Abstract: Space debris are leftovers from human activities in space. Earth orbit gets increasingly congested by a rising number of active spacecraft and debris, resulting in an increased risk of collision. Collisions with debris can destroy entire spacecraft, resulting in economic loss or worse. The additional debris increases the risk of further collision. There are several dilemmas: If we want to further our venture into space beyond what is possible today, a vastly increased number of rocket launches are necessary. That could negatively impact the debris environment and make further space endeavors more challenging. Proposed active debris removal methods could lessen that problem. However, such methods have dual-use implications, because a capability to remove large pieces of debris from orbit also implies a capability to remove active spacecraft. Hence, building up a debris removal capability could be seen as a threat to other nations' satellites. This talk will give an overview about origins of debris, projections of the future debris environment, and debris mitigation methods and their security implications. A special focus will be on a less invasive debris mitigation method based on ground-based lasers and research to assess its efficiency using long-term debris projections.

About the Speaker: Jan Stupl is an affiliate and a former postdoctoral fellow at CISAC.  He is currently a Research Scientist with SGT, a government contractor, and works in the Mission Design Division at NASA Ames Research Center (Mountain View, CA). In the Mission Design Division, Jan conducts research on novel methods for laser communication and space debris mitigation and supports concept development for space missions.

Before his current position, Jan was a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University until 2011, investigating technical and policy implications of high power lasers for missile defense and as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), as well as the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The research on laser ASATs focuses on damage mechanisms, the potential sources and countries of origin of laser ASATs and ways to curb their international proliferation. Before coming to CISAC, Jan was a Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany. His PhD dissertation was a physics-based analysis of future of High Energy Lasers and their application for missile defense and focused on the Airborne Laser missile defense system. This work was jointly supervised by the IFSH, the Institute of Laser and System Technologies at Hamburg University of Technology and the physics department of Hamburg University, where he earned his PhD in 2008. His interest in security policy and international politics was fuelled by an internship at the United Nations in New York in 2003.

Abstract: How easily and quickly can states rise in the military domain? Do industrial espionage and in particular cyber-espionage facilitate and accelerate this process? In other words, are there empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that other states can easily imitate U.S. advanced weapon systems and thus erode American military- technological superiority? Drawing from the literature in economic history, economics, management and sociology, we maintain that the dramatic increase in the complexity of military technology that has taken place over the past 150 years has led to a change in the system of production, which in turn has made the imitation and the replication of the performance of military technology more difficult - despite globalization and advances in communications. As a result, developing advanced weapon systems has become significantly more challenging. We test our theory on a set of crucial case studies addressing possible cofounders. The available evidence supports our account. Our findings reassure about the threat of cyber-espionage, the role of globalization in armaments production and rise of China for American military-technological superiority. 

About the Speaker: Dr. Andrea Gilli is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He holds a PhD in Social and Political Science from the European University Institute (EUI) in Fiesole, and in 2015 he was awarded the European Defence Agency and Egmont Institute’s bi-annual prize for the best dissertation on European defense, security and strategy. Andrea’s research focuses on change in military technology and its implications for international security. At CISAC, he is working on the consequences of the robotics revolutions for American military primacy. In the past, Andrea provided consulting services to both private and public organizations, and worked or was associated with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Preparatory Commission for the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the NATO Defense College, the Royal United Services Institute, the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies at the Columbia University in New York and the Center for Security Studies at Metropolitan University Prague. Andrea has published articles on suicide terrorism, the diffusion of drone warfare and defense policy more in general in Security Studies, The RUSI Journal, and Washington Post’s Monkey Cage, among others.

In Japan's increasingly complex security environment, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is indispensable not only to the security of Japan, but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.  The Honorable Satoshi Morimoto, former Defense Minister of Japan, will talk about Japan’s security policy and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Trump Administration.

This seminar will be moderated by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative

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This event is co-sponsored by the Japan Program, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and the Consulate-General of Japan, San Francisco

Abstract: Russia’s adaptation to the changing character of war has been an object of an ongoing discussion among security experts. Contemporary warfare is being profoundly altered by an increasingly wired world, disruptive technologies, the role of information and social interactions; it aims to impact the state’s entire capacity by exerting political, economic and cultural influence rather than by annihilating the adversary. As put by the Russian General Staff, the 21st century wars are not even declared and nonmilitary tools play an increasing role in achieving objectives of war. Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea, as well as a widespread use of disinformation, cyber attacks, electronic warfare, economic levers, and a spectrum of other means merging military, nonmilitary, asymmetrical and indirect approaches have supposedly manifested a new doctrinal and operational era in the Russian strategy, called ‘hybrid war,’ ‘new generation warfare,’ ‘non-linear war,’ or even ‘ambiguous war,’ among other terms. However, the assessments of Russian strategy lack conceptual clarity and have been accompanied by conflicting narratives, one portraying Russia as a master of strategy that has outmaneuvered the United States in key international security issues, the other claiming that strategic thinking is foreign to the current Russian authorities. This study identifies misconceptions about Russia’s contemporary military strategy, disentangles its theoretical foundations, and examines key patterns in the Russian adaptation to the challenges of modern-day and future conflict.

About the Speaker: Dr. Katarzyna Zysk is an associate professor at the Norwegian Defence University College – the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo, a position she has held since 2007. In the academic year 2016–2017, she is on a sabbatical leave and serves as a visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and subsequently as a visiting fellow at the University of Oxford. She is also a member of the Hoover Institution’s Arctic Security Initiative and was a research fellow (resident and non-resident) at the US Naval War College – Center for Naval Warfare Studies, where she also cooperated closely with the War Gaming Department. In 2016, she served as an acting dean of the Norwegian Defence University College. Dr. Zysk has an academic background in international relations and international history. Following her PhD thesis on NATO enlargement (2006), her research and publications have focused on various aspects of security and strategic studies, in particular on Russia’s security and defense policies, including military change and modernization of the Russian armed forces, strategic culture, political philosophy, Arctic geopolitics, as well as uses of seapower and maritime security. Currently, she is writing a book about Russia’s military strategy. 

Abstract: Since their conception in the 1950s, thorium reactors have been promoted as a promising technology for nuclear energy generation, though they have not yet been successfully commercialized. Proponents of thorium reactors argue that they are safer, produce less waste, and are proliferation-resistant, compared with uranium-fueled light water reactors used around the world today. The central question guiding this research concerns the final claim. Is the thorium fuel cycle inherently more resistant to nuclear weapons proliferation than the traditional uranium fuel cycle?

Advocates argue that the thorium fuel cycle is less vulnerable to proliferation of nuclear weapons technology because little or no plutonium is produced. Additionally, fissile U-233 is claimed to be “self-protected” by U-232, which is produced with U-233 and decays through Tl-208, emitting highly energetic gamma radiation. But the amount of U-232 generated depends on reactor operation. Furthermore, the U-232 content can be further decreased by conducting chemical separations at the back-end of the fuel cycle.

This presentation will discuss the proliferation risks of the thorium fuel cycle. The potential for generating large stockpiles of isotopically pure U-233 by conducting protactinium separations at the back end of the fuel cycle is examined as a new proliferation pathway that current IAEA safeguards may not be prepared to address.

About the Speaker: Eva C. Uribe is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC for the 2016-2017 academic year. Her research involves identifying proliferation pathways in the thorium fuel cycle and assessing the potential impact and implications of U-233 stockpile generation on the international nonproliferation regime. Eva received a Ph.D. in Chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley in 2016. Her dissertation research focused on structural analysis of organically-modified porous silica surfaces for the extraction of uranium from aqueous solutions using nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. In 2011 Eva received a B.S. from Yale University with a double major in Chemistry and Political Science. She served as a Next Generation Safeguards Initiative intern with the Nonproliferation Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2008 and 2009.

Abstract: While impressive strides have been made in detecting physical evidence of nuclear weapons production, there is no consensus on how international relationships combine to motivate or deter policymakers from seeking nuclear weapons. Rather than address a single variable, this study investigates how networks of interstate conflict, alliances, trade, and nuclear cooperation merge to increase or decrease the proliferation likelihood of individual states. Using multiplex networks to study the structure of international relations factors theorized to deter or incentivize nuclear proliferation and open-source data on military alliances, macroeconomic ties, armed conflicts, and nuclear cooperation agreements, we construct a multilayer network model in which states are nodes linked by proliferation-relevant variables. This work shows the first quantitative heterogenous analysis of external proliferation determinants using a network science formalism and opens a new avenue of study of the external proliferation motivators for each state within an international network. Preliminary findings suggest that specific external relations—particularly the existence of armed conflict and the signing of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements—largely explain the decision of states to proliferate or not.

About the Speaker: Bethany L. Goldblum is a member of the research faculty in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the Scientific Director of the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, a multi-institution initiative established by DOE’s NNSA to support the nation’s nonproliferation mission through cutting-edge research in nuclear security science in collaboration with the national laboratories. Goldblum founded and directs the Nuclear Policy Working Group, an interdisciplinary team of undergraduate and graduate students focused on developing policy solutions to strengthen global nuclear security. She has been involved with the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp nearly since its inception, and acted as director of the program since 2013. Goldblum received a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley in 2007.

ABSTRACT

This talk examines the ways through which successive Egyptian governments have utilized lawmaking to eliminate opponents and silence voices of dissent since the coup of 3 July 2013. Key examples include the adoption of a draconian protest law and anti-terrorism laws. Most recently, the legislature passed a bill that, subject to the president’s approval, is poised to significantly curtail the autonomy of civil society organizations. By restricting freedom of expression and association and clamping down on voices of dissent, these legal initiatives have helped upgrade the repressive bureaucratic tools at the disposal of the government.

SPEAKER BIO

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