advantages for American companies, which never panned out.

If it's an economic deal we're talking about, I think we're pursuing some pretty false hopes.

First of all, American industry they don't find the business environment there very attractive and it's not been one of their goals over the last 25 years.

McFaul: So let's pivot to President Zelenskyy next and help us think through his options and his situation right now and what he has done and what he might do moving forward.

Pifer: Yeah, well, think, Zelenskyy, first of all, I mean, he's epitomized that resistance and that resilience of Ukrainians in ways that . . . in fact, I think we had a conversation back in January of 2022 with some other Stanford scholars. And the question was, well, if the Russians invade, what kind of a wartime president would Zelenskyy be?

McFaul: Right.

Pifer: And I think we were uncertain. Well, I think Zelenskyy's proven that he was exactly what Ukraine needed at that very difficult time.

But I think you have seen growing war weariness within Ukraine. Polls now suggest that a majority of Ukrainians want negotiations, although we still have a sizable segment of the population that oppose any territorial concessions.

Zelenskyy seemed to show, I think, a bit of flexibility at the end of 2024, where he said, look, we could be prepared in a negotiation to agree that we would not use military means to recover lost territory. We would pursue diplomatic routes.

Now, he tied it to NATO membership for Ukraine. And I think what he's basically saying, If I'm going to give up, temporarily or perhaps longer, Ukrainian land, I need to have a firm security guarantee for the rest of Ukraine.

What he doesn't want to do is broker a deal with Vladimir Putin now, give Putin three or four years to regenerate his military, and then have another invasion to deal with. He's looking for solid security guarantees to prevent that.

And that, to my mind, is as the Trump administration tries to broker the settlement, any settlement is going to be judged on those two factors. One, how much territory remains under Russian control, even if just temporarily. And then two, what kind of security guarantees does Ukraine receive and how solid are they?

McFaul: Those are tough decisions, right? Because he's not getting much of a signal from the American side, at least so far, of anything substantive on the security guarantees. At least not that I've been able to see.

Pifer: No, And when Secretary Hegseth was in Europe 10 days ago, what he talked about was Europe providing either a peacekeeping force or a security force that would be on the ground in Ukraine. But he said there would be no American contribution to that.

And then he went a step further and he said that force would not deploy as a NATO force; it would be outside of NATO and it would not have the coverage of Article 5.

I worry about that because that seems to be a usually tempting opportunity for Vladimir Putin. So say you have 25 or 30,000 Europeans there not as NATO, but there to basically provide that security guarantee. That'd be an opportunity or tempting opportunity for Putin: Well, what if I hit that force? What if I had a pretext? They got too close to the Russian border or they were cooperating too much with the Ukrainians. They're no longer a neutral force.

It wouldn't have to be a big strike. But you kill a few members of this force and there's no then American response. That's going to be a pretty shattering blow to NATO. And I think Putin would be tempted on that.

So, I worry about what they're thinking in terms of how they do involve the Europeans. And I worry that they haven't thought through just how risky that could be ultimately for the underlying NATO relationship, which I still believe is very much in the American security interest.

McFaul: I'm going to get to NATO in a second, but one more question on Zelensky's position and just say parenthetically, that's a very profound thought. I haven't heard anybody talk about the scary scenario that you just laid out.

But let me come back to that in a minute. One more question about Zelenskyy and their government. As you know, and our listeners probably know, there was a floated document that the United States, the Trump administration, gave to President Zelenskyy, first in Kyiv, and then later it was presented and discussed at some detail at the Munich Security Conference when Vice President Vance and President Zelenskyy met.

And to the best of my understanding — maybe you have seen the document by now, I haven't — but I've talked to officials about it. It's a 50% sharing of the profits of all future critical minerals to be mined in Ukraine. Pretty amazing, outlandish, colonial document. And what's mysterious to me is what the Ukrainians get in return.

Having said all that, it's very clear that President Trump thinks this is an important document to be signed. What should President Zelenskyy do?

Pifer: Well, I think he was correct in not signing the document he was given, which as I understand it, it was basically giving America access to perhaps $500 billion worth of rare earth minerals and other minerals in Ukraine as a payment for what the United States had done for Ukraine in the past.

McFaul: So it was for the past, right? See, this is a very important point. Not future?

Pifer: And Trump has this incredibly inflated idea. He thinks that the United States in the past three years has provided Ukraine $350 billion. It's more like $120 billion, which is, not saying that's not a lot of money. But the bulk of that money was actually spent in the United States buying weapons for either the Ukrainian military or buying modern weapons for the U.S. military to replace things — older weapons — they had pulled out of their stocks to send to Ukraine.

And I would argue that that's not a gift to Ukraine; that's also in the American national security interest.

McFaul: Very important point.

Pifer: But I think Zelenskyy had expressed a readiness to allow the United States to help develop these minerals, but he wants something in return. And that agreement gave Ukraine, as far as I can tell, nothing in return.

Now, there was a spokesperson for the National Security Council said, “Well, that would be a secure, you know, that kind of economic relationship would be in effect a security guarantee.”

You know, if I'm in Ukraine, I'm not prepared to take that to the bank. And I think what Zelenskyy wants is he's prepared to allow the U.S. access, but he wants some firmer commitment on the part of the United States to Ukraine's security.

And thus far, that's not been on offer. So I think Zelensky was entirely correct in saying no.

McFaul: Just having some security guards, private security guards at these American mining companies is not going to be enough.

Pifer: That's probably not going to . . . the fact that the United States has companies developing those minerals, that's not going to deter Vladimir Putin from another attack on Ukraine.

McFaul: And the paradox of course, is that, you know, having talked to some of these companies around the world in my career: they're not going to do any of this mining unless they feel like their property rights are secured. So they need a security guarantee from the United States, too. It's not just the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people. So they've got to figure that out for sure.

Pifer: Exactly. And this is why I think that the administration really hasn't thought through a lot of the ideas that they're putting on the table in this rush to try to get some kind of agreement.

McFaul: Why do you think Trump is in such a hurry?

Pifer: Again, I think it gets back to solving a problem so that he can cultivate Vladimir Putin.

McFaul: That's the end game, right?

Pifer: If I look at this and say it's not incompetence, it's by design, the design is to get back to some kind of relationship with Putin. Trump admires Putin. Trump likes Putin. In some ways Trump would like to be like Putin.

And again, Ukraine is kind of an irritant that he would like to resolve. And that makes me nervous that in our effort to broker a solution, we're not going to give attention to the just positions of the Ukrainian side.

And at the end of the day, he can broker a settlement. But if it's heavily pro-Russian, the Ukrainians at the end of the day can always say, we're sorry, we cannot accept that. We will not accept that.

I think Ukrainians would like the war to end, but they're not prepared to accept a bad peace negotiated largely between the Americans and the Russians.

Zelenskyy has been very clear. He's not prepared to accept a fait accompli that's negotiated bilaterally between Washington and Moscow.

McFaul: And to add to your point: having just spent some time with Ukrainians, including Ukrainian soldiers in Munich, they don't all speak and think the same way.

Even if Zelenskyy wanted to accept a deal that Putin and Trump negotiated, then, you know, sent him an email saying to sign . .  there are other voices there as you know better than anybody, Steve. It's a democratic pluralistic society.

And there's a lot of warriors who have lost a lot of loved ones and a lot of comrades who are not just going to lay down their arms just because of a deal negotiated on the outside, blessed by the president.

I think President Zelenskyy probably understands that, but I'm not sure we in the West understand that. That's, I think, a pretty dangerous situation for Ukraine.

Pifer: And that's why in the sequencing of how you begin to prepare for this brokering, the first visit should have been to Kyiv.

McFaul: Yes.

Pifer: Because you're exactly right, Unlike Putin, Zelenskyy has a domestic constituency. And that may limit his maneuverability and what kind of concessions he can make. We need to have that understanding before we get too far down the road talking to the Russians.

They got the sequencing, I think, completely backwards. It should have been talking to the Ukrainians first, then the Europeans who, again, the American administration hopes will provide a significant force on the ground in Ukraine afterwards.

Then even before talking to Putin, we should have taken steps to build leverage. By virtue of the assistance we've provided to Ukraine over the last three years, we have huge leverage in Kyiv.

If you want to work this brokering right, you need leverage with Moscow. And there things you could have done. You could have tightened sanctions on Russia. As we know from our work in the international sanctions working group, there's a lot that can be done in that area.

Second, we could have gone to the G7 and said, let's take that $300 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets, seize them, and put them in a fund for Ukraine.

He could have even gone and asked the Congress, you know, let's prepare more military assistance for Ukraine. Things that would have confronted Vladimir Putin with the fact that if he does not negotiate . . . and thus far when Putin talks about negotiating, it's always on just his terms, which amount to Ukraine's capitulation.

We've got to move him off of that. I think the way to do that is by confronting Putin with the fact that this war continues, the military, the economic, the political costs for him are only going to increase.

And that they did none of that. They just jumped right into the conversation with the Russians. I think that was a mistake and it decreases the likelihood that this effort to broker a settlement will succeed.

McFaul: Just because you've teased it up, one last question about the American side and then we'll end with the Europeans.

I remember, you know, as we were waiting to see who would be on the new Trump team, I think there were a lot of people that I know — including in Ukraine, by the way — who are pretty excited about the fact that Senator Rubio was chosen to be Secretary of State Rubio. Same with our new National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz.

But I have friends who thought, my goodness, we are so lucky in these two jobs, we have very strong pro-Ukrainian people that understand the autocratic threat, the imperial threat from Putin.

And yet so far, we're not seeing that their voices represented. What's your take on that, Steve? Is it just too early to tell?

Most certainly, you know, they did not do well in their first round to underscore what you already said. When I saw them sitting across the table from Lavrov and Ushakov, people who have been in those jobs for two decades, and they had only been in their jobs for three weeks.

Maybe you could understand they're just getting their feet . . . they're trying to learn how to do this diplomacy. But so I'm struck by the fact that their positions before they joined the administration and now seem different.

Is that going to be the case forevermore or is it too early to tell?

Pifer: No, I've been struck by the same thing and I hope this will not be the continuing position.

I know neither Secretary Rubio nor the National Security Advisor Waltz, but I had the same view that you did. For a Republican president, these are guys who have experience in foreign policy. They've been on the right committees. They know these things. They could be the, quote, “the adults in the room.”

McFaul: Yes.

Pifer: I haven't seen them though, showing that they've been adults or that they've had any impact. And I think Secretary Rubio said a couple of things today that suggested that maybe they're looking back at what's happened over the past 10 days and maybe there's some recognition that this has not been the best way to handle things.

That's why I hope . . . I mean, in this debate of is the Trump administration's approach incompetence or design . . . I hope it's incompetence. Because you can fix incompetence. You can rethink things.

And I hope that they are reassessing and understand that they have mishandled these things. And if they want to succeed . . .

McFaul: And we want them to succeed.

Pifer: I would like to see President Trump broker a just, fair, durable settlement that ends this horrible war, that stops the killing, that brings peace back to that. And he can win his long coveted Nobel Peace Prize.

But everything that they've done, I think, in the last two weeks makes that possibility less and less and less . .

McFaul: Likely. And by the way, footnote to that: there are very few issues where Americans are united. We're a very polarized, split country right now. But a poll that came out this week, the Quinnipiac poll, for those that want to look it up, when Americans were asked, do you trust Putin? 81% said, No. Only 9% said, Yes.

And so President Trump is way ahead of the skis on this one. He is out of touch with the American society. So I think that that's an interesting data point. They have to produce results; they just cannot say, we just want a good relationship with Putin.

But Steve, go ahead and then we're going to get to the Europeans.

Pifer: I just wanted to mention there was one other quick poll that just came out when President Trump just bizarrely said that Russia attacked Ukraine, bizarrely said that Zelenskyy is a dictator, there was a poll I saw that I think was conducted on the 18th or 19th of February. It said 41% of Americans viewed Trump as a dictator, only 22 % of Americans viewed Zelenskyy as a dictator.

McFaul: Wow, I didn't see that one!

Pifer: I think there's a lot to suggest that where Trump is going thus far is very much divorced from where American public opinion is, both on Zelenskyy and on Russia.

McFaul: And Zelenskyy's approval rating actually is significantly higher than President Trump.

Pifer: 57%. And all this nonsense about postponing the elections: Last year in 2024, when they postponed the election, it was widely supported by Ukrainians. Most pro-democracy NGOs supported it. Most of the leaders of the parties in the Ukrainian parliament, with the exception of one, and this included people who would call themselves opponents of Zelenskyy, like Petro Poroshenko, the former president . . . they all agreed the election should be postponed.

And in a poll just conducted in the last couple of weeks, 63% of Ukrainians agree that there should be no elections until after the war is over.

McFaul: Interesting. Thanks for sharing that.

Finally, and I suspect we'll come back to this topic in the coming months, but give me your base reaction to the fissures in the NATO alliance. The vice president gave a pretty provocative speech in Munich.

How worried are you, Steve, that this is the beginning of the end of the alliance? Or is that too premature to think in those terms?

Pifer: You know, there were periodic suggestions during the first term that President Trump wanted to take the United States out of NATO. He actually doesn't have to formally take us out of NATO, but he can do things like reduce the American troop presence in Europe.

He can do things like . . . well, again, Secretary of Defense Hegseth, saying that basically, if you send a European security force into Ukraine, you're on your own. Those will weaken the American commitment to Europe. And they will weaken the confidence that the Europeans have that the United States will be there.

I think NATO has been a big asset for the United States over the past 70 years. I agree with President Trump that Europe has to do more in terms of its own defense spending. But what's interesting now is that in 2014, there was an agreement that by 2044, NATO members would spend 2% of gross domestic product on defense.

And so we went from three countries meeting that standard in 2014 to 23 meeting it last year. The talk now in Europe is they have to do more and they're looking at three to three and a half percent. The Europeans understand that their security situation is very different from what it was 10 years ago, that they have to do more. But that means that they can be stronger partners, stronger allies.

And I fear that if we were to throw NATO under the bus, it's going to mean that America first is going to be America alone. And if we do turn against the Europeans or we end this 76 year long security attache that we've had, do we really think the Europeans would be helpful to us when we're trying to deal with China?

McFaul: Absolutely not.

Pifer: I think at that point, that Europe would be morally preoccupied with Europe and the idea of helping the Americans out against China after we'd abandoned them in Europe . . . I wouldn't expect a lot of European assistance in that regard.

McFaul: That's a great point. Oh, by the way, our NATO allies did go to war with us when we were attacked. The only time Article 5 was invoked. Their soldiers died with us in Afghanistan. And some of our NATO allies went with us into Iraq.

And they never asked us to pay for that. They never asked us to compensate them like we're now doing to other Ukrainians.

And I hope the sounder, more rational people around the president will remind him of those kinds of facts. But Steve, I'm in trouble. I just looked at the clock. We talked much longer than I was supposed to, but that's because there's so much going on in the world.

I think we'll have a lot of news in the coming months, and let's just do this again.

Pifer: Happy to do it. I just hope the news will not be like the news we've seen in the last 10 days.

McFaul: Yeah, me too.

You’ve been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a review. And be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts, to stay up to date on what’s happening in the world and why.

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Steven Pifer joins Michael McFaul on World Class to discuss how America's relationship with Ukraine and Europe is shifting, and what that means for the future of international security.

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About the event: Studying the social construction of norms has been a fashionable way to approach understanding European Union politics. Indeed, following the outbreak of the Ukrainian war (2022- present day), scholars of the EU have published a large number of articles exploring norm-driven politics. Many scholars of the EU have seen its engagement with Ukraine as driven by common norms and/or a shared identity. However, this talk will argue that self-interest in the form of the balance of threat assessments of individual countries remains the most crucial factor in understanding patterns of support for Ukraine, as well as explaining the percentage of GDP spent on the military by EU member states. Moreover, defense priorities are driven by a broader set of threats than just that posed by Russia. This talk will further explore how free riding and defense spending are determined by states’ interests in survival rather than shared norms or solidarity. This talk will suggest that scholars should pay greater attention to smaller ad hoc alliances between states that share specific threats, a neglected dimension of the current security environment in Europe.

About the speaker: Stig Jarle Hansen was a Professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU) before joining Stanford in 2024. At NMBU, he led Norway’s only master's program in International Relations. In 2016-2017, he was a Renee Belfer fellow at Harvard University. He is also a senior nonresident associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. His work is at the intersection of crime, security, and great power politics.

Professor Hansen’s books have received good reviews in Foreign Policy (the best book of the year) and The Economist, and Newsweek published a chapter of one of them. He has contributed to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the MES Insights of the United States Marine Corps, and West Point’s CTC Sentinel. He has commented for CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Reuters, CCTV 4, and many other international media outlets.

Professor Hansen has also given presentations to various defense and governance institutions, including the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, NATO Defense College in Rome, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has testified in hearings in the British House of Commons, and has been invited to give presentations to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He is a board member of the RAAD institute in Mogadishu, the Abaad center in Aden, and a member of the editorial board of Small Wars and insurgencies.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

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Dr. Stig Jarle Hansen was a Professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), before joining Stanford in 2024. At NMBUhe led Norway’s only master program in international Relations. In 2016-2017 he was a Renee Belfer fellow at Harvard University. He is also a senior nonresident associate fellow at the Royal United Services institute in London. His work is in the intersection between crime, security and great power politics, and he has worked on relevant topics with a focus on the Middle East and Africa. 

Professor Hansen’s 2013 book, ‘Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, was critically acclaimed by Foreign Policy and The Economist, and Newsweek published a chapter of the book in their magazine. In 2019, he published a book ‘Horn, Sahel and Rift: Fault-Lines of the African Jihad’, acclaimed by Foreign AffairsInternational Affairs and The Washington Times. He also worked as a maritime security analyst for the Danish based Risk Intelligence from 2006 to 2016, and has contributed to Jane’s Intelligence Review, as well as the MES Insights of the United States Marine Corps, and West Point’s CTC Sentinel. He has commented for CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Reuters, CCTV 4, and many other international media outlets. 

Professor Hansen has also given presentations to various defense and governance institutions, including NATOs intelligence fusion center, NATOs defense college in Rome,  US Special Forces Command, as well as testified in  hearings the British house of commons, and been invited to give presentations to the senate foreign relations committee. He is a board member of the RAAD institute in Mogadishu, and a member of the editorial board of Small Wars and insurgencies. 

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Stig Hansen
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About the event: Weaponized conspiracy theories and social media disinformation have increased exponentially since Facebook’s Frances Haugen testified before the Senate in 2021. Since January 6, 2021, QAnon has been portrayed by government agencies (DHS 2021, FBI 2019), think tanks (Moonshot CVE 2020, Soufan Group 2021) and the mainstream media as dangerous with the “potential for terrorist violence.” This talk will explore the origins of the conspiracy theory, discuss how foreign adversaries of the US weaponize and leverage QAnon to exacerbate polarization and how the conspiracy theory targets LGBTQ+ community and revives racist stereotypes from the period of reconstruction and antisemitic tropes.

Latest article: LGBTQ+ Victimization by Extremist Organizations: Charting a New Path for Research

About the speaker: Mia Bloom is an International Security Fellow at the New America and Professor at Georgia State University. Bloom conducts research in Europe, the Middle East and South Asia and speaks eight languages. Bloom is the author of six books and over 80 articles on violent extremism including Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (Columbia 2005), Living Together After Ethnic Killing (Routledge 2007) Bombshell: Women and Terror (UPenn 2011) and Small Arms: Children and Terror (Cornell 2019) and Pastels and Pedophiles: Inside the Mind of QAnon with Sophia Moskalenko (Stanford 2021). Her next book, Veiled Threats: Women and Jihad was published by Cornell University Press in January 2025. Bloom is a former term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held appointments at Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, and McGill Universities. She serves on the Counter-Radicalization boards of the Anti-Defamation League, the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED), Women Without Borders and several working groups for the Global Internet Forum for Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). Bloom has a PhD in political science from Columbia University, Masters in Arab Studies from Georgetown University and Bachelors in Russian, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies from McGill, and her Pre-Doctorate from Harvard’s Center for International Studies and a Post-Doctorate from Princeton.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Mia Bloom
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Limited number of lunches available for registered guests on day of event.

About the event: How and why do nuclear delivery vehicles proliferate? This talk identifies a permissive environment for the proliferation of nuclear delivery systems in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. There are three drivers of this dynamic: First, the multipurpose/dual-use nature of the technology to deliver nuclear weapons; second, the definitional obscurity in the non-proliferation regime about what constitutes a ‘nuclear weapon’; and third, the exclusion of legally-enforceable legislation on delivery systems in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. I identify the different pathways of proliferation that both supplier and recipient states use to take advantage of these enabling factors to acquire/disseminate nuclear delivery vehicles. Using qualitative historical evidence from archives across the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India, I use an international history approach to trace the trajectory of the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s regulation of nuclear delivery vehicles. Additionally, I conduct in-depth case studies of the United Kingdom, France, and India’s acquisition of nuclear delivery vehicles. At a time of increasing nuclear concerns in the Indo-Pacific, South Asia, and the Middle East, with states expanding their nuclear and missile arsenals, this talk highlights the different ways in which potential proliferators might acquire nuclear delivery systems and use the nuclear non-proliferation regime to do so.

About the speaker: Debak Das is an Assistant Professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His research interests lie at the intersection of international security, nuclear proliferation, crises, and international history. His research and writing have been published (or are forthcoming) in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Global Studies Quarterly, H-Diplo Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum, International Studies Review, Lawfare, Political Science Quarterly, Research and Politics, Security Studies, Texas National Security Review, The Washington Post, and War on the Rocks. Debak earned his PhD in Government from Cornell University in 2021. He was the MacArthur Nuclear Security Pre-Doctoral Fellow in 2019-2020, and a Stanton Nuclear Security Post-Doctoral Fellow in 2021-2022, at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. Debak holds an M.Phil in Diplomacy and Disarmament, and an M.A. in Politics (with specialization in International Relations) from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Debak is also an affiliate at CISAC at Stanford University, the Centre de Recherche Internationales (CERI) at Sciences Po, Paris, and at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Debak Das
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About the event: What are the prospects for arms control agreements between the United States and China? Conventional wisdom is pessimistic, pointing to recent tensions between great powers. Yet we still lack a comprehensive review of the history of arms control negotiations, placing the current context in perspective. This presentation presents some initial findings of a data collection effort, conducted jointly with Matthew Fuhrmann (Texas A&M). We identify close to 200 arms control agreements from 1816 to 2017. We conclude that arms control agreements have served very different purposes. Some have been symmetric, imposing restrictions on all parties involved, while others have been asymmetric, cementing a balance of power after a global shock or excluding third parties from a technology. These agreements follow different logics and symmetric agreements, which the United States would be pursuing with China, have been rare. Even setting aside recent tensions, arms control agreements would be challenging.

About the speaker: Alexandre Debs is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University, where he is also the Faculty Director of the Nuclear Security Program at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies.

Alexandre’s research focuses on the causes of war and nuclear politics. His work has appeared in top political science and international relations journals. He is the author of the book Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation (with Nuno Monteiro), published by Cambridge University Press in 2017. Since June 2024, Alexandre has been serving as Associate Editor of the American Political Science Review.

Alexandre received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from M.I.T., an M.Phil. in Economic and Social History from the University of Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, and a B.Sc. in Economics and Mathematics from Universite de Montreal.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Alexandre Debs
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About the event: Harmful content on social media is a growing challenge with global consequences. Despite ongoing efforts to regulate major platforms, extremist groups continue to exploit gaps in content moderation to incite violence, recruit followers, and coordinate attacks.

In this talk, Tamar Mitts will present insights from her forthcoming book, Safe Havens for Hate: The Challenge of Moderating Online Extremism, which examines how militant and hate groups adapt their strategies in response to platform policies. Drawing on multi-platform data from over a hundred extremist organizations, Mitts reveals how inconsistent moderation across platforms creates safe havens where these actors evade detection, rebrand, and sustain their movements.

Mitts will argue that effectively addressing these challenges requires a paradigm shift -- moving beyond single "fixes" to recognize content moderation as a public policy challenge rather than a series of isolated platform decisions. Join us to explore how current efforts to combat harmful content often fall short, why extremist and hate groups remain so resilient online, and the questions we need to ask as we strive to better protect the digital public sphere from hate and violence.

About the speaker: Tamar Mitts is an Assistant Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a Faculty Member at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, the Institute of Global Politics, and the Data Science Institute. Her research examines how digital platforms and emerging technologies shape conflict, security, and democracy. Her forthcoming book, Safe Havens for Hate (Princeton University Press), explores how gaps in content moderation allow extremist and hate groups to evade enforcement, adapt, and mobilize across platforms. Her work has been published in leading journals, including American Political Science Review, International Organization, and Journal of Politics.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Tamar Mitts
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Nearly every day for the last three years, Russian missiles, drones, and artillery fire have struck Ukraine, killing thousands of people and damaging power plants, schools, hospitals, and homes in what has become the largest conflict in Europe since World War II.

“You live in constant fear for your loved ones,” said Oleksandra Matviichuk, founder of the Center for Civil Liberties and a participant in a February 24 virtual panel discussion with Ukrainian leaders in Kyiv on the war’s impact on daily life, the global democratic order, and Ukraine’s path ahead. The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law hosted the event on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

“It's very difficult to be in a large-scale war for three years. You live in total uncertainty,” Matviichuk said.
 


It's very difficult to be in a large-scale war for three years. You live in total uncertainty.
Oleksandra Matviichuk
Founder, Center for Civil Liberties


Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), introduced the panelists, and Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, moderated the discussion.

On the frontlines, outnumbered Ukrainian troops have waged a stiff resistance, while a mass influx of Russian troops, with enormous loss of life, have made incremental but not decisive progress. Hundreds of thousands have died or been injured on both sides. Talks to end the war are underway between the Trump Administration and Russia, with Ukraine and European nations not currently invited to participate.

Oleksandra Matviichuk (L), founder of the Center for Civil Liberties, speaks about her experiences in Ukraine over the last three years.
Oleksandra Matviichuk (L) spoke about her experiences in Ukraine over the last three years. | Rod Searcey

‘We will cease to exist’


Matviichuk, who was a visiting scholar from 2017-2018 with the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program at CDDRL, noted the conflict has actually been going on for 11 years, since 2014 when Russia invaded and occupied Crimea. Today, she said, there is no safe place in Ukraine where people can hide from Russian rockets. “Just two days ago, Russia sent 263 drones against Kyiv and other peaceful cities in Ukraine.”

Matviichuk described how Russia seeks to ban the Ukrainian language and culture, and how they take Ukrainian children to Russia to put them in Russian education camps. “They told them they are not Ukrainian children, but they are Russian children.”

If the West does not provide Ukraine with security guarantees in a peace plan, then “it means that we will cease to exist. There will be no more of our people,” Matviichuk said.

Oleksandra Ustinova, a member of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's Parliament, said, “If we talk about life in Ukraine now, it's complicated, especially during the last week after the Munich Security Conference,” where Vice President JD Vance delivered a speech that focused on internal politics in Europe.

“People do not understand how we thought the United States was our biggest partner,” she said.
 


People do not understand how we thought the United States was our biggest partner.
Oleksandra Ustinova
Member of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's Parliament


At one point, Ustinova noted that she could not hear the conversation in her headphones because sirens were blaring as Russia had just launched an aerial attack on Kyiv.

She said that Russian President Putin and others who seek a Ukrainian election are trying to set a trap because Ukrainian law does not allow an election during martial law, which Ukraine has declared because of the Russian invasion. Plus, it would involve the demobilization of more than 400,000 troops.

“It would be very easy to fake elections, and that’s what the Russians would do,” Ustinova said. “It’s a trap. They're going to find where to put the money into their own candidate.”

Ustinova, who was also a visiting scholar with the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program from 2018-2019, said, “We can see that this is a new reality, not only in the Ukrainian war, but in foreign relations, and hopefully the Europeans can unite. Because if they don't, it will be a disaster for everyone.”

Oleksandra Ustinova joined the CDDRL-sponsored event virtually via Zoom.
Oleksandra Ustinova joined the CDDRL-sponsored event virtually via Zoom. | Rod Searcey

Oleksiy Honcharuk, a former Ukrainian prime minister from 2019-2020 who was the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at FSI in 2021, said, “I think that we are still strong. My prediction is that in three or six months, Ukraine can double the damage to Russia on the battlefield from a technological perspective with drones.”

But time is very expensive now, he added, because every single day, every single hour, Ukrainians are paying with the lives of their best people and soldiers.

Honcharuk said Ukrainians are “shocked” about the position of the United States’ recent vote against a United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion as well as the Trump Administration’s position on talks with Russia.

“This is exactly the moment when all the people of goodwill should do everything possible to support Ukraine in this very complicated time,” said Honcharuk.

Regarding the UN vote, McFaul said, “I am shocked, I am appalled, I am embarrassed as an American to see those votes today. We are voting with the most horrific dictators in the world.”

Oleksiy Honcharuk (R) spoke to a packed audience in Encina Hall.
Oleksiy Honcharuk (R) spoke to a packed audience in Encina Hall. | Rod Searcey

‘Not about people’


Matviichuk said, “Putin started this war of aggression, not because he wanted to occupy just more Ukrainian land. Putin started this war of aggression because he wanted to occupy and destroy the whole of Ukraine and even go further. He wants to forcibly restore the Russian Empire — he dreams about his legacy, his logic is historical.”

This ultimately means that Ukraine needs real security guarantees, she said. “President Trump said he started the peace negotiation because he cares about people dying in this war. So, if President Trump cares about people dying in this war, he also has to care about people dying in Russian prisons.”

She explained that she’s spoken with hundreds of people who have survived brutal conditions in Russian captivity. And so, it’s surprising, Matviichuk said, to hear political statements from U.S. officials “about natural minerals and elections, about possible territorial concessions, but not about people.”

Lack of Global Support


Serhiy Leshchenko, an advisor to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s Chief of Staff, spoke about the recent overtures by the Trump Administration to Russia.

“This is a new reality we are living in now. Frankly, my understanding is that Ukrainians are not very shocked with what's going on because we went through so many shocks within the last three years.”

Acknowledging the lack of an American flag at an allied event this week in Kyiv, Leshchenko said Ukrainians know perfectly well that perception is reality.

“It means that now we have an absolutely different perception. So, it’s obvious that there is no global security infrastructure anymore. It’s obvious that NATO is not an answer anymore,” said Leshchenko, an alumnus of the 2013 cohort of CDDRL’s Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program.

Serhiy Leshchenko (R) spoke virtually via Zoom at an event hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law on February 24, 2025.
Serhiy Leshchenko (R) spoke virtually via Zoom at an event hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law on February 24, 2025. | Rod Searcey

‘Sad occasion’


In her opening remarks, Stoner noted, “We’re here on what is actually a sad occasion, which is that Feb. 24 marks three years since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.”

She said, “Only about less than 1% of land has changed hands since December 2022, so Ukraine is not losing. Ukraine is at least defending what it has, and it remains in Kursk (Russia).”

McFaul said, “It’s in our national interest that we do not line up with Belarus and Russia and North Korea – that holds negative consequences for our future security and prosperity. I actually think our country cares about values.”

He added that the notion that all America cares about is mineral rights, business deals, and hotels in Gaza is not the America he knows.

McFaul told the panelists, “I've witnessed and observed what you’ve been doing for your country, and we are just extremely fortunate to be connected to all of you, whom I consider to be heroic individuals in the world.”

A full recording of the event can be viewed below, and additional commentary can be found from The Stanford Daily.

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Vladimir Kara-Murza onstage with Michael McFaul at Stanford University.
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Gone Today, Here Tomorrow: Vladimir Kara-Murza on the Fight for Democracy in Russia
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(Clockwise from left) Oleksandra Matviichuk, Oleksandra Ustinova, Oleksiy Honcharuk, and Serhiy Leshchenko joined FSI Director Michael McFaul to discuss Ukraine's future on the three-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion.
(Clockwise from left) Oleksandra Matviichuk, Oleksandra Ustinova, Oleksiy Honcharuk, and Serhiy Leshchenko joined FSI Director Michael McFaul to discuss Ukraine's future on the three-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion.
Rod Searcey
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FSI scholars and civic and political Ukrainian leaders discussed the impact of the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, three years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

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Flyer for the seminar "A Thousand Years of Corruption" with portrait of speaker Marco Garrido.

The scholarly and popular commonsense about corruption in the Philippines is that the country has always been corrupt. Seventy-eight years of corruption as an independent state (1946-2024) may as well have been a thousand. Lay and scholarly accounts explain this continuity with respect to traditional values and premature democratization. In both accounts, corruption is all but genetic to Philippine culture or politics. To be sure, continuity is self-evident if we are looking only at corruption scandals—but scandals have been accompanied by anticorruption movements, broadly speaking. The two have gone hand-in-hand historically, suggesting that we need to understand them together. Taking them together, that is, focusing on their dialectic, produces, as I will show, a history of change. Specifically, how Filipinos relate to corruption has changed. They have become less tolerant of it in general and learned to embrace an anticorruption model of politics. How scholars and policymakers conceive of corruption has changed. They have come to adopt a view of corruption as a generic social problem, effectively disembedding it from society. These developments have enabled a more intolerant approach such that, today, the greater danger lies in an anticorruption “fundamentalism” leading to the rejection of politics altogether. Viewed as a whole, the history of corruption/anticorruption has been a popular struggle over what politics should look like, and thus we might read their dialectic as driving the progress of political modernization from below.

20250307 SEAP Marco Garrido

Marco Garrido is the author of The Patchwork City: Class, Space, and Politics in Metro Manila, which received multiple awards, including for best book in political and urban sociology. He is working on a second book, tentatively titled Bad Words, on the imbrication of corruption, politics, and the politics of knowledge in postcolonial Philippines.

Marco Garrido, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago
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