International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Did the Russian-affiliated groups that interfered with the 2016 U.S. presidential election want to be caught?

“There’s a reason why they paid for Facebook ads in rubles,” Nathaniel Persily, who is a senior fellow at FSI and co-director of the Cyber Policy Center, told FSI Director Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast. “They wanted to be open and notorious.”

Since the election, Americans have become more suspicious of fake news, but they have also become suspicious of real news and journalists in general. Another problem with the Russians’ success in influencing the 2016 election, said Persily, is that Americans will automatically assume that the Russians will do the same thing during the 2020 race.

“Everyone is going to be looking for nefarious influences and shouting them from the rooftops, and that actually serves the [bad actors’] purposes just as much,” Persily said. “Many of the attempts in 2016 were about fostering division and doubt, and I think there’s a lot of appetite for doubt right now in America.”

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Since 2016, Facebook, Twitter and Google have made some important changes to the way they handle advertising, including adding a requirement that all candidate ads and other ads of “national legislative importance” be identified as advertisements on users’ feeds.

But there are no standardized rules or regulations that dictate how tech companies should handle advertisements or posts that contain disinformation, Persily said, and because of this, it is up to those respective companies to make those decisions themselves  — and they aren’t always in agreement. For example, when a video of Nancy Pelosi that was slowed down to make her seem drunk was posted in late May on YouTube and Facebook, YouTube took the video down, but Facebook decided to leave it up.

“The standards that are going to be developed in test cases like these — under conditions which are not as politically incendiary as an election — are going to be the ones that will be rolled out and applied in elections in the U.S. and around the world,” Persily said.

When it comes to election security, the 2020 presidential race will be the next big test for the U.S. government and private-sector companies. But other countries should also be on the lookout for activity from foreign agents and actors in their elections.

“The 2016 election was not just an event, it was a playbook that was written by the Russians,” warned Persily. “That playbook is usable for future elections in the United States as well as around the world, whether it’s between India and Pakistan or China and Taiwan.”

 

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Forty years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the two superpowers are competing and contesting every arena, from trade to AI research and from space exploration to maritime rights. Instead of what Americans referred to as engagement and Chinese called reform and opening, many experts and analysts now characterize the relations between the two countries as dangerously brittle. Some see a new kind of Cold War in the making. Such assertions, however, argues Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, “both ignore history and impute a level of fragility that has not existed for many years.”

Fingar reflects on the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in a new article, “Forty years of formal—but not yet normal—relations,” published in the China International Strategy Review. He claims that the relationship is resilient and not destined for conflict, albeit it is beset by a host of aspirational, perceptual, and structural differences.

A political scientist and China specialist who served over two decades in senior government positions, Fingar urges readers to remember that assertions of fragility of the U.S.-China relationship undervalue the strength, scope, and significance of interdependence, shared interests, and constituencies in both countries. These, he says, have a substantial stake in the maintenance of at least minimally cooperative relations.

U.S.-China relations are indeed highly asymmetrical: Chinese citizens and organizations have far greater access to the United States than Americans do to China, notes Fingar. He also recognizes that the troubles that have soured the relationship are more intricate and often more sensitive than those of the past. Decades ago, most of the issues that arose were handled at the governmental level. But now “the number and variety of players with stakes in the relationship and disputes with counterpart actors are much greater.” Furthermore, explains Fingar, the U.S. business community is expressing a stronger voice for government action to change Chinese behavior and is not as consistent an advocate of stability in U.S. policy toward China as it used to be. “This is an extremely important development,” he says, “because it reverses a key dynamic in the U.S.-China relationship.”

Ultimately, however, the two countries and our institutions and people are linked by myriad ties that bring mutual benefits as well as the constraints of interdependence. “I remain confident that we will continue to be able to manage the relationship,” concludes Fingar. He expresses disappointment, though, that normalization of U.S.-China relations remains a work in progress and cautions that merely managing the relationship to prevent it from deteriorating is an unsatisfactory goal that should be unacceptable to both sides. Not only does such a low bar limit what each counterpart can achieve, but it also inhibits the kind of cooperation required to address transnational challenges like climate change, infectious disease, and proliferation of dangerous technologies.

 

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A display for facial recognition and artificial intelligence is seen on monitors at Huawei's Bantian campus on April 26, 2019 in Shenzhen, China.
A display for facial recognition and artificial intelligence is seen on monitors at Huawei's Bantian campus in Shenzhen, China. The U.S. government battle with the Chinese telecom giant represents multiple concerns about China's technological prowess.
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Since joining SPICE in 2005, my annual calendar has revolved around not spring flowers, caterpillars dangling from trees, and falling leaves around the beautiful Stanford campus, but the schedule of the Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP), Stanford’s online course on Japan and U.S.–Japan relations for U.S. high school students. As the manager and instructor of the RSP, I have had the pleasure (and truly, the honor) of teaching this online course for 14 years. We accept applications beginning in August, outreach efforts ramp up in September and October, and new cohorts of talented U.S. high school students are selected every November. With January comes the updating of the syllabus with new readings, topics, and video lectures, and identifying and inviting guest speakers for the virtual classes. And the highlight of my year—every year—is on February 1, when the new cohort signs into our online learning platform ready to engage in this new community, connect over shared interests, learn from their differences, and to embark upon the RSP journey together.

It is now early June, and the 2019 Reischauer Scholars Program is, unbelievably, soon coming to an end. This year’s RSP journey has led us through explorations of tales of samurai, the modernization of Meiji Japan through the lens of filmmaker Ozu Yasujiro, comparative perspectives on colonial and wartime legacies through textbooks, and lessons on civil liberties as told by someone who was sent to a Japanese American internment camp with his family as a 9-year-old boy.

While this online course has always approached the study of Japan and U.S.–Japan relations with an intense academic rigor befitting Stanford University, I also wanted to offer students access to the personal stories of practitioners who play an active role in Japanese society and the U.S.–Japan relationship that we study. One of the wonderful aspects of teaching online is that for our weekly virtual classroom sessions—where all students meet synchronously using Zoom video conferencing software—we are able to welcome guest speakers to join us from anywhere in the world.

As we explored the U.S.–Japan security relationship this year and the controversies surrounding the presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, for example, students met with an Okinawan native who works on the U.S. Air Force Base in Kadena. Learning about how her experiences and perspectives inform her own efforts to enhance U.S.–Japan relations gave the students new insight into the impact of international policy upon individuals and the communities in which they live.

For our module on U.S.–Japan diplomacy we were joined by the Principal Officer of the U.S. Consulate in Sapporo, Rachel Brunette-Chen, who talked about how her interests in connecting the U.S. and Japan have informed her career in the U.S. State Department. RSP students often cite international relations and diplomacy as two high-interest fields for their future undergraduate studies and career aspirations, so they made the most of this opportunity to ask thoughtful questions about careers in Foreign Service. Given the diverse career tracks available in the State Department, students were inspired to learn that they could take their multidisciplinary interests and apply them in an international context for years to come.

As we grappled with the various challenges facing modern Japanese society during the last few weeks of class—including students mired in a test-centric system, the demographic realities of an aging population and declining birth rates, pervasive issues of gender inequality, and minority rights, among others—it was important to gain an understanding of how these issues are being addressed and experienced by real people. Our final guest speaker for the 2019 RSP, a Japanese American entrepreneur and educator living and working in Tokyo, shared his first-hand perspectives on the state of entrepreneurship and innovation in contemporary Japan.

Perhaps the most memorable of the online video conferencing sessions this year were the two joint virtual classes with the students of the Stanford e-Japan Program. Stanford e-Japan is an online course that engages Japanese high school students in the study of U.S. society and U.S.–Japan relations, and is comprised of students from across Japan. The rich, open discussions and friendly international camaraderie fostered during these joint sessions are always a delight to observe. I know that many of my RSP students—and many of the Stanford e-Japan students, as well—will treasure these experiences and relationships for years to come.

In our virtual class on diplomacy, one student asked, “How can we, as high school students, make a real impact on the U.S.–Japan relationship?” “By taking the initiative to be active participants in courses like the Reischauer Scholars Program,” replied Ms. Brunette-Chen, “you are already on your way. In sharing what you learn about Japan, you are also raising awareness about the importance of the U.S.–Japan relationship among your peers and school communities.” Indeed, these 2019 Reischauer Scholars are already on their way. As the spring flowers, dangling caterpillars, and fall leaves continue to come and go in the years ahead, I am eager to see the different ways in which their impact upon U.S.–Japan relations will continue to take shape. Who knows? Perhaps a few will return to the RSP years from now—this time not as students, but as guest speakers who coach and inspire the Reischauer Scholars of the future.


To be notified when the next Reischauer Scholars Program application period opens, join our email list or follow us on Facebook and Twitter.

The Reischauer Scholars Program is one of several online courses for high school students offered by SPICE, Stanford University, including the China Scholars Program, the Sejong Scholars Program (on Korea), and the Stanford e-Japan Program.


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Student honorees of the 2018 Reischauer Scholars Program with Consul General Tomochika Uyama and RSP Instructor Naomi Funahashi.
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Renée DiResta is the former Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. She has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations, and has studied disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare.

You can see a full list of Renée's writing and speeches on her website: www.reneediresta.com or follow her @noupside.

 

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Venezuela is in the midst of an economic, social and political crisis, said Harold Trinkunas, the deputy director of FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and an expert on Latin American politics.

 

“Venezuela is a major oil-producing company, and it experienced a boom between 2000 and 2012,” Trinkunas told FSI Director Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast. “Up until then, Venezuela seemed to be doing pretty well.”

 

But things have changed since former President Hugo Chavez’s death in 2013. Once one of Latin America’s wealthiest nations, Venezuela’s economy has collapsed by more than 50 percent in recent years, Trinkunas said. Meanwhile, a large majority of its population is living in poverty, millions have fled the country, and the government — led by President Nicolás Maduro — has become increasingly authoritarian and unpopular among citizens.

Forces Behind the Downturn

During his first five years in office, Maduro’s government politicized the military and the oil industry, Trinkunas said, noting that oil production in Venezuela has declined from 3 million barrels per day 20 years ago to fewer than 1 million barrels per day in recent years. After Maduro was re-elected in 2018 amongst reports of coercion, fraud and electoral rigging, about 50 countries — including the United States and many members of the European Union — denounced his election.

 

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“The fact that there are 50 countries [that oppose Maduro] is really quite unusual,” Trinkunas said. “And this is the United States and many of its allies — many western democracies are in this camp.”

 

The Failed Uprising

Less than a year after the election, opposition leader Juan Guaidó invoked the country’s constitution to declare himself interim president. About three months later, on April 30, 2019, Guaidó called for an uprising against Maduro, but the response wasn’t what Guaidó had hoped for, Trinkunas said.

 

“Apparently there had been a process of negotiation in the weeks leading up to April 30, in which the armed forces, the Supreme Court, and other significant regime figures agreed to a transition plan which would ease Maduro out and call for new elections,” Trinkunas said. “But it looks like Juan Guaidó pulled the trigger too quickly — he claims the plot was discovered.”

 

What’s Next? Three Possible Scenarios

Trinkunas sees three possible scenarios for Venezuela going forward: one in which Maduro is able to retain his power and the state of country remains relatively unchanged; another in which the government collapses and the country is able to transition into a democracy; or the Venezuelan government may collapse and things could take a turn for the worse, he said.

 

“Venezuela has experienced prolonged electricity blackouts in the last couple of months, and food distribution is very uncertain — things are breaking down,” he said. “There’s a real [possibility] that some of the organized crime organizations could break down the social order. It might look like a much more complicated situation.”

 

 

Related: Read a Q&A with Harold Trinkunas about Juan Guaidó’s claim to the Venezuelan presidency.

 

 

 

 

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“For seven decades our thinking about Indo-Asia-Pacific security and international cooperation issues has been underpinned by the narratives of a U.S.-led international order centered around the rule of law, economic openness, and multilateralism. Now this post-WWII order is being challenged.”

With that summation, APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin opened the symposium The Past, Present, and Future International Order in East Asia. Sponsored and organized by the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) and APARC’s Japan Program and U.S.-Asia Security Initiative , the day-long event gathered 20 experts across multiple fields, including international relations, political and diplomatic history in Asia, American foreign policy and history, Japan-PRC relations and politics, security interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and U.S.-Asia regional engagement.

 

Japan Program Director, Takeo Hoshi (above, one of the Symposium leaders, launches the panel discussions

Japan Program Director, Takeo Hoshi (above, one of the Symposium leaders, launched the panel discussions by first expressing his gratitude to the participants and sponsors on behalf of the organizers and then by encouraging the audience to engage in the discussions following each panel.

At the Symposium, the participants explored the circumstances that shaped the establishment of the security architecture in East Asia; considered the forces that propelled its evolution; and debated possible futures for East Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific region.

A Wilsonian Dream

Ambassador Kenichiro Sasae , JIIA President, at podium

“Is the international order crumbling? Or, are the challenges it is undergoing a tentative deviation that can be fixed?” - Ambassador Kenichiro Sasae , JIIA President (pictured above).

The symposium’s first panel reviewed the evolution of diplomatic and security arrangements in East Asia, starting with the Versailles-Washington System, the international settlement inaugurated after World War I through the treaties signed in Paris in 1919-20 along with those signed in Washington in 1921-2. After World War II, the “San Francisco System,” the process of alliance formation and security cooperation that was initiated at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951, became the foundation of the U.S.-led regional order through the remainder of the twentieth century and continued to dominate international relations through the first two decades of the twenty-first.

Stanford historian David Kennedy explained that both systems are the products of Wilsonianism—a liberal internationalist ideology that has anchored the tradition of American diplomacy over the past century.  The spirit of “Wilsonianism” is reflected in President Woodrow Wilson’s proclamation that “the world must be made safe for democracy,” a statement that he delivered in remarks presented in 1917 as he appeared before a joint session of Congress to ask for a declaration of war against Germany. The global cataclysm of World War II, said Kennedy, afforded the United States the capacity to shape the political will that would make the Wilsonian dream of an international order possible. This pivotal point in American history is referred to as a “Grotian moment” (named after Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius), a time when “new rules and doctrines emerged in rapid succession and with greater acceptance than previously possible.”

China figured prominently in both the Versailles-Washington System and the San Francisco System. Shin Kawashima of the University of Tokyo spoke about the Nine-Power Treaty, part of the 1922 Washington Conference, that affirmed China’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Hsiao-ting Lin of the Hoover Institution stated that the treaty marked an internationalization of the U.S. open door policy regarding China, but that many in China viewed it and the broader framework of the Versailles-Washington System as Western imperialism.

In the aftermath of World War II, and particularly following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States became increasingly involved in East Asia. The signing of the peace treaty with Japan at the San Francisco Conference marked the beginning of the U.S. network of bilateral alliances, agreements, partnerships, and commitments in the region. The San Francisco System (also known as “hub and spokes” architecture) allowed the United States to develop exclusive relationships with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan (the Republic of China), and other Asian nations in the face of Communist forces.  As Dr. Lin noted in his remarks, the U.S. regional security agreements and security cooperation arrangements also enabled the Republic of China (Taiwan) to gain independence and international recognition.

The Return of the Quad

In his keynote address, Shorenstein APARC Fellow Michael Armacost , who previously served as U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines, spoke of the promise that the possible resurgence of the “Quad” might bring to increasing the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The “Quad” is an informal grouping of maritime democracies that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The four countries collectively provided relief following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and met for a summit in 2007 only to dissolve a year later, due to Australia’s abrupt departure after the PRC expressed displeasure about the partnership.

But much has changed in the ensuing decade, Armacost observed, with the argument in favor of the Quad now more compelling than ever. Armacost said that in bringing together the four democracies with their naval capabilities and convergence around norms of freedom of navigation, maritime law, international security, and nuclear cooperation, there could be a path forward towards more comprehensive cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region at a time of increased geopolitical uncertainty and as a counterpoint to China’s aggressive expansion throughout this region. Armacost also wondered, however, if Japan was in fact ready to take a greater leadership role, and who could sustain leadership beyond Prime Minister Abe’s time in office.

 

Ken Jimbo, Keio University, speaks to audience

Ken Jimbo, Keio University

Alliances and Anchor Lines

The afternoon sessions shifted focus to current Japanese, American, and Chinese interests and security concerns. APARC’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow David M. Lampton discussed the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, noting that the deterioration of the security relationship between the two countries is metastasizing into the economic, educational, and diplomatic spheres. Alliance management is bound to become increasingly important to the United States, he concluded, should the tension with the PRC intensifies further.

Tetsuo Kotani of JIIA described some ambivialence in Japan regarding the recently revised U.S. policies towards China.  On the one hand, Japan welcomes America’s tougher approach to the People’s Republic of China; on the other hand, it is not pleased by the trade war between the two countries. Even while Japan recognizes that China is challenging the established international order, argued Kotani, it was still necessary for Japan to maintain engagement with its neighbor. He expressed his hope that the United States and Japan could reconcile their expectations of the PRC in East Asia and collaborate with other nations to strengthen regional stability.

James Schoff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that United States had ample opportunity to address some of the more negative elements related to China’s rise, but that it chose instead to prioritize other issues and benefit from China’s economic growth. The United States ought to strengthen its alliances with Asian nations, said Schoff.  Comparing alliance management to an anchor and chain, the U.S. national policies, he claimed, should be crafted and deployed in a manner that best fits the issue – i.e., an anchor and chain of different lengths for different areas.  For instance, longer alliance anchor lines should be extended in the spheres of economy and diplomacy, while shorter lines are set in the areas of security and the intersection of economy, new technologies, and warfare.

 

Tom Christensen, Columbia University, speaks on panel

Tom Christensen, Columbia University

Possible Futures

The Symposium concluded with an examination of alternative East Asia and Indo-Pacific security systems. Ryo Sahashi of the University of Tokyo presented four models that could replace the current arrangement: an enhancement of the San Francisco System, with U.S. continued commitment to the region, but with Japanese and Australian increased security roles; a “group of hedging nations,” where the U.S.-based architecture was not dissolved but lesser powers operated with greater autonomy; an “emerging Japan-China rivalry,” where, following U.S. retrenchment, Japan was to defend its vital interests through defense; and “Sinicization and resistance,” where a U.S. retrenchment coupled with Japan’s backing down resulted in China’s leadership prevailing in its illiberal order-building.

The panelists agreed that China’s regional economic dominance for the foreseeable future was undeniable. However, they noted that the implications of its continued influence were up for debate. Ambassador Sasae conveyed his hope that the region might yet see positive outcomes, while other panelists expressed their concern that the present trend of turbulence and threats to multilateralism would likely continue.

U.S.A.S.I. Director Karl Eikenberry provided closing remarks, taking time not only to underscore the significance of the current situation in Indo-Pacific security, but to reflect as well on the value of events like the Symposium to increase understanding of the region's possible futures.

"Whether or not we’re at the Grotian moment [i.e., a point of transformatio in wrold relations]," Ambassador Eikenbery said, "we do know there’s been some very significant changes over the last several decades—especially regarding the distribution of power in the Indo-Pacific and throughout the world. We are seeing a steady erosion of values and norms that we took for granted…”

“It is not clear if the San Francisco System will endure. I think it’s incumbent upon us to bring people like [the Symposium panelists] together…and consider possible alternatives.”

A complete symposium report will be made available in the coming months.

 

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“But as I read what the communist party, what President Xi says, I don't see the same fervor to the ideological dimension of what China is doing around the world...[compared to what] the Soviets were doing.”

It was during the 2019 Oksenberg Conference that FSI Director Michael McFaul made the preceding assessment. Titled On the Brink: A New Cold War with China, the conference sought to explore the causes underlying today’s intensified conflict between the United States and China. McFaul was joined on stage by APARC's Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow David M. Lampton and China Program Director Jean Oi. Their panel followed an earlier fireside chat featuring keynote speaker Dr. Condoleezza Rice.

Rice, the 66th U.S. Secretary of State, opened the program with a wide-ranging conversation with Oi regarding our rapidly deteriorating trade relations with China. Among other topics, Secretary Rice drew contrasts between our current tensions with China and the Soviet-era Cold War; the potential sources of China’s increasing nationalism; and what the appropriate U.S. policy responses could be.

Condoleezza Rice (right) listens on as Jean Oi addresses the audience

Dr. Jean Oi (left) and Dr. Condoleezza Rice

Audio recordings and transcripts of the formal remarks by McFaul and Lampton are available below.

The annual Oksenberg Conference honors the legacy of Professor Michel Oksenberg. A renowned China scholar and senior fellow at Shorenstein APARC, Professor Oksenberg served as a key member of President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council, guiding the United States towards normalized relations with China and consistently urging that the U.S. engage with Asia in a more considered manner.

 

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Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow David M. Lampton (right) responds to an audience question, as China Program Director Jean Oi (left) and FSI Director Mike McFaul listen on.
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"For years, Stanford scientists have collaborated with and received funding from the Saudi national laboratory, government-supported universities and the state-owned oil company Aramco. But despite having ties with Saudi Arabia much like MIT’s — including with several of the government institutions probed in the MIT report — Stanford has undertaken no broad review of its connections to Saudi Arabia. As a result, Stanford’s Saudi relationships have continued largely under the radar. Some at Stanford find these relationships uncontroversial or point to their scientific and cultural benefits. Others approach them with more wariness or believe the University should engage more thoughtfully with the country." Our Lisa Blades and Hesham Sallam contributed to this Stanford Daily's article. Read here.

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Fighting to End Hunger at Home & Abroad:  Ambassador Ertharin Cousin shares her journey & lessons learned

A Conversation in Global Health with Ertharin Cousin

FSI Payne Distinguished Lecturer | Former Executive Director of the World Food Programme | TIME's 100 Most Influential People

RSVP for conversation & lunch: www.tinyurl.com/CIGHErtharinCousin (please arrive at 11:45 am for lunch)

Professor Ertharin Cousin has been fighting to end global hunger for decades. As executive director of the World Food Programme from 2012 until 2017, she led the world’s largest humanitarian organization with 14,000 staff serving 80 million vulnerable people across 75 countries. As the US ambassador to the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture, she served as the US representative for all food, agriculture, and nutrition related issues.

Prior to her global work, Cousin lead the domestic fight to end hunger. As chief operating officer at America’s Second Harvest (now Feeding America), she oversaw operations for a confederation of 200 food banks across America that served more than 50,000,000 meals per year.

Stanford School of Medicine Senior Communications Strategist Paul Costello will interview Professor Cousin about her experiences, unique pathway, and the way forward for ending the global hunger crisis.

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Li Ka Shing Room 320 

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