The Modern European History Lecture Series presents “Everyday Empire: Habsburg Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century” a talk by Pieter M. Judson, the Isaac H. Clothier Professor of History and International Relations at Swarthmore College.

Sponsored by the Department of History, the Europe Center and Introduction to the Humanities

The Stuxnet computer worm is perhaps the most complicated piece of malicious software ever built - roughly 50 times the size of the typical computer virus. This threat leveraged a huge array of new techniques to spread itself, conceal itself and to attack Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. This talk will provide a detailed dissection of the Stuxnet worm, answering such questions as how it spread, how it evaded detection, what it did once it found its target, and ultimately, how successful it was.

About the speaker: Carey Nachenberg is a Fellow and Chief Architect at Symantec corporation, the world's largest computer security provider. As Chief Architect, Mr. Nachenberg drives the technical strategy for all of Symantec’s core security technologies and security content, which in total protect hundreds of millions of customers around the world. During his time at Symantec, Mr. Nachenberg has led the design and development of Symantec’s core antivirus, intrusion prevention and reputation-based security technologies; his work in these areas have garnered over fifty United States patents.

He holds BS and MS degrees in Computer Science and Engineering from University of California at Los Angeles, where he continues to serve as an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Computer Science and a member of UCLA’s Computer Science Alumni Advisory Board.

There are currently 60 nuclear reactors under construction worldwide with nearly half of these projects being built in China. There is no doubt that East Asia is emerging as a leader in the international nuclear community where China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are playing major roles as a result of their aggressive new plant build programs. Both China and South Korea present very interesting case studies where the former is rapidly building up domestic expertise in nuclear construction while the latter has gone one step further in capitalizing successfully on a nuclear export business. Both countries have relied heavily on external commercial support in building up this expertise. In the case of South Korea, the “Koreanization” of nuclear power took place in the 1980’s and 1990’s, first with a large number of Western builds and ultimately a complete indigenization of pressurized water reactor technology through a technology transfer with Combustion Engineering. The Chinese domestic nuclear program has been largely influenced by Western vendors as well; however, there has been significantly less emphasis on exporting the technology up to now as they master the imported technologies for their domestic program. The recent AP1000 technology transfer between Westinghouse Electric Company and China has opened up unique transnational learning opportunities between the United States and China where the lessons learned building the first AP1000 plants in China will be shared with the two U.S. utilities now embarking on new plant construction at the Vogtle and V.C. Summer sites, in Georgia and South Carolina, respectively. This talk will review both the historical experiences of exporting nuclear technology to the ROK and China, as well as the progress being made by these countries in absorbing the technology. Further, the AP1000 passive plant technology will be summarized as an example of the general trend for future designs in response to the reactor accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi in March 2011. Finally, the advanced construction techniques being used to build AP1000 plants in both the U.S. and China will be highlighted along with their benefits in delivering new plants on schedule.

About the speaker: Dr Matzie is the former Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer for Westinghouse Electric Company and was responsible for all Westinghouse research and development undertakings and advanced nuclear plant development. He is also on the Board of PBMR Pty Ltd. and Chairman of the Board Technical Committee. In that role, he assures proper oversight of the design, safety, licensing, research and development, and quality aspects of the PBMR enterprise.

Previously, Dr Matzie was responsible for the development, licensing, detailed engineering, project management, and component manufacturing of new Westinghouse light water reactors and was also the Executive in charge of Westinghouse replacement steam generator projects and dry spent-fuel-canister fabrication projects. He became a Senior Vice President in 2000, when Westinghouse purchased the nuclear businesses of ABB. His career has been devoted primarily to the development of advanced nuclear systems and advanced fuel cycles, and he is the author of more than 120 technical papers and reports on these subjects.

The collision between the Iridium 33 and the Cosmos 2251 shows space debris is becoming a significant threat to satellites. Concerns of the threat led to the IADC space debris mitigation guidelines. However, there is no way to compel or enforce compliance with the guidelines, and since implementing some guidelines can be expensive, they are
frequently not followed. Moreover, the current legal framework is unable to determine who is liable for losses in an on-orbital collision. A space surveillance data sharing committee is proposed to solve the liability problem. Under the proposed liability rules, satellite operators would be liable for the debris they created. Insurance companies will step in to cover such risk. Therefore, there would be a financial incentive for them to adopt the debris mitigation
guidelines.

About the speaker: Ting Wang is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. His research concerns on space debris problems, and ASAT weapons. Before coming to CISAC in 2011, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. He received a PhD at the Beihang University in China. His PhD dissertation was titled "Orbital Debris Evolution and Threat to Spacecraft."

He also holds a B.A. in aerospace engineering from Beihang University and has worked at the Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering. He was a visiting scholar at the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2003, where he began to be interested in security issues.

The book The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History by Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas is scheduled to be published on May 14, 2012 by Harvard University Press. This book describes and analyzes in detail the Soviet biological warfare (BW) program, from its inception in 1928 to likely termination in 1992. The two most vexing questions that the authors attempt to answer are; in the final analysis, what were the Soviet BW program’s accomplishments? Second, might Soviet accomplishments related to enhancing biological weaponry be made available to future national or terrorist BW programs? This presentation will explain why these questions are difficult to answer but nevertheless will propose answers to them. The authors have a basis for doing so because they have been able to collect and analyze information from primary resources in archives and special collections, as well as in the course of hundreds of hours spent on interviewing scientists who operated the Soviet BW program. During his presentation, Zilinskas will discuss tentative findings that encompass subjects such as whether the application of genetic engineering, which resulted in among other accomplishments the development of multiantibiotic resistant Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, and Yersinia pestis, actually resulted in improved weaponry and whether genetically engineered strains remain in Russian cell culture collections and from there might escape or be made available to those who seek to acquire biological weapons.

About the speaker: Raymond A. Zilinskas, formerly a clinical microbiologist, is the director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the editor of Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Lynne Rienner, 1999) and co-editor of the Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense (Wiley, 2005). He received a PhD from the University of Southern California and a BA in Biology from the University of Stockholm.

Diego García-Sayán was elected President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the 2010-11 and reelected for the term 2012-2013. He was the first Peruvian to be elected President of the Court. He has  served as a judge on the court since 2004. During his distinguished career, Judge García-Sayán has served as Minister of Justice of Perú, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Perú and as a member of the Peruvian Congress.  He founded the Andean Commission of Jurists and was the Chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.  Judge García-Sayán is a university professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and author of many publications on international law and human rights.

The Cost of Inaction (COI) is an approach to the economic evaluation of interventions that draws attention to the consequences of a failure to take an action. It is not the cost of doing nothing but the cost of not doing some particular thing and it highlights the negative impacts that result when an appropriate action is not taken.

While working as research coordinator at the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard School of Public Health, Nadejda Marques was responsible for researching and analyzing the cost of inaction of public programs and actions that help reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS on children in Angola from 2009 to 2011. Nadejda will present the results for Angola and contrast these with the results for Rwanda.

Currently, Nadejda Marques manages the Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy, Development and The Rule of Law at Stanford University.

The U.S.-North Korean “Leap Day” deal of February 29 was thrown into question by the North’s recent announcement of a satellite launch between April 12 and 16 to celebrate the centenary of Kim il Sung’s birth. As the opening of the launch window nears, an intense international brouunfolds with, amazingly, the US, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea on the same page, dead set against a launch; and an isolated North Korea defiantly planning to celebrate the centenary with a satellite launch on or by April 15. In this presentation, the three speakers will provide a brief background of the successes and failures of North Korea’s previous satellite launches (score: 0 for 3 by Western count, 2 for 2 by DPRK count) and what has been learned from these; an expected timeline of activities of the countdown; and a guide and comparison of the new Sohae Western launch complex to the older Tonghae Eastern launch complex.

About the speakers:

Lewis Franklin is a long-time CISAC Affiliate, joining CISAC in 1992 as a Visiting Scholar after retiring as a TRW vice president, and previously vice president and co-founder of ESL, a defense intelligence company. Upon retirement he was awarded the CIA's Gold Medal for career-long contributions to foreign weapons assessment and national technical means capabilities. At CISAC his work focused on technical intelligence related problems, including wmd proliferation, export controls, defense conversion, and especially conversion of retired ICBMs for low-cost space launches.

Nick Hansen is a CISAC Affiliate. He graduated with a BA in Geography from Syracuse University in 1964.  His career in national intelligence spans 43 years first as an Army imagery analyst, and then in industry with GTE-EDL, ESL/TRW, Tera Research as a cofounder Vice Pres. and then again at ESL (now TRW/Northrop-Grumman) as a Director. He has also served in an SES position at the Navy's NIOC-Suitland, MD, as an image technology expert associated with Pennsylvania State University.  He has been twice nominated for the NRO's Pioneer award for innovative imagery uses and techniques development and is an expert in foreign weapons systems and test ranges. 

Allison Puccioni is an expert in remotely-sensed imagery and geospatial intelligence at IHS Janes. She was honored for her innovative intelligence in response to Sept. 11, and has been recognized by the Department of Defense and international armed forces for her outstanding strategic and tactical analysis. 

About the topic: What could queueing theory, the science of customer flows and delays in service systems, possibly offer towards understanding and countering terrorism? In terror queue models, newly hatched terror plots correspond to newly arriving customers, the number of ongoing terror plots corresponds to the queue of customers waiting to receive service, undercover agents or informants correspond to service providers, customer service is initiated when a terror plot is detected, and service is completed when the plot is interdicted. Not all plots are interdicted; successful terror attacks correspond to customers who abandon the queue without receiving service! Building upon these ideas, we will focus our attention upon a simple observation: other things being equal, the number of ongoing terror plots increases with the duration of time from plot initiation until execution or interdiction (whichever comes first), yet no estimate of the probability distribution governing terror plot duration has appeared in the open literature. Starting with a review of US terrorism-related indictments, lower and upper bounds for the initiation date of 30 distinct Jihadi plots were identified in addition to the date of arrest or an attempted/actual terror act. Accounting for the censoring and truncation effects inherent with these data; the estimated mean duration equals 9 months, while 95% of all plots are estimated to fall between 1 and 25 months. These estimates suggest that in the United States, on average approximately three ongoing Jihadi terror plots have been active at any point in time since 9/11/2001.

About the Speaker: Edward H. Kaplan is the William N. and Marie A. Beach Professor of Management Sciences, Professor of Public Health, and Professor of Engineering at Yale University’s School of Management who is currently on sabbatical as Distinguished Visiting Professor at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business. The author of more than 125 research articles, Kaplan received both the Lanchester Prize and the Edelman Award, two top honors in the operations research field, among many other awards. An elected member of the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine of the US National Academies, Kaplan’s current research focuses on the application of operations research to problems in counterterrorism and homeland security.